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Abstract 
 
The use of electoral reforms as active instruments of democratisation has been common 
in many transitions to democracy. However, in Mexico, electoral laws and institutions 
played an unusually important role in ensuring a peaceful transition to democracy.  
The current study addresses the effects of the Electoral Reforms in the Transition to 
democracy in Mexico with special reference to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). It is 
primarily intended as a contribution to the field of electoral reforms and institutions in 
processes of political change. The main aim of the thesis is to assess whether electoral 
reform contributed to or acted to confirm the process of political transition in Mexico 
and to establish the extent to which the IFE’s role expanded beyond what was initially 
expected. The study focuses on the political circumstances between the late 1970s, and 
2000, when most of the relevant legislation was implemented and the bodies for the 
supervision of elections were created. The study employs “elite interviews” and a broad 
range of local sources including law, official documents, party literature and secondary 
source analysis.  
The study begins by examining the context of electoral reform in Mexico, giving a 
description of the Mexican authoritarian regime. Then, based on interviews as well as 
secondary sources, the Mexican transition is analysed in a comparative perspective and 
its peculiarities are highlighted. It concludes that the model of transition followed by 
Mexico is characterised by a slow and gradual change through five stages based on 
negotiations centred on electoral issues that avoided ruptures and promoted dialogue to 
achieve amongst the players consensus about the rules of the game. The study continues 
with an historical overview of the electoral reforms between 1946 and 1986 establishing 
the cosmetic nature of the early reforms and the democratising character of the 1977 
reform which, by introducing Proportional Representation in Congress, not only opened 
the party system but also established the ground for political change based on electoral 
issues. The study goes on to examine the creation of IFE in the 1989-90 reform and its 
further evolution through the 1990s culminating with its total independence from the 
government  in  1996.  This  is  evaluated  in  the  context  of  other  political  and  socio-
economic changes that had an impact on political groups and generated political forces. 
It examines the attitudes of the various parties towards the reform and the institution and  
ii 
their methods of negotiation have been analysed using “elite interviewing”, the analysis 
of party documents and media sources. The analysis concludes that despite the  IFE 
being  an  effect  of  a  critical  political  conflict  generated  by  the  controversial  1988 
elections  and  being  perceived  as  just  another  government  agency,  in  time,  it 
accumulated  functions  and  gained  additional  powers  and  prestige  that  allowed  it  to 
become  a  major  player  in  generating  consensus  among  political  parties  and  the 
government and in ensuring more transparent and fair elections, and thus increasing the 
competence of political parties.  
The final part of the study focuses on the three main areas of activity of IFE including I) 
the  management  of  the  electoral  system,  II)  the  development  of  formulas  for  the 
allocation of funds and the regulation of broadcasting time on radio and TV and III) the 
efforts made to improve participation rates, including political and civic education for 
adults and children.  
It uses official IFE documents and interviews with former and present members of IFE 
to  discuss  IFE’s  evolution  and  functioning,  and  the  members’  experiences  and 
expectations for the future in relation to the institution.  
It concludes that after being created, the IFE initially focused exclusively on solving 
electoral fraud. Once IFE had finished resolving problems related to the organisation of 
elections, it started focusing on other issues such as the regulation of party finances and 
media access, moving on from a focus on merely “free” elections to “fair” elections. 
The study shows that the issue of party finances and media access only became relevant 
once earlier issues related to the organisation of elections had been solved. In relation to 
the role of the electoral authority in this area, the research shows that IFE contributed to 
the national debate on party funding, media access, and monitoring.  
The  monitoring  of  party  expenditure  and  media  coverage  by  IFE  proved  to  be  an 
important element in reducing corruption and also contributed to the credibility of IFE.  
Finally the work of the IFE in the area of civic education is analysed. This study was 
unable to prove that IFE had been successful in creating a fully democratic political 
culture that could extend far beyond the electoral arena.  
In  conclusion,  it  can  be  seen  that  electoral  reform  both  contributed  to and  acted  to 
confirm the process of political transition and that the role of IFE developed beyond 
what was initially expected.  
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Preface 
The rapid increase in number of nominally “democratic” regimes throughout the world, 
often referred to as the “third wave
1” of democracy, has provoked a wide interest in the 
politics of transition. Latin America has provided numerous examples of the shift from 
military to civilian “democratic” systems but of note is the particular case of Mexico’s 
transition from an authoritarian regime with hegemonic party to a competitive multi-
party system, culminating in the election of Vicente Fox, the candidate of the opposition 
party, National Action Party (PAN), in July 2000. That election not only brought about 
the defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for the first time in 71 years but 
also a peaceful alternation in power at national level. Competitive, clean and credible 
elections proved to be the key to political change in Mexico.
2 Between 1977 and 1996 
there was a long and slow process of electoral reforms that became active elements of 
democratisation  and  essentially  brought  about  changes  in  the  electoral  and  party 
systems. Consequently, both the electoral rules and institutions played central roles in 
ensuring  peaceful  and  transparent  elections.  During  the  1990’s,  the  nature  of  the 
electoral institution and the rules of the game became the focus of debate between the 
Government and the opposition parties.  
The study of electoral institutions (e.g. electoral commissions or electoral tribunals) is 
not an issue that attracts attention to the wider academic community. There are very few 
texts published on electoral commissions, the small number that have been published 
have mainly been guides or governmental reports.
3 In most established democracies it is 
widely  assumed  that  the  very  existence  of  democracy  guarantees  that  elections  are 
properly organised and supervised and that the votes are counted fairly. Additionally, 
the majority of studies on transitions and democratisation processes have focused on 
wider issues such as political systems, party systems, and electoral systems, but there is 
little research on the area of electoral commissions.
4 This is the reason for including the 
                                                 
1 Huntington, S. The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1991. 
2 The result of the 2000 election changed the debate on the Mexican transition. On one side, those in favour of the 
electoral dimension of democracy perceived the shift in power as the confirmation of the end of the transition. On the 
other side, were those who perceived democracy beyond its electoral dimension. See Merino, M. La transición 
Votada: Crítica a la interpretación del cambio politico en México. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003, 
p.13. 
3 For example, official documents published by electoral commissions and centres of electoral studies on how to 
manage, supervise elections, etc 
4 There are many studies on transitions. One of the first significant attempts to provide a theory on the process of 
democratisation was done by Rustow, D. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, Comparative 
Politics, New York, April 1970, vol. 2, no. 3, pp.337-63. Dahl, R. Poliarchy: Participation and Opposition. New  
xiv 
topic of the role of the electoral commission in a transition to democracy, within my 
research.  
In the case of Mexico there is extensive literature on the study of the process of political 
change,  including  the  study  of  electoral  reforms;  however  there  are  relatively  few 
studies focusing specifically on the role of electoral institutions and their functions.
5  
This  study  seeks  to  address  an  issue  which  has  not  previously  been  investigated  in 
detail, the effects of the Electoral Reforms in the Transition to democracy in Mexico, 
with special reference to the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE). The research primarily 
seeks to explore whether electoral reform contributed to or acted to confirm the process 
of political transition in Mexico. Of particular  interest is the role of the  IFE in the 
transition, and whether its functions exceeded original expectations.  
Although established by negotiated legislation and, therefore, reflecting the negotiated 
interests of the parties involved, IFE became independent from its creators. The study 
seeks to find out how and why this happened.  
Did  the  former  official  party,  PRI  expect  the  electoral  institution  to  become  totally 
independent and impartial? Did the opposition party, PAN get more than it bargained 
for? What exactly was the role of IFE in the context of the transition? 
In assessing whether electoral reform was a cause or effect of the transition in Mexico, 
the  first  chapter  provides  a  description  of  the  Mexican  authoritarian  regime  and  its 
origins. A comparative analysis of the Mexican transition is introduced in relation to 
other cases which emphasises the distinct peculiarities of its transition and the role of 
electoral  reforms.  Following  this  introductory  chapter,  chapter  two  provides  an 
historical  overview  of  the  electoral  reforms  between  1946,  when  the  first  electoral 
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commission was created, and 1986, when the last electoral reform took place under the 
hegemonic party regime. This analysis is important in order to distinguish between the 
cosmetic electoral reforms carried out by the government-PRI that further consolidated 
the hegemony party system and the more democratic reforms of the 1970s. In a context 
of  political  opening,  these  reforms  paved  the  way  for  the  future  development  of 
democratic electoral institutions and rules. The analysis of these reforms is placed in the 
context of other political and constitutional changes such as union protests in the 1960s, 
the student movements in 1968 and the debt crisis in the early 1980s, which generated 
political mobilisations and new political forces. Chapter three examines the creation of 
the IFE in 1989-90. It focuses on the new set of political challenges, such as the split in 
the  governing  elite,  and  the  highly  contested  presidential  elections  in  1988,  which 
forced the new president, Salinas, to initiate a process of electoral reform. This section 
examines the reactions and attitudes of the various political parties towards electoral 
reform and their methods of negotiation with each other over legislation. The role of the 
PRI is crucial and an understanding of the motives for initiating the reform is vital. 
Chapter four continues with the analysis of the evolution of electoral legislation and the 
IFE through a series of electoral reforms until it became totally independent in 1996. 
These reforms are analysed not only in the context of federal and local elections during 
this period, but also in the context of other economic and political challenges, which had 
destabilising effects on the political system.  
Thereafter, the study moves from focusing on the study of the evolution of the IFE and 
electoral legislation to the study of its main functions. 
Chapter 5 is the first of three chapters that focus on the main areas of activity of the 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). It looks at the management of the electoral process, 
involving the creation of the electoral roll, the issue of photo credentials, the naming 
and training of the electoral process personnel and the administration of the counting 
process. Chapter 6 examines the control of the financing of political parties, including 
the development of formulas for the allocation of funds, and the regulation of private 
funding. Chapter 7 focuses on another area of activity of IFE, the regulation and control 
of access to the media by political parties and the regulation of broadcasting time on 
radio and TV. Finally, chapter eight addresses the role of the IFE in the area of Civic 
Education,  especially  in  its  efforts  to  increase  participation  rates  and  improve  civic 
education for adults and children.   
xvi 
This study seeks to make a contribution to the field of electoral reforms and electoral 
institutions.    Overall,  it  provides  an  indepth  analysis  of  how  professional  electoral 
commissions can play a major role in ensuring credible, transparent and fair elections; 
some of the key conditions for democracy. 
The  methodology  adopted  in  this  study  consists  of  semi-structured  interviews  with 
participants  in  the  1988-96  negotiations  between  political  parties  and  the  Mexican 
government that resulted in the adoption of a new electoral code and the creation of IFE 
in 1990. The purpose of those discussions was to examine the different expectations that 
each side had during the negotiations and their evaluation of subsequent developments 
in the context of those expectations. Semi-structured interviews with present and former 
members of the IFE were also carried out. The objective of those interviews was to 
discuss  the  functioning  of  IFE,  its  evolution  and  their  experiences  and  future 
expectations in relation to the institution. The study also includes an analysis of the 
documentation used including law and official documents, party literature, newspapers 
and periodicals and secondary sources.
6  
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1  Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
Prior to studying the role played by the Federal Electoral Institute in the transition to 
democracy in Mexico, it is necessary to give a description of the Mexican authoritarian 
regime and to analyse the distinguishing characteristics of its transition.   Such analysis 
is necessary in order to understand the input and the important part played by electoral 
rule and institutions in the achievement of electoral democracy in Mexico. This will 
provide the historical and political background for the study of the long and gradual 
process of electoral reforms that constituted the transition that will be discussed in later 
chapters.  
The  transition  to  democracy  in  Mexico  relates  to  the  change  from  an  authoritarian 
regime with hegemonic party to a regime with a plural and competitive party system. In 
studying  the  Mexican  transition  to  democracy  it  is  necessary  to  examine  the 
characteristics of its political regime as these particular features shaped the course and 
form of the transition that followed. The chapter will begin by explaining the Mexican 
political  system  that  emerged  after  the  Mexican  Revolution.  This  section  will 
concentrate  on  the  origin  of  the  so-called  “hegemonic  party  system”  and  its  main 
features and subsequent evolution. The following section will focus on the theoretical 
approaches to transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, in order to place the 
Mexican case within that literature. The final part of the chapter will provide an analysis 
of the distinct peculiarities of the Mexican transition and the role of electoral reform.  
 
1.1 The Mexican political regime 
The study of the process of political change in Mexico requires firstly an analysis of its 
political  regime.  In  order  to  give  a  typology  to  the  Mexican  political  regime  it  is 
necessary to examine its historical evolution, as the regime adopted different features 
depending on the period. For a fair definition of the regime it is important to identify 
which concept of democracy is being used to examine it. Among the various definitions 
of democracy, those that consider “competitive elections” as an essential condition for a 
regime  to  be  democratic  are  relevant  for  the  analysis  of  the  Mexican  regime.  For 
instance, Schumpeter’s minimalist definition of democracy perceives democracy as a 
method to determine the leadership through competitive elections in  which political Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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leaders compete for the people’s vote.
1 In the same way, Huntington also gives a limited 
definition of democracy stating that democracy exists when there are open, fair and free 
elections.
2  One of the best definitions of democracy is the one given by Robert A. Dahl 
in his work “Polyarchy”
3 which states that a democracy is characterised by a series of 
requisites including equal competence conditions among the political elites. This entails 
competency  and  alternation  in  power  of  plural  political  parties,  free,  competitive, 
transparent and periodic elections, and the effective guarantee of individual rights such 
as the right of association, free expression and the right to vote for all plus responsibility 
of the government before the Parliament, and juridical control of those who rule the 
country.
4  Dahl provided two institutional dimensions by which to measure the level of 
democracy  of  a  political  system:  “the  degree  of  public  contestation  and  degree  of 
participation”.
5  Thus,  in  Dahl’s  theory  of  democracy,  the  concept  of  “polyarchy” 
applies to regimes that are relatively democratic but not completely democratic.
6 With 
reference to these features of polyarchy or democracy, authoritarian regimes constitute 
the  partial  or  total  negation  of  such  characteristics.  Given  these  pre-requisites  of  a 
democracy, the Mexican post- revolutionary regime can be seen to lack several of them, 
in particular those referring to equal conditions for electoral competition and free and 
transparent elections.  The introduction, by Juan Linz in 1964, of a new type of non-
democratic regime denominated “authoritarian”, which lies between a totalitarian and 
a democratic regime, contributed to the definition of the Mexican post-revolutionary 
regime.
7 According to Linz an authoritarian regime “is a political system with limited, 
not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with 
distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at 
some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group 
                                                 
1 Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York; London: Henderson and Spalding, 1943, 
p.269.  
2 Huntington. The Third Wave, p.9. 
3 Dahl, R. Polyarchy, p.3. The seven requisites or conditions that according to Dahl increase the chances of public 
contestation and polyarchy. 
4 Ibid. p.3. 
5 Hagued, Harrop and Breslin note that these two institutional dimensions vary greatly from one to another. While 
“public contestation” shows the degree to which the regime allows public contestation or liberalisation, the “degree of 
participation” is the number of persons that are allowed to participate in the control and discussion of the politics of 
government. Hagued, R., Harrop, M & Breslin, S. Comparative Governing and Politics: An Introduction. London: 
Macmillan Press, 4
th ed., 1998, p.155. 
6 Dahl notes that “polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularised and liberalised, that are highly 
inclusive and extensively open to public contestation”.  Dahl, R. Polyarchy, p.8. 
7 Linz introduced this type of non democratic regime for the first time in his article “An Authoritarian Regime: 
Spain”. See Linz, Juan J. An authoritarian regime: the case of Spain. In: Allard, Erik & Littunen, Yrjo. (eds) 
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exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”
8 
Linz distinguishes between several types of authoritarian regimes: bureaucratic-military 
authoritarian regimes,  mobilisational authoritarian regimes in postdemocratic societies, 
mobilisational  authoritarian  regimes  in  Postdemocratic  societies,  postindependence 
mobilisational authoritarian regimes, racial and ethnic “democracies”, “defective” and 
“pretotalitarian”  political  situations  and  regimes  and  post-totalitarian  authoritarian 
regimes.
9 In these authoritarian regimes political pluralism is limited by juridical norms 
or restricted to small political groups where the leaders are more responsible to those 
groups  than  to  the  citizens.
10  Under  authoritarian  regimes  the  political  elite  tend  to 
demobilise and discourage politicisation as part of limited pluralism.
11 Under Linz’s 
typology  of  authoritarian  regimes  the  Mexican  regime,  which  emerged  after  the 
revolution,  adopted  the  features  of  a  organic  Statism  or  corporatist  authoritarian 
regime.
12 However, the Mexican political regime of the post-revolutionary period was 
categorised  differently  depending  on  the  variable  that  was  used  to  classify  it.  For 
instance,  Roderic  Ai  Camp  defined  the  Mexican  regime  as  semiauthoritarian,  state 
dominated  and  corporatist,  led  by  a  bureaucratic  elite  and  a  centralised  executive.
13 
According to O’Donnell’s classification of authoritarian regimes, the Mexican regime 
was similar to a bureaucratic authoritarian regime although it differed from others in its 
high  degree  of  institutionalisation,  its  civil  character  and  its  popular  support.
14  The 
regime  has  also  been  described  as  an  authoritarian  corporatist  regime
15  and  been 
denominated  as  an  authoritarian  regime  which  was  strongly  institutionalised  with 
inclusiveness and participation.
16 John Bailey, considered that “the Mexican political 
system is  one of a centralised, statist, inclusive system with corporatist features, which 
it can manipulate to varying degrees.”
17 However other authors such as Daniel C Levy 
                                                 
8 Linz, Juan J. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes: With a Major New Introduction. Colorado & United 
Kingdom: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc 2000, p.159. 
9 Ibid, pp.184-261. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The Mexican regime adopted these features in the 1930s under the presidency of Lázaro Cardenas.  
13 Ai Camp, Roderic. Politics in Mexico. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, 1996, p.18. 
14 O’Donnell, G. Introduction to the Latin American Cases. In Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, 
edited by O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P & Whitehead, L. 4rd ed. Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1993, p.5. 
15 Reyna defines corporatism as the “nuclearisation of political groups in society through a complex network of 
political organisations connecting those groups to the decision-making process”. Reyna, Jose L. Redefining the 
Authoritarian Regime. In: Reyna, Jose L. & Weiners, Richard S. (eds). Authoritarianism in Mexico. Philadelphia: 
Institute for the study of Human issues, 1977, p.156. 
16 Huntington, S. Political Order in Changing Societies. Virginia: Yale University, 1996, pp.315-324. 
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and Kathleen Bruhn argued that the type of authoritarian regime in Mexico had a lot of 
the  institutionalisation,  forms,  pacts  and  legitimacy  which  are  characteristics  of  a 
democratic  regime.
18  However,  for  these  authors  the  Mexican  regime  could  not  be 
considered a democracy but a “semidemocracy” for three reasons: a) It lacked important 
competence between political groups, b) The elections were not fair and clean; c) The 
civil and political liberties were insufficient to guarantee the integrity of competition 
and  participation.
19  However  among  the  various  typologies  of  the  Mexican  political 
regime, Santori’s term of “regime of hegemonic party” seems to be the most appropriate 
for  Mexico.
20  Such  classification  is  also  relevant  in  understanding  the  process  of 
transition. This authors’ classification of political regimes was based on the number of 
parties suitable for the Mexican case because the transition focused on changes in the 
party  and  electoral  system.  The  term  “hegemonic  party”  given  by  Giovani  Sartori 
identified a type of party system without real electoral life that did not correspond to the 
one party system of the soviet block. These types of regimes were characterised by the 
existence  of  various  parties  that  were  permitted  although  there  was  one  party  that 
counted  more  than  the  others.
21  Sartori  notes  that  this  system  is  structured  in  two 
categories:  in  the  first  division  a  hegemonic  party  as  a  privileged  party  and  in  the 
second,  the  rest  of  the  spectators.
22  This  author  classified  the  Mexican  system  as 
“pragmatic  predominant”  because  the  parties  were  not  prohibited  as  in  a  one  party 
system, but in practice, only the party in power had the opportunity of winning the 
elections.
23 In this sense, the post revolutionary regime that lasted until the late 1980s in 
Mexico was a regime of hegemonic party which turned, during the 1990s, into a regime 
of a predominant party or predominant party system. Following electoral reforms in the 
late  1980s  and  early  1990s  and  while  the  regime  was  experiencing  a  process  of 
decomposing into a more competitive system Diamond, Linz and Lipset reclassified it 
                                                 
18 Levi, DC & Bruhn, K. Mexico sustained civilian rule without democracy. In: Politics in Developing Countries: 
comparing experiences with democracy, edited by Diamond, L; Linz, Juan L. & Lypset, MS. 2
nd edition. Boulder 
CO; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p.172. 
19 Ibid, p.173 
20Sartori, G. Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis. vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976.  
21 Ibid. p.230. 
22 Sartori, G. Parties and party systems, p.230. 
23 Sartori defined the political system known as “pragmatic hegemonic party” as a party that “neither allows for a 
formal nor “a de facto” competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed 
parties; for they are not permitted to compete with the hegemonic party in antagonistic terms and on an equal 
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as a “semidemocracy” or “pseudodemocracy”.
24 Overall, it can be said that the Mexican 
political system was a civil authoritarian and inclusive
25 regime with a hegemonic party, 
the  PRI  (Partido  Revolucionario  Institucional)  that  eventually  became  more 
predominant than hegemonic. In a comparative perspective, the Mexican authoritarian 
regime’s inclusiveness and civil character differentiated it from other Latin American 
dictatorships that used repression to discourage, stop or contain the popular sector rather 
than seek their inclusion.
26 With reference to the inclusive nature, Meyer comments “as 
long as they accepted the rules of the game all of them could get in there, so there was 
no discrimination to the left, Catholics, atheists, only the extremists or the undisciplined 
stayed outside”.
27 Other political analysts such as Carlos Fuentes, claim that it was the 
revolutionary origin that gave legitimacy to the successive revolutionary regimes that 
followed after the 1917 Constitution, as the government provided education, health, 
infrastructure and stability in exchange for democracy.
28 The PRI became the official 
party  and  along  with  the  presidential  figure  formed  the  two  pillars  of  the  political 
system.
29  Under the binomial Presidency- PRI, all political activity was concentrated 
within the official party’s elite. In addition to its inclusiveness, the regime was also 
characterised  by  stable  civilian  rule,  revolutionary  heritage  of  the  hegemonic  party 
(PRI) and cooptation of groups and sectors with political and social demands, which 
contributed to the delay and gradual nature of the transition from a hegemonic party 
system to  a competitive party system.   However, above all, it was the  existence of 
regular elections and the feature of having “non-competitive elections” one of the main 
facets that contributed to the consolidation and more importantly, the legitimisation of 
the hegemonic regime, as the organisation and supervision of the elections were part of 
the mechanism of control upon which the regime’s authoritarianism was based.  
 
                                                 
24 Diamond, L., Linz, J and Lipset, MS. Politics in Developing Countries: comparing experiences with democracy, 
edited by Diamond, L; Linz, Juan L. & Lypset, MS. 2
nd edition. Boulder CO; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1995, p.8. Diamond, L. Developing Democracy: toward consolidation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999, p.15-16. 
25 It was inclusive in the sense that the governing coalition PRI incorporated the masses through the corporatist 
sectors and maintained a network of alliances with others sector such as the catholic church and the business class.  
26 Woldenberg, J. Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. 
Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
27 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Meyer, L. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico City: 
Noticieros Televisa, 2004.  
28 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Fuentes, C. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico City: 
Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
29 For a more detailed analysis of the Mexican presidency and official party see Cosío Villejas, D. El Sistema Político 
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1.1.1  Origin of the Mexican Authoritarian regime of hegemonic party: the first 
stage 
The origin of the Mexican hegemonic party system was in the creation of the PNR (The 
National  Revolutionary  Party)  in  1929  by  the  president  Plutarco  Elias  Calles.  It  is 
important to note that after its creation the post-revolutionary regime evolved in four 
stages that adopted different features.  Initially, the revolutionary party emerged as a 
project from the executive to form a coalition made up of the different factions that had 
participated in the revolution rather than being a political party. In particular, Calles’ 
objective  was  to  unite  the  divergent  revolutionary  elites,  reconcile  personality 
differences among them and institutionalise co-operation among the various factions of 
the  Revolutionary  family.
30  In  this  way,  he  forced  the  resolution  of  disagreements 
amongst  the  revolutionaries  through  a  civil  organisation.  Huntington  notes  that 
Cardenas’ extension of the Mexican revolution by the party showed, instead of evolving 
towards military dictatorship as had occurred in other countries, the Mexican revolution 
advanced from pure military dictatorship to pure party rule.
31 From its creation, the 
PNR  promised  to  endorse  the  principles  of  the  Mexican  Revolution,  which  gave  it 
legitimacy and contributed to its consolidation. Consequently, the party emerged from 
the revolution and gained automatic legitimacy and support from the majority of the 
Mexicans who had struggled during Porfirio’s dictatorship, especially as the Mexican 
Revolution had been a reaction to the inequalities and lack of opportunities of Porfirio’s 
dictatorship.
32 Despite the revolution taking place at that particular time, this was not a 
movement  ideologically  homogeneous  and  coherent,  it  was  pursued  by  different 
revolutionary  groups  whose  objectives  and  demands  differed  during  the  process.  In 
addition, many historians observed that the revolution was not a civil war between north 
and south, but a struggle between the elite and the mass. Roderic Ai Camp notes that 
despite the disagreements amongst historians on the causes of the revolution and its 
impact, understanding the ideology of the revolution and the political structures that 
emerged afterwards is essential to understanding its political evolution.
33 Initially the 
revolution was focused on ending the dictatorship of Porfirio who prolonged his regime 
                                                 
30 The party of the revolution acquired various names in different stages such as National Revolutionary Party (PNR), 
Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM) and Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). 
31Huntington, S. Political order in Changing Societies, pp.313-314. 
32 Despite Porfirio’s regime having managed to achieve peace in the country after decades of civil war and building 
some economic infrastructure in Mexico, he failed to fulfil social needs and punished certain groups which reinforced 
the social inequalities that had existed. Ai Camp, R. Politics in Mexico. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996, pp.40-41.   
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for 34 years after failing to comply with the principle of “no re-election”.
34 Therefore, 
the first main demand of the revolution was “democracy” which was expressed in the 
famous phrase by  Francisco Madero “effective suffrage not re-election.”
35 However, 
once  Madero  came  to  power,  he  was  unable  to  stop  the  division  between  the 
revolutionary groups and control the army. Eventually, there was a counterrevolutionary 
coup against him and he was put in jail and later assassinated.
36  In parallel to Madero’s 
government, other demands emerged from new revolutionary factions led by popular 
figures such as Villa and Zapata who focused more on land reform and social justice.  
Another  faction  known  as  “the  Constitutionalists”  that  was  led  by  Carranza  and 
Obregon demanded labour rights. However, according to Ronald H. McMadonald the 
leaders  of  the  revolution  were  mainly  outlaws,  army  bosses,  regional  leaders  and 
opportunists whose main purpose was to beat the opposition and establish their own 
power.
37 The revolution ended with the approval of a new Constitution signed in 1917, 
which synthesised the demands of the different revolutionary groups.
38 For instance, for 
the peasants the land reform, for the workers, labour rights, for the citizens individual’s 
rights, and for the business sector economic liberties under the state sponsorship while 
limiting the presence of foreign trade in the economic life of the country.
39 Therefore, 
the 1917 Constitution represented the consensus of the different revolutionary factions. 
Huntington notes that a successful revolution requires the creation of a political system, 
but in Mexico, the revolution created first rule by the successful generals which proved 
to be unviable and then a revolutionary party that provided the solution.
40 Calles started 
                                                 
34 Ironically in the past Porfirio Diaz had fiercely campaigned for the principle of no re-election, first against Juarez 
in the presidential elections in 1871 and later in 1876 blaming Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada for violating the principle of 
no re-election.  See  Cosío Villegas, D. Porfirio Díaz en la revuelta de la noria. Mexico City: Hermes, 1953; Beals, 
Carleton. Porfirio Díaz, dictador of Mexico. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1932. 
35 Madero prepared and issued “Plan of San Luis Potosi” which called for effective suffrage, no re-election, the 
proposal for agrarian reform and a call for revolt against Porfirio Diaz that initiatied the revolution. See  “San Luis 
Plan”, Proposal by Francisco Madero,  October 5,  1910 
36 For a more detailed description of the role of Madero see Padgett, LV. The Mexican Political System. Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1976, pp.24-26. 
37 Mc Donald,  RH. Party Systems and Elections in Latin America. Chicago: Siracuse University, Markham 
Publishing company, 1971, p.236 
38 The Constitution of 1917 was a juridical code that denoted the structural tension of the regime: the difficult 
conciliation of liberal-democratic principles and the principles of social justice. The latter was essential for the regime 
to elaborate its populist, paternalist, corporatist and clientelar politics. 
39 To see the completed content of the constitutional text see “El consenso de Querétaro, Constitución de 1917”. 
Chambers of Deputies. Congress of the Union. Secretaría General. Secretaría de Servicios Parlamentarios. Centro de 
Documentación, Información y Análisis. Mexico. 
40 Huntington notes that in general revolutions led to: “a) the restoration of traditional structures of authority, b) 
military dictatorship and the rule of force or c) the creation of new authorities reflecting the fundamental changes in 
the amount and distribution of power in the political system produced by the revolution.”  Huntington, S. Political 
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a new political system that would shape the rest of the century.
41 Therefore the creation 
of  the  PNR  (old  PRI)  not  only  managed  to  stop  the  internal  struggle  between  the 
revolutionary elite and the caudillos
42 but also united them through pacific mechanisms 
for  the  distribution  of  power.
43  However,  at  this  stage  the  regime  was  just  a 
“reconciliation space” for the coalition elite with Calles as the head of the revolution.
44 
Padgett  notes  that  Calles’  decision  to  form  the  Revolutionary  party  made  possible 
peaceful  political  change  in  a  traditionally  violent  country.
45  This  stage  called 
“Maximato”
46  lasted  until  1935,  when  Calles  who  was  know  as  Jefe  Maximo  was 
thrown out of the country and replaced by president Lázaro Cárdenas, who succeeded in 
imposing his authority over the revolutionary coalition. Meyer notes that the creation of 
the revolutionary-official party PNR and its successors was created not to win elections 
but to maintain a “permanent campaign of propaganda” in favour of the revolutionary 
leaders and to ensure discipline amongst them.
47 The key elements of the PRI state were 
set up during this time and included a six-year presidential term, with no re-election, 
rather a presidential succession determined by the party elite in an obscure ritual known 
as “dedazo” (heavy thumb), then legitimised in a totally controlled election.
48 Cardenas 
replaced  the  original  PNR  (National  Revolutionary  Party)  with  the  PRM  (Mexican 
Revolutionary Party) in 1938. With Cardenas as president, the regime acquired the main 
features  that  would  distinguish  the  Mexican  political  regime  that  lasted  for  seventy 
years. The regime was characterised by a high concentration of power in the presidency. 
Rabasa notes that the centralisation of power in the figure of the president and in the 
official  party  resulted  from  the  specific  interpretation  that  the  presidents  Calles  and 
Cardenas  had  made  of  the  Constitution  of  1917  during  their  presidencies.
49 
                                                 
41 Silva-Herzog Márquez, J. El Antiguo Régimen y la Transición en México, p.23. For a detailed account of the role 
of Calles in this period see “Calles: a controversial figure” in Padgett, L Vincent. The Mexican political system, 2
nd 
ed. San Diego: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976, pp.32-37. 
42 Regional bosses also known as “caciques” were in control of specific regions, states or municipalities. 
43 According to Cosio Villegas the PNR had three important functions, which were to contain the split of the 
revolutionary group, to install a civilised system and settle electoral contests and provide a coherent national meaning 
to the administrative-political action in the pursuit of the goals of the Mexican Revolution”. Cosio Villejas, D. The 
Mexican Political System: the possibilities of change. Texas: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1972, p.28. 
44 The early regime was an attempt by President Calles to provide political, economic and social stability for the 
country which was unstable after the revolution. 
45 Padgett, L Vincent. The Mexican political system, p.75. 
46 Calles became the “main leader” in the immediate post-revolutionary period although there were three interim 
presidents who were considered to be puppets that were controlled by him. Weinberg, B.  Homage to Chiapas. 
London & New York: Verso, 2000, p.57. 
47 Meyer, L. Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico. In: Authoritarianism in Mexico, vol. 2. edited by 
Reyna, JL & Weinert, R. Philadelphia : Institute for the Study of Human Issues, c1977. 
48 Ibid.  
49 It is important to note that the Mexican Constitution of 1917 included many features of two previous constitutions 
(1824 and 1857), whose liberal character was incompatible with an undeveloped rural society. The result of such a Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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Consequently, the president became the centre of all political and institutional life and 
enjoyed  constitutional  and  extra  constitutional  privileges  that  contributed  to  the 
consolidation of the regime. In addition to the presidential power, the regime was based 
on  the  predominance  of  the  revolutionary  party  over  the  others  which,  following 
Santori’s term developed into a system of hegemonic party. Another important feature 
of the regime was an electoral system controlled by the government. In addition to the 
institutional  characteristic,  the  concentration  of  power  in  the  presidency,  allowed 
Cardenas  to  pursue  changes  that  re-defined  the  political  regime.  First  of  all,  under 
Cardenas the regime became inclusive. Cardenas reorganised the party on corporatist 
sectors  through  the  incorporation  of  four  corporatist  areas  into  the  structure  of  the 
party.
50  Cardenas  introduced  organisational  innovations  supporting  the  creation  of 
labour organisations such as the CTM in 1936 and agrarian confederations such as the 
CNC, which created a support between government and organised labour and peasants 
that  allowed  him  to  promote  the  revolution  through  agrarian  reform  and  in  labor-
management relations.
51The introduction of all-political forces and diverse interests in 
the  coalition  contributed  to  the  consolidation  of  power  in  the  Revolutionary  party, 
therefore coming close to the model of a single-party system, although it was a system 
of “predominant party”.
52 In this way, Cardenas created a corporatist regime which, by 
incorporating  all  of  the  social,  political  and  economic  sectors  within  the  governing 
coalition, not only ensured the support of the popular sectors and their participation but 
also  the  co-optation  of  such  groups  with  political  and  social  demands  by  the 
government.
53 In addition, the president also ensured a strong inter-elite discipline and 
cohesion that avoided future splits and divisions. The concentration of power in the 
presidency  was  consolidated  after  the  1933  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  which 
                                                                                                                                               
liberal constitution in a rural society was Porfirio’s dictatorship. Rabasa Gamboa, E. Derecho Constitucional 
Indígena, p.115.                                           
50 The reorganisation of the party on a sectoral rather than geographical basis broke the power of regional caudillos. 
Promoting the creation of the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) and the Mexican Workers Confederation 
(CTM) by Cárdenas was essential for the expansion of the party membership. By 1936 the party had over 1,000,000 
members. Huntington, S. Political order in Changing Societies, p.322. 
51 Padgett, L Vincent. The Mexican political system, p.38 
52 Mc Donald,  RH. Party Systems and Elections in Mexico. Chicago: Siracuse University, Markham Publishing 
company, 1971, p.241; Scott, Robert E. Mexican Government in Transition. University of Illinois: Press Urbana, 
1964, p.131. 
53 Cornelius notes that although this kind of mass political organisation seemed to provide power to peasants and 
workers, the reality was that these organisations were strongly controlled by the regime that blocked autonomous 
actions. Cornelius, WA. Mexican Politics in Transition: The Breakdown of a One-Party-Dominant Regime. San 
Diego: Center for U.S.- Mexican Studies University of California, 1996, pp.17-18. Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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prohibited re-election of the president.
54 Since, the presidency was renewed every six 
years, all party life was concentrated in the hands of the party leadership. This principle 
had  an  effect  on  the  relations  between  politicians,  parties  and  regional  electoral 
constituencies,  as  all  political  activity  was  concentrated  within  the  coalition  and  it 
would become very difficult for independent local and regional politicians to pursue a 
career without the approval of the revolutionary elite.
55 Finally, Cardenas benefitted 
from this concentration of power to carry out social and economic reforms that gave 
him legitimacy and support.
56 The flow of party funds was ultimately controlled by the 
president which allowed him to exercise control over party activities at local level. By 
1940,  the  power  of  the  presidency  was  further  consolidated.  The  last  stage  in  the 
conformation  of  the  hegemonic  political  party  was  under  the  presidency  of  Avila 
Camacho in the 1940’s. He renovated the party structure, by  removing the military 
sector from the governing coalition and re-naming, for the last time the revolutionary 
party  as  PRI  (Partido  Revolucionario  Institutional),  and  intended  it  to  be  the 
predominant  party.  Under  Camacho,  all  political  and  electoral  activity  was  further 
centralised in the executive.
57 Especially with the adoption of a comprehensive electoral 
law in 1946, which was to be controlled by the Minister of the Interior at Federal level, 
and the local counterparts at local level.  
 
1.1.2  Strong presidency and hegemonic party 
The  special  features  of  the  Mexican  political  system  created  after  the  revolution 
included  its  inclusiveness,  cohesion  (of  the  political  elite)  and  corporatism  which 
contributed to the regime’s long civil stability that distinguished it from other unstable 
regimes in Latin America. This political stability was achieved on one hand, through the 
total  presidential  control  of  the  State  using  its  official  party  but  also  by  the 
“corporatización” of wide sectors
58 of the population that were inserted in a hierarchical  
                                                 
54 This principle was established in order to avoid the re-election of a president after six years of being in office, after 
the dictator Porfirio Diaz had previously renewed his presidency and stayed in power for 35 years. 
55 Prud’home  J-F. “The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE): Building an impartial electoral authority. In: Governing 
Mexico: Political Parties and Elections, edited by Serrano, M. London: The Institute of Latin America Studies, 1998, 
p. 141. 
56 The support of the regime provided the opportunity to influence governmental decisions and obtain material and 
symbolic benefits which allowed a much easier cooptation by the government.  Noticieros Televisa. Woldenber, J. in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
57The selection of the official presidential candidate continued to be an informal process organised by the existing 
president, past president, and party hierarchies. Mc Donald, RH. Party Systems and Elections in Mexico, pp.241-242; 
Scott, Robert, E. Mexican Government in Transition, pp.139-140. 
58 See the evolution of the membership of the PRI’s corporatist sectors in Cansino, C. La Transición Mexicana 1977-
2000. México: Centro de Estudios de Política comparada, 2000, p.95. Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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manner in the party.
59 As a result of both, concentration of power in the presidency and 
the high level of inclusion through corporatism, the overwhelming victories of the PRI 
in both federal and local elections until the late 1960s were highly predictable. The 
political system that prevailed in these terms for thirty years between 1938 and 1968 
had  two  aspects  that  contributed  to  its  success:  social  stability  and  an  accelerated 
economic  growth.  In  addition  to  this,  the  patrimonial  character  of  the  authoritarian 
regime and the disciplined and close elite ensured that pacts and agreements only took 
place  inside  the  elite,  such  that  the  issues  of  transition,  political  power  and  public 
resources were only their business.  
However, it was the binomial strong presidency-hegemonic party that constituted the 
two pillars of the authoritarian Mexican regime.
60 First of all, the binomial presidency-
hegemonic  party  (PRI)  contributed  to  the  formation  of  disciplined  majorities  in 
Congress, which were unable to function as a counterbalance to the presidential power. 
As a result, both legislative branches were formed almost totally by members of the 
official party and the Judiciary by judges named directly by the president and confirmed 
by  Senates  who  were  under  the  PRI’s  control.
61  Therefore,  the  three  government 
branches  were  merged  into  the  executive  branch,  with  the  president  on  top.
62  The 
president  determined  political  posts,  allocated  public  resources  and  govermental 
programmes, which resulted in the creation of a network of alliances that supported him 
in  exchange  for  material  benefits.
63
  It  is  worth  noting,  that  the  1917  Constitution, 
besides establishing constitutional faculties and powers to the president
64 contemplated 
democratic principles. For instance, the division of power into three branches was a key 
principle of a democratic republic and was stated in art 49.
65 The 1917 Constitution also 
attributed to Congress faculties to initiate acts or laws (art.71), revise and approve the 
                                                 
59 Proof of evidence of the high level of “corporatist cooptation” exercised by PRI was its programmes of collective 
filliation of the different social sectors into the official pary. For example, in 1938 the agrarian sector enrolled 
2,500,000 members in the Peasant National Conference (CNC); the labour sector had 1,250,000 members enrolled in 
the Workers Confederation of Mexico (CTM), and the popular sector had 500,000 members in the National 
Conference of Popular Organisations (CNOP). See Rabasa Gamboa, E. Derecho Constitucional Indígena, p.115. 
60 For a more detailed analysis of the Presidency of the Republic and the official party see Cosío Villejas, D. El 
sistema político Mexicano. México: Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz, 1982. 
61 Rabasa Gamboa, E. Derecho Constitucional Indígena, p.115. 
62 The concentration of power in the executive was justified by those who took part in the 1916-1917 Constitution, as 
a measure to avoid the political imbalances that characterised Mexico in the XIX century. 
63 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November, 2004. 
64 Art 71: authority to initiate legislative projects; Art 72: authority to observe approved laws by Congress and 
exercise total or partial veto. Art 89: authority to announce laws and execute them; Art 67: authority to call Congress 
for extraordinary sessions.  
65 See Constitution 1917, Art.49 Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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budget  and  spending  of  the  federation.
66  However,  the  overwhelming  presence  of 
members of the PRI in both chambers of Congress, and the leadership of the president 
figure over them including the judiciary branch, did not allow the democratic principles 
of  the  constitution  to  be  applied.    Consequently,  the  president  became  the  supreme 
figure with meta-constitutional powers. The concentration of power in the president 
figure also contributed to the nature of the electoral processes. The president not only 
became the head of the three governmental branches but also acquired the faculty for 
appointing all local and state governors despite holding elections. In addition and as a 
measure to eliminate local challenges, confederations of regional and local parties were 
abolished and a hierarchy of municipal, state and national conventions were established 
to decide policy and select candidates.
67  
 
1.1.3  Social reformisms and economic stability 
It  is  necessary  to  highlight  another  element  that  was  predominant  in  the  Mexican 
political system that contributed to the delay of the transition: its social reformism that 
was supported in a model until the 1970s. As noted earlier, a strong presidency was 
needed in order to carry out social reforms, following the principle of “social justice” 
articulated  in  the  Constitution.  Starting  with  President  Cardenas  in  1930,  social 
reformism was applied by successive PRI governments that benefitted from its success 
and  support.  In  this  context,  the  principle  of  “social  justice”  was  prioritised  over 
democracy. As Javier Romo, notes the new constitution gave greater priority to social 
rights  than  to  political  rights.
68  In  addition  to  this,  the  regime  pursued  “economic 
growth”  as  another  function  of  the  regime,  which  was  supported  by  a  successful 
economic model until the 1970s.
69 Aguilar Camín notes that it was essentially a national 
regime  whose  nationalism  was  supported  by  the  control  of  the  government  in  the 
economy.
70 In this case, the official party played several roles. First of all, it served as a 
symbolic  “artefact”,  a  key  factor  for  the  identification  of  the  regime  with  the 
                                                 
66 See Constitution, Art 71, 74, 93, 108 
67 Scott, RE. Mexican Government in Transition, p.124. 
68 The ideology, based on social justice, promoted by the revolutionary faction lead by Zapata and Villa was 
considered greater than the “democratic demands” presented by the other revolutionary leader, Francisco Madero. 
Interview, Javier Romo Michaud, Advisor to President Councillor 2003-2010 (IFE) and political academic, Mexico 
City, 12 November, 2004. 
69 As Rabasa notes, the executive was able to pursue its ultimate goal of economic and social development without 
pursuing competitive and fair electoral processes. See Rabasa Gamboa, E, Derecho Constitutional Indígena, p.118. 
70 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Hector García Aguilar in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico 
City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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revolution.
71  Herzog-Silva  notes  that  the  PNR  became  not  only  the  owner  of  the 
revolution but also the major representative of the heroes of Mexican history.
72 This led 
to the identification of the official party with the government and the home land itself. 
The revolution provided a social myth and more importantly a basis for legitimacy.
73 
The official party became the party of the revolution and acquired a position in the 
popular  imagination,  which  contributed  to  the  official  party  dominance.
74  Such 
identification also contributed to the de-legitimisation and underestimation of parties 
outside the revolutionary coalitions, which were perceived as counter-revolutionary. As 
a result, the revolutionary mission turned into a hegemonic project and expression of 
patriotism,  which  was  able  to  gather  important  sectors  of  the  society  and  even  the 
intellectuals
75  of  that  period.  The  revolutionary  origin  of  the  Mexican  regime,  was 
similar to that in other countries such as Cuba where the historic objective normally 
related  to  solving  problems  of  equality  and  social  justice  and  where  the  issue  of 
constructing a democratic regime was secondary. Secondly, the official party was very 
powerful in maintaining discipline and loyalty.
76 The party was funded through a strong 
national  alliance  made  with  regional  leaders  which,  after  Cardenas,  became  a  pact 
between classes: a structure conformed by corporations or sectors.
77 Finally, the PRI, 
the official party, became a potent machine for gaining electoral legitimacy as it was 
created to rule and not to contest.
78 
 
1.1.4  Non-competitive elections  
Another aspect of the authoritarian regime that is linked to the concentration of power in 
the presidency is the existence of “non-competitive elections.” As electoral rule was 
manipulated by the presidency, and the organisation and supervision of elections were 
                                                 
71 Silva Herzog-Márquez  J. El antiguo Régimen y la transición en México, p.24 
72 From the heroes of the independency and the reform to the leaders of the liberal movement. Ibid. p.24. 
73 Huntington, S. Political Order in Changing Societies, p.315. 
74 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico City: 
Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
75 Fuentes notes that “Intellectuals supported the revolution because this was threatened by three factors including 
the USA, the church and the latifundios.” Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Carlos Fuentes  in “Mexico: La historia 
de su democracia.” Vol. 1. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004.  
76 The internal discipline was one of the key factors which the party used to survive during critical periods. However, 
for nearly 60 years, all of the PRI challenges emerged from within. By the beginning of the 1980s there was already a 
clear division inside the coalition between the conservative groups and a more liberal group. However, despite their 
disagreements in economic and political policies, they kept their differences inside the party. Interview, former senior 
member of PRI A, Mexico City, 14 September, 2004.  
77 Silva-Herzog Márquez J. El antiguo régimen y la transición en México, p.24. 
78 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004.  Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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under the Ministry of the Interior’s control, “non-competitive elections” became one of 
the main instruments for achieving hegemony. In this way, all political activity was 
concentrated within the government coalition under the direct control of the president.  
Despite the PRI being created as a party to govern and not to compete, the coalition elite 
understood the need for other parties and for regular election. In this context, parties 
outside the PRI were allowed to exist but not to compete for power, at the same time as 
being dismissed as reactionary groups. The creation of spaces for the political parties 
was needed, although the state party was the only one to have legitimacy. The holding 
of  regular  elections  gave  the  regime  not  only  democratic  legitimacy  but  also  the 
possibility  to  renew  the  political  elite,  avoiding  internal  divisions.  This  led  to  the 
creation of a non competitive system that tolerated minority parties with the condition 
that they were minority parties: a system of hegemonic party system. As noted earlier 
this term was given by Giovani Sartori who identified a type of party system without 
real electoral life that did not correspond to the one party system of the Soviet Block. 
This regime with a hegemonic party in which opposition parties are allowed to exist but 
not to compete and elections are neither competitive nor equitable and free. Cansino 
notes  that  semi-competitive  conditions  would  be  indicated  by  the  coexistence  of 
opposition parties and the hegemonic party, whose specific norms of social articulation 
(corporatives or clientelists) guaranteed its predominance over the other parties, even 
with some real or formal guarantees for the competence of other parties and political 
pluralism.
79  It  is  worth  noting,  that  the  existence  of  the  hegemonic  party  system  in 
Mexico also ensured a peaceful succession within the PRI’s elite, which had been a 
problem in the post revolutionary period. In order to avoid conflict within the elite and 
despite the principle of no re-election being re-adopted by the 1917 Constitution, the 
official  party  introduced  a  mysterious  system  of  selecting  their  own  presidents. 
Presidents  were  elected  for  a  single  six-year  term.  The  selection  of  presidential 
candidate known as “dedazo” (“heavy thumb”) consisted of an intra-party process of 
recommendation,  consultation  and  discussion  where  the  president  in  turn  played  a 
leading and dominant role.
80 After the candidate was selected by this informal process, 
the party convention nominated him without much opposition. During his six years in 
office the president had substantial power, but no hope of re-election. This practice 
                                                 
79 Cansino, C.  La transición mexicana 1977-2000. Mexico: Centro de Estudios de Política Comparada, 2000, p.74. 
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contributed significantly to the stability of the system, because if the president had been 
able  to  stay  in  power  indefinitely  other  presidential  aspirants  would  have  been 
motivated to attempt to oust him from power illegally.
81  
1.2 Theory approach: the transition 
Before analysing the characteristics of the Mexican transition, it is important to provide 
a theoretical approach to examining the literature on transition. The interest in the study 
of  “transition”  as  a  political  phenomenon  emerged  as  result  of  a  rapid  increase  in 
processes of political change towards democratisation that took place between the 1970s 
and the late 1980s in several countries around the world including southern Europe, 
some Latin-American and Asian countries and the collapsing of the Soviet Block. This 
international tendency towards political transformation that favoured democracy that 
took place in various countries over a period of thirty years
82 was named by Huntington 
as “the third wave of democratisation”. Samuel Huntington notes in his study of several 
countries, that this third wave of transitions is located within a wider process.
83 The 
analysis  of  this  rapid  democratic  change  at  international  level  generated  multiple 
hypotheses about the reasons for causes of change. Overall, as Huntington notes, the 
study of various experiences provided historical constants that modified the variables of 
the democratic changes. Huntington identified four changes in the world that favoured 
the development of a third wave of transitions to democracy: 1. economic growth that 
increased  the  level  of  literacy,  education,  urbanisation,  a  larger  middle  class  and 
expansion of pro-democratic values; 2. radical changes in the Catholic Church leading 
to  its  opposition  to  authoritarianism;  3.  changes  in  policies  that  supported  the 
democratic development of the European community, the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the mid 1980s; 4. strengthening of movements toward democracy in other 
countries  through  the  snowballing  effect  after  the  transition  in  other  countries  such 
Spain, Argentina, Poland etc.
84 Despite the existence of constants for the development 
of transitions, each transition was a result of some general causes and other endemic 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 From 1974 more than 30 countries from different parts of the world transited from different forms of totalitarism or 
authoritarism to democratic regimes. 
83 Therefore, Huntington distinguishes two previous waves; the first one between 1828 and 1926 and the second one 
between 1943 and 1962, which were followed by reversal periods. The third wave extended a period between 1974 
and the late 1980s starting with the transitions of Portugal, Spain and Greece, followed by transitions in some Latin-
American, Asian and African countries and culminated in the collapse of the soviet block at the end of the 1980s. See 
Huntington, S. The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman; London: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991 
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factors  of  the  respective  countries.
85  The  study  of  the  various  processes  of  political 
change and transition that showed the active input of political actors in the construction 
of  the  new  regimes  contributed  to  an  important  change  in  political-social  theory. 
Democracy was perceived as being the result of effort and human capacity that was 
prioritised over the existence of other requisites such as socio-economic conditions. In 
the  study  of  change  in  political  systems  and  in  particular  of  transition  from  an 
authoritarian  to  a  democratic  regime  the  most  common  approaches  have  been  the 
following: an approach that focused on socio-economic and cultural conditions as the 
causes for democracy. Seymor Martin Lipset is the main proponent of this view. Lipset 
claimed  that  democracy  depended  on  the  level  of  socioeconomic  development  and 
modernisation of a country.
86 The author explains the democratic advance in terms of 
indicators of wealth, grade of industrialisation, urbanisation and the levels of education. 
According to him, the higher the socio-economic level a country has, the greater the 
chance to become a democracy, and conversely, the lower the economic level achieved 
the more likely it is to favour an authoritarian regime.
87 This approach highlighting 
economic, social  and  cultural conditions as causes of democracy prevailed until the 
1970s. However and in clear contrast to Lipset’s approach, there was pioneering work 
by, for example, Danwart Rustow who emphasised the autonomy of politics and the 
important  role  that  political  actors  have  in  the  construction  of  political  regimes.  In 
Rustow’s view attention must be centred on understanding how democracies developed 
through a period of transition.
88  Rustow considered that there were four phases in the 
process  of  transition  from  an  authoritarian  regime  to  democracy:  a)  A  background 
condition. The model starts with a single background condition – national unity,
89 b) 
Preparatory Phase in which the process of democratisation is triggered by a prolonged 
and inconclusive political struggle. c) Decision phase, in which the political leaders 
accept the existence of diversity in the politics and to that end, institutionalise some 
crucial aspect of democratic procedure and d) Habituation phase, in which democracy is 
inserted in the culture of a country.
90  
                                                 
85Cansino, C. The Mexican Transition 1977-2000, p.32. 
86 Lipset, Seymor M, Political man. London: Heinemann, 1969, pp.48-50. 
87 Ibid. 
88 “The political scientist is entitled to these rights within the general division of labour and may wish to concentrate 
on some of the political factors without denying the significance of the social or economic ones”. Rustow, D. 
“Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” p.345. 
89 Rustow notes that “national unity means that most of the citizens must have no doubts or mental reservations about 
the political community to which they belong”. Ibid. p.352. 
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Despite the different approaches of the various theories on democratic change, they 
should nonetheless be used as tools to analyse a particular political experience.  
 
1.2.1  The Mexican case  
In  Seymor’s  approach,  the  socio-economic  conditions  for  the  development  of 
democracy  were  socio-economic  advances  such  as  industrialisation,  urbanisation, 
extensive education that were created by the Mexican authoritarian regime between the 
1930s and 1960s.
91 Rabasa notes that the emergence of the middle class after years of 
economic  growth  promoted  by  the  Mexican  regime  and  its  reactions  to  the  1968 
students’ revolt in 1968 (see Rabasa
92) corresponded to Rustow’s preparatory phase of 
democratisation.
93 However, Merino notes that Rustow’s model can only be used to 
explain the Mexican transition if both the PRI’s elite split in 1987 and the Cardenas’ 
presidential campaing in 1988 meant the beginning of the  conflict in the governing 
coalition  to  which  other  forces  joined.
94  This  will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  in 
subsequent chapters.  
 
1.3 The concept of transition 
Despite  the  extensive  literature  on  transition  to  democracy  there  is  no  model  that 
explains  how  to  carry  out  a  transition.  However,  the  examination  of  successful 
transitions can provide relevant information for the analysis or study of other similar 
processes of change. In the literature on transitions to democracy from authoritarian or 
totalitarian  regimes,  the  most  accepted  concept  of  transition  is  the  one  given  by 
Schmitter and O’Donnell.
95  
“transition is the interval between one political regime and another…the transitions are 
delimited on one side by the beginning of the dissolution of the authoritarian regime 
and  on  the  other  side  by  the  establishment  of  some  kind  of  democracy…the 
                                                 
91 Rabasa Gamboa, EE. Derecho Constitutional Indígena, p.121. 
92 Becerra, Salazar and Woldenberg note that the students’ demands were of a civil nature and were fighting for 
changes outside their scope such as the release of political prisioners, derogation of Article 145 and 145 bis of the 
Penal Code (that sanctioned the crimes of social dissolution), the destitution of authorities in charge of the police, 
etc,. Quoted by Rabasa Gamboa, EE. Ibid. See Becerra et al., La Mecánica del cambio político en México, pp.17-19. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Merino Huerta,  M. La Democracia Pendiente: Ensayos sobre la deuda política de México. México: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1993, p.76. 
95 O’Donnell, G. & Schmitter, PH. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. In Transition from 
Authoritarian Rule, vol. 4, edited by O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, PH. & Whitehead, L. Baltimore and London: The 
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characteristic of a transition is that during its process the rules of the games are not 
defined…”  
As Przeworski notes, in the transition the process of dismantling the old authoritarian 
regime,  often  through  liberalisation,  runs  parallel  to  a  process  of  emergence  of 
democratic institutions.
96 Przeworski comments on the need to understand transition to 
democracy as a process of “creating specific institutions, with their effects upon the 
capacity  of  various  groups  to  realise  their  interests  creating  specific  institutions”.
97 
Authors such as O’Donnell and Schmitter, Linz and Morlino (see Cansino
98)
 consider 
that  normally  moments  of  transition  are  defined  by  questions  over  the  existing 
institutional arrangements and political practices; and the lack of consensus towards 
them and the struggle for the establishment of the new political institutions. However, 
the  identification  of  characteristics  of  regimes  in  transition  is  difficult  due  to  their 
ambiguity. In general, a democratic transition is not a permanent state but a situation 
where new characteristics emerge and parts of the authoritarian regime are dissolved, 
while other parts move to the new regime, and result in a situation where parts of the 
new democracy are born and some of the challenges are resolved. Therefore, the study 
of  democratic  transition  attempts  to  determine  a  strategy  of  analysis  of  the  main 
political actors before, during and after the process.
99 In reference to the Mexican case, 
it  is  worth  mentioning  the  analysis  that  Morlino  (see  Cansino
100)  makes  of  the 
characteristics of regimes in transition. He notes that regimes in transition are preceded 
by an authoritarian regime that initiates an opening or partial rupture of the limitations 
to political pluralism.
101 As a result a situation is created where an emergent opposition 
exists alongside the old coalition which is no longer dominant and is less united.
102 In 
Mexico, the opening was initiated in 1977 with an electoral reform, which opened the 
electoral  arena  to  opposition  parties  through  the  introduction  of  Proportional 
                                                 
96  Przeworki, A. Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy. In Transition from authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspective, vol. 3, edited by O’Donnell, G., Schmitter,PC and Whitehead L. Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, p.56.  
97 Ibid. 
98 Quoted by Cansino, C. La Transición Mexicana, 1977-2000, p. 27. See O’Donnell, G. & Schmitter, PH. 
Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, edited by O’Donnell, G; 
Schmitter, Ph & Whitehead, vol. 4. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1986; Linz, Juan J. Crisis, 
Breakdown, and Reequilibration. In: The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, edited by Linz, Juan J & Stepan, A. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978; Morlino, L., Autoritarismi, in Manuale di scienza politica. G. 
Pasquino. (ed.). Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986, pp. 137-189.  In: Cansino, C. La transición Mexicana, 1977-2000, p.29. 
99 Cansino, C. La transición Mexicana, 1977-2000, p.29. 
100 Quoted by Cansino, C. La transición Mexicana, 1977-2000, p.29. See Morlino, L., Autoritarismi, in Manuale di 
scienza politica. G. Pasquino. (ed.) Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986, pp.144-148.   
101 Ibid. 
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Representation  (PR)  in  the  Chamber  of  deputies.
103  Morlino  also  notes  that  despite 
opposition  parties  being  allowed  to  participate  in  the  political  process,  they  are  in 
practice excluded from the possibility of accessing the government, as only one party 
can be dominant in semi-competitive elections.
104 Consequently, electoral participation 
is limited to electoral periods. Finally, Morlino notes that a strongly distorted electoral 
law can also be important in enabling the dominant party to maintain an advantage in 
the  distribution  of  seats.
105  In  Mexico,  the  1946  electoral  law  approved  by  the 
government proved to be distortional and unbalanced. Methodologically speaking, the 
analysis of a regime in transition must considerer the following aspects: a) the various 
institutional and political actors (bureaucracy, military, political parties and unions) and/ 
or socioeconomic actors (oligarchic groups, business groups, commercial bourgeoisie 
(middle class) that are part of the dominant alliance; b)  The level of ideology of the 
regime  and  the  kind  of  values  used  to  justify  the  regime  c)  the  level  and  the 
characteristics  of  the  mobilisation  from  above.
106  In  the  Mexican  case,  the 
institutionalisation of the regime included on one hand, the hegemonic party and the 
president along with the corporatist sectors, and on the other, the opposition parties. 
With regard to the values held, during the transition, the regime exploited the principles 
of the revolution as a source for its legitimisation, while mobilisation from above took 
the form of corporatist and “clientelist” tactics. 
 
1.4 Types of transitions 
There  is  no  unique  model  that  explains  how  to  develop  a  process  of  transition  or 
provides definitive conclusions, especially as each case is different. In addition to the 
lack of agreement on a model for transitions, scholars also differ on the number of 
routes for transition and the factors to be utilised for their classification. Nevertheless, 
the analysis of successful transitions in the past, the reactions of the political actors and 
the conditions within the specific countries can be used as a guide in the analysis or 
discussion  of  other  regime  changes.  In  general,  a  democratic  transition  is  achieved 
through democratic means; consequently, the basis of the political change is negotiation 
                                                 
103 The earlier reforms of 1946 to 1977 will be discussed in chapter 2. 
104  Quoted by Cansino, C. La transición Mexicana, 1977-2000, p.29. See Morlino, L., Autoritarismi, in Manuale di 
scienza politica. G. Pasquino. (ed.) Bologna: Il Mulino, 1986, pp.144-148.  
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and agreements by the elites rather than other mechanisms.
107 Due to the particularities 
of each transition, the pace and intensity varies from one case to another. In order to 
classify the different routes and forms in which a transition develops it is necessary, first 
of all to consider the strength of each political actor (opposition and government) and 
the dialogues and strategies used by them. There are different classifications in respect 
of  the  types  of  transition  from  non  democratic  to  democratic  regimes.  It  is  worth 
mentioning the classic work of Stepan
108 who identified eight possible paths that can 
lead  to  the  end  of  an  authoritarian  regime  and  the  processes  of  democratisation 
depending on the routes they follow. The first three paths war, conquest and foreign 
interventions play an important part in the redemocratisation process and include 1) 
Internal restoration after external reconquest, 2) internal democratic reformulation 3) 
externally monitored installation.
109 In the second group of transitions the authoritarian 
regime  controls  the  initiation  and  the  process  and  according  to  Stepan  are  4) 
democratisation initiated from within authoritarian regimes.
110  In the last group the 
actions of the opposition play an important role in ending the authoritarian rule and 
bringing  democracy  and  include  5)  society-led  regime  termination,  6)  party  pact. 
Finally,  the  last  two  types  violent  revolt  and  revolutionary  war  are  implicated  and 
include 7) organised violent revolt coordinated by democratic reformist parties, and 8) 
Marxist-led  revolutionary  war.”
111  In  studying  democracies  it  is  also  important  to 
consider the modes of the transition. According to Morlino in reference to the modes, 
there  are  four  relevant  dimensions  in  a  transition:  a)  continuous/discontinuous;  b) 
accelerated/slow; c) peaceful/violent; and d) internal/external.
112 Generally, continuous 
transitions  initiated  within  a  political  regime  are  the  most  common.  The  difference 
between continuous and discontinuous transitions is the way in which the dominant elite 
confront  critical  situations.
113  In  continuous  transition  there  are  a  series  of  limited 
                                                 
107 Cansino, C. La transición Mexicana, 1977-2000, p.33. 
108 Stepan, A. Paths toward Redemocratisation: Theorical and Comparative Reconsiderations. In: Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives, vol 3, edited by O’Donnell, G, Smitter, PH & Whiteheads. Baltimore, 
Md.; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp.64-84. 
109 Japan and Democratic Republic of Germany experienced the first type, France, Greece and Italy after 1943 the 
second type, and Germany after the II World War is the best example of an externally monitored installation. Ibid. 
110 Recent transitions in Latin America and the 1970s transition in South Europe. Ibid.  
111 See Stepan, A. Paths toward Redemocratisation, pp.64-84. 
112 See Morlino for a more detailed account of these four modes. Morlino, L. Cómo cambian los regímenes políticos: 
Instrumentos de análisis. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1985, pp.104-111. 
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political coalitions and successive and contradictory balances between impulses toward 
change  and  impulses  towards  preservation.  This  interaction  produces  a  sequence  of 
changes  in  the  regime  until  it  is  finally  reformed.
114  The  probability  of  a  transition 
increases when there is a considerable level of crisis in the authoritarian regime. The 
authoritarian crisis is a process of internal imbalance and destabilisation in a regime of 
limited pluralism. Consequently, the transformation of the regime can be triggered by its 
inability to deal with internal problems or its general deterioration contributing to an 
unstable situation. For instance, a scission or irreconcilable division in the coalition 
which supports the regime can provoke political instability and mobility of political 
support towards emergent actors. With regard to the type of compromise or negotiation 
that leads to democratisation, it usually takes place between the more moderate actors of 
the  regime  and  the  opposition.  O’Donnell  and  Schmitter  classify  such  phases  of 
negotiation as institutionalisation that denotes effective recognition (evidenced in the 
form of constitutional laws) and acceptance of the new rules and procedures by the 
majority of the groups of interest.
115  
 
1.4.1  Forms of transitions 
The study of the processes of political change experienced in southern Europe in the 
1970s, and in Latin America and East Europe in the 1980-90s (known as the third wave 
of democratisation) increased interest in the study of transition. These  new political 
change experiences allowed scholars to identify similarities even though the various 
experiences showed different levels of success and depended on many factors including 
structural, historic and temporary. There are many factors and conditions that take place 
in a democratic transition. With regard to political variables, the studies of comparative 
politics have provided some hypotheses that are a starting point for the study of one 
particular case. According to the negotiation party-government and the strength of the 
political  actors,  there  are  a  series  of  communalities.
116  Transitions  through  reforms, 
through pacts, rupture or collapse, and through extrication. As was the case with the 
routes of re-democratisation or transition, a particular case can experience more that one 
                                                 
114 Martins, L. The liberalisation of Authoritarian Rule in Brazil. In: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin 
America, vol. 2, edited by O’Donnell, G, Schmitter, PH & Whitehead, L. Baltimore and London: The Hopkins 
University Press, 1986, pp.72-94.  
115 O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, PH. Transition from an authoritarian rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies, pp.15-21. 
116 Linz, Juan L. Transition to democracy, p. 143, Huntington, S. The Third Wave, p.114; Cardenas Gracia, J. 
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form. In the different forms of transition it is also necessary to take into account the 
interactions between the government and the opposition, between the reformists and the 
conservatives in the government, and between the moderates and the extremists in the 
opposition.
117  In  analysing  transition  in  a  comparative  perspective,  the  classification 
described  by  Huntington,  which  is  based  on  the  correlation  of  forces  between 
government and the opposition in a specific time, has been very useful.
118 Huntington’s 
four types of transitions are: 1) Transformation, 2) Replacement 3)Transplacement 4) 
Intervention.
119  In  the  first  form  of  transition  initiated  through  “reform,”  called 
“transformation” by Huntington, and also known as “transition through transaction”, 
the transition takes place through reform. The political elites in power take the initiative 
in  bringing  about  democracy,  but  with  the  intention  of  controlling  the  process  and 
keeping some power. For this type of transition the government needs to be stronger 
than  the  opposition  and  generally  the  transition  goes  through  five  phases.
120  The 
political  elites  in  government  are  dominated  by  soft  sectors  who  try  to  prevent  a 
collapse  and  aspire  to  maintain  power.  The  reforms  are  usually  initiated  by  the 
soft/reformist sector in government as part of a liberalisation process. The reformers 
inside the government initiate negotiations with the opposition with a democratisation 
intention.
121 Huntington notes that in all of the countries that experienced transitions 
through  transformations  the  governments  were  stronger  than  the  opposition  at  the 
beginning of the process.
122 In this context, the interaction between the reformists of the 
government, supporters of the transition, and conservatives of the regime, those against 
the  transition,  is  central.  For  the  reform  to  take  place,  the  reformist  sector  of  the 
government needs to be stronger than both the conservative sector and the opposition.
123 
The  initial  political  opening  can  result  from  different  causes  including  the  loss  of 
legitimacy, divisions in the elite, failures in the economic design, or the death of the 
                                                 
117 For a definitition of “pacts” see, Cansino, C. La Transición Mexicana, 1977-2000, p.51. 
118 Huntington notes that scholars usually share the same ideas; however they prefer to use different words for those 
ideas. His typology of processes of transition coincides with that of Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring.  
See Linz, Juan J. Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, In: The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, edited by 
Linz, Juan J & Stepan, A. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 1978. p.35; Share, D & Mainwaring, S. 
Transitions through Transaction: Democratisation in Brazil and Spain. In: Political Liberalisation in Brazil: 
Dynamics, Dilemmas, and Future Prospects, edited by Selcher, Wayne. A. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986, 
pp.177-79. 
119 For a detailed description of Huntington’s four types of transitions see Huntington, S. The Third Wave, p.114.  
120 For the five phases of transition through transaction or transformation see Huntington, S. The Third Wave, pp.127-
142. 
121 See Cardenas Gracia, J. Transición Política y reforma constitucional en México, p.43. 
122 Huntington, S. The Third Wave, Op. cit. p.125. 
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dictator,  etc.    This  form  of  transition  called  “transformation”  was  experienced  by 
Spain
124 (in the early stage), Brazil, Hungary, India, Chile and Turkey. 
The  second  form  of  transition  is  a  transition  through  “pacts”,  which  was  called 
“transplacement”  by  Huntington.  The  main  feature  of  this  form  of  transition  is  the 
existence  of  a  political  pact  between  the  government  and  the  opposition.  Linz  and 
Stepan note that often transitions experience a pact between the moderates of both the 
regime and the opposition who need to control and use their respective “hard-liners”.
125 
Transitions through pacts take place in contexts where the government and opposition 
share the same strength and decide to negotiate pacts to achieve democracy. In this case, 
the pacts between the two players involve negotiations in respect of the conditions, 
depth and rhythms of the process. Among the different forms of transitions, transition 
through pacts seems to be the most ideal as it tends to be organised and more trusted. 
First of all, in transition via negotiation, political actors are more willing to moderate 
their positions in order to achieve agreement that favours both parties. In addition, the 
existence of pacts can contribute, not only to the continuity of the process but also to its 
peaceful development, as it can ensure real electoral competition.
126 Cansino, notes that 
specific variables such as favourable international context, marginal role of the military 
and strong civil society are typical of transition through pacts.
127 The Spanish transition 
to democracy in 1975 illustrates the best example of transition through pacts between 
the regime and the opposition.
128 The main aspects of this transition were not only the 
moderate and pro-democratic character of the political actors but also the caution and 
speed  of  the  process.  Despite  the  Spanish  transition  being  initiated  by  the  regime’s 
                                                 
124 In Spain the reform was initiated by reformist elements inside the governing coalition after the death of the 
dictator, Francisco Franco, who decided to initiate a moderated process of liberalisation. The substitution of Arias 
Navarro by a Suarez, a pro-democracy minister, and the support of the King Juan Carlos I started a process of 
liberalisation with the clear intention to democratise the regime. Measures such as, the approval of a law for a 
political reform by referendum, legalisation of political parties, holding of elections and the negotiation of the 
“Moncloa Pacts” between the Suarez and the opposition. Ibid. p.43.   
125 Linz, Juan L. & Stepan, A. The Implications of Prior Regime Type for Transitions Paths and Consolidation Tasks. 
In: Problems of Democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist 
Europe. Baltimore; London: The Hopkins University Press, 1996, p.61. 
126 Cansino, called this form of transition through pacts, “the consensual model” as all successful formulas of 
transitions under this model had political opening strategies that culminated in constitutional reforms (Italy, 1947, 
France, 1958, Portugal, 1976, Grecia, 1976). See Cansino, C. La Transición en México, 1977- 2000, p.40. 
127 In the Mediterranean cases the pressures from within were factors for opening and the political parties which 
proved to be dynamic in the party system.  The European countries such as Greece in 1974 and Portugal in 1975, 
showed a greater level of “civility” and indexes of autonomy in confronting the state authority.  
128 For Spanish transition see Maravall, JM. La política de la transición 1975-80. Madrid: Taurus, 1985; Coratelo, R. 
Transición política y consolidación democrática: España (1975-1986). Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas, 1992. Tezanos, J. F.;Cotarelo, R; Ramon y Blas, Andres de (eds) La transición democrática española. 
Madrid: Editorial Sistema, 1989; Maravall, JM. & Santamaria, J. Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for 
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political elite in order to carry out a controlled political change, there were the so called 
“Pactos  de  la  Moncloa”,  which  involved  negotiations  between  the  government’s 
reformists  and  the  opposition  and  this  led  to  a  successful  transition.  The  consensus 
achieved between both parties allowed a peaceful, continuous and successful transition 
to democracy. Other European countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia and Latin-
American countries such as Nicaragua, Bolivia and Brazil, in its last stage,
129 negotiated 
pacts in their political transitions.
130   
The third form of transition is transition through rupture or collapse, which corresponds 
to the “replacement” model identified by Huntington.
131 Share and Mainwaring called it 
“transition after regime breakdown or collapse” and “transition through rupture”.
132 
This form of transition takes place when the regime in power collapses and the existing 
opposition is strong enough to confront and defeat it. In these cases, the regime’s elite 
normally  loses  its  capacity  to  influence  the  process  due  to  various  factors  such  as 
erosion of its legitimacy, economic crisis or loss of effective power.
133 Once the former 
government collapses, the different opposition groups fight to determine which regime 
is best to replace it. In order for the transition to succeed, the opposition not only needs 
to be stronger than the former ruling party within it the moderates need to dominate the 
extremists or antidemocratic. The ultimate outcome depends on a number of aspects 
including  which  is  the  dominant  group  within  the  opposition,  pro-democracy  or 
radicals,  the  citizen’s  reactions  to  the  changes  and  the  political  situation  of  the 
country.
134 In contrast to the previous forms of transition, in this case there is no pact 
between  the  main  political  forces  to  regulate  the  path  and  time  of  the  transition. 
Therefore there tends to be a high level of uncertainty due to the existence of strong 
                                                 
129 The transition in Brazil was a gradual, long and constrained process that lasted for sixteen years. Like other Latin-
American countries it suffered the consequences of the international debt crisis. However it did not have important 
stateness problems like other East European countries and Spain. The transition began with the presidency of the 
General Ernesto Geisel in 1974, who initiated a  controlled liberalisation process, known as “abertura” (opening) 
and culminated with the adoption of a new Constitution in 1988 and the elections for president in 1989, in which 
Fernando Collor de Mello took office in 1990. Crisis of Efficacy, Legitimacy and Democratic State “Presence”: 
Brazil. In: Problems of Democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe. Baltimore; London: The Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp.167-168. 
130 Other transitions such as those in Venezuela and Colombia were marked by a series of detailed and explicit pacts, 
but apart from Costa Rica, all of the non pact democracies existing at different times in other Latin American 
countries were destroyed by authoritarian reversals. O’Donnell, G. & Schmitter, PH. Tentative conclusions about 
uncertain democracies, p.45.  
130 Share, D. and Mainwaring, S. Transitions through Transaction, p.531. 
131 Huntington, S. The Third Wave, pp.142-151. 
132 See Cardenas, J. Transición política y reforma constitucional en México, p.45. 
133 Ibid. p.44. 
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disloyal  opposition  and  direct  confrontation  between  the  political  actors.
135  Cansino 
notes that the difficulty in achieving consensus between the political actors is related to 
the nature of the civil society which tends to be less organised and autonomous in its 
decisions.
136 For instance, in Latin-American countries such as Argentina (1983), during 
periods of authoritarian crisis there was mass popular uprising that although not highly 
organised  was  very  spontaneous  destabilised  the  regime  and  contributed  to  its 
collapse.
137 Transitions through rupture or collapse are therefore riskier than transitions 
through reforms or pacts. Additionally, in transitions through rupture or collapse the 
prospects of consolidation are less likely than in transitions through pacts, such as in 
those of Southern Europe.
138 Transitions through rupture or collapse were typical of the 
military regimes in Latin America
139 in the 1980s. These tended to be discontinuous, 
accelerated,  violent  and  external.
140  Argentina,  Peru,  Uruguay  (1982-85),  Ecuador, 
Dominican  Republic  and  all  experienced  transitions  through  rupture  which  were 
characterised by the absence of political or economic pacts. This type of transition was 
experienced in Asian countries such as Iran and the Philippines. Also in Europe, in 
countries  such  as  Greece,  Portugal  and  East  Germany  and  in  some  East  European 
countries like Romania.
141  
Finally, several countries have experienced a form of transition that is a mix between 
transition  through  reform  and  through  rupture.  This  form  of  transition  is  called 
“transplacement” by Huntington and it is also known as “extrication”or“withdrawal”.  
According to Huntington, as the power between conservatives and reformers, within the 
government,  is  balanced  the  regime  decides  to  negotiate  with  the  opposition,  either 
                                                 
135 This opposition is explained by the nature of the transition through collapse or replacement, as the dominant 
classes of the regime such as military, oligarchic groups put up obstacles when transitions are perceived as a threat to 
their interests. See Cansino, C. La transición en México, 1977- 2000, p.51. 
136 Ibid, p.55. 
137 Argentina is an example of a transition through rupture, as the authoritarian elite collapsed after having internal 
divisions, because of the hardliners and the military defeat in the Falklands War. 
138 O’Donnell, G and Schmitter, PC., Transition from authoritarian rule. Tentative conclusions about uncertain 
democracies: Negotiating pacts. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1989, p.45. 
139 The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in Latin America did not take place under formal political 
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Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, edited by Herz, John H. Greenwood Press: 1982, pp. 231-250; Nikiforos, D. 
Regime change and the prospects for democracy in Greece: 1974-1983. In: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Southern Europe, edited by O’Donnnell, G., Schmnitter, PC and Whitehead, L. Baltimore and London: The Johns 
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pushed or pulled into formal or informal negotiations.
142 These transitions take place 
when a weakened regime seeks to remove itself from power and is not strong enough to 
set the condition of its removal.
143 In this type of transition, despite the authoritarian 
regime not being strong enough to confront the challenges of a changing process, it does 
not  collapse,  but  adopts  a  functioning  role  directing  some  of  the  conditions  of  the 
transition.  In  order  for  the  transition  to  succeed  the  strength  of  the  reformist  and 
conservatory sectors inside the regime need to be balanced, and the reformist sector 
needs to be willing to negotiate with the opposition.
144 Sometimes, this process can 
become complicated, especially when a strong opposition despite being as strong as the 
government,  cannot  act  alone  and  needs  to  negotiate  with  the  government.
145  In 
successful  withdrawals  the  dominant  groups  of  both  sides  (opposition-government) 
recognise that they are unable, on their own, to determine the future of the political 
system.
146 This normally forces the opposition to ease the departure and withdrawal of 
the government members (conservatories and reformists) of the authoritarian regime.
147 
This  form  of  transition  has  been  experienced  by  countries  such  as  Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Uruguay, Chile, South Korea, Bolivia, Honduras and El Salvador. 
 
 
 
 
1.4.2  Liberalisation and democratisation 
In order to analyse a transition to democracy it is necessary to differentiate between the 
liberalisation and democratisation processes. These two phases are normally presented 
as  interconnected  and  successive  complementary  phases.  Morlino
148  notes  that 
liberalisation and democratisation are two processes that are diverse and alternative, and 
                                                 
142 Huntington, S. The Third Wave, p.151 
143 Gill, Graeme. The Dynamic of Democratisation: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process. London: 
Macmillan Pres, 2000, pp.69-70. 
144 As in ruptures, the divisions between the opposition are very common. The reformists of the regime had to 
diminish the power of the conservatories as quickly as possible; however, the reformists of the regime were obliged 
to negotiate with the moderates of the opposition for the hardliners of the regime not to be prosecuted or sanctioned 
for violations of human rights. Cardenas Gracia, J. Transición política y reforma constitucional en México, p.47. 
145 The withdrawals consist of different sequences. For a detailed account of these sequences see Cardenas Gracia, J. 
Ibid. p.45. 
146 Generally, in these types of transitions all types of issues are negotiated except for having free and clean elections, 
in which the opposition has the highest probability of winning. 
147 The success of the mechanism is in the control of the extremists and in the moderation of the process. Cardenas 
Gracia, J. Op. cit. p.48. 
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eventually, the second succeeds the first. Democratisation is a process that conduces 
from an authoritarian situation to a pluralist democracy, while political liberalisation is 
only  an  opening  up  that  does  not  necessarily  achieve  the  same  result  and  can  be 
manipulated  to  re-establish  the  old  order.
149  The  political  liberalisation  of  an 
authoritarian regime presents particular characteristics in respect of the processes of 
democratisation. Liberalisation is the extension of civil rights and concession of some 
political  rights  within  the  authoritarian  regime  but  under  the  strict  control  of  the 
government. Przeworsky notes that a liberalisation process can be initiated through a 
number  of  different  factors  including  a)  when  the  regime  realises  the  functional 
necessities that led to its establishment. It is, therefore, no longer necessary (or even 
possible), and it collapses, b) the regime loses its “legitimacy”, and since no regime can 
last without legitimacy (support, acquiescence, consent), it disintegrates,
150  c) internal 
conflicts  cannot  be  reconciled  and  some  ruling  factions  decide  to  appeal  to  outside 
groups for support. As a result, the ruling bloc disintegrates; d) because of external 
pressure the regime is obliged to “put on a democratic face.
151 Another reason for the 
elite  in  power  starting  a  liberalisation  process  is  when  they  consider  the  liberal 
democratic regime to be the most appropriate means to organise public and political life. 
However, it is considered that this is insufficient to achieve liberalisation. Liberalisation 
must always be accompanied by another step, at a later stage or simultaneously, of 
democratisation,  which  is  a  phase  that  goes  towards  the  change  of  regime.
152  The 
purpose of initiating liberalisation is normally a response to the need of an authoritarian 
regime to increase or conserve the bases of social support or legitimacy without opening 
the system completely. However, the authoritarian crisis can also lead to the collapse of 
the  regime,  a  continuous  transition,  democratisation,  or  the  reconstitution  of  the 
dominant  coalition  and  the  reconsolidation  of  the  regime.
153  On  the  other  hand,  a 
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democratisation process connotes a total expansion and recognition of civil and political 
rights, thus creating conditions for political pluralism and participation.  Consequently, 
the widening of political and civil rights is the product of agreements and negotiations 
between the political actors.
154 In addition, aspects such as the existence of an impartial 
electoral law, recognition of opposition’s victories by the political elite and the search 
for constitutional mechanisms between the political actors, are common in a process of 
democratisation.  The  democratisation  process  concludes  when  a  new  institutional 
democratic order is installed. Therefore, in a process of change from authoritarian rule 
to a democratic regime, the establishing of a democracy and its later consolidation are 
successive  phases.  Democracy  is  established  when  new  rules  of  the  game  and 
democratic procedures are approved and may also coincide with the approval of a new 
constitution and the holding of free and guaranteed elections for the first time. Finally, 
democracy is consolidated
155 when the new democratic government starts functioning, 
adapting to the new structures and norms and achieving autonomy and legitimacy.
156  
In both processes of liberalisation and democratisation interactions between government 
and opposition and the divisions inside the government and inside the opposition are 
decisive.  Mainwaring,  O’Donnell  and  Schmitter,
157  highlight  the  importance  that 
interactions between elite and mass can have in a transition. They agree that the more 
transition advances the more actors get involved (unions, peasants groups) etc. 
 
1.5 The Mexican Transition: different interpretations  
The extensive literature generated to explain the particular case of the political change 
in Mexico after the 1970s, indicates that there is no consensus between historians and 
analysts over this political process.
158 Indeed, the Mexican transition has been analysed 
                                                 
154 Ibid. 
155 See Morlino for the different stages in the process of democratisation, from the crisis of the authoritarian regimes 
to the consolidation of the democracy, Morlino, L., Como cambian los regímes politicos, p.117. 
156 Cansino, C. Op. cit. p.74. 
157 These authors note that the opening and decompression of authoritarian rule generated a rapid increase in general 
politicisation and popular activation – “the resurrection of civil society”, as O’Donnell has described it. However, this 
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from different perspectives that place the transition at differing times. From a historic 
point  of  view,  most  authors  consider  the  1968  student  protests  that  were  violently 
repressed by the government, the starting point of the political change. However, from 
an institutional perspective, the beginning of the transition can be placed in 1977, with 
the first electoral reform, as it created the conditions for political change.
159 As noted 
earlier, in order to understand the process of political change in Mexico, it is important 
to remember the nature of the Mexican authoritarian regime, as it was its particular 
character  that  shaped  the  process.  Given  the  context,  the  stable  civilian  rule  which 
benefitted from a growing economy and the holding of regular elections Mexico had the 
appearance of a democracy. Yet, such ambiguous features not only acted as obstacles to 
political change but also defined the path it followed. To some extent this explains the 
controversy over the transition itself, where, even today there are different views about 
its real nature and consequences. Among the various interpretations of the transition to 
democracy in Mexico, some believe that the regime is still not fully democratic. Those 
who  support  this  view  argue  that,  apart  from  the  electoral  institutions,  most  of  the 
institutions  created  under  the  authoritarian  regime  maintained  the  same  design  and 
functions after the 2000 elections.
160 In fact, as most of the changes took place in the 
electoral arena, many perceive the need for further and major political modifications. 
Nevertheless, from an institutional perspective the transition to democracy in Mexico 
did take place as the authoritarian regime was dissolved and a competitive electoral 
system was established.
161 Some of the most popular interpretations of the Mexican 
process which denied the existence of democratic political change lost relevance after 
the 2000 presidential elections, when an opposition party, the PAN, defeated the PRI for 
the first time in history after 70 years in power. The alternation in power was of dual 
significance, as it not only showed that the former official party had lost its capacity to 
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mobilise its traditional corporatist bases but also that it had negotiated and accepted 
along with the other parties the new rules of the game to access power. With regard to 
the most common interpretations of the Mexican transition, it is worth noting that put 
forward by Cesar Cansino. He claimed that the political change in Mexico was not a 
process of transition but a process of liberalisation prompted by the regime in order to 
stay in power.
162 Cansino argued that in order to understand the Mexican process it was 
important to clearly distinguish the differences between the processes of liberalisation 
and democratisation.
163 Accordingly, he identified the electoral opening in 1977, and the 
successive electoral reforms pursued by the authoritarian regime as temporary solutions 
to a crisis of legitimacy, which never led to a process of democratisation.
164 Moreover, 
the  various  electoral  reforms  were  perceived  as  mere  instruments  to  legitimate  the 
different  political  and  economic  crises.
165  Another  important  interpretation  of  the 
Mexican transition was the one by Jesús Silva-Herzog Márquez which was presented in 
his  work  “The  old  regime  and  the  transition  to  democracy  in  Mexico”.
166  Like  the 
previous  interpretation  this  view  lost  credibility  after  the  2000  elections,  which 
witnessed  the  defeat  of  the  ruling  party,  the  PRI.  He  called  the  Mexican  process  a 
“transitocracia”, a term created by him, which refers to a stage that is stuck between a 
regime that has started eroding but has not disappeared completely and a new regime 
that is emerging but has not been consolidated. He defined the Mexican transition as: 
“an  equidistant  situation  between  authoritarianism  and  democracy..,  this  frozen 
transition  constitutes  a  peculiar  mode  of  organising  the  power,  that  instead  of 
dissolving in time, it consolidates.
167 According to Marquez, the “transitocracia” is a 
political  stage  in  which,  despite,  the  electoral  reforms  successfully  diminishing  the 
power of the authoritarian regime, the emerging political forces are not strong enough to 
push the transition further towards a definitive democracy.
168 From his point of view the 
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transition to democracy started but failed to reach conclusion. Marquez notes that this 
“impasse situation” can be placed after the 1997 mid-term elections, in which, as a 
result of the 1996 electoral reform, the PRI lost absolute majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies for the first time and was forced to co-govern with the opposition in Congress 
and  in  the  Federal  Government.
169  The  author  notes  that  despite  the  fact  that  both, 
political  parties  and  opposition  had  the  chance  to  negotiate  a  transition,  they  were 
unable to achieve agreement due to old political practices and authoritarian culture.
170  
Finally, one of the most accepted views on the Mexican transition is the one presented 
by Ricardo Becerra, Pedro Salazar and José Woldenberg in their work “Mecánica del 
Cambio Político”.
171 According to the authors Mexico experienced a truly democratic 
transition after the 1977 electoral reform. They claim that the 1977 electoral reform 
initiated a process of democratisation because it modified the composition of Congress, 
a vital organ of the state. The reform increased the size of Congress and introduced 
Proportional Representation, which opened the party system to those parties excluded in 
the past. Once the parties were able to enter the party system they gained strength which 
contributed to more competitive elections putting them in positions of representation 
which allowed them to push for new reforms that increased their strength further. The 
authors called this cycle of “reforms-stronger parties-reforms” “The Mechanic of the 
political  change.”
172  This  interpretation  of  the  Mexican  transition  focuses  on  the 
successive electoral reforms and their impact on the party and electoral system. 
Despite the different interpretations of the Mexican political process, it is a fact that 
Mexico experienced a process of political change between 1977 and 2000. Although the 
most significant political changes that led to the intensification of the transition and 
ultimately to the achievement of democracy, took place between 1994 and 2000.   
 
1.6 The Mexican transition: its particularities 
                                                 
169 As the PRI obtained only 239 seats of a total of 500, it was forced to negotiate.  The PRD was second, with 124 
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The literature on democratic transitions has emphasised the role of elite negotiations, or 
pacts. Also, historically, the study of Mexican politics has focused heavily on political 
elites.  However,  recent  studies  on  Mexican  politics  and  regime  liberalisation  have 
placed  greater  emphasis  on  other  dimensions  of  politics,  especially  on  elections. 
Elections and electoral politics have played a very important part in Mexican politics. 
First of all, they contributed to the dominance of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary 
Party by giving it legitimacy and allowing it to rule without excessive repression. Also, 
opposition parties have used elections to push for political reforms and liberalisation, 
and  their  success  in  state  and  municipal  elections  has  helped  build  opposition 
organisations and popularity. 
The transition in Mexico was a gradual and slow process of political change, where an 
authoritarian civil regime with hegemonic party changed into an electoral democracy 
with competitive, clean and free elections with the possibility of alternation. As noted 
earlier,  the  characteristics  of  the  post-revolutionary  regime  influenced  the  way  the 
process took place. First of all, it was the civil aspect of the regime, its social stability, 
centralisation of power in the presidency
173, power of the president, corporatist regime, 
regular elections, social stability and paternalistic regime that defined the route for the 
transition. Additionally, the coexistence of authoritarian and liberal democratic precepts 
and practices, allowed the Mexican authoritarian regime to function at the same time as 
opening the possibility of a gradual process without violence.
174 As a result, the regime 
was  able  to  maintain  the  regular  functioning  of  its  institutions,  with  styles  and 
procedures  that  without  being  democratic,  were  not  totally  dictatorial.
175  The  non-
military character of the Mexican regime contrasted to most of the other Latin American 
countries where the highly repressive character of their military regimes was decisive in 
the configuration of their transitions. The different types of military regimes in Latin 
America had two features in common, the central role of the military in the definition 
and  management  of  economic  polices  and  the  battle  against  communism.
176  The 
military  character  of  these  regimes  and  their  strong  opposition  to  communism 
contributed  to  their  repressive  character  which  was  characterised  by  the  killing  and 
torturing of members of the opposition, prohibition of trade unions and political parties, 
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violation of political constitutions and the dismembering of civil society. As a result, 
most of the transitions from military dictatorship in Latin America took the route of 
collapse  or  rupture.    However,  in  the  case  of  Mexico,  due  to  the  strong 
institutionalisation  of  its  political  regime,  the  government  enjoyed  a  high  level  of 
“effective and efficient decision making” which was adapted and used against changing 
circumstances or threats coming from the political community. In Mexico the political 
change took place through electoral reforms to the Constitution and the electoral law 
which intended to adjust the electoral system. Consequently, the transition came about 
as a gradual process of incorporation and mutual adjustment.  Given that context, in 
order to understand the Mexican transition it is important to aknowledge the electoral 
dimension. From an institutional perspective, the Mexican transition towards democracy 
started with the 1977 electoral reform which was initiated by the government. This first 
reform is perceived as being a liberalising measure of the official party, the PRI, to 
grant some political and civil rights in a move towards democracy, in order to recover 
lost legitimacy, but with the clear intention of controlling the process.
 177 Despite the 
electoral reforms being initiated by the PRI’s government they eventually benefitted the 
opposition,  which  through  gaining  powers  and  social  support  made  the  elections 
competitive. This first electoral reform shaped the nature of the Mexican transition to 
democracy, which centred on two aspects: the party system and the electoral system. 
With regard to the phases of the transition, it can be said that it started in 1977 with the 
first  electoral  reform  initiated  by  the  government;  it  was  accelerated  with  the 
controversial elections in 1988 and it finished between 1996 and 2000, with the last 
electoral  reform  and  the  holding  of  the  presidential  election.  The  gradual  and  slow 
transition resulted from the fact that the PRI (official party) and the presidency also 
enjoyed absolute control over resources, the media and the electoral law and institution 
which not only ensured its victories but also blocked the advance and development  of 
the opposition.  
1.7 The Mexican transition from a comparative perspective 
                                                 
177 The understanding of the Mexican transition depends on the approach chosen. Under a historical point of view, the 
political change in Mexico has been placed in different periods, which varies from the 1950s union protests to the 
emergence of urban guerrilla in the late 1960s. However, under the historical perspective many political analysts 
agree in identifying the student movements of 1968 as the events that triggered the political change in Mexico.  
In reference to the consequences of the student movements Rabasa notes that the brutal repression of the student 
movement contradicted the popular image of the Mexican regime known as paternalist and protective. As a result the 
call for political change towards democracy was extended to society in general. Despite triggering the spirit of 
political change, the Mexican regime did not respond until 1977, when the PRI introduced the first electoral reform.
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Most  of  the  works  on  the  process  of  transition  to  democracy  from  authoritarian 
regimes
178 have been centred on the analyses of a crisis experienced by a given regime 
and the emergence of agreements and pacts between the political elites and the level of 
their  success  in  creating  a  new  regime  of  democratic  character.  Hence,  the  most 
accepted concept of transition refers to the interval between one regime and another, 
which means that the transitions are delimited, on one side by the dissolution of the 
authoritarian  regime  and  on  the  other  by  either  the  establishment  of  some  form  of 
democracy,
179 or the return of some type of authoritarian regime or the emergence of a 
revolutionary alternative.
180  
Many authors have encountered problems in giving the Mexican Transition a typology 
within the most representative cases due to its particular characteristics. The Mexican 
case does not fit easily into the models that have been used to study democratisation in 
countries of Southern Europe,  Latin America, and Central and  Eastern  Europe. The 
various  cases  of  transitions  in  what  Huntington  called  the  “Third  Wave  of 
democratisation”  presented  common  factors  including  political  transitions  through 
reforms, pacts, ruptures or regimes’ collapse.
181 With regard to the most ideal model of 
transition: political change in which the various political elite based on a rupture in the 
past, decide to pact and negotiate leading to an institutional political transformation of 
the country, the Mexican transition is at serious odds. First of all, the Mexican transition 
did not experience significant political reforms or a foundational pact between the old 
elite and the new political actors that led to democratisation; such as in the Spanish and 
Brazilian transitions.
182 The only pacts or negotiations were made exclusively in the 
electoral arena. Agreements were limited to the electoral issues in the form of electoral 
reforms.
183 From the beginning, all political agreements were based on the opening of 
electoral processes and the reinforcement of the institutions in charge of them there was 
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no  proposal  for  a  major  transformation  in  the  institutional  frame.
184  It  was  more  a 
process of electoral changes which in time strengthened the political parties and allowed 
them to push for further changes in the electoral arena. Therefore, since the beginning, 
changes were intended only for the electoral arena and party system. Accordingly, the 
political liberalisation initiated by the PRI in the late 1970s was not planned to trespass 
on  the  limits  of  the  electoral  process  towards  democratisation,  despite  generating 
political activism and allowing the opposition to organise.
185 Secondly, 
 there had not 
been a rupture with the previous regime or conflicts that forced the ruling government to 
agree to decisive agreements such as in Chile.
186 What came about in Mexico were 
changes based on the gradual and continuous opening to political plurality. As a result, a 
pattern  of  gradual  institutional  modifications  started  occurring  without  a  rupture,  as 
there was no uncontrollable irruption of new actors to provoke it. Another distinction 
between other transitions and the Mexican case is that the authoritarian regime never 
did  collapse  as  had  happened  in  countries  such  as  Argentina.
187  Although,  Mexico 
experienced several crises including a “government crisis” (governability crisis) in the 
1970s  that  triggered  a  liberalisation  process  and  also  suffered  a  serious  crisis  of 
legitimacy provoked by the highly contested 1988 presidential election, and a split in 
the corporative pact that supported the regime, the political crisis did not turn into a 
collapse  or  a  transformation  of  the  authoritarian  regime.  It  is  important  to  note, 
however, that the government was subject to pressure from various sources; including 
the  popular  classes  who  opposed  the  economic  austerity,  the  middle  sectors  who 
demanded more political representation and the business elites who pressured for more 
intervention  in  politics.  There  was  also  indirect  pressure  from  external  sources.  
However, despite all of this, the various political and economic crises in the 1980s,
188 
                                                 
184 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November, 2004. 
185 Considering examples such as “the political decompression” (political opening) in Brazil 1974-1982, the 
democratic reform in Spain during 1975, the “aperture” of Chile from 1983, and the democratic reform of some East 
European countries in the 80s, it becomes possible to appreciate that all political liberalisation led to a re-articulation 
of forces and political resources, as well as the redefinition, of the existing political rules. Cansino, C., La Transición 
en México, 1977-2000, p.79. 
186  Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
187 Interview, Javier Romo Michaud, Advisor to President Councillor 2003-2010 (IFE) and political academic, 
Mexico City, 12 November 2004. 
188 The 1980s economic crisis severely affected the living standards of the population and created a massive 
expression of discontent within civil society that affected the appeal of the regime among the masses. Interview, 
Mauricio Merino, political academic and Electoral Councillor 1996-2000, General Council (IFE), December, 2007. Lidia Acosta                                              Chapter 1 The Mexican Transition and the Mexican Regime 
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did not force the PRI to abandon power.
189 In fact, even after the transition, the former 
hegemonic party, PRI continued to be an important player in the political arena.  As a 
result, the former political leaders of the authoritarian regime carried on operating along 
with the new political leaders.
190 Finally, the Mexican transition did not experience a 
regime  collapse  due  to  external  factors  as  had  happened  in  some  East  European 
countries. Therefore, in contrast to others transitions, Mexico did not suffer a rupture 
with the past, in which after the ruling elite lost power and the institutions were eroded 
this led to the construction of new institutions including parties, assemblies, electoral 
methods, etc.
191 Instead of a transformation or a new design of the rules of the game and 
political institution, Mexico recouped and re-activated old ones, such as the Congress 
and the Constitution.
192 Thus, the 1917 constitution was recovered in the sense that the 
norms  and  the  exercise  and  application  of  those  came  closer.  Also  Congress  was 
reactivated as a result of the successive electoral reforms that introduced plurality. For 
that reason, despite democratic norms and institutions existing during the authoritarian 
rule, they did not function or were not applied accordingly. In this context, political 
institutions such as municipal governments, state congresses, city governments and the 
chambers of congress were gradually revived and adapted to a new context of party 
plurality. Therefore, except for the electoral institutions, after the culmination of the 
Mexican transition, the original design of the political institutions stayed the same.  
The main reason for Mexico not following the traditional routes of collapse and opening 
to new democratic rules through pacts and agreements as occurred in many countries, is 
the character of the political system that existed for more than 60 years. It basically, 
experienced a slow process of dissolution, without collapse or rupture, with institutional 
changes, where the routines of democratic character were opened slowly, but without 
pause. Since the 1960s, Mexico experienced a process of gradual political change that in 
good  measure,  avoided  the  abrupt  collapse  of  the  regime.  In  addition  to  this,  the 
inclusive  nature  of  its  authoritarian  regime,  a  widely  accepted  Constitution  and 
                                                 
189 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
Romera notes that it is important to remember that despite the PRI starting the electoral reforms as political 
concessions in order to hold onto power, in time it realised that the only way for the party to survive was for it to 
become a real political party ready to compete and not simply to rule. This realisation was essential for the PRI to 
carry on functioning as a major political party. 
190 Merino notes that a change of the political class never took place, therefore the new actors and old actors had to 
learn how to live in a democracy: for instance, to negotiate with the adversary and achieve consensus. Interview, 
Mauricio Merino, political academic and Electoral Councillor 1996-2000, General Council (IFE), 17 December 2007. 
191 See Merino, M. La transición votada. 
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institutional arrangements formally democratic contributed to the gradual non repressive 
transition.
193  
1.8 Conclusion 
The model of transition to democracy in Mexico has three components: a) it was a 
gradual and slow change through stages; b) it took a negotiated route, in electoral issues, 
that  avoided  ruptures  and  established  a  dialogue  to  achieve  compromises  and  c)  it 
produced a change in which the negotiation was centred on the “rules of the game”. In 
general, in order to understand the democratic transition in Mexico it is necessary to 
appreciate the achievement of each of the electoral reforms and their impact on the 
modification of the electoral scene. The more important episodes of negotiation in the 
transition in Mexico were the successive politico-electoral reforms that took place in 
1977, 1986, 1989-90, 1993, 1994, and 1996. In each of these phases, the process of 
change was developed in the following way. An expansive dynamic that enforced the 
parties, that produced movements and increased competition; competition that generated 
new spaces for the forces that impulsed them.
194  
In the following chapters, the study of each of the reforms, and the effects they had in 
transforming  the  political  reality  will  be  addressed.  In  particular  the  creation  of  the 
electoral commission in 1990, the Federal Electoral Institute, its role in this process of 
transition and its main functions will be covered in the last five chapters. 
 
                                                 
193 The civil political life of Mexico contrasted to the Latinamerican military regimes, particularly in having civil 
political institutions without major imbalances. See Cansino, C. La transición en México, 1977-2000.  
194 This dynamic of change was called by the authors Becerra, R., Salazar, P. and Woldenberg, J. as the “The 
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2  Chapter  2  Electoral  Reforms  between  1946  and  1977:  From 
cosmetic reforms to democratic reforms 
Before  examining  electoral  reform  in  Mexico  and  the  role  of  the  IFE  (The  Federal 
Electoral Institute) in the transition to democracy, it is important to describe the context 
in  which  these  reforms  took  place.  This  will  provide  the  necessary  background  for 
examining the successive electoral reforms that took place until the creation of the IFE 
in  1990.  This  chapter  will  concentrate  on  the  analysis  of  initial  electoral  reforms 
highlighting  the  significance  of  particular  time  periods,  beginning  with  the  largely 
cosmetic reforms made between 1946 and 1963 and explaining how they contributed to 
the consolidation of a hegemonic party system. The socio-political events between 1963 
and 1977 that put pressure on the government to enact electoral reform in 1977 will then 
be  outlined.  I  will  examine  how  these  earlier  electoral  reforms  contributed  to  the 
consolidation of the hegemony party system and affected the political sphere that would 
provoke  a  decisive  electoral  reform  in  1977.  Finally,  socio-economic  and  political 
events during the 1980s that led to the last electoral reform of the hegemonic party 
system period will be examined.  
Firstly, in order to introduce the idea that the first electoral reforms contributed to the 
consolidation of the hegemony party system in Mexico, I will analyse how the regime 
used the electoral rule to consolidate its power, especially during the period 1946-63.  
The Mexican system experienced a relentless process of electoral reform.
1 This constant 
process of electoral reform contributed to the endurance of Mexico’s hegemony party. 
Horcasitas poses the question of why the official party wanted to reform the rules of the 
game that already allowed it to win
2. One of the possible answers to this question lies in 
the fact that the elite of the official party controlled the process of electoral reform in 
Mexico thus it was used not as a means to pursue change, but  as a  means to ease 
pressure for change and maintain power.  During the 1940s and 1960s reforms were 
designed to consolidate the hegemony party system, not dismantle it. By the 1970s and 
1980s the economic and political instability not only accelerated the pace of electoral 
                                                 
1 See table 1 in Appendix B. 
2 Molinar Horcasitas, J. Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas. London: The Institute of Latin American Studies, 
1996. p.26. The author notes that the survival of the hegemonic party in Mexico was the result of a “ process of 
electoral reform that steered a delicate course between the Scylla of internal factionalism and the Charybdis of the 
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reforms but also made electoral reform the issue of discussion between the government 
and political parties. In this context, as Horcasitas argues, the manipulation of electoral 
procedures became an instrument to avoid further changes when facing liberalisation 
pressures.
 3  Also the official party suffered internal division during the hegemonic party 
system,  and  also  in  time  in  relation  to  electoral  reform.  In  order  to  understand  the 
characteristics and differences between the early electoral reforms (1946-1963) and the 
late electoral reforms (1963-1986) it is important to look first at the role of formal and 
informal rules in Mexico.  
 
2.1  Formal and unwritten rules in Mexico: the power of the president 
Many analysts agree that a combination of formal and unwritten or informal rules and 
institutions created a particular political context that contributed to the dominance of the 
hegemonic  party  in  Mexico.  Serrano  notes  that  both  the  1917  Constitution  and  the 
1928-29 Pact
4 established formal rules and institutions; however in time informal rules 
were  also  developed.
5  For  instance,  the  1917  Constitution  established  a  federalist 
republic based on the traditional division of power into three branches of government; 
however the executive branch had received greater powers than the others.
6 As a result 
of this, the president became the key piece of the political system, as he headed all three 
branches of government and all political activity was concentrated in the official party.
7 
Additionally,  the  1928-29  Pact  and  the  creation  of  the  official  party  also  generated 
informal rules such as those regulating intra-party discipline, loyalty to the party and the 
rewards  system,  elite  circulation  and  mass  mobilisation  through  corporatism  further 
contributed  to  restrict  political  activity  to  the  governing  coalition.
8  In  this  context, 
informal rules also proved to be very important not only for the consolidation of the 
                                                 
3 Molinar Horcasistas, J. El Tiempo de la Legitimidad, Mexico: Cal y Arena, 1993, p.6. 
4 The 1928-29 Pact was the unification by President Calles of the different revolutionary factions into one party, 
creating the PNR (the National Revolutionary Party).  
5 Serrano, M. Rebuilding the state: Mexico after Salinas”, p.5. 
6 For an outlining of the reasons of the greater powers of the presidency see Cosío Villejas, D. El Sistema Político 
Mexicano, Mexico, 1982 Ed Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz, p. 22; González Cosío, A. Notas para un estudio sobre el 
estado mexicano. In:  México: cuatro ensayos de sociología politica, Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, 1972, p. 139; Lambert, J. América Latina, Barcelona: Ariel, 1970, pp.552-553. 
7 Manuel Moreno Sánchez notes how the centralisation of the political-administration was characterised by an official 
party as the only party, a president of the republic as the supreme head of the party and the government and the one in 
charge of selecting or removing governmental officials at all levels. Moreno Sánchez, M. Crisis Política de México. 
México: Extemporáneos, 1970, pp.42-23. 
8 Monica Serrano notes that the discipline became the “golden rule of the political system and a distinctive feature of 
the Mexican political class” and “the intra-party discipline was a result of a mix of incentives, pressures and 
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official  party  but  also  for  establishing  its  position  as  the  main  domain  of  political 
activity.
9 Finally, the incorporation of the corporatist sectors and the demilitarisation of 
the  official  party  produced  further  informal  rules  based  on  favour  and  priviliges.
10 
Serrano notes these operational procedures inside the official party also governed and 
assisted  “structure  relations  and  practices  among  PRI  and  non  PRI  sectors”.
11  The 
application  of  these  informal  laws  explains  the  inability  of  other  political  forces  to 
emerge outside the hegemonic party. However, Prud’home argues that formal laws did 
have a role in the consolidation of the hegemonic party.
12 Prud’home notes that during 
the PRI’s hegemony the regime used the electoral institution as a device to control all 
political  activity  by  deciding  who  could  participate  and  the  conditions  of  that 
participation.
13 However, by the late 1970s, the old electoral practices and institutions 
which had been functioning for nearly forty years became obsolete as they could not 
respond  to  a  new  political  context  and  increasing  party  competition.
14  As  noted  in 
chapter 1, the creation of the official party PNR (National Revolutionary Party) in 1929 
marked  the  beginning  of  the  hegemonic  party  system.  Since  the  official  party  was 
created to govern and not to compete for power, the political coalition did not operate as 
a proper political party. In this way, the official party, (PNR, PRN, PRI)
15 maintained its 
claim to a peculiar right to rule, related to the way the party emerged and achieved 
power after the Mexican revolution, essentially as a grand coalition. The revolutionary 
legitimacy of the official party not only contributed to its popularity and appeal amongst 
the masses, therefore to its dominance in the political competition, but also served to 
invalidate  and  undermine  all  external  opposition,  that  was  dismissed  as 
counterrevolutionary. Despite the fact that the origin of the hegemonic party ensured its 
dominance in the political arena, the regime also needed a functioning electoral system. 
Regular elections gave the PRI a way to renew its legitimacy as the successor of the 
                                                 
9 Ibid. p.5. 
10 Ibid. p.6. 
11 The non PRI sectors included the State’ owned enterprises, the Catholic Church, Business sectors. Ibid. p.5. 
12 Prud’home notes that the electoral institution was a result of a succession of formal laws and that the hegemonic 
party used them to control all electoral activities including elections and party competition. Prud’home, Jean-Francois 
“The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE): Building an impartial electoral authority, pp.139-140. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Interview, Javier Romo Michaud, Advisor to President Councillor 2003-2010 (IFE) and political academic, Mexico 
City, 12 November 2004. 
15 The official party was originally created by Calles as PNR (National Revolutionary Party), then restructured by 
Cardenas incorporating the corporatist sectors and called PRM (Party of the Mexican Revolution), and finally in 
1946, Avila Camacho who introduced further reforms in the party including turning the coalition of military leaders 
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revolution.
16  Middlebrook  notes  that  elections  played  a  double  legitimating  role 
including: “as popular validation of popular consent” and “as a means to periodically 
mobililise public support for government activities, the party system and the official 
party.” 
17 Also, elections guaranteed the turnover of the coalition elite which reduced 
insurgence inside the party. All electoral functions from the organisation of elections, to 
the supervision and allocations of resources were under the control of the presidency, 
thus not allowing competitive parties and elections. In addition, in this party system, the 
hegemonic  party  was  surrounded  by  a  periphery  of  secondary  parties  known  as 
“satellite parties”. It is important to emphasise the significance of the 1933 amendment 
to  the  Constitution  prohibiting  re-election.
18  This  law  not  only  allowed  the  diverse 
“camarillas” 
19 to circulate through the different posts in Congress and state and local 
governments but more importantly it allowed the president to change every six years. 
Consequently,  despite  the  PRI  presidential  candidate  being  selected  by  the  former 
president, in every term the regime could announce a new set of promises and changes 
that enhanced its dynamics.
20  Finally, holding regular elections allowed the official 
party to appear to compete with other opposition parties, contributing to the democratic 
appeal  of  the  regime.  Levy  and  Bruhn  note  that  the  “PRI  was  so  concerned  with 
maintaining  at  least  a  token  opposition  that  it  subsidised  the  smallest  parties  and 
sponsored electoral reforms when discouraged opposition leaders threatened to quit.
21 
Such reforms were not intended to let opposition parties threaten the PRI, just keep 
them  in  the  game  by  offering  incentives  for  participation  and  sanctions  for 
nonparticpation.  
 
                                                 
16 Levy,  Daniel, C. & Bruhn, K. note that the PRI often “cheated to increase its vote even when it won, in order to 
make its position look less vulnerable and ratify its status as the party of all Mexicans”, Levy,  Daniel C. & Bruhn, K. 
Mexico: the Struggle for Democratic Development. With Emilio Zebadúa. University of California Press: London, 
2001, p.87.  
17 Middlebrook, K. Political Liberalisation: Mexico in Transition from Authoritarian Rule, Latin America, ed. 
O’Donnell, G, Schmitter, P, Whitehead, L. Baltimore and London: the John Hopkins University Press, p.125. 
18 See chapter 1. This principle was established in order to avoid the re-election of a president after six years being in 
office, after the dictator Porfirio Diaz had previously renewed his presidency for 30 years. 
19 Camarilla is a group of courtiers or favourites which surround a king or ruler. Usually, they do not hold any office 
or have any official authority but influence their ruler behind the scenes. Consequently, they also escape having to 
bear responsibility for the effects of their advice. In the case of Mexico, these groups of courtiers surrounded the 
PRI’s elite. See the chapter on camarillas and clientelism (structure and institution) in Cornelius, Wayne, A. and 
Craig, A. L. The Mexican political system in transition. San Diego: Centre for U.S. – Mexican Studies, 1991, pp.39-
44. 
20 The principle of no re-election also allowed the re-activisation of the electorate every six years. Despite everyone 
being aware of the lack of competitiveness of the elections, the new PRI’s presidential candidates provided a sense of 
change, something that was positive for the regime. Interview, Member of PAN A, National Executive Committee, 
October 28 2004. 
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2.2 Cosmetic electoral reforms  
The Mexican Electoral legislation and electoral institutions have been essential to the 
consolidation of the official party, which has been catalogued as hegemonic.  Between 
1946 when the first federal electoral law was created and 1986, when the last electoral 
reform under the hegemonic party system took place, the Federal Electoral Commission 
developed  and  changed.  Although,  over  time  the  electoral  process  became  more 
complex and the electoral body in charge of managing elections changed, up until the 
end of the 1980s both the electoral process and the electoral institutions remained under 
the control of the executive branch. The Federal Election Commission was a branch of 
the Ministry of the Interior in which the Minister of the Interior was appointed directly 
by the president. The majority of the members of the board of the commission were PRI 
members who were selected directly by the president. Functions such as the counting of 
votes,  the  registration  of  parties  and  the  nomination  of  candidates  were  the 
responsibility of the executive. Consequently, the role and figure of the Minister of the 
Interior was crucial for maintaining control over the electoral process. However, by the 
end  of  the  1980s  the  lack  of  impartiality  and  autonomy  of  the  body  that  regulated 
elections became an important demand of the opposition and therefore a major issue for 
reform.
22 
In  the  following  sections,  the  electoral  reforms  between  1946  and  1986  will  be 
analysed.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  PRI  representatives  were  guaranteed  a  majority 
position  in  the  Federal  Electoral  Commission,  relegating  the  opposition  parties  to 
second position.  The official party believed that having the opposition represented was 
beneficial to its legitimacy.  However, the influence and power of the opposition had to 
be limited. In this way, as the PRI was interested in maintaining a “token opposition” it 
not  only  promoted  small  parties  but  also  sponsored  electoral  reforms  to  encourage 
opposition parties to participate.
23 The government would make sure that the political 
parties participated in the political system but not compete. Once the opposition parties 
started to get stronger, the official party would introduce changes and amendments to 
the electoral laws in order to guarantee votes for the official party. This power of the 
official party to change the law was given by a staggering majority of the PRI in the 
                                                 
22 Prud’home, J-F. The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), p.145. 
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Congress.
24 The electoral reforms between 1946 and 1986 are catalogued as cosmetic 
because they were designed not only to maintain the hegemonic party system but also to 
consolidate it. Such reforms were carried out to ease the pressure for change while 
trying to maintain its power and control.  
 
2.2.1  The Electoral reform of 1946 
Since the creation of the official party in 1929, that claimed revolutionary legitimacy, 
the arena of political competition had been restricted to the governing coalition. By the 
mid 1940s the official party had already incorporated all major political, social and 
economic groups within the party and their elite supported the principle of single party 
government. However, it was in 1946 that the electoral processes were institutionalised 
first by the approval of the 1946 electoral law and secondly by the transformation of the 
PRM  into  the  PRI.  The  new  electoral  law  centralised  the  organisation  of  electoral 
processes in the government with the creation of a federal electoral commission called 
“Federal Commission for Electoral Surveillance”.
25 The electoral law of 1946 supposed 
a complete change in respect of the previous electoral law approved in 1918. In the 
1918  electoral  law,  local  government  had  the  authority  to  organise  elections,  and 
introduced  few  restrictions  to  partisan  activity  and  the  process  of  registering 
candidacies.
26 In parallel, local and district commissions and a Council for the Electoral 
Roll were created. Consequently, all electoral processes were centralised in organs of 
the Federal Executive such as the Ministry of the Interior or organs dominated by it, 
such as the Federal Electoral Commission and the National Registry of Voters.
27 In 
addition, the transformation of the PNR (Partido Nacional Revolutionario) into the PRI 
(Institutional Revolutionary Party) signalled the confirmation of the official party as an 
instrument of the presidency.
28  
According to various authors the enactment of the new electoral law on January, 7, 1946 
contributed  to  the  hegemony  of  the  official  party  in  the  electoral  arena  and  to  its 
                                                 
24 Prud’home, J-F. Op. cit. p.145 
25 Prior to the 1946 electoral law, there was “the law for Elections of the Federal Powers” issued on June, 2 1918. 
This law allocated most of the electoral functions to the municipal authorities, voters, parties and candidates. As a 
result all of the responsibility for the organisation and surveillance of electoral procedures was highly decentralised 
and the Executive did not have role in the process. See Molinar Horcasitas, J. El tiempo de la Legitimidad, p.26. 
26 See García Orozco, A. Legislación Electoral Mexicana, 1812-1988, Adeo Editores, S.A. Mexico, 1988. pp.225-37. 
27 Molinar Horcasitas, J. El tiempo de la Legitimidad, p.28. 
28 See Jacqueline Peschard. Las elecciones en el Distrito Federal. Thesis presented in the Faculty of Political and 
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consolidation in the political system.
29 First of all, the new electoral law eliminated the 
right to present independent candidacies and stipulated that only political parties could 
register candidates.
30 More importantly, the law established that only national political 
parties  that  obtained  registry  in  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  could  participate  in 
elections.
31 The law established demanding criteria for the creation of national political 
parties  that  many  opposition  parties  could  not  meet.
32  For  instance,  among  other 
conditions, the law established that for a party to be recognised as a national political 
party it had to confirm a minimum of 30,000 members in the country and at least 1000 
in  each  of  the  two-thirds  federal  entities.
33  Klesner  notes  that  such  strict  conditions 
forced the oldest and one of the most important parties, the Communist party, to go 
underground.
34  Therefore,  despite  the  new  law  allowing  the  existence  of  opposition 
parties, it included mechanisms to control the size and nature of them, in order to avoid 
any threats to the PRI hegemony.
35 Consequently the 1946 electoral reform contributed 
to  the  PRI’s  hegemony  in  electoral  politics.
36  Secondly,  by  giving  to  a  government 
body, the Federal Commission for Electoral Surveillance, the task of the preparation, 
development and supervision of the federal elections, the law granted the PRI control of 
the elections.
37 As a result, the government, hence the PRI, exercised its control on the 
electoral  process  through  having  PRI  members  in  key  positions  in  the  Electoral 
Commission. For example, the Federal Commission for Electoral Surveillance consisted 
of the Minister of the Interior, another member of the cabinet, two representatives of the 
legislature,  one  for  each  chamber,  and  two  representatives  of  the  national  political 
                                                 
29 Serrano, M. The legacy of Gradual Change: Rules and Institutions under Salinas, 1996, p. 9, Klesner, JL. 
“Changing patterns on electoral participation” Mexican politics in Transition, USA:Westview Press, Inc, 1987, pp 
98-99. Needler, M. Mexican Politics: The containment of Conflict, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1995, pp.15-16 
30 This prohibition contained in Art 60 of the 1946 electoral law, was related to the fact that most of the PRI’s 
challengers at elections had been former members of the PRI’s elite who left the official party and presented 
independent candidacies. E.g. Padilla, Henriquez, Amaro Castro, Calderón. 
31 Such high requirements to form political parties were intended to discourage personal candidacies outside the 
official party as “it had been the main source of electoral opposition in the past.” See Prud’home, J-F. The Instituto 
Federal Electoral (IFE), p.142. 
32 “The Political parties are political associations constituted according to the law, by Mexican citizens…for electoral 
objectives and of political orientation.” García Orozco, A. Legislación Electoral Mexicana, 1812-1988.  
33 (Article 24, Fraction I). Other conditions for a party to be registered as a national party included the requirements 
to respect the Mexican Constitution, to not pact or depend on international organisations, to have a national assembly 
and a national administrative commission and local commissions, etc. Ibid. pp.11-12. 
34 Klesner, JL., Changing patterns on electoral participation” Mexican politics in Transition. USA: Westview Press, 
Inc, 1987. p.98. 
35 Prud’home, J-F. The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), p.142. 
36 Klesner, J.L. Op. cit. p.98. 
37 The allocation of the organisation of elections to the government contrasted to the previous electoral law which had 
given the organisation of elections to the local governments and had established few limitations on party registration 
and partisan activity. The electoral legislation applied until 1946 was the “Law for Elections of Federal Powers” 
issued by Carranza on June, 2, 1918. Prud’home notes that the 1918 electoral law was “an institutional agreement 
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parties. However, as the Minister of the Interior was appointed directly by the president 
and both chambers were formed by PRI members and controlled by the executive, the 
government was to begin with represented by five of six votes on the commission.
38 
Thus, from 1946 all party activity began to be regulated by PRI-Government through 
the Minister of the Interior who was the president of the electoral commission. Another 
important aspect that contributed to the PRI hegemony in the electoral system was the 
fact  that  the  Electoral  Commission  was  also  in  charge  of  the  registration  and 
cancellation of political parties. In this way, such prerogative by the Ministry of the 
Interior increased the government discretion over who could or not participate in the 
electoral  system,  which  played  an  important  role  in  reducing  the  power  of  the 
opposition.
39  As  noted  earlier,  only  parties  with  national  features  registered  by  the 
Ministry of the Interior could participate in electoral processes, while independent and 
other regional parties were excluded.
40 Another significant element of the control of the 
government in the electoral process was the composition of the electoral personnel. The 
electoral law gave the Electoral Commission the task of designating the personnel of the 
Local Electoral Commissions which in turn had to select the members of the District 
Electoral  Commissions.
41  Consequently,  the  organisation,  supervising  and  more 
importantly  the  task  of  counting  of  the  votes  were  the  responsibility  of  the  district 
electoral commissions which were made up of members dependent on the Ministry of 
the Interior.  The electoral law also gave to the Electoral Commission the function of 
selecting the personnel of the Electoral Register
42 who were in charge of functions such 
as drawing up the electoral lists and the delineation of limits of electoral districts.
43  As 
a result, the electoral staff were mainly employees of the Ministry of the Interior who 
were only allocated these duties during elections and this showed the PRI hegemony. 
Accordingly, during elections the administrative structures of the Commission and those 
of the Ministry of Government were not differentiated, therefore most of the electoral 
staff  were  mainly  personnel  from  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  staff  from  the  Local 
                                                 
38 Garcia Orozco, A. Legislación Electoral Mexicana, 1812-1988, p.243.  
39 Serrano, M. The legacy of Gradual Change: Rules and Institutions under Salinas. p.334. 
40 Prud’home, J-F. The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), p.142; Molinar Horcasistas, J. El tiempo de la Legitimidad, 
p.27. 
41 Ibid, p.142. 
42 The Electoral Registry was, since 1918, a permanent body, however with the 1946 law, it passed to be under the 
responsibility of the Council of the Electoral Roll, which was a federal organ dependent on the Federal Electoral 
Commission (Federal Commission of Electoral Surveillance). Moya Palencia, M. La Reforma Electoral Ediciones 
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Electoral Commission and employees from the Electoral Register.
44 As a result, the 
public  administration  assisted  the  official  party  with  both  material  and  human 
resources.
45 Another important aspect of this law, given that both chambers of Congress 
were dominated by the PRI, was the allocation of self-validation of the results of the 
presidential and congressional elections to the chambers. The acceptance or rejection of 
electoral  results  and  further  investigations  of  alleged  irregularities  by  parties  and 
citizens depended entirely on a body controlled by the government.
46 It is clear that the 
electoral  commission  in  charge  of  regulating  the  electoral  process  was  partial  and 
dependent on the hegemonic party, which contributed to its consolidation. Particularly, 
as the Minister of the Interior was at the same time the president of the Commission and 
the electoral staff were members of the government. It can therefore be said that all 
political activity was under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, thus under the PRI 
and  the  president.    Legitimate  competition  was  allowed  but  only  for  the  governing 
party. During this time the official party became the only arena for negotiation and 
representation of political interests and its strength depended more on the control of 
resources and the state apparatus than on other variables.
47 At the same time other rules 
such as informal rules regarding discipline within the elite were established. Political 
parties outside the PRI did not have the opportunity to compete; however competition 
among various factions within the official party continued.
48 The institutionalisation of 
the  elections  mainly  consolidated  the  structure  of  the  hegemonic  party  system  and 
confirmed the use of elections as an instrument of institutional legislation by the official 
party. The electoral institutionalisation also resulted in the modernisation of political 
discourse by the official party.  
 
2.2.2  Minor cosmetic reforms: 1949-1963  
Between 1946 and 1977, when the first democratic reform was enacted, a series of 
partial electoral reforms were passed that produced minor changes in the electoral law. 
During the period between 1946 and 1963 most of the changes to the electoral law were 
improvised modifications with the clear intention of consolidating the institutional basis 
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of the PRI.
49 This period which was characterised by relative instability in the number 
and type of legal parties, can be interpreted as the gestation of the modern hegemonic 
party.
50 Such instability in the party system further contributed to the strength of the 
hegemonic party while the opposition continued to be residual. However, during this 
period the hegemony of the PRI not only benefitted from its control over electoral rules 
and  institutions  but  also  from  economic  factors.
51  Just  three  years  after  the  1946 
electoral law, modifications to it were introduced. The 1949 law introduced the Ministry 
of  Justice  as  the  body  in  charge  of  the  investigation  of  electoral  complaints.
52  The 
Federal  Electoral  Law  of  1951  modified  the  composition  of  the  Federal  Electoral 
Commission, by increasing the number of representatives of political parties from two 
to three and reducing the number of representatives of the Executive from two to one.
53 
With this law, the regime demonstrated an intention to maintain a policy of opening on 
issues of party registry and parties’ relations. However, such changes did not alter the 
power  of  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  within  the  Commission.  Furthermore,  the  law 
increased  the  administrative  faculties  of  the  electoral  commission  such  as  the  total 
control  of  the  newly  created  National  Register  of  Voters  which  was  in  charge  of 
registering voters and determining electoral districts.
54 Additionally, a new method of 
vote counting was created that gave the commission greater administrative control.
55 
The development of the revolutionary elite highlighted contradictions within the party, 
and  thus,  created  opposition  inside  the  party.  The  reform  of  1954  tightened  the 
requirements to form political parties. The minimum of 30,000 members in the country 
that the 1946 law established was increased to 75,000 members, distributed in a way 
that  at  least  2,500  members  were  in  two  thirds  of  the  federative  entities.
56  Such 
modification  resulted  from  the  challenge  that  the  PRI  had  to  face  from  one  of  its 
dissidents,  Miguel  Henríquez  Guzman  therefore  discouraging  future  dissidents  from 
                                                 
49 See Prud’home, J-F. The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), p.143. 
50 The reasons for a process of initial reduction of registered parties can be seen in Molinar Horcasitas, J. El tiempo 
de la Legitimidad, pp.30-31. 
51 Mexico during the 1940s until the late 1950s enjoyed a period of economic growth known as “the Mexican 
Miracle”. This period of prosperity allowed the government to co-opt the corporate sectors (agrarian, labour and 
popular) while providing tangible benefits or rewards. See, Morris, SD. Political reformism in Mexico: an overview 
of Contemporary Mexican Politics. London: Lynne Riennerm 1995, p.22. Needler, M. Mexican Politics, pp.16-17. 
52 Prud’home notes that this introduction showed how the executive branch sought complete control of the electoral 
authority Jean-Francois Prud’home, The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), pp.142-143. 
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54 The National Register of Voters replaced the Council of the Electoral Roll.  Prud’home, J. The Instituto Federal 
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forming new electoral parties and reducing their options, especially before presidential 
elections.
57 Another reason for this measure was the negative results that the official 
party had obtained in the 1952 elections in which five registered parties participated.
58 
In this reform women were granted the right to vote at all levels.
59 Until 1953 only men 
had been considered citizens (Article 34 of the Constitution), but on October, 17 the 
condition of citizenry was granted to women therefore they obtained the active and 
passive right to vote.  
 
2.2.3  The 1963 and 1969 electoral reforms 
The second group of partial reforms took place between 1963 and 1977. These reforms 
can be considered semi-cosmetic. By the early 1960s the electoral system produced by 
the  hegemony  regime  was  characterised,  not  only  by  a  “distorted”  political 
representation where the PRI was overrepresented and important actors were excluded, 
but also by a total lack of credibility in the electoral processes.
60 In this context the 
government’s  main  objective  was  to  reinstate  legitimacy  to  all  three,  the  party,  the 
government  and  the  electoral  process.
61  As  a  result  of  the  government’s  concern  to 
ensure opposition representation in Congress the constitution and electoral law were 
amendmended on June, 23, 1963. The 1963 law adopted a representation system for the 
election of deputies. The formula introduced was called “party deputies” and offered for 
the first time an opening of the Chamber of deputies to the parties already registered. In 
other words, a minority block of proportional representation seats was established in 
congress for the opposition and the requirements for the formation of political parties 
eased.
62 Using this formula, minority parties were granted five seats if they obtained 
2.5% of the national vote and up to fifteen additional deputies (twenty in total), one seat 
                                                 
57 The most controversial presidential elections were those of 1929, 1940 and 1952 with protests about electoral fraud 
and led by former members of the official party such as José Vasconcelos, Juan Andrew Almazán y Miguel 
Henriquez Guzmán.  
58 The parties participating in the 1952 elections were (PRI), (PAN), (PPS), FPPM and PNM. In this election the 
PRI’s candidate Adolfo Ruiz Cortines confronted two strong opposition candidates including Miguel Hernández 
Henriquez Guzmán, an ex PRI member who launched his candidacy, and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, from the PPS. 
See Cosío Villejas, Daniel, “El momento Actual”. Historia Política y el Sistema Electoral Mexicano, pp.94-95.  
59 This right to vote for women was the extension of a previous law that only allowed them to vote and be elected in 
municipal elections. This extension of women’s right to vote in all types of election was ensured in Articles 34 and 
35. See Rabasa Gamboa, EO. Ochenta años de vida constitucional en México, p.149. 
60 Molinar Horcasitas, J. El tiempo de la Legitimidad, p.63. 
61 Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, pp.178–179. 
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constitucional en México, p.150. Lidia Acosta                                                                                         Chapter 2 The Electoral Reforms 
 
49 
for every additional 0.5% of the national vote.
63 The “party deputies” was the first step 
to introducing plurality within Congress.
64 The introduction of this “system of party 
deputies” became necessary when the PRI permanently held the majority representation 
and it became more difficult for the opposition to increase its representation. In some 
ways, the introduction of “party deputies” was the government’s attempt to stop a crisis 
of legitimacy of the electoral system.
65 However, despite the fact that this reform gave 
the opposition the opportunity to gain seats in the chamber of deputies, representation 
would still be controlled by the government which maintained the policy of numerous 
clauses.
66 In addition to the party deputies, the reform increased from two to three the 
number  of  parties  represented  by  the  Federal  Electoral  Commission,  but  again  the 
government and the PRI retained being majority in the Electoral Commission.
67 In this 
context,  assuming  that  the  representatives  of  both  the  legislative  and  executives 
branches  supported  the  PRI,  “the  government  could  count  on  the  six  votes  of  the 
Commission”.
68 According to Molinar Horcasitas this reform was the “method of the 
whip  and  the  carrot”, which  consisted  of  introducing  changes  to  open  the  electoral 
channels at the same as introducing measures to control it.
69 With the introduction of 
these measures the official party solved various problems including the problem of sub-
representation of the opposition by introducing electoral incentives for the parties to 
present  deputies’  candidates  and  the  short-term  reduction  of  anti-system  behaviour 
applied by  the PAN and the PPS in the previous decade. 
70 Finally, another aspect of 
the 1963 reform was the introduction for the first time of political parties in the Mexican 
constitutional history.
71  
The  1963  electoral  reform’s  incentives  for  political  participation  had  contradictory 
consequences. First of all, they contributed to an increase in the number of candidates 
from  registered  parties  competing  in  each  federal  electoral  district.  As  a  result  the 
                                                 
63 Prud’home, J-F., The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), p.142, Klesner, J. Changing Pattern of Electoral 
Participation, p.99. 
64 The creation of the figure of “Party Deputies” will be discussed later in this chapter.  
65 Molinar Horcasistas notes that this small concession of political space reserved for the opposition prevented 
violence in Mexico. Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Molinar Horcasistas, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su 
democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
66 Morris, S. D. Political reformism in Mexico, pp.178-179. 
67 Prud’home, J-F. The Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), p.144. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Molinar Horcasitas, J. El tiempo de la legitimidad,  p.65. 
70 Morris, SD. Political reformism in Mexico, pp.178-179, Molinar Horcasitas, J. El tiempo de la Legitimidad, p.65. 
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political parties started building regional bases and contending most of the elections. 
The artificial stimulation given to opposition parties to increase electoral participation in 
the territory helped the opposition parties, especially the PAN
72 to increase its strength 
and form cadres in the regions, thus leading to a gradual expansion and participation in 
most elections.
73 Secondly, the initial support for the reform by the opposition (mainly 
PAN  and  PPS)  contributed  to  their  temporal  participation  despite  it  being  a  non 
competitive electoral system.
74 However, new opposition political parties continued to 
experience  problems  entering  the  electoral  competition.  For  instance,  in  1963  new 
parties such as the FEP (Frente Electoral del Pueblo) were prevented from entering the 
party system by the Ministry of the Interior.
75 In addition, to denying the access of new 
parties,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  also  reduced  the  number  of  the  existing  ones. 
Consequently, the electoral options were reduced to just four parties including the PRI 
(Partido  Revolucionario  Institucional)  and  PAN  (Partido  de  Acción  Nacional)  since 
1946, the PPS (Partido Popular Socialista), since 1948, and PARM (Partido Auténtico 
de la Revolución Democrática), created and registered in 1957.
76 However, the PNM 
(Partido Nacional Mexicano) was cancelled by the Minister of the Interior in 1964 for 
having  internal  disorganisation  problems  for  example  having  three  different  groups 
claiming the leadership of the party.
77  Later, in the 1964 federal elections, only PRI, 
PAN,  PARM  and  PPS  were  registered  political  organisations  by  the  electoral 
commission. Among opposition parties, the PAN continued to be the more stable as it 
demonstrated sustainability and most importantly it adopted a political identity different 
from  the  PRI.  Other  opposition  parties  such  as  the  PARM  and  the  PPS  were  less 
independent. For instance, the PPS, despite having a different ideology
78 from the PRI, 
on its programmatic and practical levels it was the same as the regime so it was seen as 
                                                 
72 Alonso Lujambio notes that it was the first opportunity for the opposition to be in the Chamber of Deputies, in 
which the PAN obtained up to 20 deputies in 1964 in comparison to the three or four that it had obtained in the past. 
Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Alonso Lujambio, J. In “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 1. Mexico 
City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
73 For the regional PAN’s expansion see Loaeza, S. Mexico in Transition, 1988, p.45; Loaeza, S. PAN and the 
Paradoxes of opposition. In Party politics in “an Uncommon Democracy: Political Parties and elections in Mexico, 
edited by Harvey, N & Serrano, M.  London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1994.; Shirk, D Mexico’s New 
Politics The PAN and Democratic Change, London: Rienner Publishers, 2005.  
74 The positive positions of both PAN and PPS on the 1963 reform can be consulted in Política, January 15 1963; 
Year III, No.66 
75 In this case the Minister of the Interior alleged that most of the data presented by this party was false (membership, 
signatures, etc). 
76 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Jose Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico 
City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. The PNM (Partido Nacional Mexicano), in 1951 Woldenberg notes that the PPS and 
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part  of  the  PRI.  While  the  PARM’s  clear  support  of  the  PRI  made  it  difficult  to 
distinguish  it  as  different.
79  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  lack  of  independence  of  the 
PARM and PPS was also a result of the self interest of the hegemonic party.  Both 
parties were artificially granted “party deputies” by the Electoral College despite failing 
to reach the minimum threshold of 2.5% required by the constitution.
80 Molinar notes in 
time  these  bargains  proved  costly  for  the  electoral  system  as  they  exacerbated  the 
political  alienation  of  PAN,  thus  its  appeal  as  a  real  opposition.
81  Additionally,  the 
weakness of the opposition block (PPS and PARM) caused a dilemma in the system. On 
one hand, no support for these parties would contribute to a polarisation of the political 
scenario, (PRI-PAN), an option that the government did not want.  On the other, in 
order to avoid such polarisation, the government could open the register of political 
parties; however, it was not prepared to allow parties like the PCM to register. In the 
end, the government decided to maintain the status quo.
82 
 
2.2.4  The end of the Mexican Miracle and the 1968 student movement  
By the late 1960s both socio-economic and political factors created pressure for major 
electoral reform. First of all, the period known as the “Mexican miracle”
 83 characterised 
by  social  stability  and  economic  growth  ended.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  elected 
president  in  1964,  Gustavo  Díaz  Ordaz,  had  tried  to  continue  the  “government 
developing programme”, the economic crisis had already hit the middle class, which 
until  then  had  supported  the  system.
84  Secondly,  limitations  to  political  pluralism, 
difficulties of the social groups to become political actors and the systemic refusal to 
allow  free  expression  provoked  social  protests  that  created  perfect  conditions  for  a 
crisis.
85 Additionally, in the electoral arena, the overrepresentation of the PRI and sub-
representation of opposition parties in the districts of majority which resulted from the 
1963 electoral reform started being a problem for the regime.  
                                                 
79 Loaeza notes that the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) 
were perceived as mere instruments of the state. Loaeza, Mexico in Transition, p.45. 
80 The Electoral College was formed my members of the Chamber of Deputies which was dominated by the PRI.  
81 The decision of the Electoral College to grant party deputies to the PPS and PARM despite not reaching the 
minimum threshold of 2.5% in 1963 and 1970, was perceived by PAN as the regime’s strategy to diminish its 
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82 Ibid, p.86. 
83 “The Mexican Miracle” is the term used by historians to refer to the impressive econonomic growth that Mexico 
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However, the most critical event of this period was the government’s brutal massacre of 
demonstrators on July 26 1968 in Plaza of the Three Cultures at Tlatelolco.
86 For many 
historians this is when the transition started. The reaction of the Díaz Ordaz government 
confirmed the authoritarian nature of the Mexican regime as never before, especially 
given the international context.
87  All political forces criticised the brutal response of the 
government to the students. More importantly there was an impact on the popular image 
of the government.
88 The repression of the student movement influenced and altered the 
government image and undermined the myth of the Mexican revolution and produced a 
national conflict multiplied among the states, regions and universities.
89 As a result, 
faith in the PRI and the regime decreased, and the explosion of anti-system behaviour 
encouraged the opposition to demand change. Many groups that emerged as a result of 
this  protest  enjoyed  the  support  and  sympathy  of  the  nation’s  student  and  leftist 
intellectuals.
90  Becerra  notes  that  it  was  at  this  time  that  the  crisis  of  political 
representation became more evident than ever before, as party life and electoral life did 
not correspond to the social and political reality.
91 The immediate official response was 
shown with the constitutional reform of 1969 in which the right to vote was granted to 
18 year olds. Previously only an 18 year old married person or 21 year old single person 
could vote. The prerogative to vote in elections was now extended to everyone over 18 
years of age.
92 The subsequent reforms in 1973 and 1977 were the electoral answer to 
the problems of legitimacy in a period of economic crisis. The use of the electoral route 
to resolve socio-economic conflicts became a permanent instrument of the government.  
 
2.2.5  The reform of 1973 
In  1972  and  1973  the  government  and  the  newly  elected  president,  Echevarría, 
introduced a political opening known as “apertura política” in order to ease political 
pressure. One of the objectives of this opening policy was to create new political and 
                                                 
86 Protesters who were mainly students were attacked by soldiers with tanks and automatic weapons in an unprovoked 
attack. 
87 The student protest coincided with an era of worldwide student protests in other parts of the world such as protests 
against the Vietnam war, French students in Paris against de Gaulle, etc. see Needler, M. Mexican Politics, p.20. 
88 The violent repression of the 1968 student movement of Tlatelolco Square not only revealed the authoritarian 
nature of the regime but also it affected its paternalistic-protective image. Interview, Beatriz Camacho, Civic 
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social space for the rising middle class, intellectuals, universities and the left.
93 The 
electoral reform of 1973 introduced various changes including the substitution of the 
electoral commission (Commission for Federal Electoral Surveillance) by the Federal 
Electoral Commission. The main features of this reform were passive political rights 
and “deputy parties”. With regard to the passive rights the reform reduced the minimum 
age to be elected deputy from 25 to 21 and to be senator from 30 to 35.
94 However, the 
most important aspects of this reform were the increase of the number of party deputies 
available to opposition parties, increased from 20 to 25 seats, and the decrease of the 
threshold to obtain the first 5 deputies, from 2.5% to 1.5%.
95 However, this was of little 
value as the change only benefitted parties already registered and did not authorise new 
parties.
96 This electoral reform legalised the Communist party and lowered the voting 
age. Despite the attempt to open the party spectrum, the reality was that it did not create 
the  appropriate  conditions  to  incorporate  new  parties  in  the  electoral  arena.  The 
government preferred a small and manageable party system limited to just four parties 
in which two of them functioned as satellites of the PRI, leaving the PAN as the only 
real  opposition.  With  regard  to  the  right  to  vote  inside  the  Federal  Electoral 
Commission, the electoral reform gave that right to all registered parties. However, as 
Prud’home notes the PRI was still at an advantage. Although in theory it was only 
assured four votes against three for the opposition, (one by the Ministry of the Interior, 
two from the legislative representatives and one for the party representative) in reality, 
the real configuration of power favoured the PRI by a margin of seven votes to one.
97 
The amendments to electoral law instructing that the national parties had to participate 
in the Commission were pursued in order to discourage the use of anti-system strategies 
by PAN.
98  
Overall, the 1973 electoral reforms proved to be irrelevant to the electoral process.
99 
The effects of the 1968 students’ protest were still very much alive and it was clear that 
                                                 
93 The “aperture” was an attempt of the regime to reconcile with those affected during the student protests (university 
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Mexico was entering the 70’s with a political system that maintained channels closed to 
political representation. More than ever before, there was a pluralistic and expressive 
Mexican society that was not reflected on the electoral agenda because it was restricted 
and isolated due to the antidemocratic nature of the electoral system. The fact that the 
government  ignored  leftist  groups  that  emerged  in  the  late  60s,  especially  groups 
involved or related to the students’ movement, encouraged a more pluralistic society 
and opposition against the regime. Eventually, this plural society started to be noticed, 
especially  at  urban  districts  where  the  PRI  started  losing  votes.  The  official  party 
realised how changes in the tendencies of the electorate and its possible segmentation, 
with the rural and urban vote, could affect its hegemony.  
Political events back in the 1960s and during the 1970s had created the conditions for 
this crisis in the party system. It is also important to note the negative consequences of 
Echevarria’s economic policies, which contributed to a breakdown in relations between 
government and the private sector. Echevarria pro-leftist policies raised the opposition 
of  the  right,  and  the  private  sector  fought  back  by  mobilising  its  opposition  to  the 
regime.  Major  private  sector  organisations  attacked  its  political  programmes  and 
questioned the regime in 1975.
100 In addition the Echevarria leftist discourse increased 
state  government  control  over  the  economic  growth  and  government  employment 
increased  considerably.  However,  these  short-term  solutions  did  not  prevent  further 
conflicts in the labour sector, especially within the electrician workers union, which 
made Echevarria use repression to contain the threat.
101  
Another factor that contributed to the culmination of the crisis of the party system that 
had begun in the 1970’s, was the presidential  election in 1976, when  only the PRI 
candidate  López  Portillo  ran  for  president.  He  had  to  face  an  isolated  presidential 
campaign against imaginary adversaries as PAN, the only real opposition party, decided 
not to present a candidate due to internal problems. Other parties such as the PPS and 
PARM were clearly supporters of PRI. This situation created abstention and increasing 
discredit. The embarrassing situation undermined the legitimacy of the party system. 
With the absence of PAN, initially the PRI sought to benefit from the inability of PAN 
to use anti-system behaviour and the opportunity to recover its old level of support, but 
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in  fact  the  absence  of  PAN  made  the  elections  look  like  a  referendum  of  the  PRI 
nomination candidate.
102 Alcocer recalls that this election with the PRI alone and the 
PAN internally divided led to the belief that “this sovietisation’ of political competition 
had reached a limit”.
103 This limit had been reached because Mexico was now a new 
country,  with  a  changing  society,  where  the  middle  class  and  popular  sectors  had 
become increasingly critical of the hegemony party system over the past fifty years.
104 
The elections of 1976 highlighted a very ambiguous situation. On one hand, the official 
party needed the existence of a well-differentiated and autonomous opposition in order 
to maintain its legitimacy and avoid critics of the regime. On the other hand, it was 
nearly impossible for the official party to sustain this opposition without harming its 
future strength and development. There was a realisation that the eventual strength of 
the  opposition  could  undermine  the  PRI  hegemony,  therefore  the  incompatibility 
between total control and legitimacy was clear.
105 The 1970-76 presidential term ended 
with  an  economic  crisis  that  constituted  a  point  of  inflexion  with  a  growth  and 
developing period: devaluation of the peso and new conflicts.
106 Once the presidential 
election  in  1976  was  over,  the  incoming  president,  Lopez  Portillo  faced  a  critical 
situation  where  he  had,  on  one  side  an  angry  private  sector  and  on  the  other,  a 
discontented  pluralistic  society  that  wanted  to  express  through  political  parties  and 
organisations that were not officially registered. In order to ease the crisis, the president 
increased  the  role  of  the  private  sector  in  the  government,  which  allowed  direct 
consultation  on  key  policy  decisions,  and  also  softened  the  government’s  leftist 
discourse. However, the most important message from the isolated elections that López 
Portillo had to face was the need for political reform. The incoming president saw how 
only a new electoral reform could restrain the political conflict and more importantly 
ease the tension between the government and the more complex and modern society, 
that had been revealed by the 1968 student movement.
107 Indeed by the mid 1970s it 
was clear that Mexican society had become more plural but this complexity was not 
reflected  in  the  composition  of  the  Congress.  The  reason  was  the  lack  of  national 
representation of minority parties and dissident movements that were prevented from 
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expressing themselves. Furthermore, the Congress was totally dominated by the official 
party and the opposition only occupied a very small part. The state operated under two 
conditions: absence of competitive parties and non-existence of open electoral rules. 
However this reality began to change in 1977.
108 In 1976, in the context of serious 
problems  of  legitimisation  the  newly  elected  president  Lopez  Portillo  decided  to 
introduce a comprehensive electoral reform. 
 
2.3 The 1977 electoral reform  
The electoral reform in 1977 has been considered the most important reform since 1946. 
The most significant aspect of this reform was the expansion of the party spectrum; 
therefore it  can be considered  a democratic reform, although with limitations. Most 
authors agree that this reform was introduced as a liberalisation measure in order to 
resolve  the  problems  of  legitimisation  noted  earlier.  Middlebrook,  Loaeza  and 
Woldenberd  consider  that  the  decision,  to  open  up  representation  in  Congress,  was 
designed to contain the political conflicts resulting from the student protests a decade 
earlier.
109  The  crisis  of  legitimacy  had  resulted  from  the  deformation  of  political 
representation, the political cost of exclusion of important political actors and the lack 
of credibility in the electoral process
. By opening the door to political parties that had 
tried to express dissent in the previous decade, the reform concluded the government’s 
attempts  to  harmonise  with  the  left,  that  had  started  with  the  previous  president, 
Echevarria. Until 1977 the Minister of the Interior with its discretionary power decided 
which parties could participate in elections, but from 1977 the same political parties 
took  part  in  that  decision.
110  This  created  a  problem  for  the  government.  While  an 
increase in electoral participation was positive and boosted the government’s legitimacy 
it could reduce the discretionary power of the government in the elections. Also this 
move was against the authoritarian nature of the system.
111 Moreover, since the early 
1970s  the  official  party  had  started  losing  strength  at  both  federal  and  municipal 
elections, which contrasted to its performance during the 1940’s and 1950’s.
112  
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The new reform was organised by the Minister of the Interior and former president of 
the PRI, Reyes Heroles, (who became president of the Federal Electoral Commission).  
He called for an extraordinary session in the Commission in order to seek advice from 
citizens and political organisations in a project to carry out a constitutional reform.
113 
The result of this was the LFOPPE.
114 This reform expanded the range of party options 
for  the  electorate  by  legally  recognising  three  new  parties,  and  it  also  completely 
modified a central organ of the State, the Congress.  
First  of  all,  the  reform  introduced  the  constitutional  range  of  the  political  parties 
granting  them  the  position  of  “entities  of  public  interest.”
  115  The  inclusion  of  the 
political parties in the  Constitution increased their rights to, media  access, financial 
prerogatives and to participate in state and municipal elections.
116 Secondly, the reform 
introduced  a  system  of  mixed  representation  for  Congress.  This  reform  was  the 
expansion of the “party deputies” introduced in the 1963 reform. As a result, with the 
creation of a new figure called “plurinominal deputies” the Chamber of Deputies was 
enlarged from 200 to 400 deputies.  300 deputies were to be “uninominal”, elected by 
majority  vote  within  each  of  Mexico’s  300  single  member  district  contests  and  the 
remaining 100 were to be “plurinominal” (Article 52).
117 These 100 seats were reserved 
for  minority  parties  that  won  fewer  than  60  seats  in  the  300  winner-take-all  single 
member district contests.
118 With regard to the number of seats that a party could obtain, 
the  reform  established  a  limit  of  350  that  a  party  could  obtain  through  the  two 
principles. This law proved very attractive to the opposition parties, because it not only 
meant  that  such  opposition  parties  shared  these  100  seats  in  a  proportional 
representation scheme thus increasing the level of representation in Congress but also 
some parties had representation for the first time.
119 Becerra notes that the introduction 
of proportional representation in Congress was essential for the modernisation of the 
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political  parties,  as  they  found  new  ways  to  express  themselves.
120  This  new  law 
became  crucial  for  those  parties  excluded  in  the  past  such  as  the  communist  party 
(PCM). Thirdly, and in relation to PR, Article 54 established a minimum of 1.5% of the 
total  vote  for  all  the  regional  lists,  to  participate  in  at  least  100  districts  and  not 
obtaining more than 60 majority seats.
121 The reform established two different routes to 
register as a political party, a) definitive registry and b) conditional registration. One 
method  was  to  apply  for  a  conditional  registry  through  participating  in  election. 
Subsequently parties that achieved a minimum of 1.5% of the share of the national vote 
obtained their permanent registration. If the party failed to reach this threshold in three 
elections  after  achieving  permanent  registration  this  was  to  lead  to  the  loss  of 
registration. The second method was to provide the Commission with a copy of the 
statutes and principles of the party  with evidence of at least 65,000 party members 
distributed in one of two ways: 3000 or more in one-half plus one of the federal entities 
or 300 or more in one-half plus one of the federal electoral districts.
122 This initiative 
allowed the left to claim political parties and political associations and thus provoked an 
increase in electoral participation and the legitimacy levels increased.
123 Finally, a Law 
of Amnesty that benefitted political prisoners also accompanied this law. This was an 
expansive reform destined to increase the electoral party system and assess the level of 
party participaton in the elections.  
With regard to the Federal Electoral Commission, the law increased the number of its 
responsibilities.  First  of  all,  the  faculties  of  approval  or  cancellation  of  parties’ 
registration passed from the government to the Federal Electoral Commission. With this 
law the thresholds to the formation and registration of political parties were lowered.
124  
The  law  also  gave  the  electoral  commission  the  faculty  “to  administer  the  parties’ 
public funding, approval of electoral coalitions, the registration of candidacies, and the 
determination of the electoral formula for proportional representation and the counting 
of  proportional  votes”.
125  Finally,  this  reform  also  modified  the  composition  of  the 
electoral  commission.  The  electoral  commission  was  formed  by  the  Minister  of  the 
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Interior  who still chaired the Commission and  two representatives of the legislative 
branch, plus one representative of each registered national political party and a public 
notary who adopted the role of a technical secretary.
126  
The modifications, introduced to party  registration, seemed to signal the end of the 
period  of  electoral  closing,  as  the  law  enhanced  the  abilities  of  smaller  opposition 
parties not only to participate in elections but also gave them the opportunity to take 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
127 However, Prud’ home notes that this system of 
double  ballot  (one  for  plurality  deputies  and  another  for  proportional  representation 
deputies) allowed the PRI to give votes to the satellites parties.
128 Consequently, it was 
very  unlikely  that  satellite  parties  would  vote  against  the  government  in  the 
Commission, as they needed to reach the minimum threshold required (1.5%).  
Overall, the 1977 reform was not only crucial for the future development of the party 
system, but also for the initiation of the transition to democracy.
129 The introduction of 
proportional representation in the Chamber of Deputies initiated a process of political 
change based on modifications of electoral issues that generated the modernisation of 
the party system and the electoral process.
130 The opening of the party system revived 
electoral participation in elections, and some opposition parties were even able to win in 
some municipalities. The realisation of a need for a new political system started here 
and  led  to  long  process  of  electoral  reform.
131  However,  several  authors  note  that 
despite  the  advances  in  the  party  system,  they  were  of  no  consequence  as  the  real 
control  of  electoral  activities  still  rested  in  government  power.  First  of  all,  the 
composition of the electoral commission was still dominated by PRI members. As a 
result, with the new composition of the General Council, in theory, the government was 
assured five votes out of seven.
132 Also, the fact that the government could still get the 
support of the satellite opposition parties who depended on it showed the control of the 
official party. Opposition parties (such as the PAN and PTM) criticised the new law, 
especially  the  discretionary  power  of  the  Federal  Electoral  Commission.  Also,  the 
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restriction of the right to present candidates outside the national political parties was 
perceived as a PRI measure to control competence. The new law was also considered to 
be  deficient  as  the  government  did  not  modify  its  electoral  practice.  For  example, 
allegations from parties of not having the necessary surveillance to avoid electoral fraud 
emerged, while others argued that organisation and vigilance of the electoral process by 
the  government  contributed  to  its  hegemonic  position.  Therefore,  despite  all  the 
concessions,  the  PRI  still  controlled  the  voting  process  and  retained  its  hegemonic 
position. In addition critics considered the organisation of the system and the registry of 
the electoral census inappropriate and also rejected the role of the Judicial Branch in 
electoral matters.
133 Horcasitas notes that in practice the reform did not abandon the two 
basic lines of the electoral configuration that had existed since 1946.
 134 The two lines 
were the centralisation of the organisation and surveillance of the electoral process by a 
commission formed by representatives of the legislative chambers, the political parties 
and the government, but chaired and controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.  
 
2.3.1  The 1982 crisis and its political consequences 
A  political  bonanza  generated  by  the  1978-1981  oil  boom  and  the  inflow  of  cheap 
foreign loans accompanied Portillo’s political reforms. This short period of prosperity 
contributed  to  relative  political  stability  and  eased  the  pressure  for  change.  The 
economic  bonanza  allowed  the  government  to  spread  populist  subsidies  to  the 
increasing urban and middle class and at the same time maintain a good relationship 
with the private sector. The government wanted to renew the Mexican miracle that it 
had enjoyed during the 1940’s and 1950’s and carrying on borrowing from the IMF.
135 
However, this short period of apparent economic growth and political stability ended in 
1981-82 with a deep economic crisis that contributed to a new political crisis. Portillo, 
in a desperate attempt to stop capital flight nationalised the banks.
136 The nationalisation 
of the banks  evidenced  the autonomous power  of the Mexican president. Economic 
adjustments were made in order to overcome the crisis but a moratorium was inevitable. 
Measures such as a massive cut in public spending, including the ending of government 
jobs were taken in order to pay back the nation’s massive foreign debt. The financial 
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crisis of the state not only threatened to reduce the state bureaucracy but also reduce the 
resources that the party needed to distribute populism and state patronage.
137  In the 
middle  of  the  economic  crisis  in  1982  the  presidential  elections  took  place  without 
many surprises. The PRI candidate Miguel De La Madrid won. However, despite the 
support for the PRI growing by a small percentage in urban areas, reflecting the efforts 
of the official party to  restore votes in the  cities, in  general the results showed the 
deterioration of PRIs monopoly.
138 Obviously, opposition parties benefitted from the 
PRI’s loss of support, especially the PAN which since 1976 had been reinvigorating and 
achieved a percentage in the total vote in deputy elections from 7.6% in 1961 to 17.5% 
in  1982.  The  independent  organised  left  (the  PSUM,  the  PMT  and  the  PRT)  after 
obtaining registration with the 1977 electoral reform, also gained some support but not 
very significant with 5.7% of the vote.
139  De La Madrid began his time in office in the 
middle of the debt crisis that produced a turn in the economic policy of the regime.  
Despite  the  efforts  to  overcome  the  crisis,  both  the  economic  crisis  and  the  new 
economic model applied to restore growth by De La Madrid, the level of confidence in 
the regime was affected. First of all, the level of confidence in the revolutionary state, 
which had based its legitimacy on economic growth and stability, was altered by this 
economic crisis, as the regime was unable to provide more benefits in order to bolster 
stability. Secondly, the new neo-liberal economic model established to restore growth 
contradicted  the  ideology  of  the  PRI.  Concepts  such  as  an  open  and  competitive 
economy  collided  with  a  protectionist  model  of  import  substitution,  which  had 
maintained  the  relationship  between  the  elite  and  all  sectors.  In  addition,  the  new 
economic policy also provoked changes in the relationship between the government and 
press, labour, political elite, and a more politically aware society. Besides, changes in 
the PRI alliance with corporatist and private sectors also clashed with the pattern of co-
option  and  coercion  that  the  hegemonic  party  had  applied  before.
140  With  the  new 
political and economic scenario and in the middle of the crisis the government was 
forced  to  seek  other  criteria  to  justify  its  rule.  Consequently,  the  regime  used  the 
traditional official discourse based on promises to maintain social peace and stability 
along with democratic promises. De La Madrid promised reforms as a response to the 
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crisis and weakening of the government’s bases of support including anti-corruption 
campaigns, strategic political opening, liberalisation experiments with party primaries 
and government programmes designed to respond to economic and social problems.
141  
 
2.4 De la Madrid’s reforms 
De La Madrid’s political reforms to bolster legitimacy included four series of political 
reforms. The first series was dedicated to the launching of a massive anticorruption 
campaign early in his term and the second was centred on the internal operations and 
structure of the PRI, which included the weakening of “the politicos” power within the 
PRI.  In an attempt to restore the PRI internally  De la Madrid even called for local 
primaries in Hidalgo, Tamaulinas, San Luis Potosi and Nayarit to select candidates.
142 A 
third political reformist measure in the early years of De la Madrid’s term, centred on a 
strategy  to  bolster  legitimacy,  and  a  policy  of  electoral  opening  which  recognised 
opposition victories in local elections regardless of the outcome.
143 A fourth political 
reform  centred  on  a  political  reform  within  Federal  District  that  focused  on  the 
establishment of direct election of the officials for the city in contrast to the past when 
officials had been appointed by the president.
144 Clearly the government had to promise 
political change in order to avoid a more violent and confrontational reaction from a 
changing  society.  Morris  notes  that  the  new  situation  presented  a  dilemma  for  the 
political system because on one hand the  reforms were needed to restore  economic 
growth and legitimacy while the consequent politicisation of the elections threatened to 
weaken  the  regime’s  foundation  of  political  control  and  continuity.
145  On  the  other 
hand,  the  inherent  dangers  of  not  pursuing  such  reforms  were  equally  striking.
146 
Indeed,  new  reforms  seemed  to  be  the  only  option  to  confront  the  pressures  of  the 
economic situation within Mexico and the international economic crisis.
147 During this 
time, Mexico’s authoritarian regime seemed to be entering a process of decomposition, 
and  although  the  government  decided  to  apply  reform  initiatives,  the  danger 
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prevailed.
148 It is worth noting that these reforms important for opening up the party, 
and weakening the power of old party bosses also had undesired consequences. The 
emergence of new political forces or reinforcement of existing ones. As a result, these 
reform initiatives had to be abandoned or eased. For example, in the open elections of 
1983  the  PAN  won  31  “municipios”.  This  alerted  the  regime  to  the  danger  of  the 
opposition  winning  a  gubernatorial  election.  Although  this  trend  was  limited  to  the 
northern municipalities, they nonetheless forced De  La Madrid to end the policy of 
electoral opening.
149 De la Madrid was afraid not only of the rise of the PAN in local 
elections but also of the growth of urban social movements after the earthquake in 1985 
in Mexico City, which contributed to the use of old tactics to retain power.
150 Despite 
initial good intentions the regime returned to reliance on the traditional bases of support 
and  the  local  bosses  (caciques)  and  corruption  prevailed.
151  The  anticorruption 
campaign fell as a consequence of the ending of political opening and the return of De 
La Madrid to “Los politicos”. The other reform initiatives followed the same pattern as 
divisions within the elite thwarted the effort to reform the party internally. Finally, De 
La Madrid also abandoned the reform initiative of Mexico City, as he faced opposition 
from within the local government and among lobbyist planners.
152 Consequently his 
attempt at political opening was also abandoned due to pressures. Additionally, between 
1985 and 1987, in several northern states, the ruling party resurrected heavy-handed 
forms  of  electoral  fraud  characteristic  of  the  1950s.  Popular  outrage  against  stolen 
elections was most evident in Chihuahua, where citizens staged mass protests. Some 
analysts argued that although many of the nation’s administrative elite favoured more 
honest  elections,  PRI  politicians  at  local  levels  were  not  willing  to  risk  the  career 
damage and loss of spoils entailed in recongising opposition victories. Others suspected 
that many of the political technocrats were afraid to give freer rein to the opposition 
during the economic crisis. In any event the electoral fraud infuriated the opposition and 
began to unify it.  In 1988, despite their ideological disagreements, leaders of PAN, 
PMS, and FDN joined together in the Democratic Assembly for Effective Suffrage to 
organise  a  nationwide  opposition  poll-watcher  system.
153  Serrano  notes  that  De  La 
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Madrid’s reforms in 1982 had no real intention of providing formal competition among 
political  parties;  instead  they  were  pursued  to  promote  the  regime  and  restrain  the 
electorate.
154  However,  the  use  of  negative  reforms  such  as  corruption  and  fraud 
contributed to a political crisis, a further division within the elite and an unprecedented 
reaction  from  all  areas  of  society,  church,  intellectual  and  press.  Furthermore,  it 
provoked a politicisation of the electoral process and a polarisation of the system versus 
anti-system,  as  these  negative  reforms  were  intended  to  prevent  the  PAN  getting 
stronger in the states.
155  
Although the regime continued to have its basic corporatist structure it experienced 
challenge  from  the  official  labour  unions  and  business  groups.  From  the  1980s  the 
official party would experience major threats. First of all, the use of fraud provoked the 
emergence and proliferation of civil organisations, which were used as a channel by 
both left and rights groups for expression of discontent.
156 Rivera notes that the mid 
1980s saw the emergence of a variety of civil groups and neighbourhood associations 
interested  in  monitoring  electoral  processes  and  denouncing  electoral  fraud.
157  In 
addition the middle class and business sector started abandoning the country in fear of 
an  imminent  economic  crisis.  Secondly,  a  more  organised,  active  and  stronger 
opposition became the real threat to the regime. For instance, Klesner notes that the 
extent  of  fraud  reported  in  the  1985  midterm  elections  probably  contributed  to  an 
increase in PAN support despite the official results showing a decrease in their share of 
the vote.
158 Obviously, the PRI was still in control of the electoral process and the polls 
and it did not hesitate in using fraud to win elections.  However it could not avoid the 
gradual  erosion  of  its  base  of  support,  structural  decline  and  most  importantly  the 
politicisation of the elections.
159 Indeed the opposition, especially PAN
160, which had 
been the real opposition party during the 1970s, used more radical avenues to pressurise 
the  government  for  political  change,  which  increased  the  importance  of  the 
democratisation  process,  and  encouraged  disobedience  campaigns  to  disapprove  of 
                                                 
154 For instance, allegations of fraud in various states in 1984 showed that De la Madrid did not have a real intention 
to change see Serrano, M. Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas, p.10. 
155 The government used more repression to extinguish the PAN led protest over fraud, for example in Coahuila, in 
1984. See Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, pp.66-73. 
156 Interview, Mario A. Rivera. Coordinator of electoral transparency and access to information, Civic Alliance, 
Mexico City, 5 October 2004. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Klesner, J. Changing patterns of electoral participation and official party support in Mexico, p.106. 
159 Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, pp.20-21. 
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fraud.
161 Local elections began to be used as a ground to test the real intentions of the 
government and its capacity to reform.
162 This period of growing electoral opposition at 
local level forced De La Madrid to change to democratic criterion as the only means to 
legitimise the regime. Furthermore, PRI strategies such as electoral fraud that had been 
overlooked  in  good  economic  times,  were  unacceptable  now,  and  threatened  to 
undermine  the  credibility  of  the  the  electoral  process.    In  addition,  the  level  of 
abstention increased as confidence in the regime decreased. While the PAN gained the 
support of more educated voters in the northern states and capital cities, the PRI had to 
rely on its support among rural areas and the lower socio-economic sectors.
163 Serrano 
notes that despite De la Madrid’s wish to re-establish credibility and public confidence 
in the government, the effect of the economic adjustment on the electoral arena and the 
strength of PAN in the northern states forced the government to consider a new electoral 
reform.
164  
By the middle of the 1980s the electoral process became an important issue within the 
civil society and political parties. The negative tendencies of the government including 
post-electoral fraud, the proliferation of monitoring organisations, and the strength of 
the opposition affected the electoral arena, and deepened the political crisis. Eventually, 
the  government  initiated  negotiations  toward  an  electoral  reform.  The  official  party 
started negotiating with the PAN, which was willing to collaborate in electoral matters. 
However, this temporary partnership affected both parties. On one hand, the PRI was 
criticised  for  collaborating  with  a  right  wing  party,  and  on  the  other  hand,  PAN’s 
negotiation  with  the  dominant  party  contradicted  its  reputation  since,  1983,  as  the 
standard bearer of anti-authoritarianism and electoral democracy.
165 However, the PRI, 
in order to maintain political stability combined negative strategies such as electoral 
fraud with concessions.
166  
 
2.4.1  The electoral reform of 1986: the counter-reform 
The electoral reform in 1986 was the last reform of the hegemonic party system. It 
resulted from the growing electoral strength of the opposition parties and an economic 
                                                 
161 PAN’s anti-system strategies included calling for non participation in elections, street protests, threats of non 
participation in the electoral commission.  
162 Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, p.66. 
163 Ibid. pp.20-21. 
164 Serrano, M. Rebuilding the State: Mexico after Salinas, p.9. 
165 Loaeza, S. Party Politics in an uncommon democracy, p.42. 
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crisis in the 1980’s. It is important to note that the government was entirely in control; 
therefore the electoral reforms were convenient to its circumstances and needs. The 
most significant aspects of the reform included the modification of the system of mixed 
representation, the modification of the self validation of the Chamber of Deputies, a 
new electoral tribunal and the creation of a representative assembly in Mexico City.
167 
The  reform  increased  the  number  of  seats  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  allocated  to 
members of opposition parties, increasing from 100 to 200 (25% 40%) proportional 
seats. In other words, a change in the electoral formula, was introduced by increasing 
the number of proportional seats from 100 to 200 (so, the total number of deputies 
changed from 400 to 500) and for the first time allowed the majority party to have 
access to proportional representation seats. Another important aspect of the reform was 
the  creation  of  an  electoral  tribunal  to  deal  with  complaints  over  allegations  of 
wrongdoing or electoral irregularities.
168 The reform also increased the media access of 
opposition parties and introduced changes to public funding.
169 In addition it created the 
opportunity for opposition parties to help supervise the electoral register and gave them 
power  in  the  administration  and  supervision  of  elections.
170  The  reform  introduced 
changes to the composition of the Federal Electoral Commission. Although the Minister 
of the Interior still chaired the Commission the new formula increased the number of 
representatives from the political parties. Under the new formula each party with 3% of 
the vote would have the right to have one representative in the Commission. In addition 
if they gained a share between 3% and 5% up to a maximum of 16 representatives per 
political party they were allowed another representative.
171 However, several authors 
note that the introduction of proportional representation in the electoral commission not 
only reinforced the PRI hegemony in the commission as it was the strongest party, but 
also  affected  the  electoral  impartiality  of  the  commission,  as  it  was  responsible  for 
directly  selecting  electoral  officers.
172  Prud’home  notes  that  the  new  formula  still 
benefitted PRI as it provided the official party with the possibility of having 16 party 
representatives, the representatives of the legislature and the Minister of the Interior, 
while the opposition could only have thirteen representatives including those from the 
                                                 
167 See Rabasa Gamboa, E. Ochenta años de democracia, p.155. 
168 Prud’home, J-F. The Instituto Federal Electoral, p.145, Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, p.68. 
169 The issue of parties financing and media access will be covered in chapters 6 and 7. 
170 Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, p.68, Prud’home, J-F., The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), p.145. 
171 See Garcia Orozco. La legislación electoral mexicana 1812-1988, p.335. 
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three satellite parties.
173 It seemed that the reforms with emphasis on “gradual change” 
were justified on the basis of stability.   
Despite somes steps forward, this reform was in many ways a backward step related to 
the previous electoral reform. First of all, the reform eliminated the double ballot system 
and introduced a “clause of governability” which was intended to guarantee control of 
Congress by the majority party.
174 Prud’home notes that this clause ended the PRI’s 
dependence on the satellite parties to control its electoral machinery.
175 This clause was 
highly criticised by opposition parties, as it was perceived as a PRI measure to ensure 
the control of Congress by the PRI.  Secondly, another negative aspect of the reform 
was the elimination of the conditional registry that was created back in 1977. Alcocer 
notes that this reform did not intend to change the basic structure of the political system, 
especially the central role of the president and the hegemony of the PRI.
176 Although the 
reform was intended to give the impression that the government granted a new political 
role for elections in the system and supported the need to strengthen the legitimacy of 
elections, the reform was not supported by all.
177 The positive aspect of the 1986 reform 
was  the  creation  of  the  electoral  tribunal  and  the  beginning  of  the  democratisation 
process in the capital. However, the reform was perceived as a counter-reform as it did 
not alter the hegemonic position of the official party in the electoral institutions.  
Between  the  1986  reform  and  the  1988  presidential  elections,  the  PRI  continued 
winning elections, especially in the rural areas and among the lower classes and when 
needed continued using fraud to win so that it could protect its electoral hegemony in 
most areas of the country.
178 However, the reform could not stop the system/anti-system 
polarisation and the further politicisation of elections. Protests and conflicts specifically 
between 1986 and 1987 arose as a result of an increase in electoral fraud. Post-electoral 
confrontations exploded among state and municipalities.
179 Furthermore, electoral fraud 
increased the level of abstentions, which contributed to an easier manipulation of the 
elections by PRI and the government.
180 The PRI benefitted from the general opinion 
                                                 
173 Prud’home, J-F. The Federal Electoral Institute, p.145. 
174 The governability clause consisted of granting the automatic majority in Congress to a party obtaining a minimum 
of 35% of the share of the national vote. Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Alcocer, A. The challenge of institutional reform in Mexico, 1995, p.70. 
177 Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, p.68. 
178 Ibid. 
179 See Morris for a detailed account of the fraudulent elections in Chihuahua and Oaxaca. Ibid. p.60. 
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that  social  instability  was  correlated  to  the  strength  of  the  opposition  and  that  an 
eventual opposition victory would provoke social unrest. The hegemonic party implied 
the idea that only the official party could maintain stability and economic growth. But, 
by the end of the 1980s despite the fact that the PRI was still in control, it paid a price 
for  the  mismanagement  of  electoral  processes.  The  position  of  the  opposition  party 
leaders towards the authoritarian nature of the electoral system altered, which showed 
the regime the strength of the opposition among voters and the pressure and demand for 
political liberalisation. Also, the inability to solve the post-electoral conflicts during the 
1980s triggered the political interest of voters in other candidates and political options. 
Moreover, the strength of the opposition benefitted from two circumstances. It was a 
more complex and demanding society, which had changed through the years, and the 
negative consequences of the economy.
181 Finally, the strength of the opposition and its 
political pressure towards democratisation and clean elections became apparent at the 
presidential elections in 1988. This was to be a real test for the official party to prove its 
genuine intention for political change.  
The weakness of this electoral reform and the electoral institutions and rule as a whole 
became evident before, during and after the presidential election in 1988. This election 
marked  the  dismantling  of  the  hegemonic  party  system  and  the  creation  of  a  new 
electoral institution, the IFE, which accelerated a reformist process towards electoral 
competitiveness and transparent and impartial elections.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In  summary  it  can  be  said  that  the  electoral  legislation  and  electoral  institutions 
operating between 1946 and 1977 played an important role in ensuring the consolidation 
of  the  official  party  in  the  electoral  arena.  The  electoral  reforms  during  this  period 
proved to be mainly cosmetic while contributing to the PRI hegemony. First of all, the 
1946 electoral law not only ensured that the control of the political system remained 
with the PRI but also avoided the excision of the coalition elite. Secondly, the creation 
of the federal electoral commission in that year and the centralisation of the organisation 
and supervision of elections in the government  proved to be crucial for the official 
party, as the Minister of the Interior assured a direct line of control from above. The 
                                                                                                                                               
In 1987, for example elections in Nayarit had a 70 % rate of abstentions, while in the state of Mexico the opposition 
estimated actual abstentions as 50 to 80% (Cornelius, review p.16) 
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introduction of the political figure of “party deputies” in 1963 and 1973 was perceived 
as positive although it did not change the predominance of the PRI in the party system.   
The first “democratic” electoral reform in 1977 introduced proportional representation 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and  the  party  system  was  expanded  from  4  officially 
recognised parties (PRI, PAN, PPS, and PARM) to 7 (adding PCM, PST and PDM). 
This reform proved to be crucial for the future process of political change not only 
because it opened the party system to those excluded parties and social forces but also 
because it could be considered the starting point of a long and gradual process of change 
and transition to democracy. However, without ignoring the huge contribution of the 
reform in opening the party system, the political arena continued to be highly dominated 
and controlled by the official party (PRI). In the short term, the 1977 electoral reform 
did not alter the traditional methods of distribution of power exercised by the PRI, but in 
the long term it gave the opposition parties the opportunity to be seen as political actors 
and it naturalised pluralism. Socioeconomic events in the 1980s such as the debt crisis 
and the consequent economic restructuring had an important impact on political groups 
and generated new political forces. On one hand, the political actors responded in a 
variety of ways and re-ordered their priorities and attitudes to these developments,. On 
the other, the old electoral arrangements based on an official party using its traditional 
methods of distributing power clashed with a stronger opposition backed by increasing 
electoral  support.  The  1986  electoral  reform  initiated  by  the  government  of  De  la 
Madrid became a “counter reform” due to its backward policies and it did not channel 
the growing public pressure on the electoral system. Between 1986 and 1988, the nature 
of the electoral law and institutions became the centre of intense negotiations between 
the government and the opposition parties. The importance of these issues was a result 
of the increasing political competition and a new social configuration that did not fit in 
the design of the PRI as an official party in a hegemonic party system.  The controversy 
over  the  federal  elections  in  1988  proved  to  be  the  breaking  point  as  the  electoral 
institutions and rules underwent a crisis. In the aftermath of the elections, the incoming 
president, Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced the end of the hegemonic party system 
and promised electoral reforms. From then until the last reform in 1996 the political 
debate focused on the electoral arena.  
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3  Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
In the previous chapter the outline of the history of electoral reform in Mexico showed a 
clear division between the cosmetic electoral reforms (between 1946 and 1973) and the 
first “democratic” reform in 1977. This chapter will focus on the creation of the Federal 
Electoral  Institute  as  part  of  the  first  set  of  electoral  reforms  initiated  by  Salinas. 
Chapter four will then analyse the way the institution evolved during the three stages 
that  followed  its  creation.  An  examination  of  the  attitudes  and  expectations  of  the 
political  actors  towards  the  institution  at  the  time  it  was  created  and  the  way  the 
institution  evolved  will  provide  an  understanding  of  the  extent  to  which  the  IFE 
responded to their expectations. In order to examine the creation of the Federal Electoral 
Institute and its evolution, it is necessary to place these reform measures in the context 
of other political and constitutional changes.    
The chapter will begin by highlighting the controversial presidential elections in 1988, 
as  the  event  that  forced  the  incoming  president,  Salinas  to  embark  upon  an  intense 
process  of  electoral  reform.  This  led  to the  issue  of  the  Federal  Code  for  Electoral 
Institutions  and  Procedures  (COFIPE)  through  which  the  Federal  Electoral  Institute 
(IFE) was established as an independent and permanent body. The analysis of this event 
will involve examinination of the reasons why the electoral process became the core of 
political debate among political actors. This section will concentrate on the political 
consequences among political actors. The three interpretations of the future by the main 
parties  will  be  analysed.  The  second  section  will  examine  the  initiatives  given  by 
political parties and the political debate regarding the new electoral law (COFIPE) and 
the new electoral institution. The attitudes and expectations toward the IFE in the first 
stage of reforms will be analysed in the third section.  
This  first  section  will  explain  the  historical  antecedents  of  the  reforming  effort  in 
electoral-politico legislation that issued a new electoral law (COFIPE), through which 
the IFE was established: the controversial 1988 presidential elections. The immediate 
changes introduced in the electoral law came as a direct consequence of this. 
The political instability that emerged in the federal election in 1988 has to be analysed 
taking account of the electoral legislation that applied at that time (the new Federal 
Electoral Code that was issued in the 1986 electoral reform).  This background will help 
to explain its effects on the political reality and the different proposals that the political Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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actors made to solve the problem. The context of the 1988 elections differed greatly 
from previous elections as, for the first time the official party had to face a competitive 
opposition.  In  the  past  direct  government  control  of  the  electoral  process  exercised 
through the Minister of the Interior was not challenged due to the lack of competitive 
opposition,  but  by  the  end  of  the  1980s  this  long-standing  practice  was  highly 
questioned.  
 
3.1 Political context before the 1988 election: strengthening of the opposition and 
elite split 
The high level of expectation of the 1988 presidential elections was something new for 
the government. Several factors can explain this: First of all, the failed political reforms 
initiated  by  De  La  Madrid  (1982-1988)  and  his  inability  to  manage  a  political  and 
economic crisis during the 1980s provoked politicisation of the elections. As noted in 
the  previous  chapter  the  1982  debt  crisis  and  the  implementation  of  economic 
adjustments forced the government to dramatically reduce the distribution of resources 
among the corporative sectors.  The new economic programme not only affected the 
relationship between government and trade unions and labour organisations but also the 
old informal relationship between the official party  and the middle class/businesses.  
Therefore the PRI’s loss of support by the late 1988’s was of economic significance. 
Directly  related  to  this  was  a  second  factor  that  explains  the  politicisation  of  the 
elections:  the  strength  of  the  opposition.  The  inability  of  the  PRI  to  broaden  the 
middleclass and business support with the new economic programme made the National 
Action Party (PAN) an alternative to the PRI on the right, especially in the north states.
1 
Indeed, PAN took advantage of the increasing political mobility developed during the 
1980s.
2 The emergence of PAN during the 1980s in the northern states contributed not 
only to an increase in its appeal among the business and middle class sectors but also to 
the prioritising of its objectives and goals. The first goal of the party was “to pressure 
for electoral reform”. The third factor that contributed to the great expectation of the 
                                                 
1 Loaeza notes that the 1980s were crucial for the development of the PAN in the northern states. The political 
repercussions of the economic crisis benefitted PAN as most of its members were middle and upper class groups. See 
Loaeza, S. PAN and the paradox of opposition. In: Party Politics in “an uncommon Democracy”: political parties and 
elections in Mexico, edited by Harvey, N & Serrano, S. London: Institute of Latin American studies, 1994. 
2 Loaeza notes that since 1983 the PAN’s victory in local elections was a result of “a sign of disapproval of 
government policies and of the PRI’s reluctance to relinquish its virtual electoral monopoly”. Loaeza, S. Mexico in 
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1988 federal elections was a direct consequence of a split within the PRI’s elite.
3 The 
formation of a left wing coalition, led by an ex- PRI member, Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, to 
compete  against  the  PRI,  came  after  this  factionalism.  The  emergence  of  this  new 
challenge from the left was also a result of the neo-liberal policies introduced after the 
1982 debt crisis. The changing economic model, supported by the modern technocrat 
sector within the PRI, unleashed party factionalism in the PRI. Splits within the elite 
were not a new thing in the PRI. In fact since the party was created it had suffered splits 
and  factionalism  that  had  been  successfully  contained  or  co-opted.
4  However,  the 
defection and the split of the centre of the PRI in 1987 was significant because it led to 
the formation of an opposition with the same credentials and revolutionary heritage that 
the PRI had itself.
5 As a direct consequence of De La Madrid’s attack on labour and the 
politicos (PRI’s old guard) and the new economic policy, a faction of the politicos (the 
conservative faction) led by Cardenas and Muñoz Ledo, founded a coalition within the 
PRI,  called  CD  (Corriente  Democratica).  This  faction  disapproved  of,  not  only  the 
neoliberal economic model, which contradicted the ideas of state intervention and social 
equality that the dominant party defended, but also the traditional method of selecting 
the presidential candidate.
6  The dissidents’ faction decided to campaign for Cardenas as 
the PRI’s candidate for the upcoming presidential elections, but both the conservative 
wing and the technocrats did not support this proposal. Later, Cardenas head of CD 
(Democratic Current) joined Muñoz Ledo and decided to break ranks within the PRI 
and created the National Democratic Front (FDN) which in 1989 emerged as the PRD, 
while the other parties decided to maintain their identity.   Therefore, the threat that was 
posed by Cardenas’ coalition to the PRI and its increasing support among the popular 
classes  make  this  the  strongest  factor  that  contributed  to  the  politicisation  of  the 
electoral process in 1988. The fourth and last factor is a significant, if not total, lack of 
credibility in both the electoral authority and new electoral code among political parties 
and  the  general  public.  Post-electoral  conflict,  as  a  result  of  increasing  electoral 
                                                 
3 The departure of Cardenas from the PRI was perceived as incomplete, and a new political force made of ex-PRI 
members and sympathisers who were disappointed with the official party benefitted from the charismatic figure of 
Cardenas. 
4 The crisis inside PRI not only resulted from disagreements over economic policies but also from Cardenas’ 
disappointment about not being directly selected by (“heavy thumb”) as the presidential candidate.  
Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
5 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Carlos Fuentes, L. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 1. Mexico 
City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
6 The traditional method was the so-called “dedazo” or “heavy thumb”, in which the president personally selected one 
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competition  at  state  and  local  level  during  the  1980’s,  predicted  a  highly  contested 
presidential election. At local and state level, electoral authorities proved to be in favour 
of the official party, as occasionally the opposition claims of victory were denied and 
ignored by the Secretariat of Government. An increasing discontent and distrust of the 
electoral authorities among political parties and the general public at regional level was 
translated at national level. Furthermore, the existing lack of credibility of both in the 
electoral  authority  and  in  the  new  electoral  code  seemed  to  herald  a  dramatic  and 
controversial election day.
7  
In light of the above, the context of the 1988 Federal elections was unique. First of all, 
Cardenas became the first presidential candidate representing an opposition party with a 
real possibility of winning the Presidency.  In addition, and more importantly the PRI 
could see how, for the first time, its nationalistic appeal could be used from outside the 
party instead of from within, as Cardenas enjoyed more revolutionary appeal than the 
presidential candidate.
8 Secondly, other factors such as better-educated and informed 
voters conforming a new political reality added novelty to this electoral process.
9  
 
3.1.1  The controversial polling day  
The presidential elections in 1988 were a breaking point in the history of electoral law 
in Mexico. Analysis of this particular election brings two significant aspects; firstly, the 
controversy over the counting process and its consequences and secondly, the PRI’s loss 
of  votes.  By  July  1988,  the  strength  and  popularity  of  the  candidate  of  the  leftist 
coalition, Cardenas, promised a much contested election. In addition, the PRI, for the 
first time had to face opposition on the right (PAN) and the more dangerous FDN on the 
left. Indeed, the combination of increasing expectations accumulated on the electoral 
day and a high turnout put the electoral institutions to test. The PRI’s candidate was the 
                                                 
7 See Corro, S. Instructivo de la ADESE para intentar contrarrestar las infinitas formas del fraude. Proceso, 1988; 
(609): 6-7. Prior to the election, various civic organisations criticised the advantages of the PRI in the electoral 
campaign: resources and electoral fraud. ADESE (Democratic Assembly for the effective suffrage) published a list of 
expected electoral frauds by PRI including stealing of polling boxes, using of computer systems to manipulate the 
electoral roll, manipulation of the press.  At government level, manipulation of the Federal Electoral Commission, an 
out of date federal electoral roll, manipulation of the validation of the elections by Congress, ballot-box stuffing, etc. 
8 Cardenas appeal was twofold: one he was the son of the most popular Mexican president in history, Lázaro 
Cardenas, therefore he was associated with the social and economic reformism that his father had promoted. 
Secondly, for many PRI’s voters, who were discontented with the economic policies of the government, he 
represented the only option. Interview, Emiliano Vargas, member of PRD, Mexico City, 27 October, 2004  
9 Cardenas’s appeal was particularly evident in the capital city (Mexico City). However, in other areas of the country 
the electoral preferences were divided between PRI and PAN. PAN in the northern states and PRI in the central and 
south. Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), 
Mexico City, 22 November 2004.   
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young, Harvard-educated Carlos Salinas de Gortari, former minister of planning and 
budget and former director of the PRI’s Institute of Political, Economic, and Social 
Studies.
10 However, on the day of the elections the control of the electoral institutions 
proved to be a mere instrument of the official party to remain in power. The computer 
system  that  was  designed  to  have  a  rapid  distribution  of  the  results  “crashed”. 
Coincidently,  the  results  that  were  coming  to  the  computer  system  were  giving  an 
overwhelming victory to Cardenas.
11 After the system was re-established the official 
result given by the electoral authority was a modest majority of 50.4% of the popular 
vote for the PRI, 31.06% for Cardenas and 16.1% for PAN.
12  However, the focus was 
not on the results themselves but on the controversy over the counting process and the 
crash in the computer system. Allegations of fraud coming from all political parties and 
international media contrasted with the silence of the government.
13 In addition, the 
long  wait  to  complete  the  formal  procedures  for  certifying  the  legislative  and 
presidential  elections  nurtured  further  popular  protests  and  made  more  visible  the 
inefficiency and antiquated nature of the electoral institutions and procedures.  One of 
the  main  messages  conveyed  by  the  allegation  of  fraud  was  the  inefficiency  of  the 
electoral institutions and the clear intention of the official party to remain in power.
14  
The second significant aspect of this election was the official result. The PRI won by 
obtaining the lowest number of votes since its creation. It is important to note that in 
previous elections the official party had maintained electoral majority between 77% and 
99%,  but  this  time  the  PRI  was  forced  to  accept  less  than  51%  of  the  votes.
15    In 
addition, in Congress the superficial advantage of only 256 seats of the hegemonic party 
                                                 
10 With the economy deteriorating and real wages down 40% over the previous five years, Salinas tried rather 
unconvincingly to distance himself from the policies of the outgoing administration and promised to restore economic 
growth and to modernise the country’s political institutions. Mc Donald, RH &  Ruhl, J. Party Politics and Elections 
in Latin America, p.60. 
11 The first results obtained by the computer system came from Mexico City and showed that Cardenas had 
overwhelming support. Therefore these preliminary results did not represent the national tendency of the vote. 
Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and former advisor to the President Councillor of IFE, 22 November, 
2004. 
12 See table 3.1. 
13 Both the PAN and the FDN alleged that they had been defrauded of millions of votes, especially in rural areas 
where the opposition had not been able to monitor the voting process as carefully as in the cities. Cardenas asserted 
that by a narrow margin, he rather than Salinas, had actually won the presidential election, and Clouthier called on 
President de La Madrid to entirely annul the results. Both right and left wing opposition forces staged large protest 
demonstrations in the weeks following the elections. Mc Donald, RH and Ruhl, J. Party Politics and Elections in 
Latin America, pp.61-62. 
14 Most independent observers believed, at the very least, that Salinas’s margin of victory over Cárdenas was much 
smaller than recorded and that the PRI lost more legislative seats than it had admitted. Ibid. p.62. 
15 Handelman notes that the leftist support was linked to the country’s severe economic crisis. In addition to this, the 
author claims that the more optimistic the voters were about the economy, the more prone they were to vote PRI, 
while the pessimistic voted for Cardenas. Handelman, H. The dynamic of change” Mexico: The ongoing crisis.  Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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in  contrast  to  the  244  seats  for  the  opposition  was  exceptional.  It  was  also  an 
unprecedented fact that the official vote for Cardenas was 31.4% which exceeded the 
percentage obtained by any opposition party in the past. Despite the results apparently 
being positive for the PRI, they were far from what had been expected. With a bare 
majority of 50% of the vote and loss of the traditional bases of support the dominant 
party lost legitimacy. As previously stated the controversial elections and the national 
discontent over the allegation of fraud, not only unleashed fierce anti-system protests all 
over the  country but  also raised  a question within the PRI itself. The  question was 
related to its real  capacity to overcome the crisis of legitimacy  and maintain social 
instability.   
Table 3.1. Official results provided by the Federal Electoral Commission (CFE) of 
the 1988 presidential elections. 
Candidate  Party  Votes  Percentage 
C. Salinas de Gortari  PRI  9 641 329  50.36 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas 
Solórzano 
FDN (PARM, PPS, 
PFCRN, PMS, CD) 
5 911 133  30.8 
Manuel J. Clouthier  PAN  3 267 159  17.07 
Gumersindo Magana  PDM  199 484  1.04 
Rosario Ibarra  PRT  80 052  0.42 
Total    19 145 012  100 
Source: Parliamentary Encyclopedia of Mexico, volume III, section 2, “Legislation and electoral statistics” (1814-
1997)”, Mexico, 1997. 
 
3.1.2  Post-electoral  reactions:  The  Electoral  Commission  became  object  of 
protests.  
After the controversial federal elections were accompanied by a wave of protests from 
political actors and the general public, the incoming president “Salinas” realised that the 
issue of the organisation of elections was an issue of national security.
16  First of all, the 
opposition  parties’  leaders  Cardenas  and  the  PAN  candidate,  Clothier,  rejected  the 
results and initially seemed to lead a common front of not accepting the new president. 
Cardenas claimed to have won the  election  and called his supporters  for a national 
                                                 
16 Salinas was advised to start promising a major electoral reform in order to ease the disobedience mobilisation 
organised by the PAN’s candidate and by Cardenas. Salinas also used the promise of the reform as an instrument to 
divide the opposition, as he knew that the PAN would eventually support a major electoral reform. Interview, 
Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral negotiator and 
political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004.  Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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protest asking to withdraw the illegitimate PRI government.
17 His demands included 
criminal  charges  being  brought  against  Manuel  Bartlett,  the  head  of  the  Electoral 
Commission, for not showing the results from 45% of the polling precincts, and a call 
for new elections.
18  On the other hand, the PAN candidate, Clouthier, also rejected the 
results  of  the  elections.  Initially  the  PAN  candidate  rallied  support  for  a  “civil 
disobedience  campaign”  to  pressure  the  government  but,  with  reservations,  soon 
recognised Salinas as the new legitimate president. However, it became obvious that 
Cardenas’  popular  mobilisations  and  the  reaction  of  the  PAN,  contributed  to  the 
awareness of the public of the electoral process and more importantly the relevance of 
the role of electoral institutions. Furthermore, the new electoral code only approved in 
1986 proved to be inefficient and inoperative. A total lack of transparency in the way 
the  elections  were  organised  and  in  the  opacity  of  the  counting  process  showed  its 
inability to respond to the new electoral challenges. In addition and in parallel to the 
protests led by opposition parties, other civil groups reacted with criticism and initiated 
a national protest movement that put further pressure on the government. Therefore, as 
in the past, the lack of legitimacy forced the government to promise reforms as a means 
of escape. However, this time, the strong and well-organised opposition added to the 
package which ensured an uncertain conclusion.  
 
3.2 Three interpretations of the future: Versions by the PRI, PAN and PRD. 
The July 6
th elections provoked an intense debate over the political situation and the 
perspective of democracy came to the fore. At the same time that a phenomenon of 
political pluralism was taking place at the polling booths, political actors started giving 
different interpretations about the future. The post electoral trauma was approached in 
three different ways: In one extreme, the view of the PRI who claimed that nothing had 
happened. Changes in the voter’s behaviour were explained as being caused by the 
economic crisis, expecting that “once the crisis was overcome things were going to be 
the  same.”
19  This  view  came  mostly  from  the  official  party  that  perceived  the 
                                                 
17 The initial reaction of Cárdenas was to call for mobilisation but without violence and to promise to defend his 
position in the Electoral College. See Marín, C. In the discourse of the opposition, the asoma la amenaza. Proceso. 
August 10 1988; (613):7. 
18 These precints were kept in the basement of Congress under surveillance. Despite pressure, the Minister of the 
Interior, Manuel Bartlett did not allow for a re-counting, which caused a major dispute in Congress. Eventually these 
packets containing votes burned in a suspicious fire.   
19 Interview, member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) A, Mexico City, 20 September, 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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controversial  elections  as  an  isolated  event  where  the  official  party  received  the  so 
called “punishment vote” for economic not political reasons.
20  The political situation 
was expected to be brought under control by simply limiting the changes to granting 
representation to opposition parties and allowing the PRI to maintain its dominance as a 
state party. Although this view did not eliminate the idea of pursuing political-electoral 
reforms, it embraced the maintenance of state control over the organisation of elections 
and the counting process.
21 A second extreme view was put by Cardenas who claimed 
that “it was the beginning of the end of the Mexican political system”. Cardenas claimed 
to have won the election accusing the government of electoral fraud. Soon after, he 
initiated a national protest with his supporters and called for new elections.
22 Those who 
agreed  with  this  interpretation  thought  that  political  change  was  only  possible  by 
overthrowing the illegal government through a democratic movement whose first step 
would be to name Cardenas as the legitimate president.
23 The third and probably the 
most assertive view came from the PAN. Despite rejecting the electoral results and 
leading protests, the PAN leaders soon realised that this was a golden opportunity to put 
pressure on the government for electoral reform.
24 As the PAN had just received 16.1% 
of the votes, therefore losing second position to Cardenas’ party, it realised that there 
was only one option: negotiation towards electoral reform. In the future, this approach 
would be considered a “wiser strategy choice”.
  25 Indeed these negotiations and non 
confrontational strategies contributed to the PAN becoming the main actor in the new 
policies of the Salinas government. 
It  seems  that  the  PAN  leaders  provided  the  most  assertive  interpretation  of  a  new 
political context. As will be discussed later it not only helped to have a prominent role 
in the process of electoral reform that would take place but it also capitalised on the 
flawed visions of its adversaries by positioning itself as the second electoral force.
26 
However, the PRI and PRD’s polarised visions had an effect on the way this process 
                                                 
20 The economic reasons were the dramatic consequences among PRI’s supporters after the Debt Crisis and the 
economic restructuring. 
21 Salazar, L.  Mexico 2000: Alternancia y Transición a la democracia, p.29. 
22 Cardenas’ call for a new election was perceived as a vindication of his electoral victory, therefore the PAN did not 
support that idea. Interview, Alejandro Zapata, Secretary of the National Executive Committee of PAN, Mexico City, 
28 October 2004. 
23 This party expected a democratic revolution similar to those that took place in the totalitarian regimes of East 
Europe.  
24 The PAN’s leader, Luis Alvarez asked his party to enter into a new era of negotiation arguing the importance of 
“pragmatic pacts”.  See Marín, C. In the discourse of the opposition, “se  asoma la amenaza”. Proceso. August 10 
1988; (613):6-7. 
25  Bruhn, K. Governing Mexico: political parties and elections, p.115. 
26 Salazar, L. Mexico 2000: Alternancia y Transición a la democracia, p.30. Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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developed. First of all, the PRI’s vision contributed to the delay in the initiation of the 
reforms as not all of its members agreed on the possibility of reform and the conversion 
of the PRI to a normal party. Secondly the PRD’s vision of non-negotiation and non-
acceptance of the new government contributed to the delay in forming the PRD as a 
functioning political party. One of the main problems lay in overcoming the personality 
of  its  leader.
27  Thus  initially,  the  PRI  did  not  have  a  clear  idea  of  how  to  evolve 
politically; perceiving future electoral reforms as concessions and the PRD did not alter 
its claim of “crisis of governability” and its confrontational attitude. In conclusion, the 
1988 elections gave a qualitative jump in Mexican democracy and the political-electoral 
reforms  that  Salinas  would  initiate  later  resulted  from  these  strategies  and 
interpretations.
28  
 
3.3 The promise of Salinas: end of the one-party system and division within the 
coalition 
It seems that the interpretation of PAN was the more assertive as Salinas’ promise to 
end the one party system was directly connected to negotiation on the electoral issues.
29 
The true intentions of Salinas were yet to be seen, as many thought that the promise was 
rhetoric. Clearly, Salinas’ real intention in dismantling the state-party apparatus was 
doubted not only by most analysts of Mexican politics but also by society in general. As 
Garrido notes those who doubted his good intention claimed that the famous promise 
could be interpreted as a number of adjustments that could be made within the system, 
by granting representation to opposition forces within the system.
30   However, the fact 
is that the promise of reform and future free and open elections signalled an imminent 
change in the political game. First of all, the controversy over the handling of elections 
and the challenging of Cardenas seemed to force the PRI to reassess its position as an 
official party in a one-party system. However, the PRI had secured the presidency for 
                                                 
27 Interview, member of  PRD A, Mexico City 11 November, 2004. 
28 See Salazar, L. Op. cit. pp.28-30. 
29 “Salinas insisted in negotiating and called on the opposition to solve controversies through the institutions…” 
 See Ortega Pizarro, F. Salinas proposed the opposition to seek consensus. Proceso, September 19 1988; (620):8. 
30 “Salinas at the party’s  61
st  anniversary in 1990, outlined his vision of reform, but insisted that the changes should 
seek to preserve the system in order to maintain the Mexican Revolution in power. What Salinas had in mind were the 
following modifications: the selection of candidates through democratic mechanisms, greater tolerance of dissent 
within the PRI, transparency regarding the origin of financial resources, greater local autonomy from the central 
party organisation, and a semi-corporatist structure with the most important affiliated mass organisations 
represented on a quota basis.” Garrido, L. Reform of the PRI: Rhetoric and Reality. In: Party politics in an 
uncommon democracy, p.25.  Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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the following six years. Its incoming president, Salinas realised that the organisation of 
elections  had  became  an  issue  of  national  security.  The  author  was  told  that  the 
realisation of this problem and the decision to adopt a reformist approach gave Salinas 
credit for good strategic thinking.
31  Indeed, the acknowledgement of the end of the one 
party system was the first sign that the official party was coming to terms with the loss 
of  the  appeal  and  legitimacy  that  it  had  exercised  in  the  past  over  the  populace. 
Furthermore, the internal problems with the labour unions ended with the defection of 
important labour candidates, which affected its traditional bases of support, as these 
were unable to be mobilised for the party. Secondly, within the PRI, Salinas’ promise of 
ending  the  hegemonic  party  system  provoked  further  divisions  that  radicalised 
positions. In addition, the loss of the PRI deputy candidates also had an impact inside 
the  PRI.  Further  defections  resulted  since  being  part  of  the  PRI  elite  no  longer 
guaranteed a position.
32   
In  conclusion,  in  a  context  of  internal  problems,  allegations  of  fraud  by  opposition 
parties  and  civil  organisations  and  a  total  lack  of  legitimacy  and  criticised 
internationally, Salinas found himself in a “cul-de-sac”. His predecessors Lopez Portillo 
(1976-1982) and De la Madrid (1988-1994) had used electoral reform as a valve of 
escape. A call within the party for a democratic reform to restore credibility seemed the 
best option. This was perceived as a new challenge within the party and as an ad-hoc 
solution to stop the current erosion of the party and restore legitimacy to the electoral 
process. Initially the idea was to pursue a flexible strategy, which was going to oscillate 
between  encouraging  the  opposition’s  co-operation  and  controlling  the  liberalisation 
process.  A  significant  aspect  was  the  willingness  to  establish  negotiation  with  the 
opposition. An analysis of who supported this strategy and who did not, will be carried 
out later in the chapter. Some authors note that Salinas’ concerns over the dangers of 
combining  economic  reforms  and  drastic  political  reforms  explained  his  flexible 
strategy  of  collaborating  with  the  opposition  at  the  same  time  as  controlling  the 
democratisation process.   
 
                                                 
31 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. “by adopting a reformist role, Salinas 
bought time to prove his legitimacy”  
32 In 1988 the PRI obtained 32 less deputies (260) in the Chamber of Deputies than in the previous election in 1982 
(292). Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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3.4 Negotiations on the table: Salinas and PAN, versus PRD 
As outlined above problems of legitimacy combined with a new configuration of power 
among political parties put pressure on Salinas to initiate a process of electoral reform. 
The  decision  to  initiate  a  controlled  liberalisation  process  using  electoral  reforms 
resulted from a new distribution of power among political actors, where the official 
party was weakened and a dangerous left had become stronger. Before analysing the 
approaches of the different parties towards the negotiation and their relationship, it is 
necessary to examine the reasons behind them. The left took shape in a new party, the 
PRD, created in 1989 after the coalition led by Cardenas was dissolved. Through the 
creation of the new left party, the PRI had become aware of the potential power of this 
new party to mobilise the popular movements that had emerged in the 80s.
33 Moreover, 
the official party was afraid of the new party stealing the long-used revolutionary appeal 
that it had successfully used among its supporters. The emergence of this centre left 
threat altered the relationship between PRI and PAN as both parties softened hard line 
postures  towards  each  other.  Salinas  would  attempt  to  take  advantage  of  this  new 
situation and an initial positive approach to PAN seemed to be a good option. Indeed, 
the PRI realised that negotiation with the opposition was essential to introduce changes 
in the constitution. In addition, a moderate attitude was also needed to gather enough 
support  to  govern  effectively  and  the  only  common  ground  that  appeared  to  be 
appropriate  for  negotiation  was  “electoral  reform”.  The  policy  of  political  opening 
initiated by Salinas was known as “concertación” and had the intention of calling all 
political  parties  to  negotiate.  The  negotiation  over  electoral  reforms  involved  co-
operation between parties. However, only the PRI and PAN were willing to negotiate, 
as the PRD did not accept Salinas as legal president. There is a diversity of opinion 
about the hidden strategies of Salinas regarding the negotiations. As stated above the 
PRI, especially Salinas, was aware of the danger of the newly created PRD. Given this, 
the  notion  of  perceiving  the  PRI’s  strategy  of  “divide  and  conquer”  seems  very 
reasonable.  The  PRI  would  be  able  to  negotiate  with  PAN,  therefore  restoring 
legitimacy, while isolating Cardenas and the PRD.  The PRI would proceed to diminish 
Cardenas’ popular support by mounting a campaign portraying the PRD as a violent and 
                                                 
33Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
  Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
 
81 
dangerous  opponent.
34  Despite  the  clear  pressure  of  the  PRI  to  reduce  Cardenas’ 
support, it is true that the latter’s attitude of non-collaboration “limited opportunities to 
improve the party’s performance of constituent service”.
35 The negative attitude towards 
Salinas’ government was clear from an early stage. In fact, there is a record of a meeting 
held between Salinas and Cardenas shortly after the 1988 elections in which the latter 
told Salinas: “No vamos a tener nada con este gobierno” (We are not going to have 
anything to do with this government).
36  So, the PRI’s strategy included negotiating 
with  the  PAN  which  supported  its  economic  policies  while  isolating  PRD.
37  The 
collaboration between PRI and PAN during this period was also seen as an exchange 
aiming  to  pass  economic  and  political  reforms.  Indeed  the  good  relationship  and 
interdependence between the PRI and PAN could explain how the negotiations focused 
specifically on electoral reform, one of the PAN’s main demands. It seems that the PAN 
started functioning as a “hinge party”, with the clear objective of cleaning the election. 
In  addition,  the  PAN  soon  saw  the  first  benefit  of  this  negotiation:  the  granting  of 
political space, starting with the governorship of Baja California in 1989. 
 
3.4.1  Dilemmas for the political actors  
The negotiations between the dominant party and the PAN created a dilemma for both. 
The official party had to co-operate with the opposition in electoral reform in order to 
gain  credibility  and  pass  legislation.  However,  the  need  for  negotiation  to  pass 
legislation seemed to be secondary as the “lack of credibility and legitimacy” was more 
urgent to restore.
38 As has occurred in other controlled liberalisation processes the elite 
was expected to give limited concessions in order to maintain control. In addition, initial 
negotiations were intended to be short-term measures to ease the pressure for change 
without thought of the consequences. It is obvious that Salinas needed to build up his 
image as a democratic reformer through this policy of political opening. However, if the 
                                                 
34 There is evidence of post-electoral violence against the PRD’s members, especially at local level. According to the 
PRD, over 250 PRD activists were killed or disappeared between 1988 and mid-1994, especially in the southern 
states of Guerrero, Chiapas and Tabasco. See Bruhn, K. Governing Mexico: political parties and elections, p.124. 
For a recompilation of post-electoral conflicts between PRI-PRD see Del Río Pascal, Beltran. Proceso. August 1991, 
12; (771-10).  
35 Bruhn, K. Op. cit. p.124. 
36 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and former advisor of President Councillor, 22 November, 1994 
37 The interpretation of a hidden strategy of the PRI to isolate the PRD was strongly denied by members of the PRD, 
who claimed that the PRD’s isolation was a result of its no-negotiation and aggressive attitude. Interview, former 
senior member of PRI A, Mexico City, September 15 2004.  
38 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
16 November 2004. 
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short-term gain of this political opening was to restore the PRI’s legitimacy, in the long-
term it might prove rather dangerous as it was legitimising the opposition party as a 
potential governing party.  On the other hand, despite the PAN initially not accepting 
the incoming president as legal, it soon agreed to sit down at the negotiating table. The 
dilemma for the PAN lay in the negative image that collaborating with the official party 
could cause, as it  could give the impression that they were legitimising the official 
party’s continuation in power.  However, despite the PAN being highly criticised for its 
collaboration with the official party, the knowledge of the PRI’s willingness to negotiate 
in order to govern, changed its approach. As mentioned earlier the PAN’s interpretation 
of the situation was all the more effective because it predicted the opportunity to play in 
the game for the first time. If the PAN did not expect to win a majority of votes at 
national level, it realised that it had bargaining powers that could obstruct government 
decisions. Finally, analysis of the parties’ approach and attitude towards negotiation 
brings a clear differentiation of who was in the game. However, concern about how trust 
among political parties and their own interest in power could develop during this period 
of negotiation never disappeared. Clearly both official party and opposition parties had 
their own interests and expectations in the new reformism period.  However, despite the 
doubts and dilemmas that the PAN and PRI were facing, the most significant aspect of 
these negotiations was the novelty of the context. In the past, electoral laws had been 
discussed and passed by a hegemonic party in response to political pressure exerted by 
powerless opposition parties. Although many of the reforms had included more or less 
relevant “concessions” to the opposition leaders that in the long term may benefit from 
them, the opposition parties did not take part in the negotiation process. However from 
1989, and for the first time, opposition parties adopted an active role in the decision-
making process that would change Mexican politics for ever.  
 
3.5 The  first  stage  of  reforms  (1989-1990):  The  1989  electoral  reform,  the  new 
electoral law COFIPE and the creation of IFE 
Only one year after the presidential elections and despite the dilemmas that the political 
parties  were  facing,  five  of  the  six  parties  represented  in  the  Mexican  Congress 
approved the first package of reforms.  This first reform modified the Constitution and 
the 1986 Federal Electoral Code (CFE) for the Federal Code of Electoral Institutions 
and Procedures (COFIPE) in 1990. Through the COFIPE, the Federal Electoral Institute Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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(IFE) would be established in 1990 as an independent and permanent body substituting 
the old Federal Electoral Commission (CFE). 
As mentioned before, the 1988 presidential elections took place under new electoral 
legislation  approved  in  the  1986  reform  and  the  Federal  Electoral  Code  of  1987.  
However the lack of efficiency that the newly created electoral authority showed in the 
1988  presidential  elections  limited  its  life  to  just  one  election.  The  electoral  results 
provoked not only allegations of fraud but more importantly a significant change in 
electoral  preferences.  In  addition,  the  new  configuration  of  power  among  political 
forces took the PRI by surprise, as it stopped its overwhelming victory for nearly 40 
years.  The electoral support that the official party previously received was diminished 
by  other  alternatives  that  seemed  more  attractive  to  the  electorate.  However,  the 
important aspect here is not the loss of support by the PRI, but instead the inability of 
the official party to contain the social unrest that resulted from the elections. The author 
was told that until 1988, electoral fraud at presidential level was not a major problem as 
the opposition parties did not represent any challenge.
39 The need for new electoral 
legislation and more importantly a new electoral authority seemed to be essential to 
respond  to  the  new  political  plurality.  This  need  for  new  electoral  legislation  and 
authority accelerated a reformism period.   
 
3.5.1  Formation of consensus: initiatives of the reforms by PRI, PAN and PRD 
Prior to the first set of reforms, Salinas proposed, in his inaugural speech, an agreement 
to expand the democratic life called “Acuerdo Nacional para la Ampliación de Nuestra 
Vida  Democrática”.
40  Officially,  this  national  agreement  was  focused  on  perfecting 
electoral  procedures,  highlighting  the  fact  that  respect  of  the  vote  was  essential  to 
achieve  democracy.  Subsequently  Salinas  requested  that  the  Federal  Electoral 
Commission  organise  a  series  of  public  hearings  in  order  to  analyse  the  normative 
framework that regulated elections.
41 As a result of this presidential initiative, the CFE 
(Federal  Electoral  Commission)  created  a  special  commission  called  “Comisión 
Especial para la Consulta Pública sobre Reforma Electoral y la Concertación entre los 
Partidos  Políticos  Nacionales”.  All  political  parties,  social  organisations,  political 
                                                 
39 Interview, former senior member of PRI A, Mexico City, 15 September 2004.  
40 See Nuñez Jimenez, A. La reforma electoral de 1989-1990, pp.27-29. 
41 This invitation to political parties and the general public was to discuss in public forums the content of the new 
electoral reform that could be perceived as a personal strategy of Salinas’s government to avoid further political 
destabilisation through inclusion. Interview, Beatriz Camacho, Civic Alliance, Mexico City, 5 October 2004.  Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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scientists and citizens were invited to participate in this open debate. Alongside these 
public hearings the Chamber of deputies decided to hold public hearings passing this 
task to its “Comisión de Gobernación y Puntos Constitucionales”. At local level, the 
respective electoral organs also organised forums for consultation. A total of twelve 
public hearings took place in order to gather opinions about the reform of the Mexican 
electoral system. Initially a wide range of issues was discussed in hearings: such as 
political  rights  and  national  representation,  party  and  national  political  association’s 
regimes, national voter’s registry, policies, media and electoral organs etc.
42   
 
3.5.2  Parliamentary agreement on the constitutional reforms 
The sub-commission organised by the Federal Electoral Commission in the Chamber of 
Deputies (Comisión de Gobernación y Puntos Constitutionales) was integrated into the 
legislative  branch  of  the  Union  and  by  the  registered  national  political  parties.  The 
purpose of the meeting organised by this sub-commission was to adopt agreements by 
consensus regarding constitutional reform’s initiatives.
43 This step was seen as essential 
in order to secure the viability of electoral reform. The most significant aspect of this 
commission was the participation of national political parties in the discussions, as it 
was  the  first  signal  that  the  one  party  system  had  already  disappeared.
  The  open 
invitation to political parties to participate in the sub-commission to discuss electoral 
issues did not mean that the PRI left its dominant position in the Mexican party system, 
but it showed that political plurality was unavoidable. In addition the wide range of 
opinions and proposals presented in the public hearings also showed the diversity in 
ideologies  and  political  perceptions.  However,  the  regulation  of  the  government  to 
achieve agreements by consensus was not a gratuity, as part of the reason was that the 
official  party  had  lost,  for  the  first  time,  the  majority  of  2/3  of  its  members  in  the 
Chamber of deputies.
44 Therefore, the PRI was unable to reform the constitution without 
the  support  of  at  least  another  parliamentary  faction.
45  Consensus  was  necessary 
because  no  political  party  had  achieved  the  2/3  majority  required  by  the  General 
Constitution in order to be able to reform or amplify it.
46 However, for other political 
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2004. 
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analysts consensus was necessary to restore or create not only credibility in the electoral 
organs but also the government itself after the controversial elections. Above all, the 
fact was that the official party had changed from being a self-sufficient actor to being a 
main actor. Moreover, the significance of these negotiations on electoral reform lay in 
the fact that for the first time the reform was not coming entirely from above but from 
the  wings  where  the  government  was  being  forced  to  negotiate,  and  achieve 
agreements.
47  The  consensus  and  discussions  in  the  Sub-commissions  proved  to  be 
complex  and  at  the  same  time  polarised.  However  they  took  place  in  a  peaceful 
environment characterised by an uncommon consensus.
48 After the consultation forums 
were resumed, the sub-commission reduced the content of the agenda and analysed the 
final  initiatives  proposal  presented  by  the  political  parties.  The  initiatives  focused 
particularly on electoral organs, electoral litigious, validation of the elections, electoral 
system  of  the  legislative  chambers,  political  rights  and  parties’  regime  and  Federal 
District representative institutions. The two forums ended with the overall impression 
that  the  political  debate  was  to  be  centred  particularly  in  the  transformation  of  the 
electoral rules.
49 By 22
nd June 1989, and once the two consultant forums had finished, 
Salinas asked the Permanent Commission of the Congress to organise an extraordinary 
session to make public the initiatives on electoral legislation with constitutional range.
50 
Finally, during the period of extraordinary sessions held in the Chamber of Deputies, 
the  “Comision  de  Gobernación  y  Puntos  constitucionales”  received  a  total  of  29 
initiatives from the deputies of the political parties (in this case the parties that had 
presented initiatives on the different points were the PAN, PRI, PFCRN, PPS, PARM 
and the PRD).
51 Before analysing the main content of the initiatives presented by the 
political parties it is necessary to note that the focus on the electoral law proved to be 
not only a direct response to the 1988 elections but also to the increasing interest in 
reforming electoral rules among political parties. The electoral debate had become a 
common ground for discussion between government and opposition and for the first 
                                                 
47 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004.  
48 For a summary of the consensus and agreements achieved in the Special Commission see the report on this matter 
that the Federal Electoral Commission presented on 30 June 1989. 
49 To see the content of the different proposals see Recuento de la CFE (Voz y Voto, 22 de Agosto, 1988, pp. 35-37) 
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time both seemed to be in agreement.   Indeed, after the  elections, it was clear that 
regulation  on  the  organisation  of  elections  became  imperative,  especially  for  the 
government, as it was the only way to re-establish credibility and electoral competence 
for future elections.  Furthermore, this was not only a concern of opposition parties but 
also of the PRI that realised that an unwanted political polarisation dictated the need to 
revise and reform the electoral law.
52  Finally, if electoral reform seemed to the PRI an 
easy method to re-establish legitimacy, for many the prospect of electoral reform was 
perceived as the only means to achieve a transition to democracy. Therefore, the climate 
for achieving consensus in a peaceful way seemed to be positive and supported by most 
parliamentary groups.  
 
3.5.3  Initiatives of the PRI, PAN and PRD on electoral legislation 
The clear intention of the regime to promote the debate and the willingness of political 
parties  to  present  their  proposals  for  reform  heralded  a  very  long  process  of 
negotiations. Certainly,  the debates on electoral legislation organised by  the  Federal 
Electoral Commission and the Chamber of Deputies were long and polarised at times. In 
addition, the various parliamentary groups prioritised different issues in relation to each 
other.
53 In the next section of the chapter the main aspects of the initiatives of the main 
parties (PAN, PRI and PRD) will be examined.  
 
3.5.4  The electoral proposal of PAN  
As  expected,  PAN  was  the  first  party  to  present  a  completed  project  in  respect  of 
electoral legislation. This opportunity had been awaited since its creation. Furthermore, 
after the 1986 reform, PAN and other opposition parties
54 had totally rejected the new 
CFE  (Federal  Electoral  Code)  that  had  advocated  the  continuation  of  the  non-
democratic  norms  of  the  electoral  law.
55  The  most  interesting  proposal  was  the 
substitution of the Federal Electoral Code (CFE) for a new code “Código Electoral de 
                                                 
52 The PRI’s loss of appeal among its traditional bases of support (popular classes and labour workers) was in direct 
proportion to the increasing electoral support of Cardenas. 
53 The PRI, the PAN, the PFCRN and the PRD through their parliamentary groups presented their initiatives on 
electoral organs. These parties also presented initiatives relating to other issues such as validation of elections and 
electoral litigious. Other parties such as PPS (Popular Socialist Party) and PARM also presented initiatives on 
specific issues such as political rights and responsibilities and composition and functioning of the Chamber of 
deputies, etc. For a complete summary of the initiatives presented see “Comisión de Gobernación y Puntos 
Constitutionales”, Congress of Deputies, August 1989. 
54 The opposition parties that took the decision not to support the CFE were the following: United Socialist Party of 
Mexico, Mexican Democratic Party, The Workers Revolutionary Party and Mexican Workers Party.  
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“La Reforma del Estado, pp.137-138. Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
 
87 
los Poderes Legislativos y Ejecutivo de la Unión, also known by PAN’s members as the 
“blue  code”.  Surprisingly,  this  idea  was  welcomed  by  both  the  government  and 
parties.
56 Another important proposal concerned a programme to issue identification 
cards to citizens as a public document, not only to guarantee the right to vote but also as 
an identification document for others matters.
57 Also, in parallel it was  proposed to 
create a new national electoral register (Registro Nacional Ciudadano) responsible for 
issuing the photo-credential and updating an electoral roll every 10 years.
58 The photo-
credential would become one of the most important aspects of the IFE in the future.
59 In 
addition, the proposal to create a Council of Citizens responsible for the electoral organ 
was  an  idea  that  would  be  developed  in  the  future.  PAN  had  highly  criticised  the 
absolute control of the PRI in the main electoral organ, especially after the new CFE 
was created in 1986.
60 Indeed, the most important of PAN’s initiatives was related to 
electoral organs and procedures and reflected the concerns about the Federal Electoral 
Commission’s performance in 1988. Therefore, the initiative on substituting the current 
CFE  by  a  new  organ  called  Federal  Council  of  the  Suffrage  (Consejo  Federal  del 
Sufragio) was relevant as it moved the core of the debate on the institution in charge of 
the electoral process. The PAN criticised the role of the official party and government in 
the  Electoral  Commission.  Consequently  PAN  invented  a  structure  for  the  new 
commission. The new commission proposed by PAN had balance and counterbalance 
within it in order to prevent the omnipotent presence of the official party. The Federal 
Commission would be formed by the Minister of the Interior  (with a voice but without 
a vote), a councillor of Chamber of deputies (elected by majority vote among candidates 
proposed by minority parties), a councillor of the Senate (elected among members of a 
short list drawn up by the president), a councillor of the Supreme Court of Justice of the 
Nation (elected from a short list presented by a fraction of the deputies) and councillors 
of the parties (one, if the party obtained up to 10% of votes, 2 if it obtained between 10 
and 20% and three if it obtained more than 20%).  
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With  a  similar  intention  of  ending  the  extra-political  power  of  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior, who appointed the president and secretaries of the local and district electoral 
commissions, PAN proposed to introduce changes in their composition. The members 
of the local and district electoral commissions would be selected at random by means of 
a lottery organised by the Federal Council for the Suffrage and proposed by political 
parties.
61 This proposal would prove to be very significant in the future reforms of the 
electoral law that followed, especially when the parties started gaining confidence on 
the electoral authority and the possibility of cutting ties with the government became a 
reality.  In relation to media access, PAN demanded an equal distribution of slots in the 
media  among  all  the  parties  with  parliamentary  representation.
62  Specifically,  PAN 
proposed  that  all  parties  had  radio  and  TV  channels  and  making  obligatory  for 
presidential candidates to participate in public debates.
63 It also proposed to increase the 
right of access to radio and television from 15 minutes each a month to 15 minutes each 
fortnight and established that time slots in the media would not be sold to the parties 
above commercial tariffs. Another aspect worth considering is PAN’s proposed changes 
within the two  chambers. First of all, the party demanded to reduce the number of 
deputies  to  450,  in  which  300  would  be  elected  by  relative  majority  and  150  by 
proportional  representation.  Relating  to  the  composition  of  the  Senate  the  PAN 
proposed 6 senators for each federal entity half of whom would be elected every three 
years by majority vote. The idea of renovating just half of the Senate would result in a 
two-party system in each federal entity. The concerns over the composition of chambers 
showed the relevance of electoral reform for this party.
64 PAN also proposed a second 
round in the Presidential elections but this was not accepted. PAN had argued that a 
second round between the two candidates with most votes would assure an executive 
with  the  support  of  an  absolute  majority.  Regarding  party  and  political  association 
registration, PAN asked to increase the number of affiliated members from 65 to 100 
thousand  for  political  parties  and  from  5  to  10  thousand  for  political  associations. 
Another  proposal  that  is  important  to  highlight  is  PAN’s  proposal  to  end  the 
“autocalification”,  self-validation  formula  for  which  the  Congress  could  declare  the 
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validation of the elections of its own members. This demand later became an issue for 
discussion.  Regarding  electoral  procedures,  it  was  proposed  to  include  information 
about the electoral distrists within the ballot papers, to exclude party colours in the 
ballots  and  to  use  transparent  polling  boxes.
65  Finally,  in  PAN’s  view  the  Federal 
Tribunal for Elections should be substituted by the Tribunal of the Electoral Litigious 
with full faculties (Tribunal de lo Contencioso Electoral). Perhaps the most significant 
aspect of this proposal was the addition of a chapter about electoral offences to the 
Penal Code.
66  
 
3.5.5  The electoral proposal of PRI  
The  PRI’s  initiative  for  constitutional  reforms  in  electoral  issues  followed  PAN’s 
initiative.
67 Here, the PRI was facing a completely new situation as for the first time it 
was unable to reform the constitution with only the support of its legislators. Clearly, 
inside the official party, the elite realised that modifying the constitution was not only a 
condition to restore legitimacy but more importantly to be able to govern in peace.  
In addition, the idea of joining with other political parties in order to pass an initiative 
was anticipated as being a very long and difficult negotiation process. The PRI required 
at least the support of another parliamentary faction such as PAN or the PRD (the old 
FDN).    The  PRI’s  initiative  concentrated  on  five  themes:  electoral  organisation, 
electoral litigation, composition of the Congress and the declaration of validation of 
elections. As expected the organisation of elections became the core issue. By 1988, the 
dependency of the electoral organs on the Minister of Interior and the self-regulation of 
the Federal Electoral Commission had further contributed to the perception of a total 
lack of impartiality of the electoral organs. Clearly, the partiality of the electoral organs 
in Mexico was well known, but now the possibility of alternative options in government 
made it unacceptable. In order to restore the situation the PRI proposed a number of 
interesting things. First of all, the PRI proposed to use Article 41 (which dealt with 
national sovereignty and forms of government) instead of Article 60. On this matter the 
PRI  concurred  with  the  PRD.  With  regard  to  the  existing  disposition  that  the 
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government was in charge of the preparation, developing and surveillance of electoral 
process, the PRI responded that the organisation of federal elections was a state function 
that was exercised by the executive and legislative powers. However, this position was 
arguable because despite there being agreement about elections being a state function, 
there  was  divergence  on  who  should  organise  them  to  ensure  that  impartiality  was 
guaranteed. In addition, the PRI also presented a proposal relating to the composition of 
the electoral organ.
68 In PRI’s opinion, the electoral organ would be formed by direction 
and  supervision  bodies,  and  for  executive  and  technical  bodies.  They  proposed 
councillors from the executive and legislative power, magistrate councillors and parties 
‘representatives for the direction body. Secondly, as PAN also did, the PRI proposed 
changes to electoral litigation. Specifically it proposed to refine some aspects of the 
functioning and composition of the Tribunal of electoral litigation, but without changing 
its administrative structure. A point to highlight was the proposal to introduce regional 
courts. The decentralisation of the Tribunal’s function was a demand in common with 
PAN.
69  
Finally, the PRI’s proposal relating to the composition of the Chamber of deputies was 
seen as a backward step. It maintained a chamber with 500 deputies, 300 of relative 
majority and 200 of proportional representation. However, the formula allocated for the 
selections of its members would result in a return to the overrepresentation of the PRI.
70 
The PRI also proposed to open the Senate. The Senate would integrate three senators 
per state, elected by relative majority, and an additional 32 through a national list by 
proportional  representation.  However,  this  aspect  was  challenged  by  analysts  who 
questioned who would represent the 32 senators elected by multi-member districts.
71 
Finally,  and  contradicting  PAN’s  proposal,  the  PRI  proposed  the  traditional 
“autocalification”,  self-declaration  of  validity  of  election,  (where  Congress  became 
judges of their own election). However, this time the task would be carried out by a 
fraction of deputies and senators (100:64). With this proposal, the PRI responded to the 
controversial role of the last Electoral College. However, the maintenance of the self 
declaration of validity was seen as unacceptable by other political parties. Furthermore, 
the  PRI  proposed  that  the  Electoral  College  was  the  only  body  able  to  modify  the 
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resolutions of the tribunal. In the event of the resolutions being adopted by unanimity 
these would require 2/3 of the votes of the member of the Electoral College. Therefore, 
the  political  declaration  of  validity  was  above  the  judiciary  and  showed  that  their 
proposal contained many mistakes.
72 
 
3.5.6  The initiative for electoral reform of the PRD  
The newly created PRD (Revolutionary Democratic Party) also presented two initiatives 
for constitutional reforms in electoral issues on the 11 August, 1989. It was the first 
time that the PRD had participated in negotiations regarding electoral reform. In one of 
the initiatives the PRD proposed a new status and composition of the organs in charge 
of electoral organisation at federal level. Obviously, since the 1988 elections the PRD 
felt that they were the legal winners of the elections and the electoral organs were to 
blame for their unjust defeat. It also proposed some adjustments to the responsibilities 
and the formula of composition of the Electoral Tribunal.  
One of the most important aspects of its initiative was the proposal to substitute the 
Federal Electoral Commission with a new organ called the Federal Electoral Council. 
This  new  institution  would  be  a  public  organism  of  permanent  and  autonomous 
character responsible for the preparation, developing and surveillance of the electoral 
process and of the register of electors”, (reform of Article 41). However, the innovation 
here  is  the  fact  that  the  PRD  wanted  to  exclude  the  executive  and  the  chamber  of 
senators from the electoral function that until then had participated in the CFE. It was 
PRD’s view that the Federal Electoral Council should be composed only of political 
parties’ representatives and citizens chosen by the Chamber of deputies by a majority of 
2/3. Like the PRI, the PRD did not specify the number of citizens to be elected by the 
chamber of Deputies. However, of importance is the fact that this specific initiative was 
going to become a central issue in the development of the future electoral organ (IFE). 
The creation of the figure of “magistrate councillors” would partly accomplish the idea, 
and then it would be advanced in 1994 with the creation of the “citizens councillors” 
figure. However, it was 1996 before the PRD’s initiative was fully achieved, when the 
Minister of the Interior left the council, and the legislative and parties’ representatives 
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lost their votes in the General Council. It is quite interesting to note that the General 
Council of IFE, in existence since 1996, had its origins in the initiative of the PRD in 
1989.
73 This aspect is even more curious given the fact that the PRD adopted a non-
negotiating position in subsequent reforms that accomplished its original objective. This 
proposal was very important because it formed the basis for future discussion that took 
place in later years: the autonomy of the electoral organs, and the total exclusion of the 
state  and  the  PRI  from  the  organisation  of  the  electoral  process.  Finally,  another 
relevant aspect of the PRD initiative was the inclusion of “votaciones calificadas” (2/3) 
to elect members of the electoral authority. This required consensus among two or more 
parties in order to successfully nominate members. 
The second initiated proposal included new forms of composition of the chambers in 
Congress. Regarding the composition of the chamber of deputies it proposed to continue 
with 500 deputies, where relative majority would elect 250 and 250 by would be elected 
by proportional representation. The objective of this proposal was to end the power of 
the majority party.  The objective was to combine both electoral methods to achieve a 
more accurate representation of the different political forces in the Chamber without 
eliminating the regional election. This proposal opposed PAN’s.  However, it coincided 
with PAN in respect of eliminating the list of multi-member electoral districts. With 
regard to the Chamber of senators, the PRD proposed to increase the number of senators 
and put forward the recommendation of using proportional representation and relative 
majority to elect senators in each federal entity. The idea behind this initiative was to 
have the same number of senators in each federal entity. This idea seemed to be the 
more clear and realistic.  This initiative would open the plurality of the Senate while at 
the same time, maintaining, the basic criteria for its composition. This proposal seemed 
functional and democratic.
74 Finally, regarding the Federal Tribunal the PRD proposed 
to create a Federal Electoral Tribunal responsible for ensuring control of the legality of 
the electoral process. In PRD terms this tribunal would be the highest electoral judicial 
authority  and  would  be  expected  to  resolve  all  electoral  disputes  and  have 
responsibilities in electoral issues. It would be integrated by a number of magistrates 
elected by the chamber of deputies by the 2/3 voting system.  
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The different objectives of political parties heralded very long negotiations. Formal and 
informal meetings took place among the different political parties over several days. 
The  consensus  encountered  a  number  of  different  obstacles,  due  to  the  different 
objectives and proposals of the parties. First of all, the inability of the PRI to reform the 
Constitution on its own forced it to seek agreement from other parties. However, this 
did not mean that the parties empowered themselves, for without the PRI the reform 
would have been impossible.Overall the initiatives focused on three themes: electoral 
organisation, electoral declaration of validity of elections and the composition of both 
chambers.  
The priorities of the political parties started to emerge. While the PRI concentrated on 
the modification of the composition of the Chamber of deputies, PAN and PRD focused 
on the need for an electoral organ with a different composition. PAN also emphasised 
the  need  for  electoral  census  with  the  creation  of  a  National  Registry  of  Citizens 
(Registro  Nacional  Ciudadano),  and  asked  to  eliminate  the  autocalificación  (self-
declaration  of  validity  of  elections  by  Congress).  The  PRD  demanded  an  impartial 
electoral  organ  and  more  importantly  asked  to  exclude  the  participation  of  the 
government  in  the  electoral  organisation.  It  concurred  with  PAN  in  demanding  the 
elimination of the self-validation.
75  It is interesting to note that the remaining minority 
parties,  such  as  PPS  and  PFCRN,  for  different  reasons,  were  excluded  from  the 
negotiations, which centred on the triangle PRI-PAN-PRD.  
 
3.5.7  The negotiating process. 
The first public movement in the negotiations was the “parliamentary declaration on 
electoral  reform”  that  was  signed  by  the  PAN,  PRD  and  PARM  and  a  group  of 
independent deputies. This group achieved a unique agreement: “the electoral organs, at 
all levels, must be impartial and autonomous from political and public forces”…
76 This 
statement was a direct message to the PRI, as the electoral organs proved to be partial, 
especially after the 1988 elections. Later the negotiations seemed to be concentrated 
between the PAN and PRD which presented an initiative in electoral organisations and 
validation of elections. On one hand, the PRD finally decided to abandon its idea of a 
total exclusion of the state representatives in the electoral organs and accepted PAN’s 
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initiative of accepting the tribunal as the organ responsible for validating the elections. 
On the other hand, PAN accepted the Tribunal as the body responsible for the validation 
of elections instead of the Chamber of Deputies. The reaction of the PRI to this PAN-
PRD initial agreement made the negotiations difficult. In parallel, the PRI expecting to 
use  its  bargaining  power  presented  its  initiative  focused  on  the  modification  of 
composition of the Chamber of Deputies. Soon, the positions of the political parties 
were taking shape. The PRD did not cooperate in any negotiations on the initiatives; 
however  PAN  was  more  flexible.  Despite  the  negotiations  being  primarily  between 
PRD and PAN, it became clear that the negotiations were an exchange between PAN 
and  PRI.  The  exchange  consisted  of  the  PRI  accepting  a  modification  in  the 
composition of the electoral organs and PAN supporting a new form of composition of 
the Chamber of Deputies. The PRD maintained its reservations, and the negotiations 
became tense. By this stage the role of PAN was clear. It seems that PAN achieved its 
objective: to be the determining force in the reform.
77 The flexibility of PAN in its 
negotiation with the official party and a fairly developed strategy contributed to this 
new position. PAN gained power, as it became the decisive force in the reform. On one 
hand, it could add its votes to the PRI’s vote and support a reform. On the other hand, it 
could vote against the PRI and thus block any constitutional modification.
78 Indeed, the 
negotiations  on  electoral  reforms  ended  on  16  October,  when  PAN  announced  its 
decision to vote in favour of the reform. The report was approved by 368 votes from 
PRI and PAN against 70 from others (PARM, PPS, PFCRN and PRD). Although only 
two  parties  supported  the  reform  initiative,  this  event  contributed  to  converting  the 
Congress in the centre of negotiations for the first time in Mexican history.  
 
3.5.8  The electoral reform  
 
Finally the PAN and PRI agreed in a report to reform seven constitutional articles in 
electoral  issues:  electoral  organs,  the  National  Citizens  Registry,  the  Validation  of 
electoral results and electoral dispute, Composition of the Chamber of Deputies and 
Composition of the Representatives Board of the Federal District.  
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The first electoral issue that requires to be addressed in this chapter is the regulation of 
the electoral organ; the future of IFE. On this matter, PAN and PRI only agreed on 11 
points and as expected, they did not specify the composition of the electoral body. The 
11 points of the report were: 
1)  Article 41 (instead of 60), should have the normative bases that would regulate 
the organism and electoral functions. 
2)  The electoral process is a state and public function 
3)  The responsiblity for the organisation and surveillance of the electoral process 
rests with the organs of the State with the participation of political parties and 
citizens 
4)  The organs in charge of this process must have a public character 
5)  It may grant authority  
6)  It must be a professional body 
7)  IFE must be autonomous in its decision 
8)  The principles in the electoral process must include certainty, impartiality and 
objectivity  
9)  The organs will comprise qualified professional personnel 
10) Electoral functions will be remunerated (exceptions excluded) 
11) It must establish a trusted system that produces a reliable electoral roll. 
In the outline of these agreements the future IFE was defined. Obviously, this was only 
the first step, as a number of other issues, such as the formula to integrate the electoral 
authority were still to be resolved.
79 Another important aspect of the reform was the 
regulation  on  the  National  Citizen  Registry  that  was  covered  in  Article  36.  This 
particular  issue  was  an  old  objective  of  PAN.  It  was  established  that  the  Tribunal 
continued to be responsible for the declaration of validity of elections and electoral 
disputes. However, of note in this context was the decentralisation of the functions of 
the tribunal by creating local courts.  The opposition welcomed the redefinition of the 
functions  of  the  Tribunal  and  modification  of  the  mechanism  for  the  election  of 
magistrates.  However,  the  decision  to  retain  “autocalificación”  (self-declaration  of 
validation of elections by Congress) was not welcomed by the opposition. This issue 
                                                 
79 Article 41 only says “the superior organ will be integrated by councillors elected by the Executive and Legislative 
branch, by the magistrate councillors proposed by the President and elected by 2/3 of the deputies and representatives 
of the political parties. However it did not mention the proportion.  Ibid. p.40. Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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would become a source of dispute in future reforms.
80 Regarding the composition of the 
chamber of deputies the reform did not advance enough. In fact, the new arrangement 
contrasted with the step forward achieved in the previous reform in 1986. However, 
there  were  significant  advances  in  the  new  form  of  composition  of  the  chamber  of 
deputies,  especially  in  terms  of  proportional  representation.  Article  52  was  not 
modified; therefore the chamber of deputies continued having 300 deputies of relative 
majority and 200 of proportional representation. However the changes in Article 54 had 
the corrective effect of reversing the problem of over- and under-representation. The 
new form of distribution of multi-member district deputies established that in order to 
participate it was necessary to compete with at least 200 one-member district candidates 
and to obtain 1.5% of the national vote. Any party could obtain more than 350 deputies 
in total; however the most significant element was that any party with the greatest share 
of the majority and 35% of the national vote could obtain enough deputies to achieve 
the absolute majority in the Chamber. In addition to the absolute majority, it would be 
assigned two deputies through proportional representation for every 1% of votes over 
35% up to 75%. Therefore, this was a negative aspect, and in some ways, the so called 
“cláusula de gobernabilidad” was restored. This gave the party with relative majority 
automatic passage to become the absolute majority. However, from that reform, the 
minimum required to pass was 35%.  Therefore the assignation of deputies would be 
more generous. In the past, the majority party was represented in the way that votes 
were equal to deputies. However, from now a party with 35% of the vote was to receive  
50.2% of deputies, with 40% of the votes, 52.2; with 50% of the votes, 56.2%.and from 
60% of   the votes deputies would be distributed strictly proportionally.
81 Any initiatives 
of modification of the Senate went forward. 
Table 3.2. 1989-1990 Electoral Reform: Distribution of Congressional seats 
  Percentage of votes                            Number of deputies  
               35                                            251       (50%)                           
               40                                            261 
               50                                            281 
               60                                            301 
Souce: COFIPE (Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures)  
 
                                                 
80 The argument here is that the new formula tended to benefit the majority party given the new dispositions to 
integrate the Chamber of Deputies. 
81 See Becerra, R. et al.  La Mecáncia del cambio político en México, pp.238-246. Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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3.5.9  Legislative modification 
The following section will analyse the content of the new legislation on electoral subject 
matter and the political discussion around it. The new law was approved as a result of a 
series of constitutional reforms approved in 1989 that have been analysed previously. In 
April 1990 Congress approved an amendment to Article 41 of the Constitution of 1917 
that laid the basis for a new Federal Code for Electoral  Institutions and Procedures 
(COFIPE),  which  in  turn  was  passed  by  Congress  in  July  1990.  The  new  code 
“COFIPE”  (Federal  Code  of  Electoral  Institutions  and  Procedures)  was  formally 
established on October 11, 1990.  The Legislative branch of the Union, the national 
political parties, and the citizens participated in its composition. The COFIPE consisted 
of 8 books that contained 367 Articles that had further modifications in later electoral 
reforms  in  1993,  1994,  and  1996.  The  issues  discussed  in  the  new  law  were  the 
following:  the  composition  of  the  legislative  and  executive  branches,  the  regime  of 
political parties, the Federal Electoral Institute, and special procedures of the executive 
boards,  the  electoral  process,  the  Federal  Electoral  Tribunal,  the  null  system  of 
impugnation and sanctions, and the election and composition of the Representatives 
Assembly of Federal District. 
An important aspect in this issue is that the PRI did not need to pact with any other 
party  to  pass  legislation.  However,  PRI  had  an  unofficial  agreement  with  PAN 
established  during  the  constitutional  reform.  This  controversial  relationship  between 
PRI and PAN will be analysed later. After PRI presented the full initiative on the new 
electoral legislation, reforms and additions to the Federal Electoral Code were presented 
by the parliamentary groups. 
Soon after, PAN presented another initiative on electoral code named “Electoral Code 
of the Legislative and Executive power of the Union”. In April 1990 other parties such 
as the PARM (the Authentic Mexican Revolutionary Party) and the Cardenista Front of 
national  Reconstruction  (PFCRN)  updated  their  initiatives  on  their  proposals  for 
reforms and additions to the Federal Electoral Code that they had presented in August 
1989. 
On 14 July 1990 the Chamber of Deputies approved the new electoral law: the Federal 
Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE). As with constitutional reform, 
the  political  parties  agreed  to  create  a  special  commission  in  order  to  discuss  the Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
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different proposals. Multiparty commissions of deputies initiated the process to achieve 
an electoral law. The main purpose of this commission was to achieve consensus among 
political  parties.
82  The  final  vote  was  369  votes  in  favour  and  65  against  with  2 
abstentions.
83  Although the PRI’s initiative was supported by the majority of deputies 
and became the focus of the deliberation for new legislation, the PRD was again left out 
of the negotiation. Five parliamentary groups (PRI, PAN, PPS, PARM, and PFCRN) 
supported  the  new  law.  However  opposition  to  the  new  code  came  from  26  PAN 
deputies, from PRD and from the Independent Parliamentary Group of legislators. As 
noted earlier with the COFIPE the PRI did not require to find allies to get the 2/3 share 
of votes in Congress as it had a sufficient number of deputies to carry out the reform. In 
addition  the  constitutional  discussion  about  electoral  legislation  took  place  in  an 
extraordinary  period.  However,  at  this  stage  the  PRI  not  only  had  an  unofficial 
agreement  with  PAN  but  also  a  more  important  commitment  to  society  to  achieve 
consensus  among  political  actors  as  Salinas  had  promised.    It  seemed  that  political 
matters did not only belong to PRI.  However,  PRI needed the backing of the most 
significant forces of the country, and the PAN filled that gap. The unofficial agreement 
between PRI and PAN was known as “la carta de intención”. The document was a 
series of agreements that both parties promised to fulfill. The agreements were focused 
particularly on the regulation of the electoral organs and the regulations of the National 
Registry  of  Citizens.  These  issues  were  long  standing  demands  of  PAN  and  were 
therefore pushed by them. In addition, PAN benefitted as it was able to centralise its 
position.  Here, it seemed that PAN’s gain was twofold. It was not only able to negotiate 
with PRI and the government, but at the same time it also benefitted from common 
platforms with PRD. Obviously, PAN seemed to be aware that as the political context 
changed only a new strategy of negotiation was viable. PAN knowing its bargaining 
power thought that it could reorientate the discussions to its own interest. Indeed, when 
a  comparison  between  the  previous  code  and  the  new  code  was  established,  PAN 
realised that it contained many of its initiatives.  Issues such as the composition of the 
electoral organs, the counting of votes, the electoral roll and the sanction of fraudulent 
                                                 
82 Nuñez Jimenez, A. La Reforma Electoral 1989-90, 1993, p.36. 
83 Later in August after the vote’s session in the Chamber of Deputies, the matter passed on to the Chamber of 
Senators in order to complete the legislative process: the result was 48 votes in favour (94.11% of the senators 
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conducts, etc, were PAN’s demands. However, in the future, PAN would have to pay 
for this pact with the PRI (division among its deputies).  
The PRI benefitted from the agreement with PAN as it improved its image as a party 
willing  to  negotiate.  Of  course,  the  PRI  could  have  ignored  PAN  but  there  were 
negative implications in doing this. The PRI showed its commitment to PAN when it 
declared  that  it  was  willing  to  change  its  original  initiatives  on  several  points  (for 
example,  the  compromise  of  the  immediate  counting  of  the  votes).  On  another 
spectrum,  the  PRD  along  with  another  4  parties  disagreed  and  did  not  accept  the 
COFIPE. This was significant because the PRD was one of the most important political 
forces.  Initially, the PRD, tried to negotiate the agreement of two of  its issues (the 
naming of the electoral personnel at the voting booths and the faculties of the local and 
districts council personnel). But the PRI refused these initiatives and excluded it from 
the game. The PRD adopted a non-negotiating attitude, and was considered by PRI and 
PAN members to be intransigent. It can be argued that the attitude of non-collaboration 
had ambiguous consequences. On one hand, it had a political value because it eroded 
the new law, but at the same time it left the door open to new reforms.
84  
The new electoral law of 1990 was the third (1977, 1986), and was the most complete. 
This code substituted the shortlived Federal Electoral Code of 1986-1988.
85 The 1990 
law was the one that regulated the 1991 mid-term elections. Although the rules of the 
game were not accepted by all, the agreement became very promising as it formed the 
basis of future reforms and therefore future negotiations.
86 
In  the  next  section  the  most  important  elements  of  the  COFIPE  (new  secondary 
legislation in electoral subject matter) will be analysed. 
 
3.6 The creation of IFE (Federal Electoral Institute) 
Parties such as PRI, PAN and PRD had different interests, attitudes and expectations of 
IFE. The analysis of these political actors’ perceptions of IFE at the beginning of its 
operation  will  let  us  understand  better  the  subsequent  evolution  of  IFE.  The 
fundamental question is whether the political parties envisaged the real transformation 
                                                 
84 Woldenberg, J. Cuadernos para la democracia: La reforma electoral 1989-1990, pp.49-50. 
85 Becerra, R., Salazar, P., and Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, pp.247-248. 
86 For the problems of the reform see Carrión, J. Encrucijada de la reforma electoral, Estrategia, September & 
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of  IFE  from  a  body  dependent  on  the  government  to  a  truly  independent  electoral 
agency.  This preliminary analysis will show the real potential of IFE and the way the 
institution evolved will enable us to understand the extent to which it met expectations.  
The  most  important  and  at  the  same  time  controversial  book  of  the  new  electoral 
legislation was Book 3 (about the Federal Electoral Institute). The new electoral agency 
was  a  result  of  the  issuing  of  the  COFIPE  (in  1990)  and  a  series  of  constitutional 
reforms approved in 1989.  The creation of the Federal Electoral Institute is the most 
relevant feature of the 1990 reform. Specifically, Article 41 of the Constitution was 
used as the basis of the negotiations concerning electoral organisation. In this article, it 
was established that “the state function of organising elections corresponds to a public, 
professional and autonomous body; with legal personality and patrimony of its own and 
is ruled by five fundamental principles: certainty, legality, independence, impartiality, 
and objectivity.”
87 The COFIPE established that the IFE was the institution authorised 
to  carry  out  the  functions  related  to  the  preparation,  organisation,  conduction,  and 
surveillance  of  federal  elections.  These  functions  included  the  accomplishment  and 
updating  of  the  voters  roll,  attention  to  the  rights  and  prerogatives  of  parties  and 
political groups, the counting of electoral results and the design, print and distribution of 
electoral material and the formulation and implementation of permanent civic education 
programmes. With the creation of IFE, the management of the electoral system changed 
from the government to IFE. Elections were now defined as a function of the state that 
would  be  exercised  through  a  non-partisan  electoral  entity.  At  this  early  stage  the 
institution was under the direction of the Minister of the Interior.     
Although in time the Federal Electoral Institute was recognised as the most important 
advance  of  the  1989-90  reform,  it  was  initially  perceived  as  suspicious.  The  initial 
distrust of the new electoral body was based on the presence of the Minister of the 
Interior  in  IFE.  The  constitution  of  this  agency  for  organising  and  supervising  the 
electoral process became a constant issue of negotiation between the government and 
the opposition parties.
88 Indeed, after the new body was created, the political negotiation 
among political actors concentrated mainly on the IFE.  
                                                 
87 Síntesis de las deliberaciones. Commission of Government and Constitutional Points. L.D. 15/90  20 P.O. (D), 
p.23. 
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In  time  the  structure  and  functioning  of  the  IFE  would  be  altered  through  further 
reforms  in  1993,  1994  and  in  1996.  Once  the  issue  of  electoral  organisation  was 
regulated,  the  political  negotiations  focussed  on  regulating  other  issues  such  as 
financing  political  parties  and  access  to  the  media.
89  As  noted  earlier,  solving  the 
problem  of  electoral  fraud  was  the  main  purpose  for  which  IFE  was  established. 
However, in time others problems appeared and were subject to further negotiations and 
reforms. One issue that existed from the beginning was the autonomy of the agency and 
the presence of the official party in that body. The composition of the IFE was modified 
three times before 1996 when it became totally independent. From the government’s 
perspective, IFE was created as a specific organ to solve the problem of fraud. Even 
though this was a long-term problem, it was not until 1988 that the irregularities of the 
electoral  authority  in  the  organisation  of  elections  became  a  problem  that  it  was 
impossible  to  ignore.  The  PRI  found  itself  in  a  new  political  reality,  with  potential 
contestants ready to claim their victories. In addition, the PRI had already claimed to be 
ready  for  the  real  democratisation  of  electoral  practice,  and  the  creation  of  a  new 
electoral authority was part of that promise. Therefore, the creation of the new body had 
the purpose of separating the process of organising the elections from the government. 
Obviously, this was the initial idea of the PRI. In addition to the re-organisation of 
electoral institutions, the reform also created an electoral tribunal to handle complaints 
of fraud and provided for a new voter registration list. The introduction of this new 
Federal Registry of voters became very important in the cleaning up of elections in the 
future. The PRI also agreed to create a new “Electoral Roll” to gain support in Congress 
for the electoral reform package. It is important to note that the implementation of a 
voter’s identification card with photograph had been one of the issues that the PAN had 
advocated for years.
90 The new electoral rules also allowed for the reappearance of the 
conditional registry for political parties. Later in the midterm elections in 1991 minority 
parties  would  use  this  conditional  registry.  Finally,  another  relevant  aspect  of  this 
reform  was  the  introduction  of  two  new  conditions  for  deputies  of  proportional 
representation: to register at least 200 candidates to deputies of relative majority and 
                                                 
89 Once basic problems such as electoral fraud at the polling booths, manipulation of the electoral rolls, etc were 
resolved, other more sophisticated problems emerged. Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to 
President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico City, 22 November 2004.   
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achieve at least 1.5% of the national vote.
91 There was also some legislation in respect 
of public funding of political parties. 
Primarily, the most significant aspect of the new body was the fact that for the first time 
the composition of the main electoral body included members of the legislature branch, 
national political parties, and citizens. Therefore, not only the legislative and executive 
branches were in charge of the IFE, but also ordinary citizens and political parties.
92 In 
addition  it  is  important  to  take  into  consideration  three  important  aspects  of  the 
transformation of the main electoral body. First of all, the increased representation in 
the new body, especially the supervision functions of the opposition parties injected 
reliability into the electoral agency. Secondly, the incorporation of more independent 
civil servants in an attempt to ensure the neutrality of staff in charge of managing the 
election which contributed to balancing the power of the executive and political parties 
in the new electoral authority. Thirdly, the administrative separation of the body from 
the Ministry of the Interior was another step towards the professionalism of the body.
93 
As the electoral code established, the institute would be responsible for activities related 
to the electoral roll, parties’ rights (administration of party funding and access to the 
media) and the preparation and development of electoral process, the counting process 
and electoral training.
94 The IFE relied on a body of officials systematically recruited, 
trained,  and  evaluated  through  a  Civil  Career  Service  called  Professional  Electoral 
Service (SPE). Although at the beginning such electoral personnel were mostly PRI 
members from the legislative and executive powers, the base for the professionalisation 
of  the  electoral  function  was  established.
95  This  is  important  because  the  electoral 
practice passed from government official to professional electoral staff. This new army 
of electoral specialists would be subject to permanent evaluation and would receive 
appropriate training.
96 The IFE was created with two levels of structure; therefore, the 
                                                 
91 See website http://camara-diputados.ife.org.mx/reforma1991.html 
92 The figure known as “Ciudadanos” were mostly academic/lawyers who were not attached to a particular political 
party therefore could guarantee impartiality in their decisions. The idea of introducing “citizens” in the General 
Council of IFE had already been proposed in 1990. Interview Mauricio Merino, former “electoral councillor” of the 
General Council, 17 November, 2007. 
93 Prud’ Home, J-F. The Instituto Federal Electoral, p.148. 
94 Nuñez Jimenez, A. La Reforma Electoral 1989-90, p.86. 
95 At this first stage, most of the members incorporated in the civil service of IFE (SPE) belonged to the former 
electoral staff employed by the Ministry of the Interior. Despite the former electoral staff being identified with the 
PRI, it was accepted that they organise the first elections in 1991. Baños notes that the decision to use these 
employees resulted from the fact that they were the only ones with experience in organising elections, although the 
intention was to remove any civil servant with PRI attachment. Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, 
Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. IFE, 16 November, 2004. 
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body was represented at central and decentralised levels (state and district level). Within 
both the central and decentralised levels of its structure, the IFE had three kinds of 
bodies:  1)  directive  bodies,  made  up  by  councils,  deliberation  and  decision  bodies, 
responsible  for  ensuring  compliance  with  constitutional  and  legal  regulations  in  the 
subject matter; 2) technical-executive bodies, made up by Executive Boards responsible 
for  carrying  out  all  technical  and  administrative  tasks  required  for  the  preparation, 
organisation,  and  conduction  of  elections  and;  3)  surveillance  bodies,  made  up  of 
Commissions and with exclusive responsibilities regarding voter registration. 
The directive and surveillance bodies involved the participation of the political parties. 
The central organs of IFE were to be the General Council, the General Executive Board 
and the General Board. The General Council was the main directive body of the IFE. It 
was  responsible  for  enforcing  the  constitutional  and  legal  provisions  on  the  subject 
matter, as well as setting the guidelines and issuing resolutions in all of the areas of 
responsibility of the IFE. Therefore, the General Council acted as the governing body of 
the IFE. On one hand, it was formed by a member of the Executive branch (Minister of 
the Interior), who was still chairing the Council and four members of the legislative 
branches (two for each chamber, one for majority and the other from the first minority 
parties) who had a voice and vote. On the other hand six Votes Councillors and political 
parties’ representatives also integrated the Council.
97 The Votes Councillors (magistrate 
councillors) was a new figure introduced in the 1990 reform and was to be elected by a 
qualified majority of two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies from a list presented by the 
executive. This figure was the first step toward the “ciudanización” of IFE. In other 
words,  the  main  electoral  authority  passed  from  being  under  the  leadership  of  the 
government to being directed by the public. This process would culminate in 1996. This 
composition  became  very  important  because  it  contributed  to  neutralising  party 
influence in the General Council.
98  
The 1990 electoral reform also marked an important step in the professionalisation of 
the electoral civil service. The reform introduced a professional electoral service that 
gave  the  IFE  its  own  trained  staff.  Previously,  there  had  been  no  clear  separation 
                                                 
97 The number of representatives of political parties depended on the votes obtained in the last election (one 
representative, for a share of between 1.5 and the 10% of the national vote, two representatives for a share between 
10 and 20%, three representatives for a share of between 20% and 30% and four representatives, for a share of more 
than 30% of votes). 
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between the administrative structure of the Ministry of the Government and that of the 
Federal Electoral Commission. However, most directors of the administrative areas of 
the new institution had been linked in the course of their career to the PRI or to the 
Ministry of the Government and many of the new members of the electoral service 
belonged to the old electoral structure. This issue was the subject of continued demand 
for change from the opposition. The second important organ in IFE was the General 
Executive Board, which was the central executive and technical body.
99 This permanent 
body replaced one of the tasks that the Ministry of the Interior used to do. It was chaired 
by a general director, proposed by the Minister of the Interior, and required the votes of 
two-thirds of the members of the General Council. It was also formed by the Executive 
secretary and the executive directors of the 6 different areas. Each area corresponded to 
the different tasks carried out by the Institute:  Federal voters’ register, political parties 
and public financing, electoral organisation, the professional electoral service, electoral 
training and civic education and administration. This new administrative structure of the 
electoral  body  reflected  the  increasing  complexity  of  the  task  of  organising  and 
supervising elections in Mexico. In addition, this complex administrative structure was 
to be reproducing at state and district level, therefore local elections were going to be 
regulated by IFE. The reform also established that counterpart institutes held elections 
in  the  states  and  localities  and  a  multiparty  Federal  Electoral  Tribunal  would  be 
responsible for settling election disputes.
100 The decentralised structure of IFE included 
thirty-two local executive boards (one per federal entity), which represented IFE's state 
delegations and three hundred District Executive Boards, organised as sub-regions in 
each single-member district. Also, the members of the local boards were soon to be part 
of the Professional Electoral Service. An important aspect of the reform was that the 
local and district councils were mostly integrated by “citizens councillors” (six citizens 
named by the General Council at local level and by the local councils at district levels). 
The incorporation of the citizens in the decision making process in the organisation of 
the elections, the surveillance and the impartiality of the electoral process was known as 
the “ciudadanización” of the electoral authority. This proved to be a very important 
process because before the reform the Minister of the Interior named the president and 
                                                 
99 Executive and Technical Bodies are permanent bodies in charge of all the technical and administrative tasks 
required to prepare, organise, and conduct the electoral processes. It is also their duty to enforce all of the agreements 
and resolutions adopted by the directive bodies. The executive and technical bodies rely on professional, permanent 
staff that receive a salary.  
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secretaries of the local councils and district committees. Therefore, the secretary lost an 
important function in the development of elections around the country. In addition, the 
political parties participated at local and district level.
101 Finally, the last but  not least 
important aspect of the reform was the introduction of changes at the polling stations. It 
was  established  that  each  polling  station  was  to  be  headed  by  a  directive  board 
consisting  of  a  president,  a  secretary  and  two  scrutineers,  as  well  as  three  general 
substitutes, making a total of seven members. All the members of a polling station were 
to  be  citizens  that  lived  in  the  respective  electoral  section.  The  selection  process 
consisted of a double draw set forth by law and based on their academic level. In order 
to  carry  out  their  tasks,  they  received  training  courses  designed  and  taught  by  the 
electoral authority, which were be supervised by the political parties. Before the reform, 
all the staff members involved in receiving and counting the votes were named by the 
Minister of the Interior. As expected, civil servants at the polling stations were selected 
by the president of the district committees who were directly designated by the head of 
the General Council. Therefore, the lottery system introduced in the new electoral law 
(COFIPE) contributed to diminishing the distrust in the electoral bodies. This reform 
was demanded especially by the PRD.
102 It represented a significant advance in the 
consolidation of the cleaning up of elections and electoral transparency in the country. 
This  would  be  modified  in  later  reforms,  but  the  institutional  base  for  organising 
elections  was  established  in  1989-90.  Overall  the  transformation  of  the  electoral 
authority  was  very  significant.  Indeed,  it  responded  to  the  1988  crisis  but  more 
importantly it established the base for fair federal elections. The essential structure of 
the democratic competition was set.
103 
Overall the most important elements introduced in the reform were; a new electoral 
registry, tamperproof photo Identity cards issued to voters; sanctioning power of the 
Federal  Electoral  Tribunal  broadened  and  the  enactment  of  the  governability  clause 
which guaranted the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the ruling party. 
The  law  also  introduced  a  new  formula  that  distributed  the  funding  among  parties 
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according to the electoral returns, party activities and the minimum costs of an election 
campaign.  
 
3.7 Reactions of the political actors towards the new law and institution 
Although the creation of IFE as an independent institution to organise federal elections 
resulted from negotiations between political parties, it was dominated by the views and 
interests of the PRI. However, as soon as it was introduced it created conflict within the 
PRI. On one hand, the creation of this institution by the PRI seemed to contribute to 
building up credibility in the electoral system which the official party really needed 
after the overshadowing of the 1988 elections. On the other hand, the creation of this 
body also meant that there was the possibility of the official party losing control over 
the  electoral  process;  a  danger  that  challenged  its  status  and  power.  The  new  law 
received a mixed reception from the opposition, with a diversity of critics. The role of 
the Minister of the Interior in electoral decisions was seen as goverment control over the 
process. The introduction of the “Votes Councillors” was initially welcomed, but the 
independence of the Councillors was not accepted because the executive proposed them, 
and this caused criticism. Here the input of the PRI is clear as at least four votes from 
the voter councillors were needed in order to have an influence on electoral decisions.
104 
It  is  true  that  the  new  administrative  structure  of  the  electoral  body  added  to  the 
complexity of the task of organising and supervising elections and the need to build 
trust among political parties added further complications to the task.  
The most controversial feature of the reform was the introduction of the “Governability 
clause” that reduced to 35% the plurality needed to guarantee majority control in the 
Chamber of Deputies. This formula was highly contested by opposition parties and it 
promted new discussion in the future.
105 This clause guaranteed the PRI control of the 
Lower House as it established that the party, which received most of the votes in a 
congressional election, would occupy the majority of seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies.
106 In addition to the clause that included a new formula for the composition of 
the lower chamber, the law introduced restrictions to the nomination of common 
candidates.
 107  
                                                 
104 Interview, Rosa Maria González, member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), Mexico City, 4 October 2004. 
105 See Woldenberg, J.El COFIPE: agenda and  balance. NEXOS- Cuadernos nexos,September 1990,  No. 27                                    
106 Alcocer, J. The challenges of institutional reform in Mexico, p.61. 
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Alcocer
108 notes that the code was designed to eliminate the main sources of the 1988 
election controversy. The restrictions to forming a new coalition were the result of the 
dangers that the Cardenas coalition (FDN)
109 had posed to the dominant party back in 
1988. As a result of this threat, the government raised the threshold needed to gain 
power at the same time as controlling and weakening the opposition. Indeed, from these 
measures it seems that the electoral reform of 1989 was used by Salinas to weaken the 
potential for opposition coalition. Finally the COFIPE also increased the PRI majority 
on the highest body overseeing elections, therefore increasing the PRI control over the 
electoral process. Despite the electoral formula (COFIPE) which regulated the 
composition of the deputies’ chamber favouring the PRI, the formula also introduced 
new instruments, more opposition monitoring and more importantly, a new 
institution.
110 
The new conditions, in respect of financing, also received criticism. The COFIPE did 
establish electoral expenditure limits for the first time but these were so high that they 
were unsuccessful in responding to the need for fair funding distribution. In addition, 
although the law also introduced some procedures for the reporting and monitoring of 
party finances they proved to be ineffective.
111  
The constitution of an electoral agency to organise and supervise elections was not the 
only significant move of the Salinas government. Another political initiative that Salinas 
took in order to increase his image as a reformer involved negotiating with the church 
for the first time. This move was a new one for the official party as, since the revolution, 
the official party had adopted an anticlerical position, keeping the church away from the 
decision  making  process.  But,  in  late  1991  the  reform  amended  five  articles  of  the 
constitution in order to change the anticlerical  notation of the regime.
112 Among its 
features,  the  reform  recognised  the  legal  status  of  the  church.  It  also  allowed  the 
presence of foreign priests, granted the ecclesiastic the right to vote and gave them the 
                                                 
108 The code established a complex system of checks and balances to prevent any single party, formal or informal 
alliances of parties, or the government itself from controlling the country’s highest electoral body. Alcocer, J. The 
Challenge of institutional reform in Mexico, p.60. 
109 FDN (Frente Democrático Nacional). Coalition of left wing parties to compete in the 1988 presidential elections. 
For an explanation of the reasons for the leader of PMS (Mexican Socialist Party) joining Cardenas, see article by 
Heberto Castillo, Por qué el PMS? Proceso. July 4 1988; (609): 32-36. 
110 Becerra, et. al. La mecáncia del cambio político en México, p.272. 
111 De Swaan, M., Martorelli, P & Molinar Horcasitas, J. Public finances of political parties and electoral 
expenditures in Mexico, In: Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections, edited by Serrano, M. London: The 
Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998, p.157. 
112 Morris, S. Political reformism in Mexico, p.90. Lidia Acosta                                                                                               Chapter 3 The Creation of IFE 
 
108 
opportunity to express their opinions about the government. Convents and monasteries 
were legalised and finally it also allowed religious organisations to publish newspapers 
and  express  their  views  on  radio  and  television.  Many  analysts  believed  this  move 
resulted from Salinas’ desire to ease the political tensions with the church, that had 
become a critic of the government’s human rights policy and keep it away from PAN 
whose majority of supporters were pro-Catholic.
113 
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4  The  evolution  of  IFE  during  the  process  of  electoral  reform  in 
Mexico: 1991 to 1996 
The following chapter documents the further development and impact of the Federal 
Electoral Institute (IFE) in the Mexican democratisation process after it was created in 
1990.  Although  the  IFE  was  established  by  negotiated  legislation  and,  therefore, 
reflected the interests of the parties involved, this chapter will analyse if and how the 
IFE became independent from its creators. In this analysis it is necessary to determine to 
what extent after its creation the institution was transformed from being a temporary 
solution to a long term problem (electoral fraud and distrust in the electoral process) to 
becoming  a  major  vehicle  for  democratic  change  and  ultimately  an  independent 
institution with a life of its own. The new electoral authority was tested in the midterm 
elections in 1991 and acquired more powers through three successive electoral reforms 
which concluded in the independence of the electoral body, from the government, in 
1996. The 1993 and 1994 reforms took place during Salinas’s term in office. In 1996 
the  last  electoral  reform  culminated  a  gradual  and  long  process  of  changing  and 
adapting  the  electoral  law  to  a  new  socio-political  context.  The  detachment  of  the 
government  from  the  organisation  of  elections  in  1996  complied  with  a  long-term 
demand pursued by opposition parties since the IFE had been created. Although, for 
part of the opposition, particularly the left party PRD, the condition of the independence 
of IFE was essential in order to take the new institution seriously, the issue of its total 
independence only became a priority towards the end of the long period of electoral 
reforms. The accomplishment of its total independence from governmental influence 
was achieved not only by agreements made between opposition and government, but 
also by the internal input of IFE.   
The purpose of this chapter will be to determine to what extent the initiation of several 
electoral reforms by the official party, which increased the role of IFE , resulted from an 
unplanned  response  to  ease  post-electoral  conflicts  and  stop  social  and  political 
discontent  in  order  to  secure  power,  or  whether  this  resulted  from  a  more  genuine 
commitment by the government to negotiate with opposition parties in order to advance 
the democratisation process, as Salinas had promised after the controversial election in 
1988. It will be necessary to examine the expectations and political strategies of the Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
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opposition parties in the negotiation of the electoral reforms. In the latter context it will 
be necessary to analyse to what extent the dramatic socio-economic events that took 
place in this period put pressure on both parties (government and opposition) to advance 
in the negotiation process.   
The first section will concentrate on the midterm elections in 1991
1, where the newly 
created electoral code and electoral authority (IFE) was tested for the first time. It will 
be essential to evaluate the reasons behind the PRI’s re-emergence in these elections 
and the real impact and role of IFE. Despite the PRI’s victory, post-electoral conflicts at 
local level kept the electoral issue in the centre of the debate. 
The second section will highlight the differences between the 1993 electoral reform 
which was mainly initiated, pursued and approved by the government and the 1994 
electoral reform in which the motives, context and achievement differed greatly. The 
comparison of the reforms will help to establish the full implication of several socio-
economic events, in the negotiations on electoral issues between political parties and in 
the  final  outcome  of  the  reforms.  In  the  1994  presidential  elections  the  amended 
electoral code (COFIPE)
2 and the IFE were tested again. The third section will focus on 
the  last  electoral  reform  in  1996  in  which  the  main  achievement  was  the  total 
independence  of  IFE  from  government  control.  The  negotiations  between  the  main 
political  parties  (PRI,  PAN  y  PRD)  and  the  real  contribution  of  the  IFE  in  the 
negotiation  process  will  be  analysed.  The  negotiation  of  the  new  electoral  reform 
between  political  actors  was  interrupted  by  a  series  of  local  post-electoral  conflicts 
which polarised the political actors’ attitudes towards the reform.  As had occurred in 
the 1994 electoral reform, in 1996 consensus among political parties was essential and it 
was eventually prioritised in order to achieve a consensus.  
 
4.1 The role of IFE in the 1991 midterm elections  
As noted in the previous chapter, the controversial presidential elections in 1988 caused 
an unprecedented post-electoral conflict which created an urgent need for new electoral 
reform. First of all, the government realised that the polarisation of electoral processes 
                                                 
1 The midterm elections saw the election all of the members of Chambers of Deputies (elected every three years, with 
a prohibition on running again for the immediate succeeding term) and half of the Senate (elected for a six-year term, 
with the same prohibition). 
2 “Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures” issued on the 1989-90 electoral reform. Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
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which also incited further divisions among the electorate was a threat that had to be 
avoided. Secondly, it became clear to all, including the government that Mexico could 
not carry out future general elections using the same electoral law and institutions that 
had provoked unprecedented social mobilisations. A former member of PRI argues that 
the motivation of the government to change electoral legislation resulted from a sense of 
obligation towards society, using electoral reforms as a way to show its democratic 
attitude.
3  
The enactment of a new electoral law “COFIPE”
4 and a new electoral authority
5 was in 
direct response to an increasing popular demand to create new institutions and laws that 
guaranteed impartiality in elections. In fact, the most significant outcome of the 1989-
1990 reform was the definition of the profile of a new electoral authority that had to be 
impartial and reliable, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). However, the new law and 
electoral authority did not convince all political parties, especially those on the left.
6  
Despite  some  members  of  the  left  such  as  the  PRD
7and  the  PMS
8  accepting  the 
significance  of  the  creation  of  IFE  and  the  Federal  Electoral  Tribunal,  their  parties 
decided to vote against the electoral reform in 1989-1990. As a result the initiative of 
electoral reform offered by the PRI in Congress was only supported by PAN
9 who, 
taking advantage of its bargaining power, was successful in pushing for some of its 
demands  on  electoral  issues.  The  lack  of  independence  of  IFE  in  respect  of  the 
government and the influence of PRI within the IFE at all levels became, for the PRD, 
the most important reason for not endorsing the new institution.
10 In addition, a series of 
restrictions and new rules established in the new electoral law which were intended to 
prevent future coalitions were perceived as a clear PRI strategy to retain its hegemony.  
                                                 
3 Interview, senior member of PRI B, former PRI’s party Chairman, Mexico City, 9 November 2004. 
4 Federal Code for Electoral Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) created in the 1989-1990 electoral reform. 
5 Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) created in the 1989-90 electoral reform. 
6 The PRD´s congressmen had voted against the 1990 electoral reform that led to the creation of IFE. 
Manuel Camacho Solis (Head of Government of Mexico City 1988-1993) Ex member of PRI said: “In the 1989-90 
reform there were no important advances, as the reform was designed to stop the FDN´s popularity 
(Cardenas´coalition) and the electoral authority was not independent from government...). Noticieros Televisa. 
Interview of Manuel Camacho Solis in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico City: Noticieros 
Televisa, 2004. Historia de la Democracia. 
7 Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) had been formed in May 1989 to bring together most of the independent 
forces that had supported Cardenas´s 1988 candidacy. 
8 Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) 
9 National Action Party (PAN) 
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Nevertheless the law and the IFE in other smaller dispositions, allowed the opposition 
parties in general to look for arrangement spaces, position and to look for balances.
11   
Therefore in the context of a new electoral law and institution supported only partially 
by the political actors, the first general elections took place in 1991. The new legislation 
(COFIPE) and the new electoral authority (IFE) were set up to govern the mid-term 
elections in 1991. This section will focus on the 1991 midterm elections which were 
governed by the 1990 changes. It will be necessary to analyse the real impact of the 
newly  created  electoral  law  (COFIPE)  and  the  electoral  authority  (IFE)  in  these 
elections.  
This section will also analyse how PRI, after the moral and credibility defeat in 1988 
and consequent demise of its popularity, was able to re-emerge in the mid-term election 
in 1991.  The PRI´s overwhelming victory in these elections revived the controversy 
over the law and provoked the opposition to demand further reforms. 
 
4.2  Prior to the elections: political perceptions  
There were two important aspects to the midterm elections of 1991.  Firstly, it was the 
first election under Salinas’s government
12; and was therefore going to take place in the 
shadow of his election in 1988. And secondly, it was the first election to be regulated by 
a new electoral law COFIPE, and two new electoral institutions, the Federal Electoral 
Institute  (IFE)  in  charge  of  the  organisation  of  the  election  and  a  new  Electoral 
Tribunal. Thus, the midterm’s elections in 1991 were the first elections in which IFE 
was tested in its role as the electoral authority in charge of organising the elections. The 
government’s main objective on the new electoral rule and institutions was to build up 
trust in the electoral system; whose credibility had been brutally affected after the 1988 
elections. After the election, the issue of organising elections and the impartiality of the 
electoral authorities became the primary concern as the prospects of future peaceful 
elections became even more unlikely. The new political scenario changed the regime’s 
strategy. First of all, as noted in earlier chapters, the regime could not afford more 
political  instability,  as  for  decades  it  had  been  one  of  the  “pillar  of  the  regime”.
13 
                                                 
11Interview, Carlos Ravela, Executive Director, Electoral Register Executive Board (IFE), Mexico City, November 9 
2004. 
12 Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Elected president in the 1988 presidential elections). 
13 Social stability and economic growth were the two promises of the Mexican regime during the PRI´s hegemony. Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
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Secondly,  the  1989-1990  reform  that  had  been  negotiated  between  the  PRI  and  the 
PAN, put pressure on the government to comply with some of the PAN’s demands 
regarding the cleansing of the electoral process. Finally, a new political force, a variety 
of civil organisations that had emerged and strengthened since the early 1980s, joined 
political  parties  in  pressuring  the  PRI  to  pursue  electoral  reform.  Altogether,  the 
pressure for a immediate action in the organisation of elections was clear for the PRI-
government. One of the main demands was the creation of an electoral roll and photo 
credentials that will be analysed in chapter 5.  
 
4.3 The mid-term 1991 elections 
The mid-terms elections took place on the 18
th August 1991. A total of 10 political 
parties  participated  in  the  elections.  In  addition  to  seven  already  registered  parties 
(PAN,  PRI,  PRD,  PPS,  PARM,  PDM  and  PFCRN),  three  new  parties  joined  the 
competition  (PRT,  PT  and  PVEV).  The  three  new  parties  obtained  conditional 
registration  as  a  result  of  the  new  electoral  rules,  which  allowed  new  political 
associations such as the PRT, the workers party  and the Mexican Ecology Party to 
obtain conditional registration as political parties.    
The  electoral  results  from  the  midterm  elections  showed  that  the  PRI  had  obtained 
satisfactory results by getting just over 60% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. 
The results showed a clear electoral recovery as the official party captured 290 majority 
seats and 20 proportional seats of the 500 seats within the Chamber of Deputies and also 
won all six of the gubernatorial posts.  The 310 deputies of the PRI contrasted with 266 
deputies in 1988. The PRI won the elections for deputies and senators and obtained 4 
governorships and the majority in the FD assembly.
14 The electoral success returned to 
the PRI the relative majority of the Congress. Despite the PRI obtaining better results 
that it had in the 1988s elections, it was still following a decreasing trend in its share of 
the vote from 1961.
15 The PAN achieved the second position in the electoral preference 
                                                 
14 At local level, the PRI also showed its predominance as it only lost 10 majority districts from a total of 300. 
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and became the second political force.
16 Cardenas’ party, the PRD, became the third 
political force, showing that the electoral strength of the left had significantly eroded.
17 
Many political analysts agree that the PRI’s recovery in the 1991 election was explained 
by an improvement in the image of Salinas’ government.
18 Despite the opposition being 
shocked at the victory of the PRI, many of its members realised that Salinas’s political 
strategy  of  dealing  with  corruption  and  leading  important  arrests  such  as  La  Quina 
(corrupted leader of PEMEX)
19, contributed to its popularity in the election. Therefore, 
Salinas’ overwhelming support was due to recognition of a series of strategic actions 
that contributed to an increase in the level of government support in the first months.
20  
The results of the 1991 elections were welcomed by Salinas and the  PRI, not only 
because Salinas needed this recovery in order to manage the post-crisis period, but more 
importantly because the PRI regained the capacity for carrying out reforms without the 
support of others forces. The positive results showed the capacity of the official party to 
surmount crisis and renew its power and popularity.
21 
Alcocer  notes  that  the  1991  midterm  election  signified  a  big  step  towards  the 
establishment  of  a  system  with  three  major  parties  (PRI,  PAN,  PRD),  with  the 
inevitable  decline  and  dissolution  of  the  subsystem  of  minor  parties  (PPS,  PFCRN, 
PARM) 
 
4.3.1  The functioning of IFE in the 1991 mid-term elections   
There are different views regarding IFE’s first role in the early stages of the 1991 mid-
term elections. IFE was the institution in charge of the organisation of elections, and the 
                                                 
16 The triumph of PAN was not a surprise as it had already won the governorship of Baja California in 1989. Its 
strength would carry on conquering states including a governorship in 1991 and a third governorship post in 
Chihuahua in 1992. 
17 A member of the PRD claimed that despite the party complaining about the electoral results alleging electoral 
corruption, for some of its members, a third position in the 1991 mid-term elections was perceived as a success. This 
was even more significant taking into consideration that the PRD was a newly created party that had emerged from 
the FDN, the coalition of parties that competed in the 1988 presidential elections and was dissolved soon after the 
elections. Interview, member of PRD A, Mexico City, October 28 2004. 
18 Ibid. 
19 PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum) owned by the Mexican state. 
20 Camachos said that “Salinas´ decisions and actions were recognised by the general public and increased the 
support of the government in the first months”. See Manuel Camacho Solis (Head of Goverment in Mexico City 
1988-1993 and ex member of PRI. Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Manuel Camacho Solis in “Mexico: La historia 
de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
21 Noticieros Televisa. Jose Woldenberg in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico City: Noticieros 
Televisa, 2004.  Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
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main achievement of the 1990 electoral reform.
22 In this context, the organisation of 
elections became the top priority for the government, the PRI and also the IFE itself.
23  
In comparison to the 1988 elections the organisation of the first national election was 
smooth and without major obstacles. In order to prepare the elections in this period, the 
IFE, which was controlled by PRI, started a national campaign to increase the level of 
voting, resulting in a 15% increase in participation. The PRI’s intention to increase 
voting  participation  responded  to  the  fear  of  increasing  abstentions  after  the  mass 
mobilisation  in  1988.
24  However,  the  performance  of  IFE  in  those  elections  was 
received with reservations. First of all, the role of IFE was seen as limited and restricted. 
A former IFE member claimed to me that the limited role of IFE in the election was a 
result of a shortage of time. Firstly, the IFE was entrusted to create from scratch a new 
electoral roll, which was to be ready for the election.
25 Secondly, important political 
actors, such as the PRD were suspicious of the lack of independence of the electoral 
authority from the government. To the PRD, whose deputies had voted against the1990 
reform, the 1991 results demonstrated the inefficacy of the reform effort and the IFE. 
Additionally  the  PRD´s  members  insisted  that  the  official  party’s  apparatus  still 
prevented legal and fair elections.
26 To the PAN which had become the second strongest 
force, the outcome of the 1991 elections also showed the need for further improvement. 
Among the main criticisms, was the difference in resources that the PRI enjoyed in 
comparison  to  other  opposition  parties.  The  critics  highlighted  the  partiality  of  the 
media, the irregularities in the formulation of the electoral rolls, the changes in the place 
of voting precincts and the delays in their opening, the incomplete voting documents, 
the  deficit  of  secret  votes  and  the  disappearance  of  names  from  the  voting  lists.  In 
addition there were delays in reporting the results and more significantly the PRI was in 
complete control of the electoral process. On the whole, this first stage of the Salinas-
sponsored reforms did not leave the opposition fully satisfied.  
 
                                                 
22 Woldenberg notes that despite criticism, the 1989-1990 reform contributed to a significant advance in the 
organisation of elections. Ibid.  
23 Interview, senior member of PRI B, former PRI’s party Chairman, Mexico City, November 9 2004.  
“the 1988 presidential election was highly questioned and we realised that people wanted things to be checked . The 
first subject was the register (electoral roll) and the second was the impartiality of the electoral organisms” 
24 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
25 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. 
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4.3.2  Post electoral conflicts in 1991 
Although IFE celebrated the outcome of its first test at national level which brought 
credibility to the electoral system, conflicts at local level emerged at the same time and 
initiated  a  difficult  period  for  the  PRI.  Therefore,  the  PRI  recovery  and  the  IFE’s 
performance was overshadowed by allegations of fraud at local level.
27  
During the period immediately after the 1991 elections, irregularities and allegations of 
fraud were reported at local and regional level. Two major post-electoral conflicts took 
place in the states of Guanajuato and San Luis the Potosi. These two post-electoral 
conflicts  initiated  a  process  that  was  later  called  “concertacesión”.
28  Ultimately  the 
post-electoral conflicts in these two states were solved using extra-legal channels, which 
relegated the electoral path to second place.  
The local opposition parties who alleged fraud, rejected the PRI’s victory in both 
governorships. However, the local opposition parties were treated differently. On one 
hand, in Guanajuato, the victory was disputed by the PAN’s candidate (Vicente Fox) 
and the radical measures taken by PAN as civil disobedience forced the PRI elected 
governor (Ramón Aguirre) to renounce his post, allowing a panista major to be 
elected.
29 On the other hand, in San Luis Potosi where the PRI’s victory was disputed 
by the PRD candidate, his protest forced the PRI’s elected candidate (Fausto Zapata 
Loredo) to renounce his post, and an interim PRI governor was put in his place by local 
congress (González Martínez Corvalá). Soon after, the PRI governor asked for new 
gubernatorial elections which showed the unstable climate in the state. However, post-
electoral protests continued in other states, such as Michoacán, on July 12 1992, when 
PRD militants supporting the PRD’s candidate (Cárdenas) held massive protests 
claiming electoral fraud.
30 In order to ease tension and re-establish order following the 
destabilising state elections, Salinas used upper-level negotiations. Salinas intervened in 
many local and regional elections, which led to a trend of removals and interim 
                                                 
27 To see a compilation of the opinions of the political parties on the 1991 elections see Época. August 26 1991; (12): 
13. 
28 When facing post-electoral conflicts political parties used political negotiation to provide a solution to those 
conflicts. Sometimes the political negotiations were resolved directly by the president. 
29 The election of the panista member as interim governor of Guanajuato also provoked protests amongst PRI 
militants who even occoupied the building of the Guanajuato state legislature. Domínguez, J. & McCann, A. 
Evaluation of the electoral process. In: Democratizing Mexico: Public opinion and electoral choices. Baltimore; 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p.171. 
30 Ibid, p.172. Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
 
117 
governments.
31 Such extra legal solution to the post-electoral process showed that the 
progress achieved in electoral law at national level did not correspond at local level.
32 
The electoral institutions and tribunals at local level were unable to deal with complex 
post-electoral conflicts therefore, solutions to the conflicts could hardly be solved 
legally. Additionally, the uncertainty created through the post-electoral conflicts created 
the possibility of alternative governments through political negotiation instead of 
electoral methods.
33  These events in Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí and Michoacán 
highlighted the need for changes to the electoral arena and once again the electoral issue 
became the centre of debate among political actors as the recent reform of 1989-90 was 
perceived as incomplete.
34 The 1991 results gave Salinas enough power to pursue 
political, economic and social reforms but the electoral arena still presented demands 
for equity that would produce further reforms.
35 
 
4.3.3  Recuperation of the PRI and negotiations over the liberalisation process  
After  the  mid-term  elections  the  PRI  showed  a  clear  recovery  not  only  in  electoral 
support but also in its positive social perception. There are different opinions about the 
reason for the PRI recovery but there are two factors to consider. First of all, some 
political analysts claim that Salinas credibility and legitimacy was due to the fact that 
the PRI was associated with the only party able to maintain stability. The association 
between stability and the PRI had been exploited for decades, as it was one of the pillars 
of  the  Mexican  regime.  A  natural  fear  of  social  unrest  and  instability  among  the 
population was well perceived by the official party who knew the great appeal of its 
long  life  party.    Secondly,  the  economic  issue  was  also  an  important  factor.  The 
discontent brought about by economic adjustment and liberalisation policies applied by 
Salinas  that  provoked  discontent  among  the  traditional  PRI  base  of  support  did  not 
negate the perception in the electorate that the PRI was the only party able to handle the 
economy. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the assertiveness of Salinas’ use 
of  client-oriented  politics  and  social  programmes  such  as  PRONASOL  and 
                                                 
31 Despite Salinas trying to nurture his image as a reformer, the policy of direct intervention was highly criticised not 
only by the opposition who requested the resignation of key PRI officials but also by local officials. 
32 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
33 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Alonso Lujambio, in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico 
City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. Historia de la Democracia.  
34 Woldenberg, J. Ibid. Vol 2. 
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PROCAMPO  which  not  only  alleviated  the  impact  of  economic  adjustment  and 
liberalisation  but  also  encouraged  the  PRI  vote.  The  application  of  these  social 
programmes  was  another  factor  that  surely  contributed  to  Salinas’  strategy  of 
establishing  himself  as  a  reformer.
36  Theoretically,  the  Solidarity  programme 
PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad), was a programme designed to help 
those  affected  by  the  economic  crisis,  however  it  became  a  multipurpose  and 
multifaceted  “populist”  programme.  This  populist  programme  delivered  a  variety  of 
public works to impoverished districts, providing direct benefit to the  peasant. This 
programme sought to re-establish the state society relations that had deteriorated in the 
80s, and also sought to recover the legitimacy that had been lost while taking account of 
the new social processes and new actors. Despite this programme being identified with 
the official party, it had a destabilising effect within the PRI, as “distributive populism” 
added  a  new  threat  to  the  role  of  the  PRI.  However,  the  recovery  could  also  have 
resulted from the capacity of the official party to adapt and adjust to new political and 
economic  circumstances.  This  capacity  to  adjust  was  due  not  only  to  its  dominant 
position but also to the ability of the PRI to renew itself.  
 
4.3.4  Pressures for further reforms: PRI and PAN versus PRD. Division of the 
opposition 
The results of the midterm election in 1991 gave the PRI the majority in Congress and 
enough  support  to  carry  out  its  own  reforms.
37  However,  in  the  electoral  arena  the 
opposition demanded further electoral reforms in other areas such as finance and media.  
The pressure for further reforms on electoral issues from the opposition showed the 
limits of the 1989-90 electoral reform that was perceived as only the beginning of a long 
reformist period. Salinas realised that negotiating with the opposition was essential for 
maintaining  the  legitimacy  that  had  been  gained  through  fighting  corruption  and 
initiating social programmes and to maintain, at least at official level, the promise of 
                                                 
36Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
37 Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Presidente de la República 1988-1994) 1 de Diciembre, 1991. Salinas during his annual 
address to Congress announced his economic projects: “the Mexican economy has recovered its stability, it has 
transformed its structures and it has grown. The key has been and will continue to be the permanence of economic 
policy. We are looking for a strict control of public costs, a competitive fiscal system, the reduction of debt, 
commercial opening and deregulation and the promotion of investments and exports.”Data gathered in Noticieros 
Televisa. “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. Historia de la 
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greater  reforms  towards  increasing  democracy.
38  Nevertheless,  his  approach  and 
relationship with PAN and PRD was something very different.   
It can be argued that a divided opposition was the only way for the PRI and for Salinas 
to initiate the series of economic, social and political reforms that they had promised. In 
addition to this, the distance between the main opposition parties would contribute to 
the isolation of the PRD. Indeed the hypothesis of the hidden strategy of Salinas seemed 
to be in place long before the midterm elections. On the one hand, Salinas negotiated 
with PAN on economic and political matters while isolating and impeding Cardenas to 
consolidate  the  left  alliance  which  proved  to  be  very  popular  in  the  1988  federal 
elections.  The  decision  of  Salinas  to  continue  and  even  intensify  the  economic 
liberalisation  process  that  was  started  by  his  predecessor,  De  la  Madrid,  was  well 
received  by  the  PAN.  This  agreement  in  economic  policy  between  PRI  and  PAN 
contributed to the division of the opposition. The economic issue made it impossible for 
a  unified  opposition,  as  the  PRD  (mostly  formed  by  ex-PRI  members)  was  totally 
opposed to the neo-liberal economic model applied by the PRI.  In addition to this, the 
PRI made sure that the PRD was given a negative image as a party of pro-violence and 
pro-instability such that fears increased about it. However, many analysts claim that the 
PRD also contributed to this negative image, by having internal divisions and making 
political mistakes.
39 Thus, at the same time that the PRI was forging ties with the PAN 
to separate from the PRD, the official party initiated other measures to undercut its 
appeal. For instance, the use of a welfare government programme called SOLIDARITY 
was part of this strategy to cut the popularity of Cardenas with members of the left. 
Furthermore, it prevented the PRD from establishing links with social movements. This 
strategy of isolation had an impact on the way in which the PRD’s more confrontational 
approach was perceived. The official party linked the PRD to drug traffickers, described 
it  as  simply  incompetent  and  associated  the  PRD  with  violence,  instability  and 
confrontation.  This campaign resulted in not only undermining the reputation of the 
PRD,  especially  in  the  eyes  of  the  middle  class  and  the  United  States,  but  also  in 
justifying the use of security forces and repression against the PRD supporters. Another 
                                                 
38 Enrique Krauze (Historian and writer) argues that Salinas’ regime was a contradiction as he prioritised the 
economic modernisation over the political modernisation. Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Enrique Krauze in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
39 For a detailed account of the successive internal disputes among PRD’s members  see articles by Heberto Castillo, 
“Relations between PRD and government” in Proceso, February 18 1991;(746):14 & “Porfirio, González Guevara, 
Petroleo” in Proceso, February 25 1991;(747);15 and also see article by Vera Rodrigo and Beltrán del Rio Pascal 
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measure designed to undermine the appeal of the PRD was to target repression at the 
PRD constituencies.
40 The anti-PRD strategy included sabotaging the effort of the PRD 
at local governance, which gave the PRD an image of a party unable to run a local 
government. The PRI and Salinas also prevented former allies in the 1988 elections 
from joining the PRD. 
Overall, the initial division of the opposition highlighted Salinas’ ability to temper the 
inclination of the opposition towards joining forces and acting together, such a task 
seemed easier than to soften the opposition one by one.
41 Collaboration between the PRI 
and PAN resulted from the common ground that both parties shared.  The hard line 
political posture of De La Madrid towards PAN changed to a soft line position. Both 
parties agreed on the negotiation of economic and electoral issues. The collaboration 
between Salinas and PAN was costly for both parties. On one hand, the PRI was forced 
to accept some of the PAN’s demands at the increasing costs of alienating its basis of 
support. In addition, despite the negotiations initially resolving dangerous post-electoral 
conflicts these contributed to the emergence of a party system. Both parties PRI and 
PAN seemed to benefit from this scheme of negotiation. On the other, the PAN was the 
party  that  benefitted  from  the  so-called  “concertacesion”,  where  discretional 
negotiations  between  both  parties  became  more  important  in  settling  the  result  of 
contested  elections  than  votes.
42  Moreover,  the  protests  that  emerged  against  these 
extra-legal and ad-hoc solutions due to the lack of consensus over electoral outcomes 
increased a new style of party competition, based on mobilisation and resistance rather 
than electoral campaigns.   
 
4.4 The Salinas government: internal division in the PRI 
Despite the fact that the PRI was enjoying victory at most of the state and local contests 
which seemed to overcome the crisis unleashed by the departure of Cardenas and the 
CD in 1988, by 1991 internal problems still prevailed. Inside the PRI dissident voices 
                                                 
40 Woldenberg notes that during this period approximately four hundred PRD’s members were assassinated in  
mysterious circumstances in for which no one has been brought to justice. Noticieros Televisa. Jose Woldenberg in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
41 The official party tried to control these popular mobilisations in order to prevent more offensive ones. The main 
objectives of such mobilisations were either to deprive the opposition of electoral victories or to force the government 
and the PRI to recognise alleged electoral victories. 
42 The victories of PAN in the governorship of Baja California in 1989 and in Guanajuato in 1991 have been claimed 
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demanded  a  democratisation  of  its  procedures  and  for  more  independence  from  the 
government. Salinas faced the difficulty of stopping the internal and electoral decline 
that the PRI had suffered since De La Madrid. However, a call to unify the party and to 
safeguard the old alliance was made by Salinas in response to an increasing number of 
dissidents.  It  seemed  that  Salinas  faced  an  arduous  task  to  unify,  restructure  and 
refashion his party because of the internal problems between PRI leaders which made it 
more difficult to increase its popular support.
43 Within the PRI, Salinas intended to 
weaken the corporate sectors and the old style politicos who had expressed their non-
conformity on the economic policy that the government initiated in the early 1980s. 
Inside the party, Salinas also had to temper the contradictory demands between the old 
guard  and  the  technocrats,  in  addition  to  trying  to  refocus  the  party  to  the  task  of 
winning elections. Salinas pursued this task by opting for a combination of positive and 
negative reforms. Positive measures such as “concertacesion”, discussed earlier, were 
used to provide the credibility needed to gain electoral support and ease post-electoral 
conflicts.  However,  Salinas  used  negative  measures  such  as  electoral  fraud  and 
corruption to reinforce the recovery as De La Madrid had also done. As presidential 
control  over  the  party  increased  during  the  Salinas  period,  negotiations  among  PRI 
members also became more difficult. The trend for presidential control also eroded the 
internal discipline, which contributed to an increasing disturbance within the PRI and its 
relation with the ruling elite. It is important to note that Salinas monopolised the power 
previously held by institutions. His presidential prerogatives led to a situation where 
traditional  norms  and  rules  were  constantly  challenged.  Furthermore,  many  of  his 
prerogatives such as the removal of governors provoked further problems inside the 
PRI.  These  decisions  highlighted  an  important  change  in  the  traditional  role  of  the 
president towards becoming the intermediary between the opposition and the official 
party, which not only infuriated the PRI members but also encouraged the use of highly 
destabilising  political  tactics.  Furthermore,  the  attempt  to  introduce  democratic 
primaries in the official party in 1991 as a democratic innovation also failed due again, 
to Salinas’ prerogative power. Salinas’ reluctance to give up his unwritten power to 
appoint officials for state governorship and congressional seats provoked resistance of 
imposition not only at local level but also inside the party. Though, Salinas had to face 
                                                 
43 Salinas would not lose his legitimacy: Gutierrez Barrios in Proceso, September 12 1988; (619): 14-19. 
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internal disagreement between the two factions, he was more successful in constraining 
the decomposition of the party which De La Madrid experimented with in his final 
period. Eventually the departure of dissidents slowed down and even Salinas managed 
to gain stability within the party between the “old politicos” and “technocrats”.
44 The 
incorporation  of  new  elements  such  as  the  business  class  and  the  use  of  Solidarity 
programmes
45 to maintain the support from the labour and peasant organisations helped 
Salinas to further centralise his power and mobilise the vote for the party through a 
territorial rather than corporate base structure.
46 Once the new PRI began to emerge, the 
use  of  negative  reforms  such  as  fraud  diminished  and  Salinas  was  successful  in 
weakening and dividing the opposition. He was especially successful at undermining the 
PRD. Despite the recuperation of the PRI, the split of the elite led to what Huntington 
notes as mobilisations and splits within the elite which feed each other.
47 In other words 
the more factionalism within the elite, the more unstable the regime became and the 
greater the possibility for the opposition to gain political space. At the same time, as 
popular mobilisations increased and the opposition advanced, factionalism within the 
elite became clearer. 
 
4.4.1  Salinas reforms: structural change of the economy, Article 27, the church 
and NAFTA. 
Between  1991  and  1993  Salinas  initiated  the  so-called  structural  economic  change. 
Among his economic reforms, one of the most controversial was the reformation of 
Article  27  of  the  Constitution,  which  was  approved  by  Congress  and  requested  by 
Salinas. The reform of Article 27 allowed the privatisation of the “ejido”, therefore 
allowing  foreign  investors  to  invest  in  this  traditional  form  of  communal  land  that 
represented  the  best  example  of  the  Mexican  revolution.  Salinas  also  promoted  a 
constitutional reform to recognise the juridical status of the church.
48 However, one of 
the most important and influential of Salinas´ economic adventures was the initiation of 
                                                 
44 Handelman notes that Salinas as a technocrat president, favoured political liberalisation. However he set limits, for 
example he allowed the PAN to win in some local elections (eg. Baja California, 1989) while preventing the PRD 
from winning at the local level. See Handelman, H. Mexican Politics, The Dynamics of Change, p.85. 
45 The two main social programmes initiated by Salinas were the National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL) and 
the Programme of Direct Support to the Countryside (PROCAMPO). 
46 See survey on the opinion over Pronasol see study by Covarrubias y Asociados. Pronasol: ¿Propaganda o realidad?  
Voz y voto. August 1993; (6): 26-29.  
Survey on PRONASOL: 79% considered that the programme was good. 
47 Huntington, S. Political Order in Changing Societies. Virginia: Yale University, 1996 
48 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Roberto Blancarte (researcher) in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. 
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an international economic agreement with EEUU and Canada, NAFTA.
49 In 1993, the 
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  between  EEUU,  Canada  and  Mexico 
culminated  a  long  reformist  period  initiated  by  Salinas  during  his  first  years  of 
presidency. This economic agreement was expected not only to open markets in the 
United States and Canada to Mexican trade but also to secure future Salinas’ economic 
reforms.
50  The  trade  agreement,  like  the  other  reforms  in  the  area  of  economy  and 
politics that Salinas carried out in order to modernise Mexico was fully backed and 
supported by the PAN as it coincided with its economic policies.
51  
Salinas was not worried about the decline of the corporative vote as he was pursuing the 
dismantling of the corporative system in order to carry out the economic reforms and 
more  importantly  the  entry  of  NAFTA.  The  negotiation  of  a  free  trade  agreement 
between Mexico, Canada and USA was a personal objective of Salinas. However, this 
new trade agreement brought new actors and internationalised the Mexican political 
system.  Despite  the  economic  agreement  (NAFTA)  not  attaching  an  institutional  or 
formal commitment to democratic and human rights standards in Mexico, it produced 
changes  to  the  practices  and  strategies  of  political  actors.  For  example,  the  USA 
congress,  international  press  and  several  universities  became  a  place  where  the 
opposition  parties  deployed  campaigns  to  denounce  the  government’s  authoritarian 
practice.  Serrano
52  notes  that  there  was  little  doubt  that  NAFTA  contributed  to  the 
consolidation of the opposition, as the government had to allow opposition electoral 
victories in order to soften negotiations.    
 
4.4.2  Salinas’ second and third stages of reform: 1993 electoral reform and 1994 
electoral reform 
The following section contrasts the differences between the 1993 electoral reform which 
was mainly initiated, pursued and approved by the government and the PAN; and the 
1994 electoral reform in which the motives, context and achievement differed greatly. 
On one hand, the 1993 electoral reform seemed to have followed the pattern of previous 
ad-hoc reforms which were set up in preparation for incoming presidential elections. 
                                                 
49 Interview of Jaime Serra Puche (Minister of Commerce 1988-1994). Ibid, Vol.2. 
Jaime Serra explains that the reason for the government pursuing the NAFTA was the fact that Mexico was not 
receiving much foreign investment; investors started looking elsewhere, such as Eastern European countries after the 
opening of the “Iron Curtain”. Therefore Mexico needed to consider globalisation in order to attract investments. 
50 Dominguez, J. & McCann, James A. Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral Choices. Baltimore; 
London: The John Hopkins University Press, p.180. 
51 See Handelman, H. Mexican Politics, The Dynamics of Change, p.153.  
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Therefore, the 1993 electoral reform was initially set up to prepare the ground for the 
1994 presidential elections. On the other, the 1994 electoral  reform took place in  a 
different  context  which  was  affected  by  the  socio-political  impact  of  an  indigenous 
uprising in Chiapas. The threat of political violence and social instability put enormous 
pressure  on  both  the  main  opposition  parties  and  the  official  party-government  to 
prioritise the negotiation and achievement of consensus, for a new electoral reform for 
the first time in history, in order to consolidate the democratic means of election.  
 
4.4.3  Prior to the 1993 electoral reform 
By 1993 despite the initial support of PAN for the Salinas’ reforms, the electoral issue 
came to the fore in the political debate due the continuation of post-electoral conflicts at 
local  level  and  the  opposition’s  demands  for  more  impartiality  and  equity  in  the 
electoral  process.  It  seemed  that  the  credibility  of  the  elections  was  still  poor.    In 
addition to this, the use of fraud at electoral contests forced PAN and especially PRD to 
protest.
53 Also, Salinas’ presidential style in which he challenged established rules of 
the game and institutions also contributed to the erosion of one of the foundations of the 
Mexican political system, its multi-faceted discipline.  
It is important to note that the 1989-90 reform had created the foundations for two 
factors: the intensification of the public debate in all political spaces, and in Congress 
the strength of the opposition and the possibility of the official party to lose elections at 
local  level.  Indeed,  it  seemed  that  even  though  the  1989-90  electoral  reform  was 
intended to moderate the political debate, in the end, it increased it.
54 Political parties 
started using Congress as an arena to present their discontent over alleged fraud at local 
electoral contests, but especially accusations against the use of public funding by the 
official party.
55 In addition, the lack of transparency and the private funding by business 
groups to the official party  was also criticised. These pressures for further electoral 
reform forced Salinas to address the electoral issue in his annual speech in November 
1992 in which he stated that if the political parties considered it necessary to adapt the 
                                                 
53 El Mes (from June 16 to July 15). Voz y voto.  August 1993; (6): 44-61. 
The PRD contested the electoral results of the State of Mexico and in Nayarit and initiated protest mobilisation.  
54 Romera Vadillo notes that the political context surrounding the 1989-90 election contributed to the politicisation of 
the reform and the idea that it was just the start of many changes. However, for Salinas the first reform was perceived 
as an instrument for peace. Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of 
Democracia Social and political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
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electoral legislation he would support it. Again, in this reform, Salinas, though under 
pressure, acknowledged the need for a new reform highlighting the three areas that he 
required to progress in the political reform: “first of all, to make transparent the origin 
of the party’s funding, secondly to establish electoral campaign ceilings and thirdly 
modification  regarding  the  use  of  the  mass  media  and  processes  that  guarantee 
advances  in  the  impartiality  of  the  elections.”
56  Therefore,  the  new  reform  to  be 
developed was intended to address three issues (party financing, campaign expenses, 
and  the  media).  Eventually,  with  the  pressure  of  opposition,  Salinas  and  the  PRI 
initiated a new reform. The modifications introduced in the electoral legislation in 1993 
became the second process of reforms during the Salinas sexenio.  
 
4.4.4  The 1993 electoral reform: The negotiations and political actors involved. 
In June 1993, Salinas and the PRI presented their own electoral reform proposal which, 
to the surprise of the opposition, only included changes to the COFIPE and not to the 
constitutional amendments. The new reform still responded to the old pattern of PRI 
dominance  over  the  reforming  process  in  which  Salinas  himself  was  taking  the 
initiative. But the new electoral reform would be discussed in other political areas such 
as Congress and IFE. It is important to remember that the use of new political arenas to 
discuss political issues such as Congress and the IFE was relatively novel in Mexican 
politics. Additionally, the emergence of more political spaces also encouraged political 
parties to participate in the negotiations on electoral reforms. At the same time that the 
Congress started debating issues such as the distribution of seats in the Chamber of 
deputies and the design of regulations to control party financing, the IFE organised a 
public hearing to which several political analysts and experts were invited to discuss the 
content of the reform. The conclusions of the public meeting were sent to Congress to 
add to the legislative debate. 
The  shift  in  PRI’s  support  among  the  opposition  was  clear  when  PAN  and  PRD 
presented  a  counterproposal  (common  agenda)  to  the  PRI’s  proposal  in  June  1993, 
recommending nine constitutional changes that the PRI had to eventually accept. The 
opposition expected the reform to carry out constitutional amendments, something that 
                                                 
56 Speech to the nation by Carlos Salinas de Gortari (President of Mexico 1988-1994) November 1 1992, in 
Noticieros Televisa. “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
Historia de la Democracia. 
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the PRI did not want to do. This reform acquired a political significance because for the 
very first time in the history of electoral reform and disregarding the final outcome, the 
agenda of the opposition became the centre and reference of the discussion between the 
political parties.
57 With this reform, PAN and PRD achieved many of their demands 
after breaking the initial resistance of PRI legislators.
58 In fact, PAN leaders, as well as 
some factions of the PRD considered the outcome satisfactory.  
Finally, the different proposals were discussed by a Plural Commission created in the 
Chamber of Deputies which was formed by all parties.  The purpose of the commission 
was to achieve consensus for the new reform.  The reform was finally drafted jointly by 
the PRI and the PAN (as the PRD despite joining the debate did not offer concrete 
suggestions) and was approved by all parties except the PRD who voted against it.
59 
The  reform  of  1993  was  significant  because  it  was  made  possible  by  a  temporary 
agreement between the PAN and the PRD, although the PRD left the negotiation table 
at the end.
60 The negotiations between the political parties were rather complicated. 
Initially the PRI and the government seemed to be willing only to reform the COFIPE, 
but  the  opposition  did  not  accept  this  and  asked  for  constitutional  amendments. 
Eventually, Salinas proposed reforms on party finances. While the first reforms that led 
to the creation of IFE had concentrated on the management of the electoral system and 
problems being solved, in 1993 the negotiation centred on other issues such as financial 
ones. 
 
4.4.5  Content of the 1993 reform: important changes  
The  1993  electoral  reform  modified  8  constitutional  articles  and  a  total  of  170 
COFIPE’s  regulations.  The  restructuring  of  the  Senate
61  and  the  introduction  of 
regulations on party financing were two more important elements of the reform. These 
                                                 
57 See El Mes (from August 19 to September 16). Voz y Voto. October 1993; (8): 51-55.  
PAN’s leader, Peraza, indicated the PAN’s proposal for the reform and said that it was false to consider that it was a 
PRI reform to which PAN agreed. At the same time, the PRD initiated a formal dialogue with government 
representatives and the PRI.   
58 See El Mes (from August 19 to September 16). Voz y Voto. October 1993; (8): 51-55.  
59 The PRD’s argument for voting against was disagreements about its form, not its content. 
60 El Mes (from October 18 to November 17). Voz y voto. December 1993; (10): 40-45. 
The newspaper “El Nacional” noted that Cárdenas said that the reform did not need a “pact of civility” but, just to 
follow the electoral law. However, another newspaper “La Jornada” reported that Cardenas was in favour of the 
agreement for a transition to democracy, therefore he was willing to cooperate with Salinas.  
61 For a detailed account of the reform, see Alcocer, J. Recent Electoral Reform. The Challenge of Institutional 
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issues, that were ignored or delayed in the 1990 reform, became the centre of debate in 
the reform, especially through pressure from the opposition.  
Despite the debate concentrating on other aspects such as party financing and media 
access, the government’s control of IFE remained a reason for the opposition not to 
fully support the reform. This was especially the case for the PRD, who had voted 
against  these  measures  because  of  its  views  on  the  government’s  control  over  the 
electoral authority and electoral process.
62    
However, certain amendments to the Constitution, COFIPE and electoral law eventually 
increased  not  only  the  role  of  IFE  and  the  Federal  Electoral  Tribunal  but  also  the 
influence of the opposition in Congress.  
First of all, the removal of the Electoral College in Congress led to the suspension of the 
Congress’s system of judging its own members’ elections, in other words, the self-
validating of elections. In the past, the members of the two Chambers, through self-
validation,  had  approved  each  member’s  election,  based  on  the  principle  of 
“parliamentary sovereignty” (deputies and senators elected themselves). This function 
created numerous problems in contested elections such that in the 1993 electoral reform, 
it  was  transferred  to  the  Federal  Electoral  Institute  and  to  the  Federal  Electoral 
Tribunal.
63 The elimination of the function of self-validation increased the strength of 
the IFE due to the function being exercised by electoral authorities.  Additionally, the 
introduction  of  proportional  representation  in  the  senate  increased  the  opposition 
parties’ participation in the IFE. The restructuring of the Senate was one of the two 
long-standing PAN demands; the second one was to introduce direct elections of the 
local government of the Federal District (Mexico City).
64 Both were met in this reform. 
Thirdly,  the  1993  reform  also  introduced  important  changes  in  the  distribution  of 
congressional seats. The most controversial of these changes was the abolition of the 
“governability clause”.
65 The PRI’s ability to approve reforms on its own was restricted 
by the decision to prevent any party from holding more than two thirds of the Chamber 
                                                 
62 According to Pablo Gómez Alvarez, these reforms were cosmetic. See interview of Cuahtemoc Cardenas in Voz y 
Voto, March 1993;(1):14-18 
63 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Arturo Muñoz  Jiménez  (General Director of IFE 1993-1994) in “Mexico: La 
historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
Muñoz notes that since the 1993 electoral reform the Congress´ Electoral College made of deputies and senators was 
eliminated and its former functions passed to IFE.  
64 Alcocer, J. Recent Electoral Reform. The Challenge of Institutional Reform in Mexico, p.60. 
65 The 1990 constitutional amendment contained a clause on “governability”, which guaranteed the party receiving 
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of Deputies seats in addition to the unity of the composition of the chamber of deputies 
and the acceptance that no party could obtain more than 315 deputies. Therefore, from 
1993, and in order to pass constitutional reforms, a consensus between the two political 
parties  would  be  essential.  Although,  the  abolition  of  the  “governability  clause” 
promised a more fair distribution of congressional seats in Congress, the new electoral 
formula  tended  to  create  “manufactured  majorities”  through  the  systematic  over-
representation of the plurality party. Furthermore, this new formula only benefitted the 
majority  party  and  the  second  leading  party,  to  the  detriment  of  the  other  parties. 
Alcocer argues that the reform showed an “unspoken alliance” between the PRI and the 
PAN, who agreed to marginalise the PRD while constructing a two-way competition for 
elective posts.
66     
A  more  significant  aspect  of  the  1993  reform  was  perhaps  the  introduction  of 
regulations on party finances in which financial ceilings were enforced on the levels of 
both campaign and private funding for the first time.
67 It is important to note that until 
1993 there was no electoral law in charge of regulating parties’ private funding. For the 
first time in history, regulations regarding the funding of political parties and political 
campaigns  were  established  in  the  COFIPE,  Article  49.  This  article  was  set  up  to 
regulate both public and private sources of party financing. 
The  reform  established  in  the  COFIPE  the  different  types  of  legal  party  financing 
(public financing, militants, sympathisers, self funding and trusteeships). This was in 
addition to campaign spending ceilings  and the enforced limits to private donations 
from  individual  militants  and  anonymous  donations.  The  reform  also  prohibited 
political contribution by government agencies and officials, the private sector, religious 
institutions, foreign individuals and organisations. It also established for the first time 
the obligation of the parties to present to IFE an annual report on their incomes and 
expenses.
68  Legislation  about  the  revision  of  both  public  and  private  income  and 
revenues  and  political  parties’  expenditure  was  also  established.    It  is  important  to 
highlight  the  importance  of  this  new  regulation  for  the  IFE,  as  it  became  the 
administrator of such functions. This was something very important in the world of 
                                                 
66 Alcocer, J. Recent Electoral Reform. The Challenge of Institutional reform in Mexico, p.62. 
67 See the main points of the 1993 electoral reform in Inés Castro, et. al. ¿Dónde quedó la bolita? Voz y voto. 
November 1993; (9): 7-9. 
68 Noticieros Televisa. Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico City: Noticieros 
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private funding.
69 The reform also established measures regarding access to the media 
by political parties including the expansion of rules promoting equal access to media 
coverage by political parties. The cost of propaganda on radio and television was also 
addressed for the first time. The 1993 reform established that only political parties were 
allowed to buy time on radio and television for their campaigns and that the IFE would 
distribute a list of charges to political parties. Despite many of the opposition’s demands 
regarding media access, the reform did not include any major changes.
70 The purchase 
of advertising and the use of public time on television were the main concerns of the 
opposition. Eventually the lack of regulation in this area provoked further changes in the 
next presidential election in 1994. Regarding, the electoral judiciary, one of the most 
important aspects of the reform was the conversion of the Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE), 
which had existed since 1990, to a judicial entity
71 with full power to decide on electoral 
arguments. The Federal Electoral Tribunal became the office for prosecuting electoral 
crimes and expanding sanctions on such crimes. Among its new powers was the ability 
to  remove  party  registration  in  cases  of  violation  of  electoral  law.
72  This  change 
strengthened the judicial settlement of electoral disputes.
  Finally, the reform introduced 
the  figure  of  the  national  electoral  observer;  the  regulation  of  which  was  another 
demand of the opposition parties. All electoral observers had to ask for accreditation to 
the local electoral agencies of IFE. Additionally, other measures were established in 
order  to  increase  the  role  of  the  opposition  parties  during  the  voter  registration 
process.
73 Changes regarding political coalitions, polling surveys and the establishment 
of a system to gather preliminary results were also regulated.  
 
4.5 Outcome of the reform: The last of the PRI led reforms 
The  negotiation  of  the  reform  between  the  PRI  and  the  opposition  did  not  go  as 
smoothly as expected. At one point, the three main parties achieved consensus regarding 
some electoral issues but the negotiation soon became too complicated. For instance, the 
common front of PAN and PRD, in presenting a common agenda, was disrupted by 
                                                 
69 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Alonso Lujambio in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico 
City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
70 Chapter 6 will cover this issue. 
71 The previous electoral tribunal was only able to apply administrative sanctions. 
72 Noticieros Televisa. Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico City: Noticieros 
Televisa, 2004. Historia de la Democracia.  
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PRD. The two parties joined forces in order to present an alternative agenda to the PRI’s 
proposal.  The  PRI  nearly  accepted  the  entirety  of  these  proposals  but  the  PRD’s 
decision to abandon the negotiation table generated more problems to reform which had 
to  be  achieved  by  consensus.
74  Additionally,  some  of  the  proposals  made  by  the 
opposition did not obtain PRI’s approval. For example, the opposition also highlighted 
obstacles to reform of the regulation which governed electoral coalitions. Since 1990 it 
had  become  more  difficult  for  opposition  parties  to  form  coalitions,  and  it  was 
especially difficult for opposition parties to unite behind a single presidential candidate. 
The  reform  of  electoral  coalition  was  one  of  the  main  demands  of  the  PRD.  It  is 
important to highlight that the Cardenas’ movement, which challenged the PRI in the 
1988  elections,  was  able  to  form  a  coalition.  Many  analysts  thought  that  the  new 
regulation of multiparty coalition increased the PRI control over the electoral process. 
Indeed,  Salinas  was  determined  to  avoid  another  coalition  and  targeted  real  and 
potential PRD supporters. These regulations prevented the traditional satellite parties of 
the PRI (the PPS, the PARM) from joining Cardenas. Due to the obstacles involved in 
forming a coalition, the PRD reacted by calling the reform fixed and declared its clear 
intention to eliminate the formation of common candidacies similar to the one that had 
formed the FDN in 1988.
75 In fact it seemed that in 1993 the official party, in order to 
undermine Cardenas support, adopted a specific strategy for the 1994 elections. The 
strategy consisted of dividing the opposition thus impeding a possible new coalition on 
the left. 
Overall, the 1993 electoral reform resulted in a legislative exercise in which all parties 
participated  although  only  PRI  and  PAN  decided  to  approve  it  at  the  end.
76 
Additionally,  the  opposition’s  participation  inside  IFE  also  started  attracting  public 
attention.
77  Despite  the  reform  addressing  many  of  the  opposition’s  demands  and 
developing important electoral issues such as party funding for the first time, the reform 
did not solve the issue of the autonomy of IFE. It is important to remember that the 
independence of the electoral authority from government control was one of the main 
                                                 
74 The PRD expressed its disagreement over the form of the reform but not its content. 
75 See Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (President of PRD 1993 -1996) October 15 1993 in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. Historia de la Democracia.  
76Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: 
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demands of the opposition, especially of the PRD.
78 The control that the government 
still exercised over the electoral authority was seen as an undemocratic measure that the 
PRI  used  in  order  to  maintain  its  control  over  the  electoral  process.  In  fact,  many 
political actors claim that the 1993 reform can be perceived as cosmetic because it did 
not differ from previous PRI-led reforms.
79 Originally the 1993 electoral reform was 
intended  to  set  the  legal  framework  for  the  upcoming  election  in  March  1994.  The 
official party seemed to be in a very comfortable position. First of all, the positive 
results of the PRI in the 1991 midterm elections allowed Salinas to initiate reforms in 
areas such as the agrarian (ejidos), education (decentralisation) and in the relationship 
with the church.
80 Secondly, the entry of Mexico in NAFTA
81 which was supposed to 
be  the  last  step  taken  within  the  economic  reform  initiated  by  De  La  Madrid  and 
continued by Salinas, not only provided the regime with a new international image but it 
also increased the promise of economic improvements. By December 1993 the legal and 
institutional setting under the responsibility of the IFE was ready for the next federal 
elections in August 1994 in which a new president and Congress was to be elected. 
Nonetheless, the tranquil situation before these federal elections was disrupted by an 
unexpected event that not only surprised the country but the world; the sudden outbreak 
of armed rebellion by the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in the southern 
state of Chiapas. This event forced the government and the political actors to pact in 
dramatic conditions, a new and more profound electoral reform.
82   
 
4.5.1  The armed rebellion in Chiapas 
 
The political context that followed the electoral reform in 1993 was interrupted by an 
Indian-based guerrilla uprising that erupted in Chiapas on New Years Eve 1994, the 
same day that the NAFTA agreement started functioning. The so-called Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation (EZLN) declared war on the Mexican government. The EZLN 
was formed by a group of radical left wing members who were able to develop a social 
                                                 
78 During the 1993 reform the PRD and PAN insisted on introducing changes in the structure of IFE. However, the 
reform did not alter the structure of the electoral authority or the basic process of the organisation of elections. 
79 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Pablo Gómez Alvarez (President of the National Council of PRD 1993-1996) in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
80 For government-church relations, see Alcocer, J. & Rodrigo Morales M. La relación apenas empieza (Iglesia-
Gobierno) in Voz y voto. September 1993;(7): 5-9.  
81 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 
82 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: 
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base in the indigenous communities of Chiapas.
83 The ELZN was opposed to Salinas’ 
army and claimed that all legal and peaceful paths were closed.
84  
Many political analysts argue that the uprising, which took the government by surprise, 
showed a lack of legitimacy in the Mexican rules and others perceived the uprising just 
as a simple rebellion which resulted from the unbearable economic and social 
circunstances of the Indian peasants.
85 In addition, and as soon as the clash between the 
Zapatistas rebels and the army started, Salinas’ government was confronted by strong 
and international condemnation of the state’s use of the army to repress the rebellion.
86 
A myriad of civic groups, Non Government Organisations (NGOs) as well as important 
sectors of public opinion and political parties requested an ending to the fighting and 
demanded that the government start political negotiations. Some political groups among 
the opposition and society perceived the EZLN’s demands as justified and legitimate.
87 
Woldenberg notes that the threat of violence appeared again after 70 years and meant 
that not only the government but all political forces would have a firm reaction to it.    
Different sections of the government were deeply divided on how to  deal with this 
event. Initially, Salinas dismissed the appeal of the Zapatista rebel uprising saying that 
the  attack  was  carried  out  by  professional  criminals  (national  violence)  and  foreign 
groups who were detached from the Chiapas’ problem.
88  A faction inside PRI favoured 
                                                 
83 For an account on the Chiapas rebellion there is extensive literature including, Bonfil Batalla, G., México 
profundo: Reclaiming A Civilization, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996; Boremanse, D., Hach Winik: The 
Lacandon Map of Chiapas, Mexico: Institute for Mesoamerican Studies. Albany, NY, 1998., Collier, G. Basta! Land 
and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas, Oakland, CA: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1994; Harvey, N., 
The Chiapas Rebellion: the struggle for land and democracy. Mexico City and Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. 
Montemayor, C., Chiapas: La Rebelión Indígena de México, Joaquín Mortiz, 1997, Ross, John, Rebelllion from the 
Roots: Indian Uprising in Chiapas, Monroe, ME : Common Courage Press, 1995., Russell, Philips L., The Chiapas 
Rebellion, Austin, TX : Mexico Reosurce Centre, 1995, Weinberg, B., Homage to Chiapas: London and New York: 
Verso, 2000, pp. 97-202. 
84 Comandante Felipe EZLN (1 de Enero, 1994) 
“We are a million and we call on all our brothers so that they are added to this call; that is the only way not to die of 
hunger before the insatiable ambition of a dictatorship of more than 70 year, governed by a group of power hungry 
treasonous people that represent the most conservative groups who are prepared to sell their homeland” 
85 Needler, Martin C. Mexican Politics: the container of conflicts, p.33. 
86 Harvey notes that the rebellion focused attention on the social costs of neoliberal economic reforms and on the 
discrimination directed against two of the most traditionally marginalised sectors of Mexican society: indigenous 
people and women.  However, in doing so, the EZLN insisted on the centrality of democracy in articulating popular 
struggles against numerous forms of oppression. Harvey, N. The Chiapas Rebellion: the struggle for land and 
democracy, p.199. 
87 The leader of the PAN, Luis H. Alvarez, who was also Commissioner of the peace process in Chiapas in 2000-
2004, said that the Zapatista had the insight to cut to the heart of the matter, which was the poor conditions of the 
indigineuos people in Mexico. While, Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas said that Chiapas represented a clear expression of a 
deep crisis of marginalisation of important sectors of the population. See Noticieros Televisa, Historia de la 
democracia, 2004, Vol. 2. Mexico City, 2004. 
88 See speech of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (President of the Republic 1988-1994) on January 6 1994 in Noticieros 
Televisa. “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
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a  military  approach,  and  another  faction  preferred  political  negotiation.
89  Finally, 
despite facing disagreements from those who supported a hard-line reaction, Salinas 
decided  to  initiate  peace  talks  with  the  rebels.  It  is  important  to  note  that  Salinas´ 
decision to negotiate came from a desire to reduce the negative press and suppress the 
international reaction that the Mexican army received after confronting the rebels.
90 The 
international media not only attacked the response of the Mexian army but also Salinas 
himself.
91 Additionally, the popular mobilisations provoked by the indigenous uprising 
not  only  extended  across  the  country  but  also  had  an  impact  on  the  political  and 
economic context creating tensions within the government that did not know how to 
confront the crisis. Ironically, Camacho Solis, a PRI member who had lost the PRI’s 
nomination for presidential candidate to Colosio
92, headed the faction which favoured 
negotiation. Eventually, on 10
th January, Salinas ordered unilateral cease-fire in Chiapas 
and offered to start political negotiations with the guerrillas and to abandon the reactive 
policy of repression. Salinas announced an amnesty and reshuffled his cabinet, naming a 
new Minister of the Interior (Jorge Carpizo) and a special commissioner to achieve the 
peace in Chiapas (Camacho). In order to gain credibility and support, Salinas substituted 
the Minister of the Interior with a former human rights supporter, Jorge Carpizo and 
elected Camacho, who already enjoyed popular support, as the peace commissioner.
93 
Finally,  by  2
nd  March  1994  the  peace  commissioner  and  the  EZLN  concluded  the 
negotiations and signed a document which contained 32 compromises for peace. This 
document became very significant because it showed the willingness of both parties to 
negotiate.  In  addition,  this  negotiation  also  allowed  for  the  continuation  of  the 
presidential campaign process. 
The rebellion in 1994 forced a new, urgent and democratic negotiation between PRI and 
the opposition just a few months before the presidential elections.
94 A more profound 
electoral  reform  was  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  the  upcoming  federal  elections. 
                                                 
89 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Manuel Camacho Solis (Commissioner for the Peace in Chiapas 1994) in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
90 The international broadcasting of mortal casualties including indigenous people, civilians and soldiers brought the 
attention of the international community and this put further pressure on Salinas to pursue negotiation with the rebels. 
91 See El Mes. Voz y voto. February 1994; (12): 57-59. 
92 Donaldo Colosio was the presidential candidate for PRI in the 1994 federal elections. 
93 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Manuel Camacho Solis (Commissioner for the Peace in Chiapas 1994) in 
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Camacho Solís said that president Salinas wanted him to be flexible and open-minded when negotiating the peace 
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Ironically, this dramatic event which included the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas and 
high level political assassinations
95 not only tested the strength of the institution but 
more importantly forced political parties to achieve a new consensus about the electoral 
system. The transition to democracy would be accelerated by these dramatic events.   
 
4.6 Outcome  and  causes  of  the  EZLN  uprising  and  the  Internationalisation  of 
Mexican politics 
The  Zapatista rebel uprising changed the Mexican political context. First of all, the 
revolt added to an economic decline which not only damaged public perception of the 
economic  reforms  that  Salinas  proudly  carried  out  but  also  the  credibility  of  the 
electoral process and Salinas’ political reforms. Understandably, the uprising and the 
peace negotiation that followed, relegated the presidential electoral campaign to second 
position. Additionally, not only the national media was paying more attention to the 
peace negotiation than to the campaign, but also the international media expressed great 
concern about the conflict and brought to public attention abuses of human rights in 
Mexico. The national and international media transmitted the news around Mexico and 
abroad.  The  PRI  and  Salinas  realised  how  internationalisation  of  the  conflict  could 
potentially damage the positive image he had produced in order to support NAFTA. It is 
important  to  note  that  the  emergence  of  many  social  agencies  came  as  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  internationalisation  of  Mexican  politics.  This  further  increased 
pressure on the government for political change and transitional government. Agencies 
such  as  the  National  Network  of  Civil  Rights  Organisations,  and  other  independent 
organisations such as Alianza Civica (Civic Alliance) benefitted from the situation as it 
increased their credibility and role.
 96 It can be said that many human rights associations 
and  international  agencies  assisted  in  shaping  public  opinion  about  the  conflict,  for 
example the civic group “San Angel”. 
 
4.6.1  Emergence of civil groups 
At a national level the impact of the uprising and violence encouraged political parties 
and civic and pro-democratic groups to carrying out a deeper democratisation process 
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and  exert  pressure  for  further  electoral  reform.  There  was  a  consensus  among  all 
political parties that the electoral way was not closed and it was still significant. In fact, 
it seemed that the EZLN experience justified the idea that violence can be a positive 
contribution in democratic avenues.
97  
Moreover,  Civic-citizen  groups  showed  their  commitment  to  ensuring  a  democratic 
electoral process by putting pressure on the president and the parties to sign a document 
called  “20  compromises  for  democracy”.  Later,  these  compromises  were  freely 
incorporated to their campaign programme and then to the government programme.
98  
 
4.6.2  Salinas’  strategy  to  hold  the  crisis:  the  urgent  need  for  a  new  electoral 
reform 
Woldenberg  notes  that  the  government  wanted  to  avoid  the  social  and  economic 
instability  that  emerged  from  the  Zapatista  rebel  uprising,  that  added  to  the 
dissatisfaction  that  already  existed  due  to  the  unequal  conditions  of  electoral 
competition. As a result of this, Salinas’ government started working in two areas: On 
the  one  hand,  the  government  enforced  peace  negotiations  with  EZLN  and  its 
sympathisers. On the other hand, the  government also initiated negotiation with the 
opposition  parties,  mainly  with  the  PRD  and  PAN  with  a  view  to  a  new  electoral 
reform.
99 Some political analysts argue that another reason behind Salinas willingness to 
negotiate  new  reforms  resulted  from  the  PRI’s  concern  that  the  PRD  was  neither 
supporting the electoral law nor the electoral authority (IFE).
100  
 
4.6.3  Agreements for Peace, Democracy and Justice  
Finally, an agreement between eight of the national political parties including the PRD, 
was  signed  on  27
th  January  1994  and  was  called  “Acuerdos  para  La  Paz,  La 
Democracia y La Justicia”.
101 Salinas himself later acknowledged the relevance of this 
agreement that the three main parties achieved in order to culminate the process of 
                                                 
97 Rincón Gallardo argues that the appearance and the initial advance of the EZLN did little to justify the notion that 
there is a place for violence on the route to democracy. Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Gilberto Rincón Gallardo 
(Deputy for Mexico City, PRD 1991-1994) in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: 
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historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
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electoral  reform  in  Mexico.
102  These  agreements  included  an  agenda  for  peace 
negotiation and deeper electoral reform, the main purpose of which was to guarantee a 
clean  election  and  impartiality  in  the  upcoming  elections.  It  intended  to  create  an 
environment of peace and credibility for the upcoming electoral contest in August 1994. 
It is important to note the credibility gained in the electoral contests after the uprising. 
This increase in trust in the election resulted from a common commitment to prioritise 
democracy  over  violence.  Some  members  of  the  opposition  had  interpreted  this 
invitation as an intention to simulate a pact similar to that which led to the Spanish 
transition.
103 This pact for peace, democracy and political reform was intended to secure 
impartiality in the elections. The pact also established the basis of a new reform which 
took place immediately before the elections. The government and rebels agreed to hold 
a special session of congress to discuss, amongst other things, electoral reforms, a new 
agrarian reform law and a law against the discrimination of Indians. The fact that the 
Minister  of  Interior  was  in  charge  of  both  national  security  issues  and  electoral 
organisations  accelerated  the  links  between  Chiapas,  the  political  parties  and  the 
upcoming elections. The Zapatista rebel uprising in Chiapas and the NAFTA agreement 
created a situation that exposed Salinas’ presidency more than ever before. The urgent 
requirement for a deeper electoral reform came as a result of increasing pressure from 
different sources. First of all, the re-emergence of violence reinforced the conviction 
among  political  actors  to  prioritise  negotiations  and  pacts  against  more  violence. 
Secondly, one of the EZLN demands was to have greater competition and transparency 
within  electoral  contests.  Finally,  the  opposition  parties,  especially  the  PRD
104, 
considered the previous reform insufficient to guarantee fair and transparent elections 
and took the opportunity to re-open the electoral debate. Additionally, the opposition 
parties joined forces with social organisations to protest against the use of fraud, lack of 
transparency  and  inefficiency  in  several  phases  of  the  electoral  process  which  put 
further pressure on the need for a new reform. Basically, Salinas and the PRI recognised 
that pursuing a new electoral reform by the consensus of all political parties was the 
                                                 
102 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (Presidente de la República 1988-1994)  in “Mexico: 
La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
Salinas acknowledged the importance of the negotiation between the three main political parties, PAN, PRD and PRI, 
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best way to reduce not only the threat of political polarisation but also the radicalisation 
of protests by the opposition which could create conflict in the presidential election. The 
new reform of 1994 was the third reform under Salinas.    
 
4.6.4  Strength of the opposition: PAN and PRD 
The increasing strength of the opposition was a critical factor in the development of 
more democratic reforms, as this was one of their main demands. Nevertheless, the 
significance of the electoral debate which started in the mid eighties with the opposition 
parties, especially the PAN, benefitting from the PRI´s loss of legitimacy after the debt 
crisis  and  the  economic  adjustment  programmes,  was  considerable.  From  the  late 
eighties the PAN started gaining several municipalities and state elections, winning the 
first governorship in 1989, with Salinas in the presidency. Although some of the PAN’s 
state elections were negotiated with Salinas in an exchange of political support with the 
PRI.  The fact is that by the mid 1990s the PAN had already won most of the northern 
states  and  even  other  non-PAN  strongholds.  Another  reason  for  the  increasing 
popularity  of  PAN  was  its  pressure  on  the  government  to  develop  better  electoral 
machines  from  the  mid  1980s  onward  that  eventually  contributed  to  its  own 
competitiveness.
105 Also, the newly created PRD benefitted from the PRI’s problems in 
the  late  1980s.  Firstly  the  FDN  gained  the  popular  vote  that  the  PRI  lost  with  the 
economic liberalisation programme, and then again during the 1990s with its popularity 
in the southern states.  The PRD also increased pressure for more profound electoral 
reforms,  especially  after  being  the  most  affected  by  electoral  fraud  and  political 
violence  from  the  late  1980s  and  especially  during  Salinas’  sexenio.  As  the  main 
opposition parties realised the significance of participating in elections, the pressure for 
improving  the  conditions  of  electoral  competence  increased.  They  also,  started 
participating and being more active in the electoral process by fielding candidates for 
most  municipal  and  state  races,  by  improving  their  surveillance  capacity  during 
electoral contests which proved to be essential in preventing corruption at the polling 
stations. By the 1994 elections, 70% of the voting wards had PRD party representatives, 
and the PAN covered 67% of them.  
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4.6.5  Acceleration of the reform: more political violence 
The negotiations among political parties, to complete a new electoral reform before the 
presidential election in August 1994, were interrupted by a political assassination that 
not  only  traumatised  Mexico  but  also  caused  a  political  and  economic  crisis
106 
throughout the country. The assassination of Donaldo Colosio, the PRI’s presidential 
candidate,
107  on  23
rd  March  1994  had  an  impact  on  political  areas,  including  the 
electoral arena. Due to an unexpected economic crisis, triggered by capital flights and 
political uncertainty, the PRI had to select a new presidential candidate within a short 
period  of  time.  Eventually,  Ernesto  Zedillo,
108  former  coordinator  of  Colosio’s 
campaign, was elected, 6 days later. He had to initiate his electoral campaign in the 
middle of a political crisis. Throughout the period of uncertainty that followed the death 
of Colosio, the opposition and government tried to inject trust in the electoral process. 
The  negotiations  over  the  new  electoral  reform  become  more  intensive  and  the 
consensus  between  political  parties  was  achieved  sooner  than  expected.  Almost 
immediately, the more completed electoral reform was approved and ready to be tested 
in the elections in August 1994.
109  
 
4.6.6  The reform of 1994: a political answer to a crisis  
According to many political analysts, the political impact of Colosio’s assassination 
generated  willingness  and  urgency  among  the  political  parties  to  accelerate  the 
legislative process for the approval of the constitutional reform.
110 Even, the former 
Minister of the Interior in 1994, Jorge Carpizo admitted years later that the far reaching 
outcome of reform achieved in that short period of time would have taken dozens of 
years  to  achieve  without  the  interest  of  the  oppositions  leaders  of  PRD  and  PAN 
(Porfirio Muñoz  Ledo and Carlos Castillo Peraza).
111 Other  academics highlight the 
                                                 
106 Pedro Aspe notes that the political violence forced Salinas to ask for an urgent meeting with the members of the 
economic pact, to ratify the pact and prevent further problems. Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Pedro Aspe Armella 
(The Treasury Department Minister 1988-1994) 24 March, 1994 in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. 
Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
107 The person accused of the assassination was Carlos Salinas de Gortary, brother of the ex-president Salinas. 
However, the “politicos” or “dinosaurs”, the hard-liners inside the PRI were also blamed for his death, as Colosio was 
seen as too liberal and pro-democracy. Interview, member of PRD A, Mexico City, September 15 2004. 
108 Ernesto Zedillo, had occupied the post of Programming and Budget Secretary in the Salinas’ government.  
109 Noticieros Televisa. Woldenberg, J. in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros 
Televisa, 2004. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Jorge Carpizo (Minister of the Interior 1994) in “Mexico: La historia de su 
democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
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opposition, PAN and PRD put Mexico’s interests before personal or party interests. Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
 
139 
impact that the rebellion in Chiapas had on electoral reform. The rebels’ demand for 
clean elections and democracy in Mexico reopened the issue of the need to have legal 
and practical reforms in order to favour a fair and lawful transfer of power in 1994. But 
also  the  increasing  pressure  of  opposition  parties  and  NGOs,  amplified  by  the 
international  attention  to  Mexican  affairs,  forced  Salinas’  government  to  favour  the 
political negotiation that eventually ended in a democratic and peaceful agreement.
112 It 
is important to note that all parties detailed a list that included a vast array of legal and 
political actions. This agenda of eight points included issues concerning the composition 
and conduct of the electoral authorities, the creation of equitable access to mass media, 
the revision of voting lists, and the revision of the financing of political parties and 
private financing of political parties. It also included the modification of the Penal Code 
in order to punish restrictions of political freedom, the creation of a special attorney for 
the prosecution of electoral felonies, and the convocation of an extraordinary period of 
Congress  in  order  to  implement  the  resulting  agreements.  The  importance  of  these 
reforms resulted in all measures being agreed by the consensus of the main political 
parties. The PRI, PAN and PRD through the “Acuerdos” opened an intense process of 
negotiation. The PRD leaders agreed, for the first time since 1988, to establish direct 
and  official  political  negotiations  with  the  government.    This  accord  also  showed  a 
different attitude towards the electoral process.
  The consensus was very important for 
the process of political negotiation and a channel to its relative success. The government 
allocated  the  role  of  negotiator  to  Jorge  Carpizo,  and  the  national  leaders  were  the 
counterparts from the political parties. The negotiations involved only the PRI, PAN 
and PRD, and this provoked protests from some leaders of the minor parties who were 
not  invited  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations.  Initially  the  PRI,  PAN  and  PRD  were 
satisfied with the new arrangements, but soon after the PRD became divided. The PRD 
had two sectors; one led by Porfirio Munoz Ledo, who supported the negotiations and 
outcomes,  but  another  sector  of  the  party  led  by  Cuahtemoc  Cardenas,  the  PRD 
presidential  candidate,  refused  to  approve  the  agreements.  Nevertheless,  despite  the 
internal division of the PRD, which continued during the whole process, the reform was 
passed with the approval of PRI, PAN and half of the PRD legislative faction. Some of 
                                                 
112 See article of Mauricio Merino. La Democracia también se pacta. Voz  y Voto. February 1994; (12): 29. He said 
that the instability created by the Chiapas conflict and the political violence would not produce change until the 
political actors were forced to sit down and consider a civilised solution, and that it could be an opportunity for a 
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the agreements were developed into law, while others remained informal because some 
of the agreements between the federal government and the political parties did not need 
legislative  reform.  These  informal  agreements  consisted  of  almost  fifty  different 
specific actions regarding every aspect of the electoral process. Some of those informal 
agreements were implemented by the President, some by the Minister of the Interior, 
and some by the General Council of the IFE.   
 
4.6.7  Outcome of the 1994 electoral reform 
The Mexican Congress approved the modification of Article 41 of the Constitution and 
it was published in the Official Diary of the Federation on 19 April 1994. The reform 
established that the electoral organisation would be carried out by an autonomous and 
public body with the participation of executive and legislative branches, political parties 
and citizens. The inclusion of citizens in the electoral organisation was an innovation 
that intended to balance the functions of the electoral body.  The electoral reform of 
May 18
th 1994 resulted in the most democratic and advanced reform achieved to date. 
The negotiations that achieved consensus over the reform were called “The Barcelona 
agreements” and consisted of three groups of legal amendments. The most significant 
changes were the following. To begin with, changes in the composition of Mexico’s 
highest-ranking electoral body, the IFE General Council proved to be crucial for the 
future role of the Electoral authority.   First of all, the creation of the position of the 
“citizen council member” replaced the electoral magistrates.
113 The new figure that was 
to be present not only in the General Council of IFE but also in its local and district 
counterpart  contributed  to  diminishing  the  influence  of  the  political  parties  in  the 
electoral authority. The selection of the “citizen council members”, who were now a 
group of six citizen councillors, would also be changed. From now on their proposals 
would be put forward by parliamentary groups in Congress and not by the president as 
in the past, and its appointment would be by a majority of two-thirds of the Chamber of 
Deputies.  The  so-called  “ciudadanisation”  of  IFE  represented  a  move  toward  the 
autonomy of the agency. In fact, the inclusion of these new figures (citizens councillors) 
                                                 
113 Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas (Citizen Councillor of IFE 1994-1996) in Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 
2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
“the replacement of the figure of electoral magistrate by a citizen, meant that the individuals selected as citizens 
councillors were perceived by the populace as more equal, normal citizens, and it  was considered that they would 
guarantee voter’s rights and promote the interests of the people because they would be more in tune with their needs 
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was  considered  to  be  one  of  the  main  elements  of  the  reform.
114  Despite  the  term 
“citizens” implying the notion of their origin, the new figure was made up of mainly 
academics with a record of independence and impartiality in any political party that 
perceived electoral issues in a different way from the employees of the Ministry of the 
Interior.
115 Secondly, the modification of the COFIPE, after an intense legislative debate 
in Congress, between the parliamentary groups, established changes in the structure of 
the  General  Council  of  IFE,  which  also  had  important  repercussions  for  the  IFE’s 
credibility. The changes in the structure of the General Council were significant. First of 
all, the number of General Council members was reduced from 21
116 to only 11 voting 
members. The General Council was now formed by the Minister of Government (the 
executive representative), four legislators plus the Council president, representatives of 
the registered political parties and a new figure “the citizen council member” known as 
“consejeros ciudadanos”. The General Council of IFE maintained the Minister of the 
Interior  as  the  president  of  the  Council  and  the  four  legislators.    However,  the 
innovation was the decision to endow to the group of six citizens council members the 
highest voting as the political parties’ representatives lost their right to vote, keeping 
only  their  voice.  The  influence  of  citizen  council  member  in  the  decision-making 
process of the IFE gave the electoral authority extra power at national and district level. 
In  addition  to  this,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  requisites  to  exercise  as  “citizen 
council member” were also changed prioritising their independency, impartiality and 
non  party  affiliations  over  other  conditions.  The  most  important  aspect  of  the  new 
arrangement within the General Council was the situation that only the citizen council 
members and the representatives from the executive and legislative had the right to vote 
on the board of the General Council.
117 Consequently, the “citizens council members” 
who were proposed by the parties but elected by a two-thirds majority in the Chamber 
                                                 
114 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. Baños notes that the citizen councillors provided an unbiased element to the General Council as 
they were not linked to the PRI in the way that the previous “electoral magistrates” who were selected by Congress 
and proposed by the president, had been. 
115 A former citizen councillor, Santiago Creel (Citizen Councillor of IFE 1994-1996) claims that what they did was 
to provide a new fresh, unbiased atmosphere to the Council, with their own vision as common citizens who perceived 
the electoral issues in a different way from the former civil servants working for the Minister of Interior. Mexico: La 
historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
116 The General Council before the 1994 electoral reform was formed by the Minister of the Interior as the executive 
branch’s representative, members from the legislative branch, party representatives and six magistrates. 
117 For a wider analysis of the content of the reform see Woldenberg, J. Los compromisos de los partidos. Voz y Voto. 
April 1994; (14): 35-37. Woldenberg noted that although the impartiality of the “citizen councillors” was a very 
positive step for the “depoliticisation” of the electoral institution, it was important to monitor the relationship between 
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of Deputies held six of the eleven possible votes. Therefore the new members could 
exercise more influence in the Council than the Minister of the Interior, as the council 
president no longer held a casting vote and the two PRI’s legislators (one deputy and 
one senator) only had three votes guaranteed. In addition, the political parties also lost 
the capacity to exert direct influence on the Councils’ decisions, although PRI, PAN and 
PRD kept it through their legislators (two for PRI, one from the PAN and one from the 
PRD).
118 Due to the PRI having five votes, PAN three and PRD two, no political party 
would  have  a  safe  majority  in  the  Council.
119  This  is  despite  assuming  each  of  the 
Citizens Councillors would follow the line of the party that nominated them. This model 
for the structure of the General Council was replicated at each of the 32 local (state) 
Councils, and for each of the 300 Districts Councils.   
Overall, the IFE became more autonomous and gained credibility with the introduction 
in the General Council of the new figure of the “citizen council member” and their role 
in the organisation of the electoral process.
120 The autonomy of the electoral authority 
also contributed to the fact that political parties were represented on the electoral bodies 
on  a  parity  basis,  with  one  representative  per  party  with  voice  but  without  vote. 
However, the new arrangement did not convince everyone, especially the PRD who still 
perceived the presence of the Minister of Interior in direct control of the PRI in the 
electoral authority.
121 A former citizen councillor recognised years later that the reform 
was incomplete due to the power that the president of the Republic exercised through 
the  Minister  of  the  Interior.
122  Another  important  aspect  of  the  reform  was  the 
recognition of an official role for electoral observers. Back in 1988, the role of electoral 
observers  had  become  very  important.  In  1988  a  foundation  of  an  NGO  called 
“Asamblea Democratica para el Sufragio Efectivo” (Democratic assembly for effective 
suffrage) started a phenomenon that was extended in the 1990s and would continue 
throughout the decade.  By 1993, the number of monitoring organisations increased and 
                                                 
118 Alcocer, J. Recent Electoral Reforms in Mexico. The Challenge of Institutional reform in Mexico, pp.66-67. 
119 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. 
120 Carlos Salinas claimed in a TV interview in 2004 that the control of IFE was given to the citizens, through the 
“citizens councillor”, because neither the political parties nor the government could control. However, this 
interpretation can be challenged as the IFE was still headed by the Minister of the Interior. 
121 See interview of Cardenas in Voz y Voto. March 1994; (13): 42-45. 
122 Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa (Citizen Councillor of IFE 1994-1996) in Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” 
Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. “This was an unfinished reform since the power of the president of 
the Republic represented by the Minister of the Interior remained. The Minister of the Interior had the power to call 
for sessions of the General Council of IFE and such was the power vested in him that no session could go ahead 
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began to form networks, to co-operate with each other and to attract the attention of the 
international press and the United States.
123 In 1994 many of these organisations were 
even  funded,  financially  and  technically,  by  foreign  organisations  and  this  created 
concern in the PRI and in the government. The observer’s role was expanded to all areas 
of  the  electoral  process.  The  main  purpose  of  these  organisations  was  to  observe 
electoral processes. The PRI was concerned not only about the domestic organisations 
but also about the foreign observers, which by 1994 seemed to be inevitable.
124 The 
government resisted allowing foreign observers into Mexico until the resignation of the 
Minister of the Interior, Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, who was strongly against them. 
However, after his departure the PRI itself admitted that the prohibition of these figures 
would make foreign observers an issue and that would damage the credibility of the 
electoral process abroad. The government saw how by having an open door policy, PRI 
and  their  allies  could  invite  moderate  and  pro-PRI  observers,  at  the  same  time  as 
balancing the ideological mixture of foreign observers. Finally, the reform increased the 
participation of national observers and accepted international observation through the 
figure of the “foreign visitor”.  Amendments to electoral legislation were made in order 
to include this new figure and to allow international observes that had experienced other 
transitions to go to Mexico to observe the elections.
125 The General Council of IFE laid 
down rules for these figures and also had the responsibility for issuing the invitations. 
The government accepted this figure instead of official foreign observers. In the end, 
despite  not  being  official,  many  foreigner  observers  visited  Mexico  for  the  1994 
presidential elections. In fact, one of the most important civil organisations, Alianza 
Cívica, succeeded in obtaining the support of 500 organisations in the country and by 
inviting 450 observers out of the 900 that were allowed on Election Day.
126 A third 
significant subject that the electoral reform included was the innovation of opinion polls 
and a faster mechanism for counting votes. The Mexican political context, especially 
after the post electoral conflict of the presidential elections in 1988 and the political 
violence, experienced an increase in the lack of certainty  and trust in the  electoral 
                                                 
123 For a detailed explanation of the proliferation of Mexico see “El Mes” (from June 18 to July 21 1994). Voz y Voto, 
August 1994; (18): 62-65. 
124 The national chairman of the PRI expressed his concern about the presence of electoral observers during the 
electoral process arguing that they could disturb the activities of the polling booth officials and added that they were 
not ready for major competition. See Voz y voto. July 1994; (17): 32.   
125 Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas (Citizen Councillor of IFE 1994-1996) in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 
2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
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process.  Although  there  was  a  general  consensus  among  all  political  parties  that 
consolidating the electoral process was the only way to confirm legitimacy of elections, 
public  opinion  was  rather  confused  and  continued  to  be  suspicious  of  electoral 
processes.  First  of  all,  it  is  important  to  remember  that  by  1993-94,  post  electoral 
conflicts at local level were still taking place and were contributing to a lack of trust in 
elections. Furthermore, the relatively tranquil 1991 midterm elections did not match the 
increasing post electoral conflicts at local level. Additionally, the inefficiency of earlier 
mechanisms of quick vote counting, such as the one used during the 1988 elections, 
generated great concerns. Therefore, in the negotiations of the 1994 electoral reform the 
issue of transparency and cleanness of elections became crucial in order to be able to 
deal  with  the  uncertainty  that  events  such  as  the  Zapatista’s  rebellion  provoked.
127  
From 1994, the “process of quick counting of votes” and “opinion polls” became a 
regular practice in electoral contest, even increasing their role over time, as they would 
be used to conclude and consolidate the announcement of the results and the credibility 
of the election. Many analysts believe that professionalisation of the electoral bodies 
was  the  key  to  easing  the  conflicts  over  the  organisation  of  elections  and  electoral 
results, even the social legitimisation of the elected. This aspect will be fully analysed in 
chapter  5.  The  reform  also  introduced  changes  in  the  formation,  publication  and 
auditing of the voting registration lists. It is important to take into consideration that 
back  in  1991  the  PAN  proposed  the  use  of  Photo  credentials  in  the  state  of  Baja 
California. Initially this was a local proposal, but soon post-electoral conflicts in other 
regions, due to irregularities regarding voting registration lists, led to an expansion of 
this idea. By 1994 the electoral census was totally renovated. Finally, a fourth aspect of 
this reform was the amendment of the Federal Penal Code to control and punish many 
of the common practices of electoral fraud. The reform established an additional chapter 
on electoral crimes in the Federal Penal Code. In addition to this, the President reformed 
the “legislation” of the Attorney General in order to allow the appointment of a special 
prosecutor  for  electoral  crimes.  However,  the  appointment  of  a  special  prosecutor 
created tension among the political parties who did not achieve consensus about the 
right person for the post, especially the PRD who claimed that the person appointed 
enjoyed favouritism from the Minister of the Interior (Jorge Carpizo) who was heading 
                                                 
127 Oscar Hinojosa noted that 1994 was characterised by intense competition for the presidency, the emergence of a 
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the General Council of IFE. The reform of 1994 also included informal agreements that 
were made public by the Minister of the Interior on the 3
rd June: A total of 36 informal 
agreements were discussed and approved by the political parties participating in the 
reform.  
 
4.6.8   The importance of party financing and media access  
With  advances  in  the  professionalisation  of  the  organisation  of  the  elections,  the 
political parties, especially the opposition started to focus more on the issues of party 
finances and media access, which were considered essential in democratic elections. 
Since 1991 a series of reforms passed by Congress had given IFE new responsibilities 
in the financing of political parties and the setting of ceilings for campaign spending. 
Despite  the  1993  reforms  establishing  a  law  that  regulated  both  public  and  private 
sources of party financing for the first time, the spending ceiling was unrealistically 
high. As a result the opposition felt that the regulation of party finances and media 
access in the 1993 electoral reform was insufficient. In fact, the significance of these 
issues  became  greater  during  the  presidential  campaigns  for  the  1994  elections, 
especially the problem of the inequity in terms of media access and campaign funding. 
Basically, the opposition demanded equal access to media by their candidates for their 
campaigns.  Despite  earlier  disagreements  between  the  PRI  and  the  opposition,  they 
managed  to  reach  consensus  regarding  media  access  and  party  finances.  This 
unexpected consensus between political parties may have occurred because the election 
day was only two months away and all political actors involved wished the elections to 
be the centre of attention again. Also, it seems that all opposition parties agreed that it 
was important to highlight, during their presidential campaign, the inequity in media 
access and campaign funding between them and the PRI who enjoyed greater media 
coverage and funding.
128 First of all, the parties signed an informal agreement which 
established  a  package  of  actions  regarding  media  coverage  of  electoral  campaigns, 
including the use of official time, political debates, guarantees of access to mass media, 
and  other  measures.  One  of  the  most  original  aspects  of  the  reform  during  the 
presidential campaign was the televised political debate between the three main party 
                                                 
128 A former citizen council member, Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas (Citizen Councillor of IFE 1994-1996) recognised 
years, later that the 1994 election had very clearly exposed the “inequity” that would change the approach in which 
the parties participated in the media and participated in public and private funding in the future. “Mexico: La historia 
de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
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candidates (the PRI, PRD and PAN).
129 Another significant aspect of the reform was the 
decision to revise campaign expenditure for the first time. From then on, all political 
parties  were  obliged  to  declare  all  finances  including  their  sources  of  income  and 
expenditure. This decision proved to increase the significance of party finances in the 
future, as it showed inequality in terms of funding between the PRI and the others 
parties.
130 After the  elections the inequality and  unfairness in party funding became 
more obvious. It was also decided that local and district councils that had to be proposed 
by the IFE’s committees had the responsibility for setting campaign ceilings.
131 The 
reforms formal amendments introduced changes within the IFE by increasing the power 
of the independent citizen representatives, strengthening the laws against electoral fraud 
and appointing a special prosecutor to prosecute electoral crime. The reforms informal 
agreements also improved equality in access to the media and accepted the existence of 
independent  audits  of  the  voter’s  lists  and  exit  polls.  The  reform  also  gave  official 
recognition to national election observers and created a role for foreign observers. 
 
4.6.9   The relationship of the political parties.  
Despite  achieving  consensus  in  many  aspects  of  the  reform,  the  negotiations  of  the 
electoral reform in 1994 took place in a difficult and tense atmosphere. As in previous 
reforms  Salinas’  government  adopted  different  approaches  towards  the  two  main 
opposition parties, the PRD and PAN. On one hand the government continued having 
an unstable and troubled relationship of co-operation and conflict with the PAN. As in 
the past ad hoc agreements between PRI and PAN allowed important amendments of 
the Constitution and articles dealing with political representation and elections. There is 
still disagreement whether the so-called “concertacesión” between Salinas and the PAN 
really took place.
132 Despite both parties denying such extra-legal negotiations, the truth 
is that after PAN won the first governorship in Baja California in 1989, many of its 
victories were to be recognised during the 1990s.
133 This apparent relationship between 
                                                 
129 The debate was aired on prime time television on 12
th May 1994 just two and half months before the elections. 
This television experience not only contributed to bringing the election into the public domain as it was watched by 
millions, but also, showed a political plurality that had been ignored by the media before.   
130 The PRI’s expenditure was made public and showed that it was 80% of the total amount spent by all of the parties.  
131 This contrasted with the 1993 electoral reform that established that the campaign ceilings were pre-determined by 
the executive local and districts committees of IFE. 
132 Hinojosa claimed that the PAN’s candidate Diego Fernández de Cevallos would have to explain the practice that 
had prevailed where there had been collaboration between PRI and the PAN to their mutual benefit. Hinojosa, O. Una 
campaña sin mentiras. Voz y Voto. May 994; (15): 50. 
133 See Shirk, D for a detailed explanation of the evolution of PAN. Shirk, D. Mexico’s New Politics, The PAN and 
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the PAN and the PRI contributed to the generation of consensus in several electoral 
issues  during  the  1993  and  1994  electoral  reforms.  However,  both  parties  clashed 
regarding other electoral issues and other matters like corruption and security.  
On the other hand, the relationship between the government and the PRD was tense for 
most of Salinas’ period, and continued to be that way during and after the 1994 reform. 
The PRD and PRI almost never voted for each other’s initiatives in Congress. During 
this time the official party not only encountered difficulties with the opposition but also 
within its own party.  
 
4.6.10   Comparing the 1993 and 1994 electoral reforms  
Despite  Salinas  being  criticised  for  concentrating  more  on  his  dramatic  economic 
reforms than pushing for the democratisation of the political and electoral context, his 
role in the 1993 electoral reform gave him a certain level of credibility that contributed 
to his reformist image inside and outside Mexico.  However, for many political actors 
the 1993 electoral reform is still regarded as a cosmetic reform, for several reasons. First 
of  all,  it  was  mainly  dominated  by  the  PRI’s  proposals  and  Salinas’  dominance, 
although in the end it had to accept some of the opposition’s demands. Secondly, the 
negotiations between the political parties did not achieve consensus between the three 
main parties. And finally, and maybe the most important reason, it continued giving the 
government  total  control  of  the  General  Council  of  IFE,  its  main  governing  body. 
Therefore, as long as the electoral authority in charge of the organisation of elections 
was headed by an executive’s representative, many political actors disregarded not only 
the role of IFE but also the efficiency of the reform.  Additionally, the context in which 
the  third  electoral  reform  of  Salinas  (the  so  called  1994  electoral  reform)  differed 
greatly from that of the 1993 electoral reform. First of all, the 1994 electoral reform 
came as a result of unexpected circumstantial events including the Chiapas’ uprising 
and political assassinations. The PRI’s presidential candidate,  Luis Donaldo Colosio 
urged all political parties to consolidate the electoral process against other violent paths. 
There was a need to achieve agreement in order to inject trust in the electoral process. 
The decision of both the government and the opposition to negotiate can be explained as 
follows: On one hand, the dramatic events that took place in the first months of 1994 
not only damaged Salinas’ image and credibility but also contributed to greater internal 
divisions  within  the  PRI.  Those  internal  divisions  got  worse  due  to  disagreements Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
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between PRI members on how to handle the Zapatista uprising and then after the death 
of Colosio disagreement over his replacement.
134 Internal division also increased when 
deciding whether or not an electoral reform was the best solution to the political crisis. 
In  addition  to  this,  an  increase  of  drug  related  violence  damaged  the  notion  of  the 
stability of Mexico that Salinas had exported during his economic reforms. Overall, 
Salinas and the PRI agreed to work towards a peaceful electoral process, even though 
they  had  to  negotiate  again  with  the  opposition.  On  the  other  hand,  the  opposition 
parties  also  coincided  in  the  need  to  negotiate  a  new  electoral  reform  with  the 
government,  not  only  because  of  the  threat  that  political  violence  brought  to  the 
electoral arena, but also, because they sought the opportunity to push for reforms to 
improve their competitiveness in the presidential campaigns.  It is difficult to imagine 
with the dramatic events that took place during the presidential campaign in 1994, that 
another  electoral  reform  took  place.  There  was  a  need  to  confirm  the  viability,  the 
cleanness and the opening of the electoral process. Finally, the significance of the 1994 
reform in relation to the previous one, was the consensus that political parties achieved 
especially  in  the  negotiation  of  elite  pacts  between  elites.
135  The  government  was 
involved in the negotiation of two elite pacts. The first pact called “Pacto Politico de 
Civilidad” was agreed in January 1994 and it was signed by all political parties, except 
the  PPS,  and  reinforced  the  promise  for  free  and  fair  elections.  A  second  pact  that 
centred on  avoiding post-electoral violence and  social expression was negotiated by 
Carpizo  and  was  signed  by  all  parties,  except  the  PRD.  This  pact  was  called 
“Agreement  for  civility,  concord  and  justice”  and  was  signed  in  July.
136  Both 
agreements were designed to promote change, and restrict the opposition from using 
destabilisation  methods.  But  even  though  the  PRI  used  all  of  these  measures,  it 
struggled to run an effective campaign and win the elections.
137 
 
4.6.11   The IFE in the 1994 electoral reform 
The 1994 reform established that the Minister of the Interior was to continue to head the 
General Council of IFE, therefore, as an executive’s representative its impartiality from 
                                                 
134 The “politicos” opted for the selection of Fernando Ortiz Arana, while Salinas supported Ernesto Zedillo, his 
former budgeting and Education Secretary. 
135 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. Baños said that the intention of the pacts was to break the crisis generated after the Chiapas’s 
uprising and Colosio’s assassination, which increased uncertainty. 
136 Acuerdo por la civilidad, la Concordia y la justicia. Voz y Voto. August 1994; (18): 24. 
137 See content of the agreement in Valdés, Leonardo. Acuerdo de buenas intenciones. Voz y Voto. March 1994: (13): 
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the PRI and government was still under suspicion.  However, the introduction of the 
figure of “citizen’s councillors” in the General Council and the regulations on party 
finances and media access that were agreed in the reform gave IFE a more important 
role. IFE´s first attempt to promote its more impartial role in the electoral process, was 
to make a recommendation for more balanced and fair conduct by the media. Another 
aspect that increased trust in IFE was the presence of the media during the General 
Council’s session, as manipulation became more difficult.
138  In addition, the presence 
of the media during the session also resulted from public opinion in the opposition.    
 
4.6.12   The Civic movements: Grupo de San Angel (San Angel’s group)  
The insecurity and uncertainty of dramatic events like the  Chiapas’ uprising and the 
assassination of Colosio, affected the atmosphere of the electoral campaigns and also 
increased civic groups’ activity, and even led to the creation of a heterogeneous civic 
group called “San Angel’s group”.
139 This group was formed by academics, politicians, 
and personalities from different ideologies who met in order to propose different ideas 
and eventually gave political diversity to Mexican political life.
140  
 
4.6.13   The 1994 elections and the trust in IFE 
By  August  1994,  and  just  weeks  before  Election  Day,  the  new  legal  framework  to 
regulate elections was ready to be tested. The moderate success of the negotiations of 
the new electoral reform allowed the “elections” to again become the centre of public 
attention, although the day before the elections the atmosphere was tense. The holding 
of the “elections” also meant that not only the electoral authorities (IFE, TFE) but also 
the trust among the voters of the political parties and candidates was going to be tested. 
In fact, many of the changes included in the reform were applied during the electoral 
campaigns. For instance, all political parties enjoyed more media coverage, although 
critics argued that its inequality continued.
141 
In the transition to democracy in Mexico, the 1994 presidential elections became very 
significant because first of all, despite taking place after dramatic political events and 
                                                 
138 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
139 The group was called “San Angel” because they used to meet in a street called San Angel in Mexico City 
140 Carlos Fuentes notes that the motivation of this group was to gather people of diverse political backgrounds in 
order to propose ideas. Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 2. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
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facing  threats  of  violence,  in  the  end  the  electoral  process  took  place  in  relative 
normality. Secondly, although the opposition denounced some irregularities, overall, the 
electoral results were accepted and many Mexican and international analysts considered 
the election to have been the cleanest in the nation’s history. More importantly they 
contributed to an increase in the trust and credibility of the electoral process. In addition 
to this, the high level of participation also added significance to the elections.  For the 
first time, it seemed that the way the electoral process had developed, the new measures 
proposed by IFE and the transparency in the counting process, contributed to build up 
trust in the electoral process. According to Alcocer the importance of these elections lies 
in  the  fact  that  the  new  structure  of  the  IFE  allowed  for  the  first  time  an  electoral 
process  where  the  government  and  the  ruling  party  did  not  control  the  electoral 
authorities.
142 Others analysts, however, consider that the presence of the Minister of the 
Interior obstructed that perception.  
 
4.6.14   The Electoral results of the 1994 federal elections 
The  presidential  election  on  21
st  August  1994  proved  to  be  a  real  trial,  even  an 
experiment for all political parties, government and the general public.  There was doubt 
whether the elections could overcome a dramatic political context characterised by high 
levels of uncertainty and fear. In the end, the day of the election took place without any 
serious problems.
 Surprisingly, the expected abstentions did not happen, as participation 
levels were high. For the transition analysts, this election is very significant because 
both  political  actors  with  their  agreements  and  voters  showed  their  interest  in  the 
elections. Finally, the electoral results gave victory to the PRI presidential candidate, 
Ernesto  Zedillo, who obtained 50.03% of the  votes, with a vote  range of 49.3% to 
50.7%. Despite the PRI not obtaining absolute majority, the contest was not as close as 
had been anticipated.
143 The surprise was the performance of the PAN, which retained 
second position with 26.97%, (which it had lost to Cardenas in 1988) relegating the 
PRD to third place with only 20% of the votes.
144  
The  electoral  results  of  the  1994  presidential  elections  showed  a  clear  division  in 
political preference. Despite the PRI winning the election, 48% of the national vote 
                                                 
142 See Alcocer, J. The Challenge of Institutional reform in Mexico, p.66. 
143 See Becerra, R. et. al. La mecánica del cambio político en México. 
144 The official results of the 1994 elections were the following. The PRI gained 17, 333,931 votes; The PAN gained 
9, 221,474 votes; The PRD gained 5,901,324 votes; other small parties (PPS, PFCRN, PDN, PARM, PT, and PVEM) 
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proved that the opposition parties, especially the PAN were doing well at local level, 
and were also winning seats at national level.  The electoral results allowed the PRI to 
keep majority in the Chamber of Deputies with 60% of the seats, 300 out of the total 
500  representatives.  In  the  Senate,  and  even  with  the  introduction  of  Proportional 
Representation that introduced more plurality, the PRI had an overwhelming majority 
with 95 of the 128 seats, and therefore it was able to keep 74% of its seats. Indeed the 
victory of the PRI showed that the party was still able to defend its position in a more 
democratic context. Many analysts and members of the opposition predicted a defeat of 
the  PRI  in  the  elections,  not  only  because  of  the  negative  effects  that  the  political 
instability had on Salinas’ legitimacy but also because of the apparent incompatibility of 
an official party/or former hegemony party within an increasing democratic context. 
However, the predictions proved to be wrong, and as in the 1991 midterm elections, the 
PRI regained votes and credibility. There are several reasons for the PRI´s revitalisation. 
Firstly, the active role of the PRI in the peace negotiations and then in the electoral 
reform,  helped  Salinas  and  the  government  to  gain  a  national  and  international 
reputation as a pro-democratic leader. Secondly, and surprisingly the fear and threat of 
more violence that the Chiapas’ rebel uprising created in Mexico was ingeniously used 
in the PRI’s strategies. The PRI’s presidential campaign was criticised for using the so 
called  “fear  campaign”,  in  which  the  PRI  presented  itself  as  the  only  party  able  to 
ensure social stability. The most affected political party of this fear campaign was the 
PRD.
145  Some  analysts  argued  that  Salinas  government  succeeded  in  the  de-
politicisation  and  depolarising  of  society.  However,  the  latter  interpretation  can  be 
dismissed  as  the  emergence  of  a  stronger  opposition  and  more  politicised  society 
proved.  The  1991  midterm  elections  and  the  1994  elections  showed  that  Salinas’ 
measures were successful. However, he failed to alter the structural change initiated by 
the  consolidation  of  opposition  political  parties,  like  the  PAN  and  the  rise  of  new 
political actors such as Alianza Civica. Finally the PRI, led by Salinas, also benefitted 
from a new state-business alliance, which contributed to the support of the business 
                                                 
145 Cuahtemoc Cárdenas Solorzano admitted in 2004 that the 1994 elections were overshadowed by fear in the 
country, following the PRI’s attempt to gain support by instilling fear about the level of political violence and 
instability and claiming that they were the only party capable of managing the situation. Noticieros Televisa. 
Interview of Cuahtemoc Cárdenas. Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 
2004. 
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community, and the support of the agrarian and labour sectors through an effective use 
of solidarity programmes that Salinas had started during his sexenio.  
 
 
4.6.15   Outcome of the 1994 election: The problem of inequality is highlighted. 
The 1994 elections were peaceful and the results were accepted by nearly all parties. 
Nevertheless, in the weeks following the elections the two opposition parties changed 
their perceptions. On one hand, the PAN protested over several electoral irregularities 
but admitted that the corrections of such irregularities did not change the final results 
and  declared  that  the  elections  were  legal  and  even  “a  step  in  the  direction  of  fair 
elections”. However, the PAN claimed that the elections had taken place under very 
unfair conditions, claiming PRI to be the only beneficiary of the inequalities. The PAN 
candidate, Cevallos acknowledged the unfairness and inequality of the elections and 
explained the difficulties that his party had to face when confronting a state party like 
PRI.
146 On the other hand, the PRD did not accept the electoral results and alleged 
electoral fraud. For instance, Muñoz Ledo denounced irregularities in the election day 
such as multiple voting, mishandling of voters’ lists and irregularities in the counting 
process.
147 However, the fraud allegations did not reach the same level as they had done 
in past elections and Cardenas was not able to initiate significant protests as in 1988. 
The PRD also protested about the inequality in the conditions in electoral competence. 
A few days after the elections, Cardenas complained about the inequality of the PRI’s 
electoral campaign in relation to the oppositions.
148 Cardenas also protested against the 
over-use of television by the PRI. It is important to remember that during the Salinas 
sexenio  the  relationship  between  PRI  and  PRD  was  always  difficult  and  political 
violence  by  the  PRI  against  the  PRD  was  normal.  In  addition,  several  civic 
organisations such as Alianza Civica also reported fraud, but only at a minor level.
149 
Overall,  the  1994  presidential  elections  were  considered  the  most  competitive  ever. 
Additionally,  the  lack  of  major  allegations  of  fraud  showed  that  the  issue  of 
                                                 
146 Cevallos acknowledged that the campaign had been extremely unequal in terms of financial resources.  
Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Diego Fernández de Cevallos (PAN’s presidential candidate 1994) on August 22 
1994  in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
147 See interview of Muñoz Ledo “Segunda fundación” in Voz y Voto. October 1994;(20):16-21. 
148 Cuahtemoc Cardenas claimed that the PRD witnessed the inequality of the campaign of the official party with 
respect to all the others. He also said that the television had been a determining factor in showing the domination of 
the PRI regime. Interview of Cuahtemoc Cárdenas  (Presidential Candidate, PRD 1994) on August 22 1994. Mexico: 
La historia de su democracia. Op. Cit. Vol.3. 
149 See article about the reaction of Civic Alliance by Pedro Enrique Armendares. Alianza: sus dilemas (after the 
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“organisation of election” was solved and the trust in elections had increased. However, 
the relative solution of this issue led to the uncovering of another one: the inequality in 
electoral competition. This issue became the centre of the electoral debate, especially 
the  concern  about  party  finances  and  media  access.  Soon  after  the  elections,  all 
opposition  parties  agreed  that  the  problem  of  inequality  in  electoral  competition 
represented an obstacle for democratic elections. Even worse, the parties felt that PRI’s 
victory  and  popularity  in  the  political  competition  was  due  to  its  control  of  public 
resources.  In fact, the creation of equal conditions in electoral competence became the 
new issue in the democratic transition.  
 
4.6.16   The role of IFE after the 1994 electoral reform 
The lack of major fraud allegations in the 1994 elections also benefitted the IFE. The 
IFE, as the electoral authority in charge of organisng the elections and delivering results 
gained trust among the general public. The role of the “citizen council members” was 
also  appreciated  by  the  political  parties.  One  former  IFE  citizen  council  member 
described the impressive credibility that the IFE accomplished in the 1994 elections, 
and  its  contribution  in  reducing  abstentions.
150  It  is  important  to  acknowledge  the 
increasing role of the IFE in this election as many of the electoral issues discussed in the 
electoral reform back in March were put into practice. For instance, the publication of a 
report by IFE for the first time regarding the auditing of parties’ expenditure showed a 
clear advance in the regulation of the funding of political parties. Despite the fact that 
audits  were  limited;  it  showed  a  step  toward  transparency.  Although  the  advances 
toward  transparency  were  welcomed  by  everyone,  the  campaign  funding  ceiling 
established by IFE was criticised as being too high and exaggerated. The acceptance of 
the opposition defeats showed this new perception. Indeed the task of getting reliable 
results was another challenge of the elections. This was the responsibility of the IFE 
which, supported by most of the opposition and official party, intended to confirm the 
transparency  and  openness  of  the  electoral  process.  However,  it  can  be  argued  that 
during the 1991 and 1994 elections, the IFE was still formulating or re-accommodating 
                                                 
150 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas (Citizen Councillor. IFE 1994-1996) in “Mexico: La 
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its institutional purposes because of its dependency on the executive.
151  Additionally 
the PRD still criticised the functioning of IFE.
152 
 
4.6.17   Zedillo requests independence of the PRI from the government:  
There is a difference of opinion about the real contribution of president Zedillo in the 
transition to democracy during his government. First of all, it is important to take into 
consideration  that  a  succession  of  events  like  high  level  assassinations  and  a  deep 
economic crisis that followed his election made Zedillo act to pursue change. However, 
even in his political campaign Zedillo had expressed his intentions to introduce major 
changes  in  government.
153  Zedillo  thought  that  in  order  to  maintain  stability  it  was 
necessary to go through a fundamental political change. As a result of this he promised 
to strengthen the state of law, limit the power of the presidency, use dialogue to achieve  
a  political  consensus,  increase  the  autonomy  of  organisations  that  provided  official 
information and even more significantly to increase the political participation of society. 
Firstly, the incoming president raised the need to reform the PRI internally, in order to 
democratise it and make it independent from government.
154 Such a request was a major 
knock to the PRI as the official party had enjoyed that position since its creation. Then, 
on the day that he took office, he reiterated his intention to pursue deeper democratic 
change in the country.
155 He also promised to maintain separation between the PRI and 
the  government,  including  reform  within  the  PRI  and  creating  conditions  for  the 
democratic selection of candidates, something that he was very determined to do, and 
present a complete report on campaign spending following the election.  
Therefore, it seemed that he realised that democratisation of the country included a 
reform of the PRI. Zedillo seemed committed to pursue political reform that would 
increase trust in his government and made sure that he conveyed that message the day 
that he took office. Later, during the negotiations on political reform Zedillo confirmed 
                                                 
151 Interview, Carlos Ravela, Executive Director, Electoral Director Executive Board (IFE), Mexico City, September 
8 2004. 
152 PRD’s leaders, such as Muñoz Ledo complained about the complicated burocrautic machinery of IFE who 
sarcastically referred to it as “IFELANDIA”. See interview of Muñoz Ledo “Segunda fundación” in Voz y Voto. 
October 1994;(20):16-21. 
153 See El Mes (from July 18 to August 24 1994). Voz y Voto. September 1994; (19): 54-57. 
154 Interview, Mauricio Merino, political academic and Electoral Councillor 1996-2000, General Council, IFE, 17 
November 2007. 
155 See speech by Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (Presidential Candidate of PRI 1994) December 1 1994 in “Mexico: 
La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
 “Mexico demands a sustained reform that by achieving political consensus eradicates the suspicions, recriminations 
and mistrusts that provoke the electoral processes.” Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
 
155 
his commitment to advance democracy with the participation and consensus of political 
parties. These promises contributed to the consolidation of IFE later in the 1996 reform. 
 
4.6.18   Zedillo’s presidency: demands for another electoral reform  
Soon after taking office, the incoming president, Ernesto Zedillo, recognised as he did 
during his campaign, the inequality in the conditions about electoral competition.
156 As 
he witnessed the other parties complaining greatly about the PRI´s advantages during 
and  after  the  electoral  campaigns,  he  committed  himself  to  pursue  a  new  electoral 
reform towards fairer conditions. Krauze
157 notes that Zedillo showed great courage by 
acknowledging  the  inequality  of  his  own  election  showing  his  commitment  to 
democracy. Additionally, the debate over the lack of equality in electoral competition 
was fuelled by the publication of the PRI campaign expenses that showed shocking 
differences. Zedillo’s promises resulted from a variety of criticisms of inequalities in the 
previous presidential elections.
158 For instance, the inequality in the political parties’ 
campaign expenditure in the previous elections became a powerful reason to continue 
with  electoral  reform.  Irregularities  in  local  and  regional  electoral  contests  also 
contributed to the need for further regulation. Woldenberg
 notes that, despite the IFE, 
from  its  creation,  addressing  the  problems  concerning  the  organisation  of  federal 
electoral elections, at regional and state level the problem was still a major one.  In 
addition the local electoral institutions still did not guarantee clean elections and did not 
allow  for  negotiations  among  the  political  forces  as  had  occurred  at  federal  level. 
Therefore,  and  although  Zedillo  won  in  a  cleaner  election  than  Salinas,  with  more 
legitimacy  than  his  predecessor,  pressures  for  further  changes  continued  to  fuel  the 
debate  over  electoral  reform.  With  Zedillo  as  president,  electoral  reform  became  a 
priority on the  agenda  of the new  government and also became  a constant issue of 
negotiation between political parties. In fact, he did not wait long before presenting it as 
the great project for his sexenio. He encouraged and assisted Congress to discuss the 
issue of electoral reform and the reform of the Mexican state.
  Zedillo accepted that a 
                                                 
156 Zedillo acknowledged the unfairness of the 1994 elections publicly.  
157 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Enrique Krauze in “Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: 
Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
158 See the challenges faced by Zedillo in his first months in the presidency Alcocer, A. Descontrol. Voz y voto, 
February 1995;(24):3  
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new electoral reform had to deal with “equality in party competition: the funding of 
political parties, the funding of political campaigns and the regulation of access to the 
media. Zedillo called the new electoral reform “The definitive one” and indeed it proved 
to be definitive for the electoral reform process in Mexico. 
 
4.6.19   Reasons for a new reform: stronger opposition  
The  promise  of  a  new  political  reform  by  Zedillo  was  also  attributable  to  a  very 
dynamic political system that got stronger in the 1994´s election. The PRI remained in 
power, but instead of concentrating only on governing like in the past, this time they 
had to face an ever stronger opposition, with the PAN as a second political force and the 
PRD  as  the  third.  In  addition,  the  rise  of  the  opposition  at  state  and  regional  level 
became another concern for the local PRI, as they saw how the PAN had become the 
favourite  party  in  many  northern  and  central  states  during  the  1995  state  elections. 
Woldenberg
159 notes that electoral contests during 1994 showed how the PRI had lost 
strength in some of its strongholds and support in rural areas, while the PRD benefitted 
from ex PRI votes. At the same time the official party could not avoid the emergence 
and  strength  of  non-governmental  organisations  by  the  mid  1990s,  such  as  Alianza 
Civica, which not only consolidated its role in the electoral process but also put pressure 
on the government to pursue political change. Serrano notes that despite the official 
party showing initial vitality after the elections, the political control exercised by the 
PRI seemed more incompatible with efficiency in government and dangerous signs of 
instability appeared.
  Finally, the PRI had to face other dramatic events that further 
damaged its image both within and outside the party. The assassination, in September 
1994,  of  Francisco  Ruiz  Massieu,  the  General  Secretary  of  PRI  provoked  another 
important internal crisis. This high level assassination was very important because not 
only was he one of the most important members of the PRI but also the intermediary 
between  the  “politicos”  group  and  “the  technocrats”  group,  thus  provoking  another 
internal crisis as accusation between them threatened to weaken the party.  The tension 
increased, as while the PRI´s internal groups, the “politicos” and “technocrats” made 
accusations against each other, the investigation exposed the PRI´s elite and uncovered 
the  person  responsible,  Raul  Salinas,  brother  of  the  ex-president  Carlos  Salinas  de 
Gortari.  
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4.6.20   The debt crisis of 1995 
The willingness of both Zedillo and the political parties to continue with a new electoral 
reform was to be challenged by a debt crisis in December 1994 which resulted in being 
the worst of the recent times. In 1995 inflation was 52% and dropped 6.9%. In order to 
confront the crisis, Zedillo initiated a programme to overcome the economic crisis, and 
got the economic support of the US government, the IMF and the World Bank.
160 In 
order  to  implement  his  programmes,  Zedillo  had  to  seek  the  support  of  the  PRI´s 
legislator, action that contradicted his intention to establish distance from the PRI. Many 
PRI members criticised Zedillo´s double moral as he used the PRI to pass his bills in 
Congress, while trying to distance himself from the party.
161 In addition, the opposition 
also perceived Zedillo´s decision to join PRI as a sign of his lack of real commitment to 
a real separation between the government and the PRI.
162 Some of the government’s 
measures to confront the crisis were highly criticised and generated a debate and public 
attention,  especially  the  decision  to  increase  VAT.  The  PRI  and  government  got 
condemned not only by the general public but also by the opposition. This economic 
crisis contributed to further strengthen opposition parties, as they received the support 
of  disillusioned  citizens  and  the  business  community.
163  A  cycle  of  devaluation, 
inflation and recession was followed by the PRI losing every election during the six 
months after the devaluation at the same time as the PAN and PRD started gaining PRI 
strongholds.  Molinar  Horcasitas
164  notes  that  the  complicated  economic  situation  in 
1995 put pressure on the government to proceed with political reform because that was 
the only alternative to deal with the situation of the expression of popular discontent – 
“even if the cost of this reform is the victory of the opposition”.   
The third section will focus on the last electoral reform in 1996, the main achievement 
of which was the total independence of IFE from government control. In this section the 
                                                 
160 Despite Zedillo signing an Agreement of unity to confront the crisis with the productive sectors and receiving 
18,000 millions dollars from the international community to confront the crisis, the level of trust in the government’s 
capacity to handle the crisis did not increase during this period. See a more detailed account of the 1995 economic 
crisis in the article by Carlos Acosta in Proceso. January 16 1995;(0950):01. 
161 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
162 See interview of Muñoz Ledo (President of the PRD 1993-1996) on March 23 1995 in “Mexico: La historia de su 
democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
163 For reactions of the business sector to the economic measures presented by Zedillo see article by Alvaro Delgado 
and Antonio Jaquez in Proceso. March 13 1995:(0958);19. 
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negotiations between the main political parties (PRI, PAN and PRD) will be analysed 
along with the real contribution of the IFE in the negotiation process. The negotiation of 
the new electoral reform between political actors was interrupted by a series of local 
post-electoral  conflicts  which  polarised  the  political  actors’  attitudes  towards  the 
reform.    As  had  occurred  in  the  1994  electoral  reform,  in  1996  consensus  among 
political parties was essential and it was eventually prioritised in order to achieve a 
consensus.  
 
4.7 First negotiations of a new electoral reform: the Pinos´ agreement 17 January 
1995 
The negotiations for a new electoral reform started in the middle of an economic crisis 
in complex political circumstances. Eventually, an agreement between president Zedillo 
and the political parties´ leaders to take forward political reform was signed on 17
th 
January 1995. For many political actors the agreement showed a real commitment by 
the  political  parties  and  Zedillo  to  advance  the  transition  to  democracy.
165  The 
negotiation of the so-called “definitive electoral reform” took one and a half years to 
produce results. As in the past, the consensus between political parties proved to be 
difficult to achieve, but in this case the cause was different: post electoral conflicts 
forced the opposition PAN and PRD to abandon the negotiation table several times.
166 
Woldenberg notes that those post-electoral conflicts that disrupted the negotiation of the 
electoral reform were a clear indication that an electoral reform was necessary, but at 
the same time its persistency made the talks difficult.
167 In fact, these local electoral 
conflicts  provoked  the  departure  of  PAN  from  the  negotiation  table  and  created 
reticence in the PRD. 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 Felipe Calderón (Party’s Secretary PAN 1993-1995) said that “A national political agreement in 1995 was 
achieved due to PAN´s willingness to negotiate with the government in order to avoid a social and political crisis and 
other forces…“  
Porfirio Muñoz Ledo (Presidente del PRD 1993-1996) said “We agree that it was a very good and well done agenda, 
the first great agenda of the reform of the state that had four components:  electoral issues and representation, 
executive and legislative, federalism, citizen participation and mass media.” Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” 
Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
166 See  Hinojosa, Juan José. El cobro de la mentira. Progreso. May 22 1995; (0968-25). 
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4.7.1  Negotiations of the electoral reform: post-electoral conflicts with PRD  
The negotiation of the reform between the government and the PRD was affected by a 
post electoral conflict in the state of Tabasco in November 1944. The official winner 
was the PRI’s candidate, Roberto Madrazo with 56% of the votes in contrast to the 
PRD’s candidate with 37%. However, this result was disputed by the PRD’s candidate, 
Andrés  Manuel  López  Obrador,  who  alleged  electoral  fraud  and  requested  the 
annulment of the election.
168 Despite the PRD organising protests in the state and even 
taking  several  of  the  PEMEX
169  facilities,  the  PRI´s  candidate  took  up  the  post  in 
January 1995. The post-electoral conflict in Tabasco grew and provoked a national PRD 
protest which led to the PRD´s candidate organising a rally in Mexico City six months 
later known as “caravan to democracy” which failed to annul the election.
170 In addition 
to the allegations of fraud, the PRD´s candidate, Manuel Lopez Obrador also accused 
the  PRI  of  overspending  in  the  electoral  campaign,  and  this  was  an  issue  that  was 
already  in  the  electoral  debate.
171  Ultimately,  the  post-electoral  conflict  in  Tabasco 
created tension between PRD and the federal government. As a result of this, the tension 
affected the negotiation on the electoral reform, and the PRD abandoned the negotiation 
table. Despite the Minister of the  Interior, Esteban Monteczuma meeting the PRD´s 
president  Muñoz  Ledo,  in  order  to  re-establish  the  debate  on  political  reform,  the 
negotiations broke down. Following these events, and taking advantage of the publicity 
of  the  post  electoral  conflict,  the  PRD´s  candidate,  Andrés  Manuel  López  Obrador 
became the leader of the PRD.  Alcocer claimed that the difficult relationship between 
the PRD and the government was a result of its radicalism in its early period which 
triggered Salinas’ repression against it and made it impossible for dialogue to take place 
between the PRD’s leader and the president.
172 Another conflict that put further strain 
on  the  relationship  between  the  Zedillo’s  government  and  the  PRD  was  the 
radicalisation of the government in respect of the Zapatista conflict. First of all, the 
government  uncovered the real identity of Marcos, a Zapatista leader
173 along with 
other prominent members of the indigenous movement. Following this,  the government 
                                                 
168 Among the reasons given by the PRD to invalidate the elections were electoral fraud, partiality of the electronic 
and printed media and inequality of the electoral process. For a detailed account of the conflicts surrounding this 
election see article by Elias Chavez and Armando Guzman in Proceso. December 19 1994; (0946): 12.  
169 PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos) State oil company.  
170 Thousands of PRD’s supporters participated in the rally to the capital which was known as “Caravan for the 
democracy”. See Op. cit. Proceso. 
171 See El Mes. Voz y voto. May 1996; (39): 35-38. 
172 Jorge Alcocer. Voz y Voto; June, 1995;(28): 3. 
173 The Zapatista leader was unmasked as a philosopher, sociologist and university lecture from Tampico, 
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initiated military action on the Zapatista zone.
174 The escalation of government pressure 
against the Zapatista movement caused wide spread protest among social groups and the 
general public who asked for the continuation of the peace dialogue initiated in 1995.
175 
Finally,  another  event  affected  the  political  climate  with  Zedillo´s  government:  the 
assassination of dozens of peasants in the southern state of Guerrero, on the 28
th June 
1995
176 which  led to the postponement of the Chiapas’s negotiation for peace on the 5
th 
of July 1995.
177 Additionally, this event prompted Muñoz Ledo to condition the return 
of the PRD to negotiations by requesting the Guerrero’s governor to leave his post.
178 
To this conflict, Zedillo introduced changes in his cabinet, appointing Emilio Chuayffet, 
a  former  director  of  IFE,  as  new  Minister  of  the  Interior.
179  Eventually,  following 
internal discussions, the PRD returned to the negotiation table.  
 
4.7.2  Negotiations for electoral reform: Conflicts with the PAN and with the PRI 
The  relationship  between  the  PAN  and  Zedillo´s  government  was  also  affected  by 
several events. First of all, the PAN’s victory in the states of Guanajuato and Jalisco in 
1995 surprised the PRI and created the perception that alternation was expected at local 
elections. Therefore, the close victory of the PRI’s candidate,  Victor Cervera over the 
PAN’s candidate, Luis Correa Mena in Yucatan
180  was challenged by the PAN who 
contested the official results.
181 This post electoral conflict triggered a series of anti-
government  actions  by  the  PAN  including  rallies,  meetings  and  public  complaints 
leading to the refusal of PAN to negotiate the electoral reform.
182 Eventually, the PAN 
returned to the national political dialogue but with added conditions such as the creation 
                                                 
174 See declaration by Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (President of the Republic 1994-2000) on February 9 1995 in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004.  
175 The government’s tough response to the Chiapas’ conflict contradicted his initial promise of achieving negotiation 
without violence. For information on Zedillo’s promises see article by Guillermo Correa and Julio López in Proceso. 
December 1994; (0944):7. 
176 The assessination of 17 peasants in Aguas Blancas, state of Guerrero and subsequent crimes and repression against 
PRD’s supporters was widely published and criticised not only by human rights organizations but also the national 
media. For a detailed account of the numerous crimes and repression against PRD’s supporters in Guerrero see article 
by Gloria Diaz and Ignacio Ramirez in Proceso. October 2 1995; (0987):14. 
177 The dialogue started again in October 1995 in San Andrés, the Rianza, Chiapas and resulted in agreements on 
signed rights and indigenous culture with the government in February 1996. Woldenberg, J. Mexico: La historia de 
su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
178 See El Año. Voz y Voto. February 1996;(36):4-11. 
179 See article by Jorge Alcocer on the figure and challenges faced by Emilio Chuayffet in Proceso. July 10 
1995;(0975): 27.  
180 According to the official results the PRI’s candidate obtained 45% of votes over the PAN´s candidate, who had  
44% of the votes. 
181 The PAN alleged electoral fraud and particiality and illegality of the local electoral tribunal before the 
Interamerican Commission for Human Rights. See El Mes. Voz y Voto. August 1995; (30):43-49. 
182 For a more detailed account of the post electoral conflict in Yucatan see article by Alejandro Caballero and 
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of  a  body  to  discuss  local  conflicts,  specially  those  from  Yucatán  and  Tabasco.
183 
Another  event  that  made  the  PAN  to  abandon  the  negotiation  table  was  the  post 
electoral  conflict  in  Huejotzingo,  in  Puebla,  on  12
th  November  1995.  This  time  the 
PAN´s victory was impugned by PRI, resulting in the Electoral tribunal annulling the 
PAN´s victory.
184 The PRI responded saying that PAN had invented the problem in 
order to abandon the negotiation over the electoral reform.
185 The PAN returned to the 
negotiation after the PRI’s mayor left the post and the municipality was governed by a 
municipal council led by a panista and.
186 This was seen as a concession from Zedillo 
that many perceived as another “concertacesión.”
187 
The relationship between Zedillo and the PRI was also difficult from the beginning. 
Many of the PRI members criticised Zedillo´s attitude when he tried to distance himself 
from the party, but then used it when it was convenient.
188 Despite the discrepancies 
between the PRI and Zedillo, the PRI supported the president during the process of 
political reform.
189 In August 1996, the PRI legislators finally approved the reform. By 
1996  despite  numerous  political  conflicts  the  reform  continued,  which  according  to 
Woldenberg was perceived as necessary in order to balance the political situation in 
democratic  conditions.
190  The  political  parties  demanded  transparent  and  competent 
rules, for equal competition especially access to the media and enough funding for their 
campaigns.
191 The negotiations between government and political parties accelerated in 
order for the electoral reform to be ready for the midterm elections in 1997. 
 
4.7.3  The 1996 Reforms 
During  1995,  the  opposition  won  many  local  elections  that  not  only  surprised  the 
opposition but also the PRI. The official party realised that as electoral competition 
increased,  voters  started  supporting  alternative  governments.  By  1995  the  Congress 
                                                 
183 See El Año. Voz y Voto. February 1996;(36):4-11. 
184 Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (Party Secretary PAN 1993-1995) notes that Huejotzingo had been snatched in a totally 
arbitrary way from the PAN by the then governor Manuel Bartlett, and that marked the definitive breaking of PAN 
from the government in the process of political reform. Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: 
Noticieros Televisa, 2004.  
185 Manuel Bartlett Diaz (Governor of Puebla 1993-1999) claimed that the conflict in Huejotzingo was an excuse by 
PAN to leave the negotiation table of the political reform. Ibid. Vol 3.   
186 Woldenberg, J. Ibid. Vol.3. 
187 Bartlett Diaz claims that the municipality was given to PAN as part of the alleged “concertacesión.” Ibid. Vol.3. 
See article by Soledad Loaeza about the consequences of PAN’s alleged negotiation with PRI during the Salinas’ 
presidency  (concertacesiones) in Loaeza, S. La virtud de la opportunidad. Voz y Voto, March 1996, (37):20-25. 
188 Mariano Palacios Alcocer (PRI party chairman PRI 1997-1999), Ibid. Vol 3.  
189 Woldenberg, J. Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004.  
190 Ibid. Woldenberg, J. Vol. 3. 
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finally  approved  the  law  initiative  to  open  a  dialogue  among  political  forces  and 
conciliation with Chiapas. Despite the economic crisis a negotiation table was organised 
with an agenda which included proposals on electoral reform, regulation of mass media 
and participation of citizens. However, the discussions over electoral reform were slow 
and painful, and they were prolonged during 1995 and most of 1996 by the sponsorship 
of the Minister of the Interior.
  The negotiation lasted nearly two years and both PAN 
and PRD abandoned the negotiation table at different stages. During this period, the 
PRD  abandoned  the  negotiation  following  post-electoral  conflicts  and  alleged 
inequalities in campaign expenditures and the PAN even initiated a civil disobedience 
campaign against the PRI in Yucatan at the same time as it was abandoning the national 
negotiation  table.  Eventually,  by  July  1996  an  agreement  for  political  reform  was 
formalised  by  Zedillo,  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  and  the  presidents  of  the  main 
political parties. It is important to note that constitutional reforms required the support 
of two-thirds of Congress, therefore the PRI needed the support of opposition parties to 
have them approved. Therefore for the first time the political parties in both Chambers 
of  Congress  approved  a  constitutional  bill  for  electoral  reform.  Eventually,  the 
negotiation process between the government and the political parties succeeded. The 
main aspect of the 1996 reform was that consensus and negotiation among all political 
forces became essential in the process of electoral reform. In fact the former Minister of 
the Interior said that the agreement set up two very important premises: the requirement 
of  an  ultimate  political  reform  and  the  need  to  achieve  that  agreement  with  the 
consensus of all political parties.
192 Consensus between parties became essential for the 
success of the reform. A common proposal that the PAN and PRD´s leaders presented 
was expressed in a document called “ten points for electoral reform” and resulted in 
being the first agreement between the two main opposition parties.
193 Paradoxically this 
novel accord between the two main opposition parties was possible thanks to a series of 
conflicts between the opposition parties and the government, such the post-electoral 
conflicts in Tabasco and Yucatan and the lack of consensus on issues related to the 
IFE.
194 This document showed the PRD and PAN´s intention to leave behind the crisis 
                                                 
192 Emilio Chuayffet Chemor (Minister of the Interior 1995-1997) in  Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. 
Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
193 The document was signed by Carlos Castillo Peraza (Party leader of PAN) and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo ( Party leader 
of  PRD) and supported by the participants of the Seminary of Chapultepec, citizens councillors, parties’ 
representatives and political academics. See “Ten fundamental points of the reform” in Voz y Voto. September 
1995;(31). 
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that had disrupted the negotiation process.
195 It also showed that their main objective 
was to get rid of the government from the electoral process.
196  
 
4.7.4  The  IFE  and  its  role  in  the  1996  electoral  reform:  the  Seminary  of 
Chapultepec 
From the beginning, the 1996 electoral reform was set up to be an ultimate reform that 
had  to  be  accepted  by  all.  Therefore,  consensus  between  political  parties  and  the 
government  was  essential,  especially  for  Zedillo  who  did  not  support  bipartisan 
negotiations.
197 However, as stated before post-electoral conflicts and political violence 
had disrupted and stopped the negotiation process. It seemed that there was a need for a 
third group-force to gather the different proposals and opinions that the political parties 
had presented. For that reason, the citizen council members of IFE had a role in this last 
reform. First of all, the citizen council members of IFE presented, with independence 
from the government, a very precise agenda of electoral reform in which they showed 
the obstacles and the reforms to be carried out.
198 Secondly, the IFE citizen’s council 
members also took part in the so-called “Chapultepec Castle Seminar”
199 in which they 
discussed  their  proposal  with  political  parties  and  acted  as  intermediaries.
200  The 
participation of the IFE in the negotiation of the electoral reform contributed not only to 
the accomplishment of consensus between political forces but also to its image as a 
more independent body. It is important to note the formation of a discussion group 
known as “Chapultepec Castle Seminar” which was created in order to urgently push 
for new and deeper electoral reform.
201 This informal group which comprised members 
of  the  General  Council  of  IFE,  who  were  expert  on  electoral  regulation  and 
representatives of political parties, had the responsibility to discuss all the issues of 
                                                 
195 Carlos Castillo Peraza (PAN leader 1993-1996) August 21 1995. Ibid. Vol 3. “The executive committees of the 
PAN and the PRD resolved to work together to achieve a solution to the crisis. To that end they determined to 
publicly subscribe to the ten fundamental points for the electoral reform.” 
196 Santiago Creel Miranda (Citizen Councillor of IFE 1994-1996). Ibid. Vol. 3.  
197 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
198 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Miguel Angel Granados Chapa (Citizen Councillor of IFE 1994-1996) in 
“Mexico: La historia de su democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
199 “The Chapultepec Castle Seminar” was a negotiation table at which political parties and IFE council members 
discussed their proposals for the new electoral reform. 
200 Miguel Angel Granados Chapa. Op. cit. Vol. 3.  
Granados notes that it can be said that during 1995 and part of 1996 the reform was developed in the discussions held 
in the Castle of Chapultepec, after two IFE’s citizen councillors, Ortiz Pincheti and Creel established an informal 
table of negotiation and invited political parties and citizen councillors to present proposals. In fact, several proposals 
of the IFE’s citizens councillors and others from the parties were proposed in these meetings.  
201 See article by J. Woldenberg for an overview of the political context during these negotiations. Woldenberg, J. 
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electoral reform. The group produced a document, which included 60 points in respect 
of the opinion of political parties on electoral issues. Eventually, most of the proposals 
to be approved for the electoral reform were reached in the Chapultepec Castle Seminar 
and were a combination of the IFE´s council members’ agenda of July 1996 and the 10 
points for electoral reform drawn up by PAN and PRD. Finally, president Zedillo and 
the leaders of four political parties signed the agreements for the constitutional reform 
on electoral issues. Immediately afterwards, the Permanent Commission of the Congress 
called for an extraordinary period of sessions. Then, and after 18 months of intense 
debates and failed negotiations, in August 1996 18 articles of the  constitution were 
amended  and several  articles of the COFIPE (Art 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48). This 
reform was particularly significant because it was the first time that an electoral reform 
was pacted by the political parties and developed, approved and applied in Congress, 
and not created by the executive branch.
202  The constitutional reform was approved 
unanimously in the Chamber of Deputies and in the senate. However, the reform of the 
COFIPE  (ley  reglamentaria)  was  approved  unanimously  in  the  first  part,  but  in  the 
second part, in both chambers it was only voted by the PRI.
203 In the reform of the 
ordinary law (Cofipe) the parties disagreed on the issues over coalitions and finances. 
Despite the reform being essentially approved and accepted by all political parties, the 
opposition, especially the PRD had reservations. Some members of the PRI also felt that 
Zedillo granted too much to the opposition, and that he could have used its majority in 
Congress.
204 
 
4.7.5  Content of the 1996 electoral reform 
One of the most significant aspects of the 1996 electoral reform was the emphasis on 
the conditions of electoral competition. This electoral issue had become the central issue 
of Mexican politics. The legal changes and new institutions established in the electoral 
reform responded to many demands that had been presented during the long process of 
electoral reforms. Political parties and the government realised that the electoral process 
could no longer be a source of conflict. In fact, many analysts argued that elections 
could be the key to democracy.  
                                                 
202 Noticieros Televisa. Interview of Leonardo Valdés (Researcher of UAM) in “Mexico: La historia de su 
democracia.” Vol. 3. Mexico City: Noticieros Televisa, 2004. 
203 Woldenberg, J. Ibid. Vol 3. 
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4.7.6  The autonomy of IFE 
A second important aspect was the re-definition of the structure of IFE, which resulted 
in the total independence and autonomy of the electoral body. The reform created a new 
figure called “electoral councillors” who became the principal members of the General 
Council. Now the General Council was formed by eight electoral councillors who were 
proposed by the political parties and needed the approval of two-thirds of the Chamber 
of Deputies. The reform also established that the election of the president of IFE was to 
follow the same procedure as the electoral council followed. In the new IFE General 
Council political parties and the legislature had representation but without the right to 
vote.  This  aspect  is  very  important  because  citizen  council  members  were  the  only 
members  with  the  right  to  vote  in  the  directive  bodies.  Finally,  the  reform  also 
established that the president would have the faculty to propose an Executive Secretary 
whose functions were the same as those held by the former General Director of IFE. 
These changes rendered the electoral institution free of any political influence including 
the executive and political parties for the first time in the history of modern electoral 
institutions in Mexico. Both political analysts and political actors agree that the most 
important aspect of the electoral reform in 1996 was the granting of autonomy to IFE, as 
it lost the executive representative. The total independence of the electoral authority 
gave IFE the credibility that it did not have before. In fact, as the electoral body became 
free  from  government  control,  the  opposition  recognised  its  authority.
205  Many 
transitions  experts  also  agree  that  the  IFE´s  independence  from  the  government 
provided a clear step from a non-competitive system to a fully competitive system, as 
the government and its party were unable to change unfavourable results.
206 Another 
important aspect of the reform was that changes in IFE were recognised and accepted 
for the first time by the PRD when it became independent.
207 The 1996 electoral reform 
also approved a new formula for the composition of the General Council of IFE (art. 
74).  The  figure  of  the  citizen  council  member  which  was  created  in  1994  was 
substituted by a new figure called electoral councillor.  
                                                 
205 Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (President of PAN 1996-1999). Ibid. Vol 3. Calderón claimed that the reform of 1996 
contributed to an independent and citizen IFE that had the support of all the parties and was able to organise the 1997 
mid-term elections without serious opposition.   
206 Jose Antonio Crespo (Researcher of CIDE). Ibid. Vol 3.  
207 Andrés Manuel López Obrador (President of PRD 1996-1999). Ibid. Vol 3. 
“The 1996 electoral reform was very important because it formed an independent council in IFE for the first time 
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4.8 In  the  COFIPE:  On  the  General  Council  and  its  presidency:  The  reform 
amended Article 73
208  
Article 74 established the new composition of the General Council: a councillor 
president, eight electoral councillors, legislative councillors, parties´ representatives and 
the Executive secretary.  The new councillor president of the General Council of IFE 
was to be elected by two thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies proposed by 
the parliamentary groups who needed to be present to vote. The election of the new 
electoral councillors and the councillor president was very significant not only for its 
selection process but also for the fact that its selection needed a prior consensus among 
political parties in the Chamber of Deputies.
209 The very strong emphasis on achieving 
inter-party agreement and ultimately consensus seems extremely important. That 
emphasises the "spirit of the electoral laws" as distinct from the formal "mechanisms". 
Besides being elected by the consensus of the parties in the Chamber of Deputies, they 
would  also  be  accepted  as  mediators  in  the  electoral  competitions.  In  addition,  the 
reform also established that the legislative members in the IFE´s General Council could 
only have a voice and not vote as before, therefore, any presidential input would be 
impossible.
210 Another important change was the new formula for the composition of 
the legislative branch (Book One). From now on, any party could not obtain more than 
300  deputies  nor  have  more  than  a  percentage  of  deputies  greater  than  8  points  in 
relation to its national vote.
211 The Senate also opened to plurality. In each of the 32 
entities two senators were elected by the principles of relative majority and the third was 
assigned  to  the  first  majority,  and  the  other  32  were  elected  by  the  principle  of 
proportional representation.
212  
Main aspects of the reform: 
                                                 
208 Article 73: The General Council of IFE is the superior organ of direction which is responsible for supervising, the 
fulfilment of the constitutional and legal dispositions in electoral matters, as well as ensuring that the principles of 
IFE are complied with. The principles are legality, independence; impartiality and objectivity and guide all the 
activities of the institute. 
209 Miguel Angel Granados Chapa (Citizen Councillor, IFE 1994-1996). Ibid. Vol 3. 
Granados pointed out that what fundamentally distinguished these citizen councillors from others was their autonomy 
and independence as they were selected by all members of Congress and not only one faction. The selection of these 
“electoral councillors” depended on the consensus achieved between the different parties in Congress.  
210 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
Bedolla considered that the new composition of the General Council contributed to the IFE losing its previous 
presidential character. 
211 Cofipe. November 1996. Chapter 2. Art. 12(3). 
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1) Funding of political parties. One of the main issues in the constitutional reform was 
the  funding  of  political  parties.  This  issue  was  already  discussed  in  the  previous 
electoral reform in 1994 but protests over an unrealistic campaign ceiling and unfair 
distribution of resources provoked further modifications. This time the distribution of 
funds was to be as follows: 
•  70%:  proportionally:  distributed  according  to  the  national  voting  percentage 
obtained by each political party represented in both chambers of Congress in the 
last deputies election). 
•  30%: assigned evenly among all political parties represented in Congress.  
Therefore the public funding was allocated depending on the votes received. In addition, 
the  reform  also  established  regulation  over  the  origin  and  expenditure  of  financial 
resources and set up penalties for those who exceeded the set limits. The reform also 
established that anonymous funding was forbidden and parties were obliged to present 
an accurate administration of their funding in order to increase its transparency. 
The reform also established the approval of a regime of party finances favouring the use 
of public resources over private resources (Art  29).  It also established  an important 
increase in the resources coming from public sources and it increased the equality of its 
distribution. Five modes of financing were established: public financing which had to 
prevail  over  the  others,  financing  for  militancy,  financing  for  sympathisers,  self-
financing and financing for performance.
213 It was established that of the total funding 
that corresponded each year to all political parties, 30% was distributed in equal parts 
between political parties and the other 70% as a function of the votes of each party in 
relation to its last election; this was a definition of equality. The increase of public 
financing was the most controversial aspect of the reform and at the final moment led 
the PAN and PRD not to support the changes in the COFIPE in particular. Another 
important  aspect  of  the  reform  was  the  increasing  role  of  the  IFE,  especially  its 
monitoring activity. Despite the PAN and PRD refusing to receive public financing set 
up by the reform, in time, both parties accepted it. 1) The reform forbade anonymous 
funding. In addition a auditing commission of IFE was also created to receive and pass 
reports on campaign expenditure of the political parties. It also guaranteed major equity 
in media access for political parties during electoral periods.  
                                                 
213 Cofipe. November 1996. Title 3
rd. Chapter II. Art. 49 (1). Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
 
168 
2) The reform also introduced changes regarding the mass media, where principles of 
equality in relation to use of the media were established. Among the changes, the reform 
increased the free time allocated to parties during campaigns; it introduced proportional 
distribution of official time to political parties depending on their electoral strength and 
set  limits  on  television  and,  radio  time  and,  space  contracts,  and  the  duration  of 
campaigns.
214  
3) The reform also increased the minimum percentage required for a political party to 
register  and  have  representation  in  Congress,  from  1.5%  to  2%.  In  addition,  new 
conditions to form electoral coalitions, which led to “convergence candidatures”, were 
established  and  the  conditional  register  of  political  parties  disappeared.
215  However, 
these  changes  were  criticicised  and  it  was  claimed  that  rise  of  level  for  keeping 
registration made it more difficult for new parties to get into the party system. The 
provisions restricticting the formation of electoral coalitions were also criticised and the 
creation  of  the  category  of  “national  politics  groups”,  which  required  only  7000 
members to qualify for public funding, was also seen by critics as an attempt to divide 
society and weaken political parties. Finally, the creation of a centre for research and 
civil education within IFE represented the intentions of all political parties to continue 
with the process of electoral opening and electoral transparency.    
4) The modification of the Electoral Tribunal was another aspect of this reform. Pre-
electoral  and  post-electoral  conflicts  at  regional  levels  regarding  electoral  fraud  and 
corruption had contributed to increasing pressure for extending Electoral tribunal to 
local authorities. Therefore the constitutional reform was expanded to all areas of the 
country. The reform also established the independence of the Electoral Tribunal, as it 
became independent from executive control. It gave the Electoral Tribunal the faculty of 
validating  the  presidential  election  that  was  done  previously  by  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.  
5) Finally, the 1996 electoral reform also opened a new phase for the Federal District as 
it  established  the  figure  of  the  Head  of  Government  to  be  elected  directly  by  the 
inhabitants of the capital from 1997.  
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By  31
st  October  1996  the  new  General  Council  of  IFE  had  selected  the  electoral 
councillors who were: Jacqueline Peschard, Alonso Lujambio, Emilio Zebadúa, Juan 
Molinar Horcasitas, Jaime Cárdenas, Mauricio Merino, Jesús Cantú and José Barragán. 
With this new legal framework the country would regulate the midterm elections in 
1997.  In  the  1997  midterm  elections,  the  PRI  lost  the  majority  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies for the first time. The sum of the opposition was bigger than the party of the 
President.  The  Congress  had  to  confront  the  presidential  power  and  the  victory  of 
Cardenas in Mexico City. The federal election would not be impugned by anyone, and 
the centre of political debate turned to the legislative power.  
Overall, the 1996 reform represented a radical change in the process of electoral reform 
in Mexico, as the electoral institution in charge of organising and supervising elections, 
IFE  became  totally  independent  and  autonomous.  It  became  the  centre  where  all 
political  parties  converged  to  discuss  and  debate  electoral  issues.  This  reform  was 
unique because in contrast to past reforms, which tried to introduce plurality in congress 
or  give  space  to  excluded  minority  parties,  its  purpose  was  to  detach  the  electoral 
institutions  from  the  executive  branch.  In  addition  it  intended  to  provide  material, 
financial and legal resources to all political parties in order to assure a competitive party 
system that would become stronger in time.  
After  the  1996  reform  the  consensus  and  agreements  between  political  forces  were 
broken again, the strength and new status of IFE had already established the electoral 
rules  which  for  the  first  time  were  respected  by  all  political  forces  including  the 
dominant party PRI. The debate over electoral authorities seemed to be over, as the new 
institution was perceived as reliable by the majority.  In  fact this new  status of  IFE 
allowed for a competitive party system that Mexico had always lacked. Woldenberg 
notes  that  the  elections  of  1997,  despite  starting  within  a  context  characterised  by 
discord and disagreement, political parties were able to compete in equal conditions in 
respect of not only funding but also access to the media.
216 This had been one of the 
main demands of the opposition parties in the negotiations previous to the reform of 
1996. It is important to note that despite these positive views on electoral reform, other 
authors  disagree  about  the  contribution  of  electoral  reform.  For  instance,  Levy  and 
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Bruhn
217 after the 1997 elections argued that although electoral reform contributed to 
fairer elections, it had not guaranteed the establishment of conditions for free and fair 
elections. Woldenberg, however, argues that the fact that the PRI lost majority in the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  in  these  midterm  elections  is  proof  of  an  effective  share  of 
power.
218 Soon after, Mexico witnessed how electoral reforms and negotiations and the 
importance of the vote had contributed to a radical change in the political context. The 
conquest of governorship and Congress seats, by opposition parties, confirmed this deep 
transformation of the Mexican political system, and more importantly the fact that this 
change was possible due to a combination of massive votes, electoral reforms and clear 
rules, without violence and by democratic means.  
In order to understand the significance of the 1996 reform it is necessary to compare it 
with previous ones. First of all, the electoral reforms in 1977 and 1986 were important 
for the transition, but they had been limited because the government and the official 
party not only took the initiative but also controlled their content. In the 1990-91 and 
1993 reforms, changes had to be agreed with the opposition, especially with the PAN. 
Then in 1994 and after dramatic events in Chiapas the inclusion of all political forces 
became necessary in order to adapt the new legal frame. However, by 1996 the fact that 
a consensus among the three main political parties PRI, PAN and PRD was essential to 
design the new electoral reform was undeniable. Therefore, the 1996 reforms resulted 
from intense negotiations and public discussion among political parties.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
After the controversial elections of 1988, the Mexican political system witnessed the 
dismantling of the hegemonic party system and initiated a process to rebuild electoral 
life in Mexico. The evolution of the electoral institutions towards greater autonomy and 
impartiality  was  not  linear  but  went  through  a  process  of  political  struggles  among 
parties where negotiations over the rules of electoral competition combined, or mixed, 
with the parties strategies for their own political advancement. Political interests and the 
need for legitimisation and governance marked the electoral reforms.  
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The  creation  of  the  IFE  (Federal  Electoral  Institute)  in  1990  was  a  significant  step 
towards the building of an independent electoral institution in Mexico. In fact, for many 
analysts the 1989-90 electoral reform stuck out because with the creation of IFE, it was 
the  first  time  that  the  presidential  principle  of  distribution  of  political  posts  was 
challenged.
219  A  long  process  of  negotiation  between  political  parties  and  the 
government and pressure from civil society contributed to the total independence of IFE 
in 1996. However, the independence of the electoral authority in 1996 was achieved 
because other more basic electoral issues had been resolved previously. There was a 
very important institutional accumulation in the initial years of the IFE.
220 In fact, it can 
be said that the  IFE had three stages. First of all, the IFE was created to solve the 
original problem in Mexico, the electoral fraud, specifically the manipulation of results 
on electoral day and the counting of votes. Therefore, the early IFE concentrated fully 
on resolving the problems in the organisation of elections. The electoral reform process 
during  1991  and  1994,  was  centred  on  resolving  the  issue  of  cleaning  the  electoral 
process. Once the electoral process became more transparent and reliable the electoral 
debate  centred  on  other  issues.  At  this  point,  what  IFE  did  during  the  successive 
electoral processes that it organised, was to give certainty to the electoral process.
221 
Despite the activity of the IFE, at this early stage not receiving the total trust of all 
political actors and the general public because of its dependence on the government, the 
institution  increased  its  role  in  the  electoral  process.  However,  the  political  parties, 
especially the opposition, started to challenge the role of the government and PRI in the 
IFE. Therefore, between 1994 and 1996, negotiations on the electoral reform centred on 
the issue of autonomy of IFE. The changes in the composition of the General Council of 
IFE in the 1996 electoral reform,
222 the highest electoral authority, contributed to the 
independence of the IFE. Once the electoral authority became independent in 1996, the 
electoral debate centred entirely on party financing, especially legal and illegal funding 
to  political  parties  and  access  to  the  media.  These  issues  had  been  discussed  and 
regulated since the 1993 electoral reform, but without much success. 
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Overall it seems that during the 1990s, political parties concentrated more on electoral 
reform than other issues. Socio-economic events during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
such as the introduction of the neo-liberal economic model, the entry into NAFTA, the 
rebellion  in  Chiapas  and  a  new  economic  crisis  provoked  further  internal  divisions 
within the PRI and increased the level of discontent in civil society. Opposition parties 
took  advantage  of  this  discontent.  For  instance,  the  PRD  benefitted  from  repeated 
defections from the PRI and gained the support of many ex-PRI members, and the PAN 
further increased its voting appeal in urban areas and northern states. It is important to 
remember that, the same electoral reforms initiated by the regime in order to increase its 
support, were the ones that introduced constant change to the political system. The role 
of  the  opposition  parties  in  the  process  of  electoral  reform  became  very  important, 
especially  the  PAN  and  then  the  PRD.  First  of  all,  in  the  1980s  PAN  led  an  anti-
authoritarian mobilisation, which contributed, to the process of political liberalisation. 
The fact that the official party was forced to initiate this process of liberalisation, meant 
that negotiations among political parties were not only allowed but essential for the 
regime.  The  PAN  took  advantage  of  this  bargaining  power,  as  it  was  aware  of  the 
difficulty of winning national elections and it gained enough power to obstruct and limit 
PRI measures. However, PAN used its privileged position to pursue its main objective: 
electoral reform. Another reason for the PAN’s relevance lay in the fact that PAN’s 
strategies corresponded  to those of a party in power. A long process of negotiation 
among  opposition  political  parties  and  the  official  party  over  electoral  reforms 
culminated with the total independence of the IFE in 1996. This last step was negotiated 
and supported by the main political parties, PRI, PAN and PRD.  It can be argued that 
this  process  of  negotiations  and  consensus  over  electoral  reform  contributed  to  the 
transition  to  democracy  in  Mexico  as  elections  became  the  source  of  legitimacy. 
Electoral  reforms  that  had  initially  been  initiated  by  the  dominant  party  to  restore 
legitimacy, unexpectedly changed political strategies of opposition parties by allowing 
them to win congressional seats and by allocating funding and access to the media to 
opposition  parties.  Civil  organisations  and  stronger  opposition  parties  realised  how 
changes  in  the  electoral  rules  could  allow  cleaner  and  more  competitive  elections. 
Therefore, the electoral reform became the main issue of discussion between political 
forces.  The PRI’s loss of the majority in Congress in the midterm elections in 1997 
showed not only the end of the PRI hegemony in the Chamber but also the importance Lidia Acosta                                                                                             Chapter 4 The Evolution of IFE 
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of  the  vote  to  decide  political  outcomes.  Later  the  victory  of  the  PAN  presidential 
candidate, Vicente Fox in the presidential elections in 2000 proved the impartiality of 
the electoral institution, since it was the first time that the official party PRI allowed an 
opposition  party  to  win  the  presidential  elections.  This  event,  explains  how  IFE 
achieved such a high level of acceptance among all political actors and the general 
public  after  the  1996  electoral  reform.  However,  some  political  analysts  argue  that 
without the good performance of IFE in previous elections (1991, 1994 and 1997), the 
outcome of the 2000 elections would have been impossible.
223 The choice of gradual 
change in Mexico had been accepted as the safer option rather than other choices that 
involved violence and uncertainty. However, this gradual pace of change also delayed a 
deeper  political  change  that  could  have  taken  place  earlier. 
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5  Chapter 5 Management of the Electoral Process: the First Stage of 
IFE 
This chapter will analyse the first area of activity on which IFE concentrated after being 
created;  the  “management  of  the  electoral  process”.  It  will  focus  on  how  changes 
introduced to the organisation of elections, during the earlier reforms, contributed to 
increasing the credibility of the electoral process. In this section it will be important to 
consider the real input of IFE, as the electoral authority, in achieving transparent and 
reliable elections which were accepted by all. The chapter is divided into five sections. 
The  first  section  will  provide  an  introductory  explanation  of  the  existing  Mexican 
electoral system that IFE initially operated in and a detailed explanation of what IFE did 
and its main functions. The second section will focus on IFE’s first assignment after 
being funded as an independent electoral management body: the creation of the electoral 
roll. The unreliability of the electoral roll in previous elections had been a long standing 
problem that urged both the government and the PRI to find an immediate solution, 
especially after the highly contested 1988 elections. This section will analyse the input 
and  role  of  political  parties  and  the  IFE,  (that  at  this  earlier  stage  was  strongly 
influenced  by  the  government)  in  creating  the  new  electoral  roll  (Federal  Electoral 
Registry) and in issuing photo credentials for the first time. It will also contain a brief 
analysis  of  other  significant  IFE  activities  related  to  electoral  organisation,  the  
implementation  of  which  also  had  an  effect  on  the  political  parties  and  the  public 
perception of IFE. These tasks included the installation of polling sites and the selection 
of polling booth officials by IFE as well as the design, production and preparation of 
electoral documents. The third section will focus on the creation and further evolution 
of the Professional Electoral Service (SPE) of IFE as professionalism of the electoral 
service became another necessary change in order to restore credibility in the electoral 
process.  In  this  section  it  will  be  interesting  to  see  to  what  extent  the  eventual 
independence and autonomy of this service from the Secretariat of Government was 
expected  by  the  government  and  by  its  party,  the  PRI.  It  will  also  be  necessary  to 
examine  the  real  pressure  exercised  by  the  parties,  towards  the  impartiality  and 
professionalism of the electoral service, as well as the role of IFE in this process. The 
fourth section will analyse the impact of the newly created Electoral Tribunal in the 
electoral process, which in 1990 replaced the old Federal Tribunal. The creation of the Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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Electoral Tribunal not only allowed the judicialisation of conflict resolutions for the first 
time in history but it also became both supervisor of and complement to IFE’s work.  
 
5.1.1  The Mexican Electoral System  
In  order  to  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the  contribution  of  the  newly  created 
electoral commission (IFE) in the organisation of electoral processes it is necessary to 
give  a  brief  explanation  of  the  Mexican  electoral  system.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of 
Mexico, the study of the rules of the election (electoral system) is important because 
most  of  its  political  moves  toward  democracy  went  through  electoral  reforms  that 
affected its existing electoral system.
1 In other words, the democratisation of Mexico 
was achieved through electoral reforms. In general “electoral systems” describe how the 
political system functions and play a key role not only in elections and representation, 
but  also  in  parties  and  party  systems,  government  formation  and  the  politics  of 
coalitions.
2  Indeed,  the  decision  to  choose  one  electoral  system  over  another  exerts 
important influence on the political system’s structure. In Mexico, as happened in most 
electoral systems, the original design of its electoral system resulted from the specific 
historical  and  social  conditions  of  the  country.
3  After  the  Mexican  revolution,  the 
Constitution  of  1917  and  its  subsequent  amendments  established,  in  Article  41,  the 
regulation of its electoral politics.
4 There is a vast amount of literature on Electoral 
systems and different aspects and typologies.  However, for the purpose of this study, it 
is not necessary to examine this in detail, but it is worth noting some of the fundamental 
features of the Mexican electoral system at this stage. Prior to explaining the Mexican 
electoral  system  it  is  necessary  to  provide  a  general  overview  of  the  political 
organisation.  First  of  all,  and  according  to  the  Mexican  Constitution,”  the  political 
organisation of the State is that of a representative, federal and democratic republic.”
 5 
The Federal Mexican State is formed by 31 states and a Federal District (Mexico City), 
which is the seat of all the Federal Branches. Secondly, the Mexican government is 
based on the traditional division of legal power among the Executive, Legislative and 
                                                 
1 For example the introduction of Proportional Representation in the electoral reform of 1977 which allowed 
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The change encouraged opposition parties to demand more changes in the electoral system. 
2 Farrell, D. Electoral systems. A comparative introduction. p.2. 
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Judicial  Branches  and  both  the  Federal  Branches  and  those  of  the  thirty-two  states 
mentioned in this model. On one hand, the Executive Branch is formed at federal level, 
by the President of the Republic, at state levels by the governors and in the Federal 
District, the Head of Government, who all serve a six year term by direct election and 
universal suffrage and cannot be re-elected. On the other hand, the Federal Legislature 
rests on the Congress of the Union, which is composed of a Lower Chamber and a 
Senate. The Legislative Branch of the thirty-two states has only one chamber called “the 
Local  Congress”  and  in  the  Federal  District  is  denominated  as  the  Legislative 
Assembly. All legislatures serve three years, except for the Senators whose term lasts 
six years. Finally, the Federal Judicial Branch rests upon the National Court of Justice, 
which is formed by 11 ministers, nominated by the President and voted by two-thirds of 
the members of the Senate. The Judicial power of the 32 federal entities rests upon their 
particular Supreme Court of Justice.
6 As seen in chapters 2 and 3, the division of power 
mentioned above only took place on paper, as until the late 1980s and early 1990s when 
a stronger and more organised opposition started winning state elections and seats in 
Congress, the executive branch headed by the president, dominated and influenced both 
the legislative and judiciary branches. 
 
5.1.2  Election principles 
According to the electoral legislation
7 established after the 1996 electoral reform, in 
order to constitute the representative bodies at national level, two principles were used: 
relative majority and proportional representation. In addition to this, for the Senate the 
principle  of  first  minority  to  allocate  one  seat  per  state  was  also  used.  As  a  result, 
Mexico operates today in a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, as it combines 
both  majoritarian  and  proportional  representation  (PR)  electoral  systems.  As  Dieter 
Nohlen notes, the current Mexican electoral system, which is called mixed or “sistema 
electoral combinado”
  8, is the result of  a very slow process of continuous electoral 
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reform  that  started  in  1977  and  in  which  Proportional  Representation  was  first 
introduced to the lower chamber.
9  
This  denomination  resulted  from  the  fact  that  the  President  of  the  United  Mexican 
States, 64 of the 128 senators and 300 of the 500 federal deputies were elected under the 
principle  of  relative  majority.
10  Additionally,  the  principle  of  proportional 
representation
11was  applied  to  elect  200  of  the  500  deputies  and  32  of  the  128 
senators.
12 Furthermore, the principle of first minority was applied to allocate one seat 
in the Senate to each state. As mentioned before, a new president is elected every six 
years through direct election, universal suffrage and re-election is strictly prohibited.  
 
5.1.3  The Lower Chamber: Chamber of Deputies 
The 500 members of the Lower Chamber are elected for a three-year term and may not 
be re-elected after an intermediate term. Furthermore, the election of the 300 members 
of the Chamber of Deputies was achieved through the principle of relative majority 
where 300 single-member districts, and the election of the remaining 200 members was 
carried out by means of regional voters’ lists in five multi-member districts through the 
principle of proportional representation. The law also enforced that only those parties 
that had registered candidates for deputies by the principle of relative majority in at least 
200 of the 300 single members districts were entitled to obtain registration on regional 
lists.
13 In addition to this, the Constitution also enforced that deputies’ seats of PR could 
only be obtained by parties that achieved a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for 
regional  lists  of  candidates  by  this  principle  in  the  5  multi  member  districts.
14  It  is 
important to note that current legislation allows political parties to register a maximum 
of 60 candidates to federal deputies by both principles at the same time.  
                                                 
9 According to Dieter Nohlen the Mexican electoral system responded to more than one motive. First of all, the 
proportional representation “sistema segmentado” (segmented system) was introduced in 1977 in response to several 
critics of the government’s exclusion of minority parties. Another motive for changing the electoral system responded 
to the emergence of new concepts of representation in Mexican society that abandoned the idea of a one party system, 
and then the evolution of the electoral system also changed after a reform in 1996 which was achieved by consensus 
among the political parties, where the opposition demanded further changes. 
10 Principle of relative majority: the candidate or candidates obtaining the highest number of votes out of the total 
votes cast in the corresponding election, automatically obtained the position being contested. The Mexican Electoral 
System and the Federal Election. 1997. IFE 
11 Proportional representation: positions are distributed among registered candidates, depending on the number of 
votes obtained by each political party out of the total votes cast in the corresponding election. The Mexican Electoral 
System and the Federal Election. 1997. IFE 
12 The election principles noted above corresponds to the current electoral legislation, which includes changes and 
innovations introduced by the Constitutional reform on political-electoral matters approved by Congress of the 
Union, and promulgated by the Federal Executive Branch in August of 1996. 
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5.1.4  The Senate 
The 128 members of the Senate are elected for a period of 6 years, and may not be re-
elected immediately after. Between 1993 and 1996 the constitutional reforms introduced 
important changes to the Senate. First of all, from 1993 the Senate adopted the “two 
elections” principle, as  PR was introduced in the election of members of the upper 
chamber.    The  1993  reform  maintained  128  members.  It  was  established  that  three 
senators were elected in every one of the 32 states. Two of the seats were allocated 
through the majority relative principle, and the third one was appointed through the first 
minority principle.
15 Proportional representation was applied to the remaining 32 seats 
according to voter rolls in one single national multi-member district. It is also important 
to note that in 1993 it was established that the Senate renewal changed from every three 
years to every six years, although this new regulation would start in the year 2000.
16   
Having  outlined  the  main  characteristics  of  the  Mexican  Electoral  System  and  its 
election principles, we now move on to the definition of the new electoral commission, 
IFE, and its functions. (Federal Electoral Commission).  
 
5.1.5  The IFE:  an answer to electoral fraud 
On August 15
th 1990 the IFE was created as a public, independent and permanent body 
responsible for carrying out the state function of organising the Federal Elections. In 
other  words,  it  was  endowed  by  the  state  with  the  authority  to  organise  federal 
elections.
17 As noted in chapter 3, a succession of electoral reforms from 1990 until 
1996  included  important  amendments  to  the  Constitution  in  electoral  issues,  the 
electoral law (COFIPE) and the IFE. By 1996 the IFE had become the highest authority 
in  electoral  matters  and  its  performance  became  highly  professional.  However,  it  is 
important to draw attention to the fact that initially the first set of reforms created by 
president Salinas in the early 1990’s included the creation of IFE, as an urgent solution 
                                                 
15 That is to the party that obtained the second largest amount of votes. 
16 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.39. 
17 “According to the Political constitution of the United Mexican States, organising federal elections is a state 
function performed by a public organisation that is autonomous and independent, called Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE), that is endowed with legal status and financing of its own.” The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal 
Election. IFE. 1997.  Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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to the specific problem of unreliable elections.
18  In other words, it can be argued that 
the creation of IFE by the PRI government was done entirely to solve the primitive 
problem of “electoral fraud”, which in the 1988 elections caused unprecedented political 
turmoil among parties and in the general public. Therefore, the decision to create a new 
electoral  body  in  1990  to  replace  the  existing  Electoral  Commission  resulted  from 
pressure exercised by stronger political parties and the realisation of the government of 
the  need  for  credible  and  more  transparent  elections.  However,  according  to  a  PRI 
member,  the  electoral  reforms  that  led  to  the  creation  of  IFE  did  not  result  from  a 
unilateral  governmental  or  PRI  decision,  but  by  the  PRI  detecting  restlessness  and 
opposition  demands  for  more  transparent  elections  that  it  deemed  responsible  and 
acceptable.
19  Nevertheless,  the  reaction  and  conduct  of  the  electoral  authorities  in 
relation  to  the  contested  victory  of  Salinas  in  1988  suggested  that  the  electoral 
framework and electoral authorities operating at that time were unable to cope with new 
party competition and more politicised public opinion that demanded urgent electoral 
reforms.
20  Among  the  criticisms  made  by  political  parties,  were  complaints  about 
electoral mal practices that were encouraged because of badly organised elections at all 
stages and levels. This traditional inefficiency produced a total lack of credibility not 
only  in  the  electoral  system  but  also  in  the  government.  The  credibility  of  the 
government  and  PRI  greatly  depended  on  the  immediate  solution  of  the  problem.
21 
Therefore, the first aim of those who had facilitated the creation of IFE,
22 especially the 
PRI  government  with  the  support  of  PAN,
23  was  to  organise  more  transparent  and 
reliable elections. Here, it is worth noting that even IFE , though still controlled by the 
Ministry of the Interior, expressed its concern about the real possibility of achieving 
transparent  elections,  as  for  that  it  required  technical  and  operative  efficacy  that 
                                                 
18 Interview, senior member of PRI B, former PRI’s party Chairman, Mexico City, November 9 2004. A former PRI’s 
party Chairman argued that the unreliability of the elections was more to do with a “problema de confiabilidad”, the 
lack of trust that the citizens had in the electoral process.   
19 Ibid. Interview, senior member of PRI B. 
20 Becerra, Salazar and Woldenberg note that the 1988 elections accelerated the process of political change through 
the electoral via. However they note that at the same time stronger political parties sought the possibility of expansion 
through the electoral route the current institutional format became insufficient to channel the new intensity and force 
of the competing parties. Becerra. et. al. La Mecánica del Cambio Político en México, p.211. 
21 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
22 IFE is an organ in charge of administering and controlling the electoral process, which could guarantee honesty in 
the material development of the process and promote changes to the regulations” 
23 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. Romero notes that despite the 1988 elections triggering the 
creation of IFE, the pact that led to its creation was only signed by the PAN and the PRI, leaving the most aggravated 
party, the PRD, out of the negotiation. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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promised to be very difficult.
24 It should be pointed out that since the initial creation of 
IFE, the government and the PRI were unsure whether the new electoral authority could 
respond to a difficult demand that entailed not only organising impartial elections but 
also required the ability to reach an acceptable settlement between the different parties 
at  the  negotiating  table.
25  However,  despite  initial  doubts,  only  the  PAN  and  PRI 
decided to negotiate  and recognise  IFE  as a body capable of organising transparent 
elections, as the PRD still did not accept the new electoral authority because of its link 
with  the  government.  The  absence  of  the  PRD  (Cardenas’  new  party)  from  the 
negotiation table is paradoxical as the Left (FDN) had been the most aggravated party in 
the elections that led to the reforms.
26  
Although there were many reasons for the creation of IFE, there is general agreement 
that the electoral reform that created IFE, resulted from a general lack of credibility in 
the political system, in public opinion and amongst the opposition, especially due to 
inefficient  and  unreliable  electoral  processes  that  also  had  serious  organisational, 
material and technical deficiencies.  
 
5.1.6  Main functions of IFE 
Before analysing the first tasks allocated to IFE, it is important to explain what IFE does 
and its main  functions.  First of all,  IFE’s structure  and functions have  been  altered 
throughout the various constitutional and legal reforms on electoral issues. One of the 
main  aspects  of  the  IFE  with  respect  to  its  precedents  is  its  permanent  nature.  In 
addition  to  this,  the  IFE  has  legal  personality  and  patrimony
27of  its  own  and  it  is 
organised  under  a  decentralised  structure  that  allows  it  to  exercise  its  functions 
throughout the country.
28 Another relevant aspect of IFE is its personnel, as it was the 
first professional service to operate not only in the electoral authority but also in all 
government and official bodies in Mexico. The reason for the creation of this service 
                                                 
24 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. 
25 Interview, senior member of PRI B, former  PRI party Chairman, Mexico City, November 9 2004.  
In the beginning the government was concerned with the ability of IFE to organise elections, as the PRI were aware 
of the complexity of the process of organising elections, since this had formerlyto beening a goverment function.  
26Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. “the leftist parties, especially Cardenas’ party maintained their 
claim of having fraudulent elections, therefore they did not recognise the importance of IFE” 
27 COFIPE Art.70 1. The Federal Electoral Institute is a public and autonomous institution, of permanent 
character….See COFIPE and other electoral dispositions 2002. IFE. Book III, del Instituo Federal Electoral. Titulo I. 
Preliminary Disposition… 
28 The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Electoral Process. IFE. 2003, p.32. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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known  as  SPE  (Professional  Electoral  Service)  was  to  guarantee  a  professional  and 
specialised performance of the IFE tasks. The creation, description and evolution of the 
service will be analysed in the third section of this chapter. As the COFIPE states in 
Article  65  “The  IFE  is  the  electoral  authority  in  charge  of  the  state  functions  of 
organising  elections”.
29  Subsequently,  the  IFE  is  directly  responsible  for  all  the 
activities concerning the preparation, organisation, conduction and surveillance of the 
federal electoral processes, as well as for those regarding the aims that the law has 
established for it.
30  
Among its main functions include:  
•  to elaborate and update the Federal Voters Registry 
•  to determine and revise the Electoral geography periodically, to register national 
political parties  
•  to deal with issues concerning the rights and prerogatives of national political 
parties and groups  
•  to set the ceiling for campaign expenses 
•  to register the candidacies for federal election posts 
•  to design, print and distribute electoral material 
•  to prepare everything  for the polling day 
•  to  select  and  train  the  polling  booth  directive  board  officers,  to  regulate  the 
electoral observation and the opinion surveys and polls, to tally the electoral 
results. 
•  to declare the validity and grant certificates in the elections for Lower and Upper 
Chamber members.  
•  to design and implement permanent civic education programmes.
31 
                                                 
29 COFIPE. Book III Instituto Federal Electoral. Título I. Article 68. 1. IFE 2002. 
30 With IFE, many electoral functions that were isolated in the past, were concentrated in the institution. Such as the 
permanent updating of the electoral roll, the registration of political parties, the party’s prerogatives, the organisation 
of electoral processes, the counting process, the electoral training and civic education, amongst other tasks. 
www.ife.org.mx/portal/site/ife/ 
31 Source: The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Electoral Process. IFE. 2003. Nature and functions of the 
Federal electoral Institute, p.33. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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All of the above functions are distributed among its three main bodies that constitute the 
IFE;  “Directive”  formed  as  councils  in  a  collegiate  fashion.  “Technical-executive” 
composed  basically  by  members  of  the  Electoral  Professional  System,  “Executive 
Boards  and  Surveillance  body”  formed  mainly  and  equally  by  political  parties  and 
shaped as commissions. In conformity with the principle of decentralisation, on which 
the  performance  of  IFE  in  the  organisation  of  elections  is  based,  these  bodies  are 
presented at a central level, at state level (one delegation in each of the 32), at district 
level (a sub delegation in each of the 300 single-member districts), and in some cases 
even at a sectional level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
 
183 
The following table shows the current organisation of the IFE (as set up after the 1996 
electoral reform). 
Table: 5.1. Composition of the IFE 
  DIRECTIVE BODIES  EXECUTIVE AND 
TECHNICAL BODIES 
SURVEILLANCE 
BODIES 
CENTRAL BODIES 
(NATIONAL 
LEVEL) 
GENERAL COUNCIL 
•  President Councillor  
•  Eight Electoral Councillors 
•  Legislative Branch   
Councillors(1) 
•  National Political Parties 
Representatives(2) 
•  Executive Secretary 
GENERAL 
EXECUTIVE BOARD 
•  President Councillor 
•  Executive Secretary 
•  Six Executive 
Directors 
NATIONAL 
SURVEILLANCE 
•  Executive Director of 
the Federal Voters Registry 
(president) 
•  National Political 
Parties Representatives(7) 
•  Representatives of the 
INEGI(8) 
•  Secretary 
DELEGATION 
BODIES (ONE PER 
STATE) 
 
LOCAL COUNCILS(3) 
•  President Councillor 
•  Six Electoral Councillors 
•  National Political Parties 
Representatives(4) 
•  Three members of the 
Local Executive Board 
•  Secretary 
LOCAL EXECTUIVE 
BOARDS 
•  Executive 
Representative 
Representatives of: 
•  Electoral 
Organisation 
•  Federal Voters 
Registry 
•  Electoral Training 
and Civic Education 
•  Secretary 
LOCAL 
SURVEILLANCE 
COMMISSION 
•  Local Representative 
of the Federal Voters 
Registry (President) 
•  National Political 
Parties Representatives(9) 
•  Secretary 
SUB-
DELEGATION 
BODIES (ONE PER 
SINGLE MEMBER 
ELECTORAL 
DISTRICT) 
DISTRICT COUNCILS 
Made up as the local councils 
DISTRICT EXECUTIVE 
BOARDS 
Made up as the local 
councils 
DISTRICT 
SURVEILLANCE 
COMMISSION 
Made up as the local 
councils 
SECTION BODIES 
(AT LEAST ONE 
PER ELECTORAL 
SECTION) 
POLLING SITE DIRECTIVE 
BOARDS(5) 
•  Polling Site Officials (Four 
holder and three substitutes) 
•  National Political Parties 
Representatives(6) 
   
Source: The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Electoral Process. IFE. 2003. 
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4. One per party. 
5. Only during the electoral process. 
6. Two representatives and one substitute from each party per polling site. 
7. One representative and one substitute per party. 
8. National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics 
9. One representative and one substitute per party. 
 
5.2 The first assignment of IFE: creation of the electoral roll 
This second section presents an analysis of the first task undertaken by IFE: the creation 
of a new electoral role.
32 One of the first and most important tasks that was given to IFE 
at the beginning of its life was the creation of a new Federal Voters Registry.
33 The 
modification of the Federal Voting Registry, in the COFIPE (electoral law) in 1990, is 
today  considered  to  be  of  great  significance.  First  of  all,  because  it  created  a  new 
electoral roll using census techniques, and secondly, because the electoral roll that was 
created for the 1991 mid-term elections is essentially the same electoral roll that is still 
used today.
34 
 
5.2.1  Antecedents of the electoral roll  
The first important step in the production of an electoral roll, was in 1946 with the first 
Federal Electoral Law, that established a technical body at national level known as” The 
Electoral Registry” to carry out the activities related to the elaboration of the electoral 
census. The same electoral law also set up a Council for the Electoral Roll (Consejo del 
Padrón  electoral),  as  a  technical  body  dependent  on  the  Federal  Commission  of 
Electoral  Surveillance  whose  main  functions  included  the  division  of  the  national 
territory, the setting of the basis of the organisation of the permanent register of voters 
and the issuing of voting cards. Then in 1951 the Federal Electoral Law created the 
National Register of Voters, substituting the former Council of the Electoral Roll, which 
eventually became an institution of public service with permanent functions and whose 
                                                 
32 The creation of an electoral roll was set up by the COFIPE as one of the new electoral authority activities. see 
Article 135 COFIPE, Book IV p.126. 
33 Nuñez notes that until 1823 there was not an electoral register as such. It was established for the first time in 
primary elections of a new congress that church’s registers would be used. Nuñez, A. La reforma 1989-1990, pp.91-
92. 
34 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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director was appointed by the President of the Federal Electoral Commission.
35 The 
next most important step, was in 1963 when the character of the voting card became 
permanent.  In  the  1977  electoral  reform  the  LFOPPE
36  created  the  “Technical  and 
Surveillance Committee of the National Register of Voters”, which incorporated the 
participation of political parties.
37 By 1987, this body then known as “Federal Electoral 
Register” was configured in Article 99 of the Federal Electoral Code, as a technical 
body  in  charge  of  registering  the  Mexican  citizens  on  the  electoral  roll  and  other 
activities such as revising and updating the roll. The 1986 Federal Electoral Code, set up 
in the 1986 electoral reform, looked at significant changes to the registry of voters, 
specifying measures to prioritise the reliability of traditionally neglected electoral lists.
38 
Despite the new electoral code instructing a regular process of elaboration, revision and 
updating of the electoral roll and even with the participation of political parties, both the 
complexity  of  such  activities  and  the  easy  manipulation  of  them  led  to  general 
complaint. The unreliability of the electoral roll was the subject of bitter complaint from 
the opposition, who criticised both the lack of legal regulation and the manipulation of it 
by political actors. The opposition protested about the manipulation of the electoral roll 
that had restrained citizens from exercising their right to vote.
39 A new electoral roll 
became essential in order to simplify the electoral processes that had become highly 
unreliable and a source of conflict between the government and parties. By the late 
eighties, especially in the 1988 elections, the problem of the lack of trust in the electoral 
roll became an issue of debate.  It is also important to note, that the 1988 elections 
opened a debate, not only, on electoral fraud but also on the credibility of the electoral 
process as a whole, especially because of the pluralism that had been expressed in the 
polling booths that was so intense that the new government could hardly ignore it.
40 
                                                 
35 See Nuñez Jimenez, A. La Reforma Electoral 1989-1990, p.93. 
Patiño Camarena notes that the original “Electoral Register” was changed only in minor aspects, as it kept its 
structure and organisation until 1990. Among the minor changes were its name to National Register of Voters (RNE) 
and its composition (membership) in 1951, and in the LFOPPE of 1977, a surveillance technical committee was 
included in the register. See Patiño Camarena, J., Nuevo Derecho Electoral Mexicano. Mexico: Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurídicas – UNAM, 2006. See http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/4/1833/pl1833.htm 
36 Electoral law approved in 1977. Ley Federal de Organizaciones Politicas y Procesos Electorales (Federal Law of 
political organisations and electoral processes). 
37 See Nuñez Jimenez, A. La reforma electoral de 1989-90, p.93. 
38 See list of reform innovations in Nuñez, La reforma electoral de 1989-90, pp. 93-94. 
39 See Proceso. May 1985; (654) and Nexos. 1989; (23). 
40 After Salinas got into office, in his accepting speech in Congress, he invited all political forces and citizens to 
debate around three themes to look for consensus: one of them was: “Strengthening of the organisation and 
participation of the citizens, through the simplification of the electoral processes, in order to consolidate the 
democratic advances including the possibility of legal reforms.” Becerra, R., Salazar, P., Woldenberg, J., La 
mecánica del cambio político en México, p.213. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
 
186 
Indeed, most political activists agreed that the 1988 elections had shown evidence of 
deficiencies in three aspects: electoral organisation, electoral roll and in the operation of 
the electoral authority.
41 Therefore, the creation of a new electoral roll became the first 
step in the process of making elections more transparent and reliable. 
 
5.2.2  The debate on the electoral register: the first step 
The debate on a new electoral register came in response to a number of factors. First of 
all, Salinas’ government felt that restoring the credibility of the electoral process was 
essential not only to legitimise themselves but also to ensure the continuity of elections 
in the future. In his first presidential speech Salinas emphasised the urgent need for 
transparent elections.
42 As “transparent elections” became one of the central concerns 
for both the opposition and for the new PRI government, it was natural that the political 
debate  over  electoral  reform  focused  first  on  the  organisation  of  the  elections, 
particularly  through  the  need  for  a  new  electoral  roll.  The  decision  by  the  PRI 
government to create a new electoral register was arrived at for a number of different 
reasons. First of all, for the first time, Salinas’s government needed to negotiate with the 
opposition in order to pass constitutional changes.
.43 Therefore, it was expected that the 
content of the first reform was to respond to some of the opposition’s demands. One of 
the opposition’s main demands was related to the need for impartial and transparent 
elections, as it was deemed to be a condition for their own party being able to compete. 
Furthermore, the parties perceived that most electoral fraud occurred through having an 
old  and  inefficient  electoral  roll  that  allowed  fraud  at  the  polling  site.
44  It  is  worth 
noting, that the electoral organisation and the electoral roll had been a concern for the 
political parties in the past, but during the PRI’ hegemony the parties had little to say. 
By the end of the 1980s, when the PRI’s hegemony started disappearing, the opposition 
parties gained support and strength and electoral competition increased and debate on 
the electoral organisation came into view. The most significant aspect of this related to 
how to organise elections without governmental interference to control the results, how 
                                                 
41 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004. 
42 Salinas’s first speech 1 December, 1988 “the most urgent measure required is in the area of transparent electoral 
processes.” Nuñez Jimenez, A. La reforma electoral 1989-1990, p.27. 
43 The 1988 electoral results gave PRI only relative majority. The PRI lost the prerogative of passing constitutional 
law on its own. 
44 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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to prevent the manipulation of the vote, and even how to prevent the dead voting.
45  
This collective decision resulted mainly from the fact that the parties had blamed the 
PRI for manipulating the electoral roll in the past
46 and saw an unreliable electoral roll 
as  an  impediment  for  transparent  elections.  Another  reason  for  the  interest  of  the 
Salinas’ government in creating a new register was the fact that there was urgency to 
ensure cleaner elections in 1991 in order to legitimise the government. Furthermore, the 
1991 midterm elections were quite close to the preceding 1988 presidential elections, 
and the PRI government could not afford another post electoral conflict like the one in 
1988, that was directly connected to electoral fraud.
47 Finally, for the government and 
the PRI the pressure, for democratic claim, was not only coming from the parties and 
the opposition alliances, and from a great part of society and public opinion, but there 
was  also  an  international  demand.
48  Therefore,  during  the  negotiations  on  the  first 
electoral reform in 1989-90, the need for cleaning the electoral processes shaped many 
of the decisions, including the idea of constructing a new electoral roll.  The negotiation 
during the first electoral reform included among other issues the situation and status of 
the body in charge of the register, the building of a new electoral roll or the depuration 
of the existing one, the issue of reliable voting cards and the establishing of proper 
mechanisms for the updating of the voting lists.
49 Once Salinas had shown his readiness 
for “electoral cleansing”,
50 the reform launched by the government opened discussion 
and public audiences in the Federal Electoral Commission, in the Chamber of Deputies 
and even in the states.
51 The debate over these subjects led to different party positions. 
One of the most common concerns among political parties was the inconsistency of the 
electoral roll that lacked verification. Indeed the creation of a new electoral roll was 
                                                 
45 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004.  Romero notes the traditional “death vote”, on election day, 
where names of deceased people not only appeared in the electoral roll but also voted. 
46 Note of the report published by ADESE before the 1988 elections in Proceso. July 4 1988; (609): 6. 
47 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
48 Becerra, R., Salazar, P., & Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.213.  
These authors note that in the aftermath of the 1988 election, agreements and communication between political actors 
seemed impossible, as some of them were talking about “constitutional crisis” while others claimed a “simple 
electoral incident”, and in addition to this, the election had been a source of confusion and nonconformity. Ibid. 
p.212. 
49 Nuñez Jimenez, A. La reforma electoral 1989-1990, p.96. 
50 Salinas’ speech to Congress. December 1988. “I am calling all political forces and civil society to discuss four 
topics through which we can achieve consensus: first of all, measures to alleviate foreign debt; secondly, 
strengthening the organisation and citizens’ participation through the simplication of the electoral process including 
the possibility of electoral reforms in order to consolidate democratic progress, etc.” 
51 Baños notes the level of the response to the government’s call for electoral reform, out of the 31 local congresses, 
26 organised public hearings to discuss issues to be reformed. Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, 
Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, November 16 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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perceived as the first step towards the elimination of electoral fraud at the polling site. 
Therefore,  in  parallel  to  the  debate  on  the  1989-90  electoral  reform,  the  Federal 
Electoral Commission that was still operating,
52 considered the technical possibilities of 
creating  a  new  list  of  citizens  based  on  the  data  of  “the  XII  General  Census  of 
Population and Housing of 1990”, to be used in the federal elections of 1991.
53 Finally, 
as a result of the discussion in the Federal Electoral Commission, the Minister of the 
Interior, announced his support for the agreement referring to the new creation of an 
electoral roll and the issue of a new voting card.
54  
  
5.2.3  Creation of the new electoral roll  
In the electoral law COFIPE,
55 approved in 1990, it was decided to create a new Federal 
Electoral  Registry.  However,  prior  to  the  agreements  for  creating  the  new  Federal 
Voters Register, the parties presented alternatives on the subject. Eventually the PAN’s 
proposal of the constitutional Article 36, to develop a National Register of Citizens,
56 
that entailed a wider register, was contemplated, but during the legislative process of the 
electoral  law  it  was  agreed  not  to  implement  it,
57  choosing  instead  to  create  a  new 
electoral roll and new voting card. The proposal to create a new registry of citizens had 
been first raised by PAN in its 1947 agenda.
58 The creation of this new registration 
instrument  was  the  first  step,  after  the  renewal  and  construction  of  other  electoral 
instruments  and  procedures,  within  the  first  electoral  reform  pursued  by  Salinas  in 
1989-90. As the COFIPE provided IFE with the state function for organising elections 
and for considering the new register (a public interest service), it made sense to allocate 
the responsibility for creating the new register to IFE. It is worth noting that the Federal 
Voters  Registry  consisted  of  two  sections:  the  section  of  the  General  Catalogue  of 
                                                 
52 The Federal Electoral Commission was the electoral authority before the promulgation of the COFIPE and the 
creation of IFE. 
53 Nuñez Jimenez, A. La reforma electoral 1989-1990, p.97. 
54 Ibid. 
55 COFIPE (Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales). (Federal Code of Electoral institutions 
and procedures) 
56 On May 31 1989 during the discussion and final approval of the COFIPE, the PAN presented its initiative on the 
Electoral Code to the Permanent Commission. In its Book III it included the establishment of the organisation and 
functioning of the National Registry of Voters. The service provided by this registry included the creation of a unique 
citizen’s census and the regular updating of the registry. It also established the issue of a citizen’s identity card and 
the elaboration, classification, publication and distribution of nominal lists of voters to be used in the electoral 
processes. Commission on Governing and Constitutional Points. Initiatives: The National Action Party. Book III. pp. 
4-5.  
57 The National Register of Citizens was excluded because it was considered that citizenship extended beyong the 
electoral arena, therefore, the regulation of that body should be established in another juridical area. See Nuñez 
Jimenez, A. La reforma electoral 1989-1990, p.99. 
58 See El Partido de Acción Nacional: La reforma del estado. IFE. 2000. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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voters and the section of the Electoral Roll.
59 The Federal Voters Registry was made up 
of four fundamental instruments that were clearly differentiated: the general catalogue 
of voters, the electoral roll, the photo voting card, and the voters lists with photographs.  
The COFIPE established that such services and tasks related to the registration of voters 
would  be  carried  out  through  a  specialised  technical  area  within  IFE  called  “the 
Executive Direction of the Federal Voters Registry” and its permanent decentralised 
bodies at state and district levels.
60 In 1990 Article 92 of the COFIPE established the 
functions  of  the  Executive  Direction  of  the  Federal  Electoral  Registry.  The  main 
responsibilities of this board were to: 1) Organise the Federal Electoral Register service, 
2) Produce a general catalogue of voters and the electoral roll, 3) Issue photo voting 
cards, 4) Revise and update the electoral roll, annually, 5) Establish with the federal, 
state  and  municipal  authorities  the  necessary  coordination,  in  order  to  obtain 
information about citizens who have died and about the loss, suspension or obtaining of 
citizenship, 6) Formulate the project for division of the national territory into 300 single 
member electoral districts, as well as the five multi-member circumscriptions that the 
country was divided into.
61 It is important to note that the Federal Voters Registry was 
also used by the State’s electoral authorities for the organisation and functioning of their 
local  elections,  therefore  the  IFE  and  the  state  governments  and  authorities  had  to 
maintain permanent and signed agreements of cooperation.
62  
In addition to these responsibilites relating to the Federal Voters Registry, the IFE was 
also in charge of material and electoral documentation, the composition and functioning 
of the polling booths, the supervision of the electoral roll and the procedures for the 
initial counting of votes and preliminary electoral results. Some of these issues will be 
discussed later in the chapter.  
                                                 
59 Instrument of the Federal Voters Register: 1) General List of voters – or citizens’ census which contains all the 
basic information about all Mexicans who are above 18 years old and 2) The Electoral roll, which includes basic 
information about all citizens who as well as being included in the general list of voters, apply personally for their 
registration on the electoral roll.  
60 See table 5.1. “Composition of the IFE.” According to the Constitutional legal mandate on electoral affairs, it is its 
responsibility to grant all services and develop all the activities related to the registration of voters, which it carries 
out through its specialised technical areas, including the Executive Direction of the Federal Voters Registry (EDFRV) 
and the permanent decentralised bodies on which the Direction relies at  state and district level. The Mexican 
Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE.                         
61 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal  Elections of the year 2000. Federal Electoral Registry. IFE 2000, 
pp.1-2. 
62 Ibid. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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Overall, the decision to create a Federal Voters Registry was welcomed by political 
parties and the federal government
63as its timely composition was considered to be an 
essential  requirement  to  ensure  the  transparency  and  certainty  of  the  electoral 
processes.
64  
 
5.2.4  The “electoral roll”: important aspects on the electoral roll  
One the most important features relating to the production of a general catalogue of 
voters and electoral roll was that IFE created them without taking into consideration any 
pre-existing registry or list and through the application of a total census method within 
the whole national territory.
65 The creation of the register started at the end of 1990
66,
 
with  the  making  of  the  national  catalogue  of  voters  that  was  obtained  through  the 
application of a census technique through house to house visits. The drafting of a new 
electoral roll became a major task for the IFE as the new census was to contain over 47 
million citizens out of approximately 50 million able to vote. Therefore, once those 
citizens who were included in the general catalogue of votes applied individually for 
their registration at the IFE, their names were added to a second instrument derived 
from the first one: the electoral roll.
67 Subsequently, the creation of an authentic and 
trustworthy electoral roll was only possible by making first a general catalogue of voters 
using  the  mentioned  total  census  technique.  Furthermore,  it  was  established  that  all 
citizens, in addition to applying formally and individually for his/her inclusion on the 
electoral roll, had to submit an application form including a signature, finger print and 
photograph.
68  
1) Another important aspect of the new electoral roll was the regulation by the COFIPE 
in respect of its updating and depuration. The electoral law established that in order to 
ensure  the  electoral  roll’s  reliability  it  had  to  be  subject  to  control  and  security 
instruments  that  could  be  supervised  and  checked  not  only  by  citizens  but  more 
                                                 
63 Woldenberg, notes that the creation of the New Federal Register of voters “was an absolute strategic contribution 
to the new electoral framework”, as this intended to include all Mexicans in order to guarantee their political right to 
vote. Woldenberg, et. al. La mecánica del cambio político, p.260. 
64  1997 Federal Electoral Process. Basic Information. IFE.  
65 Therefore the electoral roll used in the 1988 presidential elections was removed completely. 
66 Marco Baños notes that the issue of the electoral roll had always been one of the most controversial issues, as the 
electoral roll was the data base of the citizens who could vote and make elections possible. Interview, Marco Baños, 
Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, November 16 2004. 
67 Becerra, R. et. al. La mecánica del cambio político, p.261. 
68 Such measures seemed a bit extreme in consolidated transparent electoral systems. However, in Mexico, decades of 
electoral fraud and manipulation made such “padlocks” (check and balances) a requirement in order to ensure the 
credibility of the electoral instruments. Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President 
Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico City, 22 November 2004.   Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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importantly by political parties.
69 The electoral law also established that any change in 
the electoral roll regarding the inclusion or elimination of a name had to be supported 
by a source document confirming that any change was done by the citizen or, in the case 
of death, by documents provided by the Civil Registry.
70 Woldenberg notes that despite 
these measures having a justification because of the initial lack of trust of the parties in 
the IFE, in time when the reliability of the electoral roll stopped being a concern, these 
measures became a problem when updating the Electoral Roll.
71 In other words, the IFE 
could be forced to hold an outdated electoral roll if the citizens or civil registry did not 
take action. 
2) In addition to this, and in order to include the citizens in the annual updating of the 
electoral roll, it was established to deliver an intense updating campaign which invited 
those unregistered citizens to do so.
72 The COFIPE also confirmed that this campaign 
would also be delivered by IFE. 
3) Finally, a very significant point regarding the electoral roll was the introduction by 
law of a National Commission of Surveillance
73 as part of the National Voters Registry 
of IFE. This commission was set up to allow the political parties to maintain permanent 
surveillance of the electoral roll and the voting lists. This Commission would also count 
on computer terminals.
74 This particular arrangement responded to previous complaints 
from political parties regarding the manipulation of the electoral roll by PRI officials. It 
is  worth  noting,  that  the  scheme  of  National  Commission  of  Surveillance  was  also 
applied  to  the  32  local  surveillance  commissions  (one  per  state),  300  district 
surveillance  commissions  (one  per  electoral  district),  and  one  at  national  level,  was 
formed by the parties’ representatives. Therefore, as the political parties were able to 
supervise the updating of the electoral roll by IFE, both at national and local level, in 
time the reliability of the electoral roll was difficult to question.
75 Additionally, the 
recognition  given  to  the  political  parties’  suggestions  regarding  the  electoral  roll 
appeared to contribute to their backing of this electoral instrument.   
                                                 
69 Interview, Mauricio Merino, political academic and Electoral Councillor 1996-2000, General Council, IFE, 17 
November 2007. 
70 Arturo Nuñez, A. La reforma electoral 1989-90, pp.99-100.  
71 Woldenberg, et.al. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.261. 
72 Nuñez Jimenez, A. La reforma electoral de 1989-90, p.100. 
73 Surveillance commissions are bodies in which the national political parties have equal representation and have the 
task of surveying the work related to the electoral roll. 
74 Op. cit.  Nuñez Jimenez, A. p.100.  
75 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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5.2.5  Evolution of the electoral roll: 1991-2000 
The electoral mandate to create a new electoral roll in October 1990 not only gave IFE, 
an enormous responsibility but also placed a considerable amount of pressure on it. First 
of all, the electoral authority at this stage was still highly influenced by the government, 
as  it  was  chaired  by  the  Minister  of  the  Interior
76  and  dominated  by  PRI  votes. 
Therefore from the political parties’ point of view; the work of IFE was the work of the 
government. Secondly, as the scandals surrounding Salinas taking office, gave both the 
president  and  the  government  a  bad  image  among  the  public  and  political  parties, 
Salinas needed to restore that image by ensuring more transparent elections. This he did 
by focusing on the close mid-terms elections due in August 1991. Therefore, the IFE 
confronted its first job under two sources of pressure: one relating to the reliability of 
the new electoral roll and two, a tight deadline. IFE faced the major task of making up 
one of the largest data bases in the world,
77 which needed to be completed in only eight 
months.
78 
As noted earlier the creation of the new roll was done without reference to any previous 
register or lists instead a census technique (house to house visits) was used. Such a 
radical  measure  was  necessary  to  ensure  total  transparency  and  validity.  This  task 
required  nearly  16  million  home  visits  and  took  approximately  nine  months.  After 
several audits and verifications of an approximate data base of 45 million Mexicans 
over the age of 18, the general catalogue of voters (the first step in making the new 
register)  included  42.5  million  of  them.  The  information  gathered  allowed  IFE  to 
register 39.2 million citizens, who met the conditions of inscription, on the electoral roll 
and  to  issue  36.6  million  voting  cards,  to  those  who  appeared  on  the  voting  list.
79 
Despite  the  complexity  of  IFE’s  first  task,  it  produced  one  of  the  biggest  electoral 
registers in the world in only eight months with the highest international standard in 
                                                 
76 Most of the allegations of fraud coming from the opposition during the controversial 1988 elections centred on the 
obscure actions of the Ministry of the Interior.  
77 There are almost 2 million new eligible voters each year in Mexico, 300,000 deaths, more than 2.5 million changes 
of address and a significant migratory population. In addition, there are approximately 154,000 communities with less 
than 2,500 inhabitants dispersed throughout the country, sometimes in highly isolated areas. Despite the difficulties 
this situation creates, every effort has been made to maintain a precise and updated electoral register. The importance 
of having an updated and reliable registry has been so great that Mexico has spent approximately 730 million dollars 
in improving it. This sum is equivalent to having built 48,000 new classrooms or 56,000 new homes. The Mexican 
Electoral System. IFE. 1994.  
78 The creation of this new roll in less than a year was considered an unprecedented job that gave IFE technical 
credibility. Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), 
Mexico City, November 16 2004. 
79 Ibid. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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terms of coverage and reliability.
80 After the new electoral roll was created in 1991, the 
IFE,  particularly  the  General  Council  of  IFE  agreed  to  carry  out  a  programme  of 
integral refinement of the electoral roll which was carried out between July 1992 and 
March 1993. This programme of verification detected a level of inconsistency of 4.63% 
in the register. The decision by the General Council of IFE to refine the electoral roll 
appears to show an early attempt of the IFE to take a lead in decisions relating to the 
organisation of elections.  After the first draft of the electoral roll for the mid-term 
elections was finished, the IFE continued to update and work on its development. Initial 
positive  results  were  soon  observed,  for  example,  in  1991,  the  Electoral  Registry 
registered nearly 87% of Mexico’s citizens and the Federal Electoral Registry was able 
to deliver 81 percent of the voting cards or voters credentials. By May 1994, and in 
preparation for the presidential elections, the Electoral Register accounted for almost 
90% of all citizens.
81 And working with a database of nearly 50 million eligible voters, 
the IFE managed to inscribe 47.5 millions of them into the electoral census. Regarding 
the voting cards, a tamper proof credential with photo was also developed to be ready 
for the elections and delivered to 86% of qualified voters. In addition to the updating of 
the electoral roll, a total of 36 audits and verification were simultaneously done in order 
to find out the degree of precision and consistency. The audits and verifications reported 
a level of trust of over 96%.
82 The updating process delivered by IFE became even more 
sophisticated in 1993 when political parties were allowed to access the content of the 
database  and  its  images,  source  documents  and  entries  on  the  electoral  Roll.
83  This 
consent was given to political parties and provided IFE with a “consulting role” that 
improved its image among political parties, as they were able to consult and obtain the 
information they required. In addition to this, the IFE’s performance in respect of the 
electoral  registry  was  also  observed,  and  at  times  challenged,  by  political  parties 
through the national, state and district commissions in charge of supervising the registry 
(National  and  Local  Commissions  of  Surveillance).
84  Another  interesting  aspect 
regarding the updating of the electoral roll was the first external audit was granted in 
May 1994 to private firms led by McKinsey, a well known consulting company, the 
                                                 
80 The Mexican Electoral System. IFE. 1994.  
81 This compares favourably with voter coverage in the United States (55%) Colombia (79%), Spain or Italy (80%) 
and Canada, France or Australia (90%). The Mexican Electoral System. IFE. 1994. 
82 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. 
83 The Mexican Electoral System. IFE. 1994.  
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results of which were announced on June 30 1994. Finally and in preparation for the 
2000 federal electoral process, the IFE designed and implemented new plans to update 
and refine the electoral instruments, including the electoral roll. Ultimately, the original 
draft of the electoral registry created in 1991, underwent not only 36 independent audits 
but also the constant supervision of all political parties through the different electoral 
reforms and elections. Baños notes that the work of IFE in making the new electoral roll 
was well regarded and accepted by all as it was not contested at any of the national or 
local elections held after it was created. Indeed, he points out that the significance of 
this trust was even greater because the electoral roll, created by IFE, was used at local 
and municipal elections which were organised not by IFE but by their local electoral 
organs with IFE’s collaboration.
85 In addition, the opportunity given to all citizens to 
check  and  verify  the  lists  in  respect  of    personal  details  also  contributed  to  the 
perception of IFE, among the general public, as a professional and more independent 
electoral authority. Eventually, all of the refinement techniques applied to the electoral 
roll  and  the  opening  of  “windows”  (where  parties  and  citizens  could  supervise  the 
elaboration and updating of the electoral roll) gave the electoral roll credibility that in 
many ways reflected the effectiveness of the IFE’s first task.   
 
5.2.6  The issue of a photo credentials   
The issue of a photo credentials
86 was the other main assignment of IFE. Vadillo notes 
that the issue of a new photo-voting card by IFE went beyond its electoral purposes, as 
it became in time the only official document of identification for Mexicans.
87 In parallel 
to the creation of a new electoral law, the IFE also started a process of developing a 
tamper-proof voter credential with photograph. It is worth noting, that the idea of a 
photo-voting card was a project that had been considered more than two decades earlier 
but had never taken shape. However, as the COFIPE established the issue of a new 
photo credential, everyone agreed that leaving such a task to the Ministry of the Interior  
                                                 
85 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. Baños also notes that the IFE provided the electoral roll to all states apart from Baja California, 
as it had its own. 
86 The photo voting card is the document required in order for citizens to be able to exercise their right to vote. Apart 
from exceptional cases, a citizen who does not carry and show his/her photo card on the day of the election is not 
allowed to vote.  
87 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. Vadillo highlights how important the issue of the photo-
credential was for Mexico, as in the past, most of the Mexican population was “without identification”. In fact, it 
became the basic instrument of identification for all kinds of purposes. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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controlled by the PRI, was impossible as it could generate uncertainty and mistrust.
88 
This new procedure to issue a new voting card which was developed at the same time as 
creating the electoral roll was established in the new electoral legislation (COFIPE).
89 It 
is important to note that the decision to create a new voting card also responded to an 
old opposition demand. The old cards had not been trusted because of their propensity 
to be falsified. In fact, the National Action Party (PAN) proved that the creation of a 
new  card  was  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  the  transparency  of  the  process,  by 
implementing it in the state of Baja California.
90  Therefore, the decision to develop a 
new tamper proof photo credential was welcomed by parties as another step towards the 
transparency of the voting process. Initially, the objective of IFE was to complete the 
creation  of  the  two  electoral  instruments,  a  new  electoral  roll  and  a  new  photo-
credential, before the midterm elections in 1991. It was established by law that those 
citizens of voting age firstly had to be included on the electoral roll, and secondly, had 
to acquire a photo-identification voting card in order to vote. The photo voting card was 
to be obtained free of charge from the IFE. Just before the mid-term elections in 1991, 
the IFE managed to issue a voting card to nearly 36.6 of the 39.2 million citizens who 
met the conditions of inscription on the electoral roll. However, despite the fact that the 
COFIPE included the regulation to include a photo in the voting card, the cards issued 
for the mid-term elections did not include the photographs of the voters. IFE’s members 
explained  later  that  the  lack  of  photos  was  entirely  due  to  the  time  constraint.
91 
Therefore, after the federal electoral process ended, the national political parties restated 
their  interest  in  the  inclusion  of  the  photograph  as  the  legal  mandate  stated.  The 
construction of the new voting cards was started on November 1992 and concluded in 
July  1994.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in  this  area  IFE  started  to  operate  as  a  more 
independent body, as in July 1992 the General Council of IFE at the same time as 
carrying out a programme of refinement of the electoral roll also approved the final 
model and design of the photo voting card that included new security elements in order 
to  prevent  alterations.  The  incorporation  of  the  photograph  in  the  voting  card  was 
                                                 
88 Interview, Carlos Ravela, Executive Director, Electoral Register Executive Board (IFE), Mexico City, 10 
September 2004.  
89 The Mexican electoral regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000, p.10. 
90 A member of the PAN notes how the issue of the photo voting card in the state of Baja California, the first 
governorship that an opposition party gained (the PAN had won the states elections in 1989) showed photo voting 
cards could contribute to the transparency of the electoral process. Interview, Member of PAN A, National Executive 
Committee, Mexico City, October 28 2004. 
91 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
 
196 
perceived as an additional step to ensure the transparency and trust of this electoral 
instrument. In the end, as part of the complete updating of the electoral roll in 1994, the 
photo was added to the credential. The IFE managed to cover little over 47.5 million 
citizens (out of an an estimated 50 million), of which 45.8 million or 96% obtained their 
new  photo-identification  voting  card.
92  In  preparation  for  the  mid-term  elections  in 
1997, additional effort was made to reinforce the trust in the electoral instruments; the 
photo was also added to the voter’s lists.
93 This extra measure further amplified the 
transparency  and  ensured  trust  in  the  voting  card  when  used  on  election  day.  The 
political parties also asked for permanent revision and audits from IFE. By this stage, 53 
million  citizens  were  already  registered  on  the  electoral  roll,  out  of  a  total  of  55.5 
million  citizens,  and  nearly  50  million  of  them  obtained  their  photo-identification 
card.
94 Finally, it is important to note that in the elections of July 2
nd  2000, out of a 
population of approximately 60 million, the IFE was able to register 58.5 million on the 
electoral roll and nearly 56 million were in possession of their photo voting card.
95  
Ultimately, the more significant aspect of the issuing of photo-voting cards by IFE was 
the fact that it became the basic and most accepted identification instrument in Mexico. 
Vadillo notes that several surveys show how most Mexicans identify IFE with the issue 
of the photo-credential, because it has allowed them to have an identity and in some 
ways, some status, therefore contributing to an important cultural change.
96 
Overall,  the  work  of  IFE,  through  the  Executive  Direction  of  the  Federal  Voters 
Register, in making up  a new electoral roll and a new photo-voting credential, was 
generally accepted by both parties and the general public. In fact, it appeared that the 
recognition  and  endorsement  of  the  IFE’s  registration  instruments  by  the  political 
parties was achieved when the electoral debate started focusing on other aspects.
97 Also, 
it is important to note that the parties first, through the national and local Surveillance 
                                                 
92 Basic Information. The Federal Electoral System. IFE 1994. 
93 The voters list included all citizens that applied for their inclusion and that had in their possession a valid photo 
voting card. The voters list that was generated, distributed and used on election day included the photographs of all 
the elegible voters. 
94 The Mexican Electoral System. IFE. 1994.  
95 By the year 2000 the national electoral roll comprised 55,592,388 citizens of which 26,800,334 (48.21%) were 
men, and 28,792,054 (51.79%) were women. 
96 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
97 Becerra notes that while the electoral instruments of registration were proving to be fair and efficient during 
presidential elections, the parties started turning their attention to others issues such as media access and electoral 
funding. Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), 
Mexico City, 22 November 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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Commission of the Federal Voters Register and secondly, through their own parties, 
could participate in the updating and incorporating of these electoral instruments, and 
this contributed to their endorsement.  Finally, and as a comment on current electoral 
debate, many electoral analysts
98 agree that today the tasks related to the Federal Voters 
Registry and its instruments should not be the responsibility of IFE. First of all, the 
creation of the electoral roll and issue of photo-credentials by the IFE during 1991 and 
1992 were justified due to the lack of trust that the opposition parties and citizens had in 
the former electoral roll. This accomplishment cost a lot of money and used much of the 
IFE’s time. However, following the 1996 electoral reform the rulers began to realise 
that the Federal Voters Registry and its responsibilities should be transferred to another 
body, as the  IFE had already achieved its objective of making the electoral process 
transparent.
99 Secondly, a common opinion among IFE’s members is that the objective 
of issuing photo-credential has been distorted because many citizens only obtained them 
in order to have an identification card, but not necessarily to exercise their right to 
vote.
100  
 
5.3 Electoral materials and documentation  
As  mentioned  earlier  in  this  chapter  the  IFE,  as  well  as  being  responsible  for  the 
creation  and  updating  of  the  electoral  roll  and  photo-credentials,  also  became 
responsible for a number of electoral tasks that had been mishandled in the past and had 
contributed to the unreliability of the electoral process. For example the IFE became 
responsible for the composition and functioning of the polling booths, the material and 
electoral  documentation  and  the  procedures  for  the  initial  counting  of  votes  and 
preliminary electoral results. Despite the fact that for many political analysts the issue of 
electoral materials is quite peculiar and insignificant, for Mexico, due to the tradition of 
electoral fraud, it is quite significant. In fact, the performance of IFE in this issue has 
had a considerable impact on the credibility and reliability of electoral processes.  
                                                 
98 Interview, Carlos Ravela, Executive Director, Electoral Register Executive Board (IFE), Mexico City, November 9 
2004.  
99 Ravela notes that in parallel to the issue of photo-credentials, the government had been working on developing 
another identity card known as “curco” (identification card) which was supposed to have multiple uses including 
voting. However, he thought that this situation was duplicating the effort and the expenses of the IFE. Ibid. 
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It  is  worth  noting  that,  for  Mexicans  the  effective  preparation  of  the  electoral 
documentation and electoral materials prepared prior to the elections, are crucial aspects 
to ensure transparent electoral processes. In order to appreciate the significance of the 
performance of IFE in these tasks it is necessary to note for example, that before IFE, 
the  preparation  and  distribution  of  electoral  materials  such  as  “voting  ballots”  were 
totally controlled, manipulated and misused by PRI officials.
101 For decades, electoral 
fraud  could  be  put  into  effect  by  many  means,  including  fake  “voting  ballots”, 
“duplicate  voting  ballots”  and  others.  With  the  arrival  of  IFE  in  1990,  all  political 
parties agreed that a cleansing and reorganisation of this process was urgent, therefore 
the IFE became responsible for the production, distribution and registration of “voting 
ballots”.
102  It is worth noting that the IFE, although controlled by the Ministry of the 
Interior, implemented quite successfully many of the new security measures, such as 
producing ballots with state-of-the-art  counterfeit measures  and transparent ballot.
103 
Another interesting additional security measure that contributed to greater trust in the 
electoral process was the development and implementation by IFE of a special ink mark 
to be applied to every voter’s thumb to ensure that no one could vote twice. This special 
ink, which is used in many countries, has a special significance in Mexico, as it was 
applied to reduce the possibility of electoral fraud by voting twice.
104 The special ink, as 
with  other  electoral  materials,  was  revised  and  updated  by  IFE.  In  1994,  the  IFE 
entrusted  production  of  the  new  ink  to  the  Geological  Sciences  department  of  the 
National Polytechnic University. The success of the new formula led to its application 
to  both  national  and  local  elections  and  it  has  even  been  exported  to  different 
countries.
105  
 
5.3.1  The composition, installation and location of the polling booths. 
Another  important  technical  task  of  IFE  that  contributed  to  the  credibility  of  the 
electoral roll, was the composition and functioning of the polling stations. In fact, this 
                                                 
101 See ADESE report. Proceso. July 4 1988; (609): 6-7. 
102 See transcrips of the  discussion between various representatives of political parties on common problems 
encountered in the preparation and organisation of elections in “Hacia 1991: Conflict and electoral legality. Nexos, 
October 1990; (154).  
103 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. The production, distribution and registration of the ballot paper are functions of IFE, which has 
to guarantee to follow each of these rigorously. In Mexico today, all ballot papers are numbered and each ballot paper 
is attached to a document which contains the number of the ballot paper, the entity, the type of election and the 
electoral district to which the ballot paper corresponds.  
104 Ibid. The use of indelible ink on the finger that makes it impossible for a person to vote twice.  
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task, which was an electoral mandate, also became a primary task for IFE in its first 
stage, as it received pressure from both, the government who wanted to avoid post-
electoral conflicts and from the parties who asked for transparent elections. The new 
institution  not  only  had  to  eliminate  the  old  system  applied  by  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior, in which mostly PRI officials carried out the composition and functioning, but 
it also had to design  a  new process for  recruiting and training polling  officials and 
preparing and providing all the documents and electoral materials. It is worth noting that 
the IFE was under considerable pressure while carrying out these tasks because it not 
only had to fulfil the legal regulations but also had to prove its technical and operative 
efficacy.
106  As  highlighted  earlier  the  electoral  law  (COFIPE),  that  set  up  IFE, 
established that the new electoral authority was directly and fully responsible for all 
activities related to preparing, organising and conducting electoral processes, and its 
main  responsibilities  included  the  design,  printing  and  distributition  of  all  electoral 
material, preparation for the election day and the selection and training of polling site 
personnel. The Polling site office boards became part of the organic structure of IFE 
(see  table  1).  However,  and  despite  the  new  measures  and  security  systems,  the 
opposition still requested to be present to supervise the activities at the polling site. 
There was a perception among the opposition parties that, an IFE still highly dominated 
by the PRI, could not prevent electoral fraud at the polling site.
107 Therefore, by law it 
was  established  that  the  Polling  Booth  Directive  Boards  (electoral  bodies  that  are 
installed on the polling day for the reception and first counting of the votes)
108 were 
formed  by  a  president,  a  secretary  and  two  scrutineers  as  well  as  three  general 
substitutes, adding to a total of seven members who must be residents of the respective 
electoral  section,  but  also  by  political  parties  or  political  coalitions’  representatives 
appointed  by  their  respective  parties.  This  decision  was  praised  later  by  the  same 
opposition  who  could  see  the  value  of  joint  responsibility  in  the  supervision  of  the 
elections,  “so  that  they  may  be  held  according  to  the  principles  mandated  by  the 
law”.
109 One of the most innovative aspects of the composition of the polling sites was 
the  selection  process  of  their  members  or  “polling  site  officials”  using  a  means  of 
                                                 
106 Ibid.  
107 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
108 Polling station directive boards are electoral bodies formed by citizens responsible for respecting and enforcing 
the freedom and effectiveness of suffrage, guaranteeing vote secrecy and ensuring authenticity in tallying votes 
during the election.  
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double lottery by electoral mandate.
110 The members would be assigned a specific role 
in the polling site depending on their education level and after this they would receive 
two training courses delivered by IFE.
111 In order to ensure the transparency of this 
procedure, the political parties were allowed to supervise the training courses and their 
selection. In addition to this, and in order to guarantee the secrecy of the vote it was also 
arranged  that  the  IFE  would  supervise  the  location  of  the  polling  sites  and  the 
installation  of  booths  or  modular  elements  as  the  law  entitled.
112  Finally,  another 
important aspect of the polling booths was the selection of their location in the electoral 
sections  by  IFE.  In  the  early  1990s,  voting  participation  was  low,  especially  after 
decades of electoral conflict which eroded the value of voting. Baños notes that in order 
to motivate the participation of voters in elections, the IFE had to make efforts to ease 
access to voting, including the selection of accessible polling booths.
113 Therefore, when 
negotiating electoral reform the legislators agreed to ensure that the number of polling 
booths allocated to each electoral section
114would allow voters to vote close to their 
home. It was established by law that each electoral section would have a minimum of 50 
and a maximum of 1,500 voters and for every 750 voters or fraction, a polling station 
would be installed. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that, the electoral regulation 
regarding  the  installation  of  the  so-called  “extraordinary  polling  sites,”
115  was  the 
responsibility of IFE as well. This measure also showed how there was a real attempt by 
the legislators to facilitate voting by citizens. Finally, the IFE also became responsible 
for controlling and making sure that the lists containing the exact location of polling 
sites were published in newspapers at least twice and the names of the members of each 
polling site were shown on the directive boards.
116 Baños notes, that when in 1991 the 
IFE started implementing the new activities related to the polling booths including the 
                                                 
110 Baños notes that this system of double lottery means that the IFE for every electoral section has to adhere to the 
following process which takes four months: first, it has to draw 10% of the electoral roll, and train this first group, 
secondly it needs to evaluate them with a test and finally apply a second draw to the group of potential officials who 
passed the first test. Then the members of the final group integrate the polling sites. Interview, Marco Baños, 
Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, November 16 2004. 
111 The lottery of the citizens in charge of the polling booths was an original proposal of PRD approved in the 1994 
electoral reform. 
112 The law established that the polling sites must be located at accessible places and the installation of the booths had 
to guarantee the secrecy of the vote. 
113 Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. 
114 An electoral section is a basic cell of territorial division for electoral purposes. 
115 These types of polling sites are installed when the geographical conditions of a given section make difficult the 
access of voters. In order to receive the votes of electors temporarily away from their home address, the installation of 
up to five special stations per each electoral district is permitted. The Mexican Electoral System, 1994. IFE.  
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selection  of  their  location,  composition,  etc  the  new  electoral  authority  was  able  to 
confront successfully the opposition of PRI regional sectors.
117 On the whole, despite all 
of the above and the  security measures appearing to be in some ways exaggerated, most 
political  activists  and  political  analysts  agree  that  such  checks  and  balances  were 
necessary in order to meet specific parties’ demands and more importantly to guarantee 
the certainty of the electoral process.
118 
Table. 5.2  Size and coverage of the bases of the Registry 1991 – 2003 
 
Year  Electoral roll  Nominal list  Coverage  Total national 
voting 
% Citizens’ 
participation 
1991  39,239,177  36,676,167  93.47%  24,032,482  65.53 
1994  47,480,159  45,729,053  96.31%  35,285,291  77.16 
1997  53,022,198  52,208,966  98.47%  30,080,639  57.61 
2000  59,584,542  58,782,737  98.65%  37,603,923  63.95 
Source: Reports of the electoral process of 1991, 1994, 1997 and 2000 
*Voting  lists:  lists  with  the  name  of  citizens  enrolled  in  the  electoral  roll  and  in 
possession of a photo-credential. 
The above table shows the comparative results of the Electoral Roll in 1988, 1991, 
1994, 1997 and 2000 elections. The figures in the table show that the size and coverage 
of the electoral roll and voting lists nearly doubled in the period between the 1991 mid-
term elections and the 2000 presidential elections. In addition, they also became more 
precise.
119  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117Interview, Marco Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. 
118 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. Romero notes that the power to anull polling sites or select the 
location of polling booths by IFE was essential to ensure the credibility of the electoral processes. 
119 Between 1991 and 1994 the reliability of the electoral roll was questioned and used as a controversial issue. 
However between 1997 and 2003 it became a national consensual example of efficacy. Interview, Marco Baños, 
Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, November 16 2004. 
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Graph 1. Inconsistency rates of the electoral instruments 1991-2000 
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The above graph shows the level of inconsistencies (i.e. the number of errors verified by 
external audits to the electoral roll) during the elections of 1991, 1994, 1997 and 2000.  
 
Table. 5.3. Efficacy rate in the installation of approved polling sites 1991-2003 
Election  Polling sites 
approved 
Installed   Number %  Not  installed  Number % 
1991  88 308  88 144    99.81  164                        0.19 
1994  96 415  96 393    99.98  22                          0.02 
1997  104 716  104 595    99.88  121                        0.12 
2000  113 423  113 405               99.98  18                          0.02 
Sources: Numeralia. Elections 1991, 1994, 1997 and 2000  
The table shows that the number of polling sites not installed represents less than 1%, so 
showing a rate of efficacy near 100%. It also shows how in the first election organised 
by IFE, the midterm 1991 elections, 88,308 polling sites were installed in the whole 
territory.  However,  for  the  1994  presidential  elections,  the  IFE  managed  to  install 
121,423 polling sites. That means that it increased significantly in proportion to the 
increase  of  the  nominal  list.  Baños
120  notes  that,  this  accomplishment  is even  more 
remarkable in the case of Mexico, a country with 100 million people, where 65 million 
are registered on the electoral roll, with the installation of at least one polling site for 
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every 750 voters in each electoral section. The implementation of all of these activities 
by  IFE  before  the  election  day,  where  the  electoral  authority  needed  to  show  both 
technical and operative efficacy during the period mentioned, ultimately contributed to 
the acceptance of the elections by Mexican society and the political parties. 
 
Table. 5.4. Number of supervisors and electoral trainers between the 1991 
midterm elections and the 2000 elections 
 
Year   candidates  Supervisors   Electoral trainers  Total at National Level  
1991  N.D.   N.D.   6,000   6,000  
1994   29,578   1,035  10,548   11,583  
1997   68,166  1,068   10,627   11,695 
2000  61,090   1,591   16,409   18,000  
Source: Official Reports of the 1991, 1994, 1997 and 2000 elections. IFE 
 
Table. 5.5. Observation and surveillance of the electoral process between the 1994 
presidential elections and the 2000 elections. 
 
Year   Total of Electoral Observers    Total of organisations that 
authorised electoral observers 
1994 *  81,620  251  
1997  24,391  143  
2000  38,433   403  
Source: Official Report of the 1994 Election. IFE 
 
5.4 The Professional Electoral Service: The IFE’s personnel  
One of the most important aspects of the creation of the IFE as the body in charge of 
organising elections was its personnel, which not only became professional but also 
specialised  in  electoral  services.  Essentially,  the  personnel  of  IFE  was  the  first 
professional civil service established in Mexico. The recruitment system of the Mexican 
public administration was traditionally provided through politics, in which the Mexican 
administration was a system of “political clientelism and personal loyalties” where the 
civil servants were selected by means of party membership or personal relationships. 
The fact that the IFE’s personnel gradually became a professional body specialised in Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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electoral services was not only exceptional for the Mexican administration but it was 
also  used  as  an  example  for  the  general  professionalisation  of  the  Mexican  public 
administration.
121  Before  IFE,  elections  were  organised  through  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior and by a temporary body of staff who became electoral officials during election 
periods. However, the operation and functioning of those electoral officials was not 
challenged  by  political  parties  nor  by  the  general  public  until  increasing  party 
competition confronted the PRI’s hegemony at the beginning of the 1980s. However, 
and during the 1980’s and 1990’s, the organisation of elections became more complex. 
The need for professional electoral staff became imperative, when in the early 1980’s 
the  opposition  parties  started  disputing  the  state  elections,  in  which  the  PRI  had 
officially  claimed  victory.  During  this  period  the  fact  that  elections  were  not  only 
organised by the government through the Ministry of the Interior but also prepared and 
administered by its staff, contributed to the assumption, among parties and voters, of its 
partiality.  Therefore  the  creation  of  a  special  system  of  recruitment,  selection  and 
training  and  evaluation  of  qualified  staff  to  provide  electoral  service  called  the 
Professional  Electoral  Service  was  created  in  response  to  constant  complaints  from 
opposition parties who did not trust the impartiality of the electoral personnel formed by 
members of the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, with the creation of IFE, it was 
decided that elections would be organised and carried out by this permanent body of 
civil  servants  within  the  IFE  structure.
122  This  Electoral  Professional  Service  was 
necessary to ensure not only trust in IFE but also the professionalism of its performance. 
In fact, the creation of this electoral service the job of which was directly linked to the 
preparation and organisation of elections, provided a very important step towards the 
professionalisation  of  the  organisation  of  elections,  and  more  importantly  to  the 
credibility of the new electoral authority. It is important to remember that the previous 
body in charge of federal elections, the “Federal Electoral Commission” had lost all 
credibility and was seen as unable to ensure any transparency and accountability in any 
area of electoral organisation. Prior to the creation of the SPE (Professional Electoral 
                                                 
121 Despite criticisms, the importance of IFE’s personnel structure is the fact that it is a “professional service” and not 
a recruitment system based only on personal loyalties. Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor 
(IFE), former member of Democracia Social and political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
122 Within the structure of IFE, the Technical and Executives Bodies are permanent bodies responsible for all 
administrative and technical tasks necessary for the proper preparation, organisation and development of electoral 
processes. All these tasks are carried out by professional, permanent and paid staff. The staff is selected, trained and 
updated through the Professional Electoral Service, established in the Federal Electoral Institute by legal mandate in 
1992. Therefore, the Technical-Executive bodies are formed mainly by members of the Professional Electoral Service 
organised in Executive Boards. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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Service) deficiencies in the training of electoral officials and the general functioning of 
the  system  were  blamed  for  the  difficulties  that  the  government  encountered  when 
organising elections. Functions like recruitment, selection and training of officials in 
charge of organising elections seemed to be arduous tasks which most of the time ended 
in ad hoc solutions as they had to be done in a very short period of time.  Therefore, 
after adopting the new electoral code (COFIPE) and the creation of IFE in 1990, one of 
the  main  objectives  was  to  correct  common  problems  like  those  encountered  when 
organising elections. The idea of creating a professional electoral service was a novelty 
because  it  was  the  first  time  that  the  professionalism  of  the  electoral  service  was 
determined as a legal mandate.  
Overall it can be said that there were a number of reasons behind the creation of the 
Professional Electoral Service including the eradication of improvisation, increasing the 
trust  of  citizens  in  electoral  institutions  and  procedures,  accomplishing  a  significant 
level of electoral services and working towards the self-improving and permanence of 
the personnel who were encouraged to feel part of the institution. 
 
5.4.1  Evolution of the SPE 
Despite the creation of a professional electoral service for the organisation of elections 
being envisaged since the creation of IFE in 1990 the process for the composition did 
not  start  until  December  1992  with  the  publication  of  a  recruitment  notice.  The 
announcement of recruitment for the electoral service was carried out by means of an 
intense national media broadcasting campaign, which provoked a great interest among 
citizens as it was unprecedented. The recruitment process ended in May 1993 once the 
Agreement of the General Executive Board on the selection of candidates was issued.  
Therefore, the electoral personnel who participated in the first elections in 1991, were 
mostly members of the Ministry of the Interior.
123 The participation of this group of 
officials at the beginning of the life of IFE, was questioned by parties who perceived the 
PRI’s control as being official through the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, for many 
political activists the reliability of the 1991 midterm elections where the PRI obtained a 
comfortable majority were doubted and complaints were generated from the opposition, 
                                                 
123 Interview, Marcos Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico 
City, November 16 2004. 
Baños notes that IFE decided to use members of the previous electoral service in order to benefit from their 
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especially from the PRD.
124 Some of IFE’s members, however, defended the use of 
experienced electoral personnel before the creation of the SPE, as they were the only 
ones who knew the procedures and were able to organise the 1991 elections.
125 
Despite complaints about electoral mandate, the performance of the electoral officials, 
who took part in the 1991 midterm elections, was considered as a first step towards their 
later inclusion in the Electoral Service. In time, and line with what was established in 
the  COFIPE  this  specialised  group  of  officials  would  be  renewed  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  each  electoral  period.
126  By  1993,  and  prior  to  the  presidential 
elections in 1994, the political parties
127 expressed their disquiet about the SPE being 
identified with the PRI. Ravela notes that due to the increasing complaints being made 
about the IFE’s personnel, the PRI decided to organise negotiations with the political 
parties, the Minister of the Interior and the IFE in order to legitimise itself and ensure 
the  success  of  the  1994  elections.
128  During  the  negotiations  all  electoral  officials, 
especially those from the local structures, were analysed and tested for their affiliation 
to the PRI.
129 There were a number of attempts to rid the SPE of PRI influence and 
members of the electoral service were challenged and confronted if there was any doubt 
about their political affliation. Finally, after the 1996 electoral reform with the arrival of 
the new electoral councillors, the SPE was again reformed. More importantly, the law 
established  a  new  “statute”  with  strict  requisites,  conditions  and  controls  for  the 
recruitment  to  the  electoral  service  and  thus  contributed  to  the  further 
professionalisation and independence of it.  By 2000, only between 15 and 20% of the 
initial 1991 electoral personnel structure remained in IFE.
130  
 
 
 
                                                 
124 It is worth noting that the PRD did not accept IFE on the grounds of its lack of independency from the 
government. The PRD maintained this position until the 1994 electoral reform, when it decided to negotiate for the 
first time. 
125 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004. Becerra quoted Woldenberg, saying that the former electoral personnel of the Secretariat of 
Government were not just the only ones who knew how to organise elections but were also the best to train the new 
personnel. 
126 See Professional Electoral Service Statutes.  
127 The complaints about the PRI influence on the electoral service were coming particularly from the PAN and the 
PRD.  
128 Interview, Carlos Ravela, Executive Director, Electoral Register Executive Board (IFE), Mexico City, November 
9 2004. 
129 Ibid. The cleansing programme applied during these negotiation tables proved to be quite significant as from 
having 1500 electoral civil servants in 1991, by 1993 the IFE had eliminated 540 members.    
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5.4.2  Normative Basis of the Professional Electoral Service  
The creation of the SPE came about as a response to a constitutional disposition which 
considered professionalisation as one of the main requirements of the Federal Electoral 
System.
131 However, the set of rules on the organisation, operation and development of 
this service were contained in the “Statute of the Professional Electoral Service”  
 
5.4.3  Composition  and  recruitment  and  personnel  selection  of  the  SPE: 
important aspects 
The  SPE  (Professional  Electoral  Service)
132  consisted  of  two  specialised  groups 
(directive officials and technical officials), whose main goal was to provide the IFE with 
the qualified staff needed for electoral services, and thus contribute to the fulfilment of 
professional  activities.  The  directive  officials  performed  managing  and  supervisory 
functions  and  the  technical  officials  performed  specialised  electoral  activities.  Both 
were  distributed  between  central  and  decentralised  bodies.  The  justification  for  the 
professionalisation efforts within the area was the fact that these staff carried out the 
main  activities  of  the  IFE.  An  interesting  aspect  of  the  recruitment  process  of  the 
Professional Electoral Service was its decentralised nature, which included broadcasting 
commercial,  personal  guidance  to  candidates,  receiving  applications  and  revising 
documents which were shared between local and districts boards. It is worth noting that 
the  decentralisation  of  the  professional  service  was  quite  significant  in  the  case  of 
Mexico, as most of the electoral malpractices were commonly applied by local officials. 
Therefore, the requirements and conditions implemented in respect of the IFE personnel 
were also applied at local level. However, the law established that the evaluation and 
final selection of the members of the SPE was the duty of the IFE’s central headquarters 
in order to ensure impartiality in applicants’ selection.
133 
                                                 
131 Eighth paragraph of Article 41 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States and related rules was 
included in Article 95 of the COFIPE. (Article 95 of the COFIPE established the functions of the Executive Board of 
the Professional Electoral Service of the IFE, namely formulating the Statute Draft, enforcing the procedures of the 
Professional Electoral Service, and carrying out programmes of selection, training and development of the electoral 
staff).    
132 Electoral officials have to follow the ruling principles of the federal electoral processes that are contained in the 
Political constitution (certainty, legality, fairness, objectivity and independence). It is important to note that the 
statute of the Professional Electoral Service was ratified by the General Executive Board, the General Council and by 
the president of Mexico, who issued a ruling announcement in the official Gazette of the Federation on June 29th 
1992. The importance of this statute lies in the fact that it “regulates all aspects of staff management, it also 
determines the norms for recruiting and selecting staff, as well as the regulation related to the enforcement of 
sanctions and removals”. 
133 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.109. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
 
208 
With regard to gaining access to the recruitment process, it is important to note that 
there  were  three  different  ways  of  achieving  this:  training  courses,  winning  an 
incorporation  contest  or  passing  an  incorporation  examination.  Once  the  applicant 
accomplished one of the requirements a provisional nomination was made which would 
become definitive once the applicant had participated in an electoral process and had 
passed  the  annual  performance  evaluation,  in  addition  to  training  and  development 
programmes. The introduction of a professional electoral service in IFE was evaluated 
and recycled on a regular basis and set the basis for a general evaluation system. The 
main  points  to  be  evaluated  included  general  knowledge,  discipline,  ability  for 
interpersonal skills, initiative, etc.
134 Finally, another characteristic that is worth noting 
in relation to the Professional Electoral Service is the requirement for all of its members 
to  participate  in  courses  provided  by  IFE.  In  order  for  staff  to  qualify  for  electoral 
services, the IFE organised permanent training and development programmes that were 
supervised by the parties. On the whole, it can be said that despite its design problems, 
the creation of the Professional Electoral Service and the eventual efficiency that this 
electoral service achieved in implementing its administrative and technical activities, 
became an important element that guaranteed the IFE’s legitimacy and credibility.  
 
5.5. The Electoral Tribunal  
For the purpose of this chapter it is necessary to analyse and revise the development of 
another electoral institution in Mexico: the Electoral Tribunal. The Electoral Tribunal is 
“the jurisdictional body responsible for protecting the political electoral of the citizens 
and resolving the controversies that emerged in elections”.
135 Between 1989-90 two 
important  elements  were  introduced  in  Mexico.  Not  only  was  a  new  electoral  law 
enacted  (COFIPE)  but  also  electoral  institutions,  very  different  from  the  previous 
regime, were established: the IFE and the Electoral Tribunal.
136 Therefore the 1989-90 
                                                 
134 The results of this evaluation  form the basis to assign a post and or a work field, rank, promotion in the hierarchy 
structure, and permanence in the Service. Active participation in these programmes is both an obligation and a right 
for the staff. Besides the recruitment programme for the Professional Personnel, a promotion system has been 
designed to take into account the following aspects: personal achievement and professional performance, work and 
research, grades obtained in formation courses and seniority. The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. 
IFE. 1997, p.110. 
135 Anaya Gutierrez, A. Reflexiones en torno a la evolución y perspectivas de la Justicia Electoral en México in 
Testimonios sobre el desempeño del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial. Mexico: El Tribunal, 2003, p.23. 
136 Baños notes how Mexico differs from other countries, such as Brazil and Bolivia, where the electoral 
administrative organs and the juridical organs are the same thing. Interview, Marcos Baños, Executive Director, 
Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, November 16 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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reforms not only led to the creation of IFE as an administrative authority in charge of 
the organisation of the elections but also to a new jurisdictional institution which was 
responsible for the control of legality in the electoral process. After successive reforms 
this  jurisdictional  organ  became  the  “Electoral  Tribunal  of  the  Poder  Judicial  de  la 
Federación” in 1996, the highest authority for resolving electoral controversies. The role 
of this institution would prove to be a complement to IFE’s role, as the tribunal would 
not only be in charge of solving electoral disputes but also of supervising and surveying 
the legality of the  IFE’s activities. The  IFE and the existing Electoral Tribunal, the 
TEPJF (Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Power of the Federation), which resulted from 
the previous electoral reform in 1996, are considered by many analysts to be the two 
pillars of the new Mexican democracy.  At the same time that the electoral organisation 
and procedures were developed, strengthened and updated in order to adapt them to the 
new party competition and more complex elections that had emerged by the end of the 
80s,  political parties also demanded a more reliable system of resources and procedures 
to solve controversies on electoral matters. Therefore, due to the need for more complex 
rules, not only was a specialised administrative organisation like IFE needed to organise 
elections but also another juridical body for the resolutions derived from it.   
 
5.4.4  The need for a new Electoral Tribunal: antecedents 
It has been argued that the issue of electoral justice in Mexico did not come to the fore 
until  the  end  of  the  1980’s,  when  a  more  competitive  electoral  system  started 
challenging PRI victories. In fact electoral justice emerged as “a systematic demand of 
the different political forces who disagreed with the electoral result that the government 
offered through the Secretariat of Government, whose president headed the Federal 
Electoral Commission in both federal and local elections”.
137 The IFE, the Electoral 
Tribunal  and  the  electoral  justice  system  went  through  a  process  of  legal  and 
constitutional reform in order to adapt to a new competitive party system and political 
plurality that emerged during the 1980s and early 1990s. It is worth noting that the 
resolution or lack of resolution of electoral controversies by the electoral tribunals and 
the government contributed to the uncertainty of the outcome of electoral processes. 
This uncertainty became evident, when more competitive and complex elections incited 
a long list of unresolved post-electoral disputes which were unable to be solved by legal 
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and transparent means. Basically, there was a need for an impartial body, which could 
resolve disputes through using unambiguous and precise rules. In addition to this, the 
creation of IFE brought about the idea of a complementary body which had also to be 
independent and impartial in order not only to reinforce Constitutional rules but also to 
supervise and confirm the decisions and actions of the new electoral authority itself. 
Indeed it appears that as the IFE was a response to the need for an impartial electoral 
authority to organise elections, there was also a need to use another impartial electoral 
body to resolve electoral disputes between parties and between the electoral authority 
and the citizens. As happened with the creation of IFE, the arrival of the new tribunal 
was not welcomed by some PRI’s members as many of them did not see the necessity 
for the new Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) to undertake tasks previously done by 
the Chamber of Deputies, such as the validation of elections.
138  
 
5.4.5  Evolution of the Electoral Tribunal and its role 
In order to understand the relevance of the role of electoral justice in Mexico throughout 
the transition to electoral democracy it is necessary to briefly revise its stages. As noted 
earlier, the Electoral Tribunal and electoral justice system went through a process of 
legal and constitutional reform to adjust to the new political context that emerged at the 
end of the 1980’s.  Therefore, the current role and institutional status of the Federal 
Electoral Tribunal changed in parallel to other transformations, which were not only in 
the party system, which had been forced to abandon its hegemonic character, but also to 
a change in society which became more politicised than ever. By the end of the 1980s, 
both parties and society were already demanding an impartial and independent tribunal 
to solve electoral disputes.
139 It was not until 1986 that there was an institution in charge 
of dealing with electoral disputes. In fact, both administrative and electoral complaints 
were  dealt  with  by  the  Federal  Electoral  Commission,  which  was  basically  a 
government  body  under  PRI  control.  As  expected,  the  intrusion  of  the  PRI  in  the 
Federal Electoral Commission did not please the opposition parties who questioned its 
                                                 
138 Interview, senior member of PRI B, former PRI’s party Chairman, Mexico City, November 9 2004. This member 
of PRI admitted that despite the different points of views regarding the role of the Federal Electoral Tribunal, being 
the cause for internal conflicts, these were solved internally and never provoked significant divisions or fractures 
inside the PRI.   
139 The 1996 Electoral reform that produced the current institutional design resulted from a consensus decision, which 
was made when electoral competition was extremely intense. Woldenberg, J., Orígenes, función y perspectiva del 
Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación. In: Testimonios sobre el desempeño del Tribunal Electoral del 
Poder Judicial. Mexico: El Tribunal, 2003, p.345. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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impartiality.
140 Prior to the 1977 electoral reform, final resolutions on electoral matters 
were  provided  by  the  Electoral  Colleges  which  were  formed  by  deputies  that  had 
political  not  jurisdictional  features.  This  arrangement  lasted  until  the  1977  electoral 
reform when the legislators set the grounds for the structure of a jurisdictional system 
by implementing the so-called “recurso de apelación”, a complaints appeal that could 
be  used  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice  against  the  resolutions  of  the  Electoral 
College.
141 Woldenberg, notes that despite the existence of this appeal, the reform did 
not represent a guarantee for the parties and also had deficiencies that made the original 
problem  worse.
142  The  same  author  notes  that  even  with  the  reform  that  gave  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Justice  of  the  Nation  the  right  to  revise  the  Electoral  Colleges’ 
resolutions  through  the  so  called    “recurso  de  reclamación”
143  with  the  intention  of 
reporting  their  observations  to  Congress,  the  ultimate  decision  still  rested  with  the 
Electoral College.
144 In addition to this, the existence of the complaints appeal before 
the Electoral College of the Chamber of Deputies was not much use for the opposition 
parties as none of them had nominal seats, all were proportional.
145 Then, within the 
1986  electoral  reform,  a  new  Federal  Electoral  Code  (CFE)  created  a  new  tribunal 
“Tribunal  de  lo  Contensioso  Electoral”,  known  as  “TRICOEL”,  as  an  autonomous 
organ of administrative character with competence to resolve appeals and complaints on 
electoral  matters.  The  tasks  of  the  new  body  included  the  revision  of  the  Federal 
Electoral Commissions’ activities (antecedents of IFE) and even the right to establish a 
limit on the Electoral Colleges’ decisions. However, the law stated that the new organ 
only had an  administrative function and  could  not solve electoral controversies, but 
could  only  give  recommendations  to  the  Electoral  Colleges  of  both  chambers.
146  In 
addition  to  this,  most  of  the  impugnation  presented  by  political  parties  alleging 
irregularities  or  partiality  of  the  electoral  authorities  were  systematically  rejected. 
                                                 
140 See article by Oscar Hinojosa, Proceso. August 1989; (666): 15.  
141 The Electoral Colleges were formed by deputies. Official Diary of the Federation 6 December 1977. 
142 Woldenberg, J. Testimonios sobre el desempeño del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial, pp.349-350. “The law 
had defects like the fact that the electoral organs in charge of organising the elections were the same as those in 
charge of revising the legality of its activities.” 
143 Resolutions made in cases of substantial violations during elections or during the process of validation of 
elections. 
144 Woldenberg, J. op. cit. pp.349-350. 
145 See Anaya Gutierrez, A., Reflexiones en torno a la evolución y perspectivas de la Justicia Electoral en México. In: 
Testimonios sobre el desempeño del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial, p.24. 
146 The recommendations given by the TRICOEL (Electoral Colleges of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate) 
did not have much effect on the final decisions of the Electoral College, because the element of “self-validation” still 
existed, where the elected deputies and senators had the power to certify and validate their own election. Interview, 
Marcos Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, November 
16 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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However, many political analysts agree that the TRICOEL had a positive aspect as it 
inaugurated a formula to process electoral disputes that would be improved in future 
reforms.
147 In addition to this, the law also foresaw the existence of impugnation means 
for the electoral bodies activities which were subjected to law. The 1989-90 electoral 
reform, proved to be very important for electoral justice in Mexico, as the “TRICOEL” 
was  substituted  by  a  new  tribunal  with  juridical  power,  known  as  the  “TFE”  (the 
Federal Electoral Tribunal”).
148 The importance of this new body was both, its juridical 
nature and, its new role of supervising and surveilling the legality of the IFE’s activities.  
However,  the  reform  maintained  the  procedure  of  validating  the  elections  in  the 
Electoral College, called “self-validation”.
149 The reform also established the same legal 
appeals  for  both  political  parties  and  citizens  to  impugn  electoral  activities  and  the 
appropriate  mechanisms  to  make  them  effective.
150  The  next  important  step  in  the 
advancement of electoral justice took place in the 1993-1994 electoral reform. First of 
all, the Electoral Colleges were eliminated along with the controversial “self-validation” 
of presumed deputies and senators.
151 “Hetero-validation” was established, which was 
related to the revision in the process of electoral certification. This  process of hetero-
certification  was  shared  between  the  IFE  and  the  Federal  Electoral  Tribunal  and 
consisted of: 1) the revision of the fulfilment of the electoral requisites by the candidates 
for  political  posts  and  the  legality  of  all  electoral  activities  carried  out  during  the 
elections  by  IFE  and  2)  the  resolution  of  electoral  controversies,  by  the  TFE  (the 
Federal Electoral Tribunal). It is worth noting that this new arrangement where IFE was 
in charge of the electoral administrative activities and the tribunal had the faculties to 
resolve  electoral  controversies  contributed  to  the  re-defining  of  many  of  IFE’s 
activities.
152   
Finally,  with  the  1996  reform,  the  Federal  Electoral  Tribunal  became  the  Electoral 
Tribunal  with  federal  competence  “Tribunal  Electoral  del  Poder  Judicial  de  la 
                                                 
147 See Woldenberg, J. Testimonios sobre el desempeño del Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial, pp.349-350. 
148 Paragraph 9 of article 41, established the existence of an autonomous tribunal to function as a jurisdictional 
organism in electoral matters. The organisation and competence of the Electoral Tribunal is contained in Book VI of 
the COFIPE 1991, and in Article 264 (1) it was indicated that the Federal Electoral Tribunal was the autonomous 
legal institution in electoral matters that was responsible for the resolution of legal appeals and electoral disputes.  
149 “Self-validation” is the procedure where the presumed deputies or senators in the elections are part of the Electoral 
College of each chamber and can certify and validate their own election. 
150 The reform established the periods for appeals, the rules to respect the guarantee of legal audience, the proof that 
could be presented, etc. 
151 Note that “self-validation” of the presidential elections remained in Congress. 
152Interview, Marcos Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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Federación”
 (TEPJF) and passed from being an autonomous organ to be part of the 
Judicial Branch of the  Federation
153 as a specialised body.
154 The new tribunal was 
constituted as the highest legal authority on electoral matters, with the exception of 
actions of non-compliance with the Constitution, which were exclusively reserved by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice  of  the  Nation.
155  Alberto  Anaya  notes  that  this 
constitutional reform was very important because “it provided an integral system of 
electoral justice, it established the forms for all the electoral rules to be subject to the 
Constitution, it increased the actions of unconstitutionality in electoral issues and gave 
to political parties the opportunity to impugn the content of those norms.
156 In addition 
the  tribunal  also  became  in  charge  of  certifying  the  validity  of  the  election  of  the 
president.
157  The  role  of  the  Electoral  Tribunal  increased  particularly  from  the  mid-
nineties  onward  when  the  tribunal  started  resolving  electoral  controversies  in  party 
finances and campaign spending. The following chapter covers this point in more detail. 
The most relevant aspects of the 1996 electoral reform which related to the Electoral 
Tribunal included: 
1)  Like the IFE, the new tribunal lost any link with the executive, and became totally 
independent, as its members (magistrates, 1 superior and 5 regional) were not proposed 
by the president, as in the past, but by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.
158 
2) The possibility to impugn IFE’s decisions, not only by parties but also by citizens. 
3) As mentioned earlier, the reform also established that the election of the President of 
the United Mexican States must be solved in the last instance by the Superior Court of 
the Electoral Tribunal. After 1996 all federal elections for deputies, senators, and for 
president  had  to  be  validated  jurisdictionally,  this  increased  trust,  certainty  and 
transparency.
159 
                                                 
153 Also the first paragraph of Article 94 was modified to include the Electoral tribunal in the area of the Judicial 
Branch of the Federation. 
154 Woldenberg notes that this was one of the most important aspects of the new tribunal because “despite being 
independent and autonomous in its decisions and internal administration, it was subject to the norms that regulated 
the functioning of that branch.”  Woldenberg, J. Testimonios sobre el desempeño del Tribunal Electoral del Poder 
Judicial, p.350. 
155 The central aspect of electoral justice Article 99 was modified to establish that the Electoral Tribunal will be the 
maximum jurisdictional authority in the matter, and specialised institution with the exception of what the fraction II 
of Article 105 of the Constitution stated. Anaya Gutierrez, A. Op. cit. p.27.  
156 Ibid. 
157 The “validation” of the election of president by Congress had been the object of protests and complaints by 
political parties. 
158 The final selection of these magistrates depended on the vote of 2/3 of the members of the Senate, who attended. 
159 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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4)  The  Electoral  Tribunal  was  also  granted  the  facility  to  control  the  actions  and 
resolutions of the federal electoral authority that violated constitutional or legal rules.  
This  faculty  allowed  wider  jurisdictional  control  over  the  norms  and  activities  on 
electoral issues in order to guarantee its coherence with constitutional objectives.  
5) The reform also gave the tribunal the faculty to deal with actions and decisions 
violating political – electoral rights of citizens to vote, to be candidates, and to freely 
and peacefully participate in the political affairs of the country. 
6) The new tribunal also received the faculty to deal with federal and local controversies 
through  the  Proceedings  for  the  Electoral  Constitutional  Revision  (the  Juicio  de 
Revisión Constitutional Electoral).
160 This aspect meant that the tribunal could take final 
and  firm  actions  on  decisions  of  authorities  in  the  states  that  were  in  charge  of 
organising or validating elections, or in relation to controversies during the elections 
that could affect the development of the election or the final election results as well as 
the corresponding retribution if these were legally possible. 
7)  Labour  conflicts  or  differences  originated  between  the  Electoral  Tribunal  and  its 
employees, and between the Federal Electoral Institute and its employees. 
8) Determining and applying sanctions on electoral matters.  
Overall the final 1996 electoral reform produced a new judicial system on electoral 
matters that produced more precise rules that eventually reduced the partiality of the 
electoral  authorities  that  in  the  past  had  generated  distrust  and  uncertainty.
161  In 
addition, this reform helped IFE to consolidate its role: first of all, the TEPJF was the 
highest  authority  on  electoral  disputes  and  therefore  removed  from  the  IFE  the 
responsibility of taking decisions on electoral matters. Secondly, the new tribunal also 
provided accountability for the IFE’s decisions. Decisions could be appealed or disputed 
by those who considered it necessary with reference to a different body, a tribunal, who 
could ratify or confirm IFE’s resolutions. Therefore, it appears that the IFE was well 
complemented with a body from above such as the TEPJF, which was a tribunal of 
legality, whose main job it was to revise the process when an action was disputed.
162 
Woldenberg notes that the new electoral system resulted from a process that moved 
                                                 
160 Woldenberg notes that this “revision proceeding”opened the possibility for activities of local electoral authorities 
to be contested and be solved by a Legal federal organ. See Woldenberg, J. Testimonios sobre el desempeño del 
Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial, pp.352-53. 
161 Ibid, p.347. 
162Interview, senior member of PRI B, former PRI’s party Chairman, Mexico City, November 9 2004. Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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from a situation where electoral disputes were solved by political bodies that benefitted 
their own particular interests using poorly defined rules and procedures, to a situation 
where  conflicts  could  be  resolved  by  professional  bodies  integrated  in  the  Judicial 
Branch, and whose decisions were based on specific legal mechanisms established by 
law. 
5.5 Conclusion.  
In conclusion, it appears that in the initial stage, while still highly influenced by the 
government  through  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  IFE  concentrated  mainly  on 
implementing measures that were demanded by both parties and the general public to 
ensure  transparency  in  the  electoral  process  (electoral  roll,  voting  card,  professional 
electoral service and electoral organisation). However, and due to the lack of legitimacy 
of the Salinas’ government, it appears that the government itself also wanted IFE to 
make  elections  more  reliable,  despite  PRI’s  local  resistance.  Soon  after  IFE  started 
functioning it became obvious that timely composition and permanent updating of the 
different instruments of the federal registry (General Electors Catalogue, Electoral Roll, 
Voting Card and Nominal lists, polling booths etc) constituted at this early stage became 
essential to ensure transparency and certainty in the electoral processes. It seems that 
most parties apart from the PRD, which refused to support IFE because of its link with 
the government and the PRI government, were interested in resolving the sources of 
electoral fraud. On one hand, the parties that gained strength and support wanted to 
ensure their competence in the party system while on the other, the government wanted 
to legitimise itself after the controversial 1988’s elections. Regarding the Professional 
Electoral Service, it has been seen that in time it became one of the most tangible steps 
that the Mexican Electoral System took in order to strengthen democratic processes. 
The  professionalisation  of  electoral  officials  became  an  essential  guarantee  of  the 
changes which took place in the Mexican political culture. This is especially significant 
since it stemmed from the participants themselves, who worked directly on the electoral 
systems.  Therefore,  the  creation  of  those  highly  technical  organisations  and  a  more 
professional delivery made it possible to generate trust, certainty and legitimacy that 
helped the process of democratic transition in Mexico. The legal advance on this issue 
played an important role in the systematic dissolution of electoral conflicts that were 
typical in the first part of the 1990´s. It is fair to say that with the expansion of the 
guarantees of legal certainty in the electoral processes a culture of electoral legality had Lidia Acosta                                                                             Chapter 5 Managing the Electoral Process  
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been created between parties and citizens. Finally, and regarding the tribunal, it can be 
said that democratic change in Mexico can be confined to three strategic functions: a) 
The creation of an administrative impartial authority b) the creation of conditions of 
competence that promoted greater equality amongst contestants and c) the creation of a 
jurisdictional institution whose resolution of electoral conflicts generated confidence. 
For example, by the late nineties the electoral litigious differed greatly from those in the 
past. The electoral controversies went from issues related to electoral fraud, with lack of 
impartiality  and  transparency  in  the  organisation  of  elections  to  more  sophisticated 
issues like funding and equity. It seems that in the years before the 1996 reform, an 
authentic party system had been built due to the strengthening of political parties and 
their presence in all the territories. With IFE, the conditions of electoral competence 
became more and more balanced, and with every election the predetermined victories, 
or defeats, diminished. By 1994, political actors started focusing on other issues such as 
party financing and the issue of electoral fraud diminished and was confined to isolated 
local elections.  Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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6  Chapter 6 The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties  
This  chapter  continues  the  discussion  of  another  area  of  activity  of  IFE  (Federal 
Electoral  Institute):  the  control  of  the  financing  of  political  parties,  including  the 
development of formulas for the allocation of public funds, the regulation of private 
funding and accountability mechanisms and regulation of broadcasting time on radio 
and TV and access to media by political parties. Between the electoral reform in 1993 
and the so-called “definitive” electoral reform in 1996, discussions between government 
and  political  parties  started  to  focus  on  the  area  of  electoral  competition.  As  with 
electoral issues discussed in earlier chapters, the debate around the inequality of the 
conditions  for  electoral  competition  amongst  political  parties  was  activated  by 
opposition political parties. The inequalities and unfairness in the conditions of electoral 
competence, such as party funding and media access were identified by the parties as 
obstacles to their prospects of winning elections. The concern and debate amongst the 
parties that emerged in the early 1990s on the issue of party finances ran parallel to the 
continuous  discussions  on  other  electoral  issues  such  as  improvement  of  the 
organisation  of  elections  that  had  been  the  subject  of  negotiation  since  the  first 
negotiated  reform  in  1989-90.  Therefore  the  electoral  agenda  for  the  1993  electoral 
reform was not only intended to ensure transparent and credible elections but also to 
make the elections more competitive and fair. The IFE had been empowered in each 
reform by adopting new responsibilities. The aims of this chapter are firstly, to analyse 
the different positions of both political parties and government during the negotiations 
and the consequential reforms to the Constitution and electoral law in the area of party 
funding. Secondly, to examine the real input of IFE in the negotiations and the impact 
of its work in achieving more equal and competitive electoral contests. Lastly, it is also 
interesting to examine the extent to which the IFE’s new areas of responsibility played a 
part  in  the  credibility  of  the  electoral  authority  and  therefore  contributed  to  its 
independence and autonomy. Those responsibilities increased the  role of  IFE in the 
transition to democracy, as they contributed to a more competitive party system where 
the main political parties were allowed to contest under fair conditions. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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The first section of this chapter will examine the evolution of financing of political 
parties and the fiscal control processes of their public funding up to the 1990 electoral 
reform, when IFE was created.  
This section will show how the issue of party funding did not occupy an important place 
on  the  reforming  agenda  until  the  party  system  started  to  be  more  competitive, 
particularly after the 1988 presidential elections. The analysis will seek to determine the 
gradualist nature of the introduction of regulations on party funding. These were first 
given as concessions by the PRI government, in the context of a one dominant party 
system. This eventually became the centre of debate, as a result of demands made by the 
political parties in their pursuit of guarantees of greater equality and competition in 
electoral processes. It will also focus on the regulations that moved from being general 
and illdefined to being specific.  
The second section of the chapter will look at how, from the 1993 electoral reform, 
when the issue of control of party finances was first discussed, a reformist disposition 
among both government and political parties was initiated to regulate party funding and 
how this has remained ongoing. This section will highlight the main regulations made in 
party financing in the 1993, 1994 and 1996 electoral reforms, during which the political 
actors started focusing their energies on demanding constitutional and legal reforms of 
financial issues.  Along with the analysis of the different regulations approved in the 
reforms,  it  is  important  to  examine  how  the  IFE,  after  gaining  more  electoral 
responsibilities  in  financial  matters,  became  the  natural  enforcer  of  the  regulations 
passed by political parties in Congress. This section will also seek to establish whether 
IFE, or at times members of IFE, acting as mediators between parties and government, 
contributed not only to the achievement of consensus and agreement on what to reform 
in  financial  issues  but  also  to  the  credibility  of  electoral  processes  through  its 
supervisory functions.    
The final section of the chapter will seek to compare the evolution of party funding that 
political parties received between the 1991 midterm election and the 2000 presidential 
election. It is important to note that the electoral reforms that introduced changes in this 
respect took place before and after elections, therefore, the content of the reforms was 
directly related to previous electoral experiences. This section will attempt to establish Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
 
219 
whether IFE’s activities in such areas contributed to more equitable and competitive 
electoral processes. 
6.1 Evolution of party financing in Mexico.  
The regulation of the financing of political parties and fiscal control in Mexico that 
started in the mid 1990s was an essential factor in the so-called electoral democracy that 
culminated in the presidential elections in 2000. Indeed, as happened in other countries, 
in  Mexico,  the  control  of  party  finances  and  campaign  spending  limits  ultimately 
became a condition for the advance of democracy.
1 However, it was not until the early 
1990s that the inequalities of the conditions for electoral competence became a major 
issue to be addressed in order to achieve democracy. The delay resulted from the special 
nature of the Mexican party system during the PRI’s hegemony,
2 where fusion between 
the official party and the state contributed to both the concentration of political activity 
and public resources around one party. Furthermore, this “hegemonic party system” led 
to  a  proliferation  of  satellite  parties  that  not  only  lacked  incentives  for  political 
competition but also held back the development of other serious parties which intended 
to grow. In a non competitive system there are a number of reasons for the opposition 
not  growing  including,  electoral  fraud  through  manipulation  of  votes,  coercion, 
repression and lack of incentives. However, in the case of Mexico the total control of 
resources  by  the  official  party  also  played  a  very  important  role.  The  parties  were 
simply decorative pieces in a party system without electoral competition. Despite their 
existence they were precluded from winning the electoral game. Therefore, during the 
PRI’s  hegemony,  the  struggling  and  powerless  opposition  could  hardly  exert  any 
pressure  with  regard  to  requesting  regulation  of  their  finances.  When  analysing  the 
challenges that party funding presented to the democratic nations Woldenberg points 
out that the “parties’ money is a relevant issue, not only due to the sums involved or 
their  sources,  but  also  because  the  parties  have  become  the  spinal  cord  of  the 
democratic state.”
3 In this context, it can be said that in the hegemonic party system in 
Mexico the parties were simply tokens to enable the official party to feign a democracy. 
“Porcelaine political parties”, to look at but not to touch or use.  
                                                 
1 See article by Jean Francois Prud’homme and Rodrigo Morales. Los fondos de la política. Voz y voto. April 1993; 
(2): 16-23.  
2 For a detailed explanation of the characteristics of the hegemonic party system in Mexico see chapter one. Also see 
Article by Jean-Francois Prud’homme in Voz y Voto. December 1994; (22): 21-23. 
3 Woldenberg, J. Electoral Contests: funding as a challenge for democracy. Elecciones México, November 2000- 
April 2001; (5). Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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To  the  all  inclusive  authoritarian  Mexican  regime,  which  invited  everyone  to 
participate,  strong  parties  were  not  that  necessary,  so  their  finances  were  similarly 
unimportant.  In this context, it seems that as long as a party system is not competitive 
“the issue of party funding” is not a concern of the party in power and there will be no 
opportunity for the opposition to make it a core issue. Becerra notes, the weaker the 
political parties in a party system, the more difficult it is to identify deficiencies in the 
electoral structure of the country.
4 That is why the issue of party finances did not occupy 
the  centre  of  the  electoral  debate  until  the  parties  were  strong  enough  to  demand 
regulations and measures on the issue. Consequently, in Mexico, the development and 
strengthening  of  competitive  political  parties  was  related  to  the  regulation  of  their 
financing.  As  a  result,  the  successive  electoral  reforms  from  above,  that  gave 
concessions to opposition political parties, although not very  relevant on their own, 
were  cumulative  over  time  and  increased  the  presence  of  the  parties.  As  soon  as 
stronger  and  consolidated  opposition  parties  realised  their  appeal  and  potential  for 
electoral victory, they used the electoral reforms to increase their competitiveness. In 
the  race  for  transparent  and  fair  electoral  competition,  the  parties  demanded  and 
negotiated, firstly, reforms on basic problems such as the organisation of elections and 
the counting process. Secondly, and along with the resolution of the basic electoral 
issues,  the  parties  identified  new  obstacles  such  as  inequalities  in  the  conditions  of 
competence, and they focused their energies on reforming this area. In this context, the 
Federal Electoral Institute, IFE, created in 1990 with the primary objective of organising 
transparent and credible elections, also evolved in time with the changes in electoral 
competence.  After  solving  initial  problems  between  1991  and  1994,  it  focused  its 
energies on injecting “equity” into the electoral competition.
5 By the mid 1990s and 
along with an increasing competitive party system, issues such as the regulation of party 
funding, control of party expenditure and access to the media became the centre of the 
electoral agenda and the conditions for fair elections that parties demanded.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
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6.2 Antecedents: 1963-1990: The first  electoral reform of financial issues: 1963-
1964  
In Mexico the electoral regulation of financial  issues (rules for  campaign and party 
finances) had to wait until the electoral reform of 1962-63.
6 The first reform of the 
electoral law was passed on February 28, 1963, and included regulations on economic 
aspects. The reform incorporated the first form of “indirect public funding” for political 
parties.  It  exempted  registered  political  parties  from  paying  taxes,  on  rent-lease, 
purchase-sale or donation contracts; raffles, events and festivals that were organised to 
obtain money; on revenues, on taxable profit that derived from the sale of property 
acquired via purchase-sale or donations for the performance of their specific functions; 
on  the  sale  of  printed  material  related  to  the  dissemination  of  their  principles, 
programmes and statutes.
7 These exemptions were officially intended to assist small 
parties increase their presence in Congress and in the party system. However, it was 
clear  that  the  introduction  of  those  measures  resulted  more  from  the  need  for  the 
government to maintain the legitimacy of the “hegemonic party system” as it had started 
to erode. This view is shared by most political analysts who perceive these concessions 
as part of the PRI’s strategy to consolidate its power.
8 In this context, it is worth noting 
that the 1963 reform also introduced the figure of the “diputados de partido”, in order to 
increase the political presence of the opposition. As noted in chapter three, the creation 
of this figure was the first step towards the recognition of political parties as important 
elements in the political system, although it did not change the hegemony of the PRI.   
 
6.2.1  Party Prerogatives: exemption of payments for Postage and Telegraph and 
Access to Radio and Television.  
The next step in party funding was introduced in the 1973 Federal Electoral Law. Along 
with  the  addition  of  new  elements  to  the  previous  electoral  law  including  greater 
participation of the political parties in the Federal Electoral Commission.
9 The electoral 
law also introduced a special chapter on party prerogatives. The law established that for 
                                                 
6 Lujambio notes that over the first 45 years of the post-revolutionary period, the government did not give any 
prerogative to the political parties. Lujambio, A. Funding and Fiscal Control of political parties in Mexico. 
Elecciones México. November 2001 to April 2002; (5). 
7 Electoral Law (December 4 1951), reformed (December 28 1963), Art 44 bis. Gerardo Garcia Marroquín 
Elecciones México. November 2001 to April 2002; (5). 
8 Lujambio, A. “Funding and Fiscal Control of political parties in Mexico”. Elecciones México. November 2001 to 
April 2002; (5). 
9 It was established that political parties would be able to designate a representative with a“voice” and “voting” 
power in the Federal Electoral Commission, local commission and district councils. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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a political party to have prerogatives they had to be obtained through the registry in the 
Ministry of the Interior. The chapter on parties’ prerogatives included new types of 
indirect public funding  such as subsidies for postal and telegraphic services, by the 
state,  and  free  access  of  political  parties  to  radio  and  television  during  electoral 
campaigns. It is worth noting that this was the first time that the issue of media access 
had been recognised in the electoral arena.
10 Despite these prerogatives being welcomed 
by parties who benefitted from being able to officially promote their activities, they 
were nonetheless too limited. In addition, the regulations on party finances were still 
nonexistent as the law did not include regulations on important matters such as party or 
candidate expenditure. It it did not force the parties to report their finances and failed to 
establish monitoring powers for the authorities.
11  
 
6.2.2  The  Federal  law  of  Political  Organisations  and  Electoral  Processes 
(LFOPPE) 1977: the introduction of Direct Public Funding, without Rules 
of Allocation. 
The new electoral law LFOPPE (Federal Law of Political Organisations and Electoral 
Procedures”) was approved in the 1977 electoral reform,
12  introducing for the first time 
a model of public funding for political parties. It is worth noting that the consideration 
of public funding for political parties was directly related to the modification of Article 
41 (paragraph 2) of the constitution, which introduced the concept of political parties as 
“entities  of  public  interest”.  Article  (41)  conferred,  on  political  parties,  official 
recognition  within  the  Mexican  Constitution  as  entities  of  public  interest.  The  new 
electoral law established that the parties would have a permanent character and would 
be entitled to receive prerogatives and rights in order to be able to participate in state 
and  municipal  elections  and  promote  civil  participation  in  democratic  life.
13 
Woldenberg notes that the recognition of political parties as “entities of public interest” 
was  a  radical  change  as  the  1917  Constitution  (5  February)  despite  acknowledging 
Mexico  as  a  democratic  federal  and  representative  republic,  had  not  included  any 
                                                 
10 Lujambio, A. Funding and Fiscal Control of political parties in Mexico. Elecciones México.  November 2001 to 
April 2002; (5). 
11 de Swaan, M.,  Martorelli, P. and Molinar Horcasitas, J. Public Financing of Political Parties and Electoral 
Expenditures in Mexico. In:  Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections, edited by Serrano, M. Institute of 
Latin American Studies. University of London. 1998, p.157. 
12 The new electoral law, known as LFOPPE was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on December 19, 1977 by 
164 votes in favour and 19 against. The new law substituted the Federal Electoral Law of 1946. 
13 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.108. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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disposition on political parties.
14 As a result, for sixty years the electoral legislation had 
not paid much attention to political parties. However, the new constitutional status of 
political parties forced the reformers, in this case the PRI government, in future reforms, 
not  only  to  introduce  elements  for  their  promotion  and  protection  but  also  for  the 
regulation of their participation in elections.
15 The 1977 reform created a precedent for 
the parties who wanted to develop and increase their competitiveness. In the electoral 
law of 1977, the LFOPPE extended the rights of political parties, establishing in Article 
48 both direct public funding, for the first time, and indirect public funding, without 
rules of allocation.
16 First of all, it established in relation to direct public funding, that 
“in federal elections, the national political parties should count in an equitable manner, 
on  a  minimum  of  elements  for  the  activities  designed  to  obtain  the  popular 
vote/suffrage”.
17 Lujambio notes, that this third chapter represented for the first time, 
the law recognising the need to provide cash to political parties in order for them to 
develop their activities.
18 Also Article 45 (paragraph II) established that political parties 
would be assisted financially or in kind, in order to carry out their editorial activities, 
e.g.  paper,  printing  and  distribution  of  their  publications.  Additionally,  the  law 
confirmed two previous prerogatives of indirect public funding for political parties, the 
exemption from payments on taxes and exemptions in postage and telegraph services, 
which had been approved in previous reforms (1963-1973).
19 Another important aspect 
of  this  reform  was  the  introduction  of  a  new  political  parties’  prerogative  which 
established that “the national political parties will have the right to have permanent 
access to the mass media (TV and radio) according to the law”.
20 In order to control 
access  to  the  media  the  government  created  a  new  special  commission,  the  “Radio 
Diffusion Commission,” which depended on the Federal Electoral Commission. Despite 
the new electoral law establishing various rules for determining the amounts of public 
                                                 
14 Becerra, R. et.al. Op. cit. p.107. 
15 The constitutional articles state that: “the political parties are bodies of public interest; the law will determine the 
specific forms of their participation in the electoral process. The political parties had the goal of promoting the 
participation of society in democratic life and of organising citizens, to make it possible for them to exercise public 
power, according to the programmes, principles and ideas that follow and through the universal, free, direct and 
secret vote..” Article 41. Paragraph 2 Mexican Constitution. 
16 Lujambio, A. Funding and Fiscal Control of political parties in Mexico. Elecciones México. November 2001 to 
April 2002; (5). 
17 Article 48. Chapter III LFOPPE  
18 Lujambio notes that this third paragraph of this article served as a legal basis for the Ministry of the Government to 
start providing cash to the political parties. Lujambio, A., Op. cit.  
19 Article 48. Chapters IV and V LFOPPE  
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funding, many political analysts claim that the regulations were unclear and lax.
21 For 
example, the law did not state the formula to allocate the resources, nor the total amount 
to be allocated, nor establish any procedure to manage or supervise them or hold to 
account the resources received by the political parties.
22 In addition the law also failed 
to provide any kind of control or regulation on private funding or limits to campaign 
expenditure. Additionally, another aspect of the reform that was not welcomed by the 
opposition was the empowerment of the Federal Electoral Commission, by giving it 
authority to distribute the prerogatives. It is important to note that the Federal Electoral 
Commission (predecessor of IFE), was just a government branch, whose membership 
mainly constituted priistas. Everyone assumed that the Minister of the Interior, who 
controlled the Commission, would favour the official party in the distribution of the 
prerogatives, in addition to the traditional advantages such as equipment, personnel and 
logistic.
23 Therefore, despite including new discretionary elements it was nonetheless a 
reform  from  above.  Since  it  was  designed  and  controlled  by  an  official  party,  that 
intended to stay in control of the electoral game, the Electoral Commission, with its 
discretionary powers, was another instrument of control. Mony de Swaan, Martorelli 
and Molinar Horcasitas note that as a response to this discretionary authority, the PAN 
refused the subsidies for nine years.
24 Finally, the reform provided the Federal Electoral 
Commission with juridical personality and financial support, giving these governmental 
organisms greater powers. The reform provided the Electoral Commission with not only 
the ability to establish regulations and sanctions but also exposed it to the possibility of 
having its decisions challenged by any other institution or tribunal.  In section 2, the 
importance of the accountability of the future electoral authority, the Federal Electoral 
Authority, IFE, to political parties and society in general will be highlighted. In part the 
lack  of  credibility  that  the  IFE  initially  suffered  was  related  to  the  old  relationship 
between the PRI and the electoral commissions.
25  
 
                                                 
21 Alonso Lujambio, 2002, Mony de Swaan, Paola Martorelli and Juan Molinar Horcasitas, 1998; Jean Francois & 
Prud’homme, 1998. 
22 Mony de Swaan, M., Martorelli, P  & Molinar Horcasitas, J. “Public Financing of Political Parties and Electoral 
Expenditures in Mexico,” p. 157; Lujambio, A. Funding and Fiscal Control of political parties in Mexico. Elecciones 
México.  November 2001 to April 2002; (5). 
23 Interview, Emiliano Vargas, Member of  PRD, Mexico City, 27 October 2004. 
24 Mony de Swaan, M. et. al. Op. cit. p.157. 
25 Interview, Rosa Maria González, member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), Mexico City, 22 September 
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6.2.3  The Federal Electoral Code of 1987:  Direct Public Funding with Allocation 
Regulation  
The  Federal  Electoral  Code  was  approved  in  1987  and  was  the  first  legislation  to 
incorporate public funding to parties. The new electoral code stated that political parties 
had the right to public funding for their activities, in addition to income they obtained 
from their members’ contributions. The new electoral law provided, for the first time, 
the regulations to determine the total amount of public funding for political parties, a 
distribution formula and distribution criteria.
26 Even though it was later demonstrated 
that the law had too many loopholes and lacked precision, it was relevant because “it 
was the first time the Constitution granted political parties the right to receive public 
financing, in order to carry out activities aimed at attracting votes.”
27 The new formula 
for the distribution of public funding to political parties established in Art 61 that public 
funding  for  their  activities  would  depend  on  their  electoral  results  in  the  previous 
election  and  the  percentages  of  seats  won  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.
28  The  law 
established  that  the  electoral  authority  “the  Federal  Electoral  Commission”  was  the 
body in charge of calculating the formula for the distribution of public funding. The 
CFE  formula  consisted  of,  first  of  all,  a  calculation  for  the  “minimum  cost  of  an 
electoral campaign for a deputy”, then the result obtained had to be multiplied by the 
number of registered candidates of relative majority. The resulting amount was divided 
into  two  equal  parts,  50%  of  the  financing  previously  determined  was  distributed 
according to the number of votes obtained by each political party in the last election for 
the federal deputies, (percentage of votes received by each political party in the last 
election for deputies of relative majority) and the other 50% was allocated according to 
the number of federal deputy seats obtained by each party.
29 Another relevant aspect of 
the  new  law  was  the  introduction  for  the  first  time  of  measures  in  respect  of  the 
accountability of political parties. It was established that political parties were obligated 
to justify annually the use of public funding before the Federal Electoral Commission.
30 
However, in reality, the accountability of political parties could not be achieved as there 
                                                 
26 Becerra, Salazar and Woldenberg note that the new law reduced the level of discretional management of public 
financing that had existed in the past, although it was still limited. Mecánica del cambio político, p. 197 
The distribution criteria were: three annual distributions, 20% in the first year, 30% in the second and 50% in the 
election year. Becerra, R. et. al. La mecánica del cambio político en México.  
27 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997. 
28 Federal Electoral Code 1987, Art 61. 
29 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997.  
30 Lujambio notes despite this “rule marking the beginning of an accountability exercise, there was no record of the 
delivery of reports by political parties”. Lujambio, A. Funding and Fiscal Control of political parties in Mexico. 
Elecciones México. November 2001 to April 2002; (5). Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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were no regulations in respect of monitoring or reporting their funding. In addition, the 
non existence of sanctions, for those parties who did not adhere to the regulations, left a 
discretionary  gap  for  parties.  With  regard  to  the  requirements  needed  for  parties  to 
receive public funding, the legislation stated that 1.5% was the minimum percentage 
required for parties to be entitled to receive it. Overall, the introduction of these criteria 
for the distribution of public finances would prove to be critical for the development of 
opposition parties at this time.
31 Indeed, formulas for the calculation and distribution of 
public funding and the control of them would play an important role in the electoral 
process of 1988.
32 However, the reform did not introduce enough elements to ensure the 
transparency of the instruments used to distribute public funding to political parties nor 
provisions for the reporting and monitoring of party finances. Lujambio notes that the 
transparency of the new formula was jeopardised until 1989, as the amount of public 
funding  granted to parties in 1987  and 1988 was never disclosed to the public  and 
therefore  was  unknown.
33  Additionally,  from  the  middle  of  the  1980s,  stronger 
opposition parties had started complaining about the illegal use of public funding by the 
official parties, although the complaints did not produce any consideration or initiatives 
to  change  the  law.
34  It  seems  that  the  PAN  was  the  only  party  to  express  its 
disagreement over the distribution model alleging that “creating too big a dependency 
of  the  parties  on  the  electoral  authority  was  dangerous.
35  The  defects  and  lack  of 
regulation of this new electoral law would become more obvious when it was applied 
for the first and last time in the presidential elections in 1988.   
 
6.2.4  1989  COFIPE  (Federal  Electoral  Code  of  Institutions  and  Electoral 
Procedures): looking for transparency 
The approval of a new electoral code on July 14 1989, COFIPE, which resulted from 
the reformist process that the newly elected president Salinas initiated, increased the 
relevance  of  political  parties  funding  by  introducing  a  new  formula  and  criteria  for 
distribution.  It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  reform  was  a  consequence  of  the 
                                                 
31 Chayffet Chemor, E. Algunas reflexiones sobre el financiamiento. Mexican Law Review. 2006; (5): 37. See 
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/1/347/5.pdf.  
32 Becerra, R, Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.197. 
33 Lujambio notes that the fifth provisional article of the Federal Electoral Code of 1987 established the retroactive 
application of Article 61, which was the allocation of public funding to parties taking into consideration the results of 
the 1985 elections, by which the parties would have benefitted. However, the amount of public funding for political 
parties in 1987 and 1988 remains unknown. 
34 See article by Jean Francois Prud’homme and Rodrigo Morales in Voz y voto. April 1993; (2): 16-23.  
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highly  contested  1988  presidential  elections,  which  forced  Salinas’  government  to 
pursue  urgent  electoral  reform  to  respond  to  the  new  electoral  context.  The  most 
vigorous complaints among political parties were related to the “organisation of the 
electoral process,” including the counting process. Consequently, the participants in the 
negotiations  focused  mainly  on  addressing  aspects  related  to  the  management  of 
elections such as the creation of a new electoral roll and new mechanisms to count the 
votes.
36  The  creation  of  a  new  federal  electoral  commission,  IFE  and  an  electoral 
Tribunal were created with the intention of ensuring transparent elections. The need for 
the  creation  of  these  two  institutions  not  only  resulted  from  complaints  about  the 
handling of elections by the Electoral commission, but also because of concerns about 
the management of public resources by the official party.
37 Despite the issue of party 
funding not being at the centre of the electoral agenda, opposition parties accused the 
PRI of using public resources during electoral campaigns. In addition, it was already 
perceived  among  the  emerging  opposition  as  having  major  implications  for  their 
competitiveness. With regard to dispositions on electoral finances of the new legislation 
(COFIPE), the law adopted four criteria for distribution for the first time: The new types 
of  public  financing  were  the  following:  1)  for  “electoral  activities”,  which  was 
established according to the total number of votes gained by each political party in 
senators’  and  deputies’  elections;  2)  for  “general  activities”  which  was  distributed 
equally among all political parties and corresponded to 10% of the total funding for 
electoral  activities.  The  law  then  established  a  third  and  fourth  new  type  of  public 
funding, one “for subrogation”, that the State would make of the contributions made by 
legislators to support their parties, the amount received would be equivalent to 50% of 
the net annual income of its deputies and senators and the other, for “specific activities”, 
which was granted by IFE annually and consisted of the reimbursement, up to 50%, of 
demonstrable spending carried out by each political party to finance educational and 
political training, research and publishing activities.
38 Lujambio notes that in relation to 
the  changes  to  the  public  financing  issues,  the  most  relevant  modification  was  the 
introduction of a new allocation formula, which despite not being perfect, contributed 
towards making elections a bit more equitable: “90% of resources would be allocated in 
                                                 
36 This area has been covered in chapter 5 (making of new electoral roll, new mechanisms of vote counting) 
37 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
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relation to the votes obtained by each of the parties that exceeded the threshold of 1.5% 
and  10%  would  be  distributed  on  an  egalitarian  basis.”
39  Overall,  the  reform  was 
positive in clarifying the distribution of public funding and opened the debate between 
the parties, however it was insufficient. First of all, the amount of public funding and 
the dispositions regarding control of the origin and destination of party funding required 
large  adjustments  as  they  were  loose  and  vague.  Secondly,  the  expenditure  limits, 
introduced for the first time, were unrealistically  high,
40 and of no use. Finally, the 
reform failed to regulate the fiscal control of the political parties, a function that could 
be performed by the IFE.
41 It is important to note that the 1989-90 reform started an 
intensive reformist period where the content of the successive reforms would be brought 
by  the  parties  themselves.  Therefore  the  outstanding  regulations  of  a  reform  would 
become the centre of debate, especially from 1993 the financial issues. 
 
6.2.5  The IFE and party finances 
Once the IFE was created, as the new electoral authority in charge of the state function 
of  organising  elections,  it  concentrated  mainly  on  the  procedures  related  to  the 
organisation of elections such as the creation of a new electoral roll, the issuing of 
photo-credentials  and  the  technical  preparation  for  the  elections  in  1991.  Like  its 
predecessor, the IFE was the body in charge of distributing public funding. However, as 
the IFE was still highly controlled by the government, in 1991 most of its energies were 
focused on organising peaceful elections. At this early stage, the role of IFE in party 
finances was limited to the distribution of public finances as agreed by the electoral law. 
Within IFE, there were no real concerns about financial issues. It appears the high level 
of control of IFE by the government, not only through the Ministry of the Interior but 
also through most of its staff, who were PRI members, prevented any independence on 
the issue of party funding. All operations, energies and resources were concentrated on 
solving  the  most  basic  problem  of  “electoral  fraud”,  through  cleansing  the 
organisational process.
42 On the whole, the most significant aspect, in this early period 
of  IFE, was the creation of the institution itself. Along with the reform, the parties 
                                                 
39 Lujambio “Funding and Fiscal Control of political parties in Mexico”. Elecciones México. November 2001 to April 
2002; (5). 
40 Mony de Swaan, et. al. Public Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Expenditures in Mexico, p.157. 
41 Becerra, R.,  Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.259. 
42 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
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would perceive IFE as the most obvious institution to be empowered to control party 
finances. Indeed, through the cumulative nature of the electoral reforms, the IFE would 
acquire more and more responsibilities in relation to the regulation of party finances and 
the setting of campaign spending ceilings that would define its role in the transition to 
democracy.   
 
6.2.6  Towards  transparency,  control,  accountability  and  fairness:  1993,  1994, 
1996 electoral reforms 
In previous chapters it has been noted that the first electoral reform in 1989-90 under 
Salinas’ government, which for the first time had to be negotiated with the opposition in 
order  to  be  passed,
43  initiated  a  process  of  political  negotiation,  on  electoral  issues 
among political parties, that lasted the whole decade. The Constitutional reform in 1993 
was in keeping with traditional practice of reforming before a new electoral contest, as 
had  happened  in  the  1986,  and  1989-90  reforms.  On  this  occasion  the  forthcoming 
elections were the 1994 presidential elections. However, this time the electoral debate 
and its content would be determined by a series of changes in the party system. First of 
all, the change of the ISI economic model to the neo-liberal model that De la Madrid 
had started in the 1980s and was continued by Salinas, had an impact on the way public 
resources were distributed among the political elites, therefore, affecting the PRI itself. 
The emergence of Cardenas, an ex PRI member, in the 1988 elections, and later the 
strength  of  the  PRD,  resulted  from  that  change,  as  most  of  the  support  came  from 
government ex employees who had abandoned PRI for the PRD.
44 In addition, the cuts 
in public spending that had nurtured a corporative state, contributed to a more aware 
society that started being more active and looking for other political parties to support. 
Secondly, and as a result of the increasing popularity of the opposition, they decided to 
open  the  electoral  debate.  By  1993,  and  within  the  second  electoral  reform  under 
Salinas,  the  opposition  parties,  especially  the  PAN  and  PRD  benefitted  from  an 
increasing bargaining power to push for reforms. As expected during the negotiations 
for the 1993 electoral reform, the introduction in the electoral law of the rules for “the 
control of party finances” was one of the big issues. In fact, various happenings, during 
                                                 
43 It is important to note that since the 1989-90 reform that was initiated by Salinas, all subsequent reforms had to be 
negotiated between the parties and the government. The first reform in 1989 was negotiated between the PAN and the 
PRI. 
44 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
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the 1991 midterm and state elections, refocussed the attention on earlier discussions 
relating  to  inequalities  in  the  conditions  of  competence.  Discussion  centred  on  the 
inequalities in the distribution of resources, the high cost of campaigns, the need for 
control of party funding and access to electronic media.
45 It was clear that the financing 
issue had become one of the aspects to be discussed in the reform. First of all, prior to 
the reform, Salinas had expressed his willingness to advance on issues such as: the 
transparency  of  the  funding  of  political  parties,  the  need  to  set  campaign  expenses 
ceilings and to work towards the impartiality of the mass media.
46 The initial intention 
to  regulate  party  funding  was  a  result  of  several  complaints  and  protests  from  the 
opposition parties who, despite enjoying greater support since 1988, could not compete 
with  the  PRI’s  overwhelming  financial  resources.
47  Furthermore,  it  was  common 
knowledge that the PRI still relied on traditional sources of funding that it had enjoyed 
for decades, including government resources, the three sectors (agrarian, popular and 
labour) and funding from militants and sympathisers, although, with Salinas in power, 
in a more sophisticated manner.
48  In fact, the need for separating the PRI from the 
government  was  essential  in  order  to  guarantee  equality  in  elections.  According  to 
Alberto Aziz Nassif the 1991 midterm and local elections showed how the inability of 
the PRI to undertake politics and compete with the opposition “was compensated by 
overspending,  use  of  excessive  public  resources  and  new  techniques  for  voters 
mobilisation “political engineering“.
49 Secondly, there was another matter concerning 
the  parties:  the  regulation  of  private  funding.  At  the  beginning  of  1993  a  series  of 
accusations among the political parties, relating to private party funding, focused the 
discussion on the relationship between money and politics. On one hand, the PRI was 
accused of abusing its position, as a state party, to request funding from the business 
sector. A meeting, that took place in March in the house of the ex- secretary of the 
Treasury Department, between PRI members
50 and prominent business people, and at 
which President Salinas was present, where the PRI had requested donations of millions 
                                                 
45 See article by Jean Francois Prud’homme and Rodrigo Morales in Voz y voto. April 1993; (2): 18. 
46 Carlos Salinas, Fourth report to the Government: November, 1, 1992. Congress of Deputies. 
47 The opposition’s protests and complaints against the so-called “state party”were common. Among the illicit 
methods that benefitted the “State party”, the PRI, included transfers of money, material aid and personnel, which 
both civil servants and public organisations offered to it. Becerra, R. at. el. La mecánica del cambio político en 
México, p.287. 
48 See Roman, G. Partidas y Partidos. Voz y voto. April 1993; (2): 24-27. 
49 See Aziz Nassif, A. Reformismo Agotado. Voz y voto.  June 1993; (4): 26-27. 
50 The meeting took place on the 23 February 1993 in the home of Antonio Ortiz Mena in the presence of President 
Salinas. There were 25 business people present and Genaro Borrego asked for 75 million pesos for the PRI, in order 
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of pesos, was reported in the national press
51 and triggered a series of protests. The 
published  event  provoked  dissent  not  only  among  political  parties  but  also  within 
traditional social sectors of PRI such as the agrarian and the telephonist union.
52 Despite 
PRI  declaring  in  a  press  conference  that  the  “funding  received  was  not  going  to 
influence the PRI’s decision” and that the objective was “to give more independency to 
the  PRI”,  the  event  not  only  triggered  a  series  of  explanations  and  restating  of  the 
sectors involved, including the private sector but also put the issue of private funding in 
the centre of the debate.
53 The meeting was commented on by the international press 
adding more controversy to the event and was headlined as a “cartelización” of the 
private sector.
54 The PRD and PAN reacted badly to this piece of news. Muñoz Ledo, 
the president of the PRD, declared that the meeting of the PRI and the businessmen 
showed the “oligarchic” character of the PRI.
55 The Minister of the Interior, Patrocinio 
González,  also  accused  the  opposition  of  illegal  funding  through  drug  trafficking, 
money laundering and funding from abroad.
56 On the whole, the succession of events 
demonstrated the need for strict regulation on both public and private funding. There 
were two main problems: first of all there was no regulation on private funding and no 
limits to campaign spending, and secondly, their accountability
57 before the electoral 
authorities was overlooked. The issue of party funding would maintain a status on the 
electoral agenda until becoming a condition of its democratic quality.  
 
6.2.7  Negotiations towards transparency 
Prior to the 1993 reform and taking account of the controversies over party funding, the 
government, PRI and opposition started to reveal their positions on the subject. Despite 
                                                 
51 The newspaper that covered this event was “El Economista”. March 12 1993. 
52 See in Voz y Voto complaints from various deputies, including Demetrio Sodi and deputies from the agrarian sector 
who agreed that the PRI should oppose financing of the party by priviliged people. El Mes. Voz y voto. April 1993; 
(2): 49. 
53 The leaders of the “Consejo Coordinador Empresarial”, CONCAMI and CONCANACO claimed that the private 
sector did not have a strategy to support the PRI, and those members who donated money to the PRI did so “ on a 
personal basis”. Ibid. Voz y voto. El Mes. April 1993; (2).  
54 The Wall Street Journal on February 9 1993, mentioned the dinner and commented that “they are looking for the 
illusion of democracy without the risk of democracy”. 
55 Muñoz Ledo. Ibid. Voz y voto. El Mes. April 1993; (2): 49. 
56 Patrocinio González, from PRI denounced the fact that some politicians were receiving funding from money 
laundering to fund their political activities. See El Mes. Voz y voto.  April 1993; (2). 
57 From 1990 the parties were obliged to inform the IFE annually of their use of public funding, but until 1993 the 
practice was not consistent. Jean Francois Prud’homme & Rodrigo Morales. Los fondos de la política. April 1993; 
(2): 16- 23. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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the positive results of the PRI in the 1991 midterm elections
58 giving Salinas the chance 
to carry out reforms without the support of any party, the government encountered 
resistance, especially in the electoral arena. In this context the PAN and PRD in clear 
disapproval of the PRI’s reform proposal, presented a common agenda for the first 
time.
59 One of the demands in the (PAN-PRD) common agenda was the request for 
“regulation of the financial regime of the parties and a guarantee of equality in the time 
spaces of mass media”.
60 As noted previously, despite the reform being discussed 
between the four political parties, as a result of opposition pressure in the “Plural 
Commission” of Congress, it was only approved by PRI, PAN and PARM, as the PRD 
along with the PFCRN and the PPS had decided not to sign it.
61  It is worth noting that 
since 1989 the PRD maintained its opposition to dealing with the PRI government. With 
regard to the regulation of funding it had alleged that the “government is interested in 
the transparent use of resources but not willing to establish realistic limits to campaigns 
and effective control as it could  dismantle the PRI’s traditional costly campaigns.”
62 In 
addition, the PRD did not support the financial structure that the government wanted to 
apply as it was to the detriment of the intermediate parties, PAN and PRD, the real 
opposition.
63  
 
6.2.8  The electoral Reform: regulation of private funding and campaign spending 
ceilings  
Private  money  constitutes  a  very  important  source  of  funding  to  political  parties  in 
established  democracies.  In  the  case  of  Mexico,  although  the  first  regulations  had 
focused on public funding, it was common practice for the main parties such as PAN 
and PRI to be supported by private funding (from business and supporters). However, 
due to the lack of control over private funding until 1993, it is impossible to know the 
real  input  from  this  source  of  funding.  However,  as  party  competitiveness  grew, 
disparities  in  party  finances  became  more  evident  and  the  need  for  regulations 
                                                 
58 The mid-term elections in 1991 were won by the PRI, obtaining enough seats to initiate reforms on its own. With 
the positive results, Salinas initiated a period of reform in all areas, including economic, agrarian and electoral. See 
chapter 3 for electoral results. 
59 See common agenda for constitutional and legal reform in chapter 3 and in Becerra, R. et. al, La mecánica del 
cambio politico en México, p.289. 
60 Ibid. p.89. 
61 The PRD’s reason for not supporting the 1993 electoral reform was not only the insufficient regulations but also 
the continuation of governmental control in the IFE. 
62 See interview to Muñoz Ledo, PRD’s party charmain about the reform, by Hinojosa, O. Gradualismo, la máscara 
del autoritarismo. Voz y voto. June 1993; (4): 16-20.  
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increased.
64  The  1993  electoral  reform  finally  approved  regulation  of  the  private 
financial sources for political parties for the first time. As a result, private financial 
sources for parties were defined, limited and regulated for the first time.
65 First of all, 
the COFIPE authorised four different sources of private financing: by militants or by 
membership,
66 by followers
67or sympathisers, by self-financing,
68 by financial profits, 
funds and trusts.
69 With regard to the private source “by militants” the law considered 
and allowed the “economic contributions of its social organisations”.  Within financing 
by sympathisers, the law allowed anonymous contributions but established that they 
must not exceed ten percent of that party’s public funds and it also established limits to 
individual contributions to 1% of the total amount of public funding available to all 
parties and entity contribution to five percent of that figure.
70  
Finally, the modifications to the COFIPE also introduced campaign spending ceilings 
for  the  first  time.  It  was  established,  by  a  PRI  proposal,  that  the  local  and  district 
executive boards of IFE
71 would be the bodies in charge of setting the limits to the 
campaigns for senators and lower chamber members. Despite having been a concern 
among the opposition, the issue of campaign spending limits only became crucial after 
the 1994 presidential elections. Muñoz Ledo argued that the government’s reticence to 
establish campaign ceilings resulted from its own interest in prioritising the regulation 
of private funding in order to stop accussation and intimidate the opposition with the 
threath of fiscalisation of their finances.
72 
 
                                                 
64Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
65 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. 1997. IFE, p.118. 
66 “By Militants: It includes all the ordinary and extraordinary obligatory quotas of its members and the donations by 
its social association whose amounts and periodicity are determined freely by each political party; as well as the 
voluntary quotas and personal quotas that the candidates of each party give exclusively for their campaigns, which in 
all cases will follow the limit the internal party body responsible for the administration of finances sets”. The 
Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal elections of the year 2000. IFE. 
67 By sympathisers it includes all contributions and donations in cash or kind, provided to political parties given 
freely and voluntarily by Mexicans individuals or entities other than commercial corporations that are not members of 
the party. Ibid. 
68 By self-financing, which stems from promotional events; it includes all income obtained by concept of promotional 
activities, such as conferences, shows, games and raffles, cultural events, editorial sales, and any other similar activity 
carried out with the purpose of raising funds. Ibid. 
69 By Financial profits: it includes all earning generated through the funds and trusts created by political parties with 
their own capital, or with the contributions from any source permitted by law. Political parties are impeded from 
soliciting credits from development banks and non-identified persons. Likewise, the law also establishes annual 
ceilings similar to those applied to contributions made by followers. Ibid. 
70 The Mexican Electoral System. IFE. 1994. 
71 Executive bodies made up of members of the professional electoral service. 
72 See interview to Muñoz Ledo, by Hinojosa, O. Gradualismo, la máscara del autoritarismo. Voz y voto. June 1993; 
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6.2.9  Prohibitions and Restrictions to party finances 
Another significant aspect of the reform was the regulation on private  donations or 
funding from supporters. The law established limits to this type of funding for the first 
time. It seems that this resulted from the overwhelming criticisms that the PRI received 
after news of their infamous” dinner with business men” became public knowledge. 
However,  the  PRI  itself  defended  the  new  measures,  arguing  that  the  opposition, 
especially  the  PRD  would  also  benefit  from  foreign  funding.
73  With  regard  to  the 
limitation  on  private  donations,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  principle  of  freedom  of 
information could conflict with the idea of equity in the competition. However, in the 
case of Mexico, the principle of transparency was essential in order to make credible the 
intention to regulate political finances.
74 As a result, and together with the establishment 
of the legal sources of private funding, the electoral law published for the first time the 
different  private  and  public  national  and  international  sources  that  were  not  legally 
allowed to finance political parties. It prohibited any kind of funding or aid coming 
from different public and private institutions including all federal, state or municipal 
organisations, from foreign individuals, from religious organisations or ministers and 
from  international  organisations.  These  prohibitions  were  basically  intended  to  add 
credibility to the reformist effort of the government which had long been accused of 
diverting contributions and donations from the public institutions to the PRI.  
Finally, one of the most important innovations was the introduction in the Constitution 
of the obligations of the parties in relation to the management of their resources,
75 both 
public and private. The introduction of these regulations in the constitution was very 
important because until 1993 the electoral legislation did not mention anything about 
the control and monitoring of party funding. In addition there were no regulations to 
allow the IFE authority to know the origin, destination and use of party funding.
76 Also, 
their  introduction  to  the  Constitution  also  meant  that  further  regulations  could  be 
approved in this area. 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Voz y voto. May 1993; (3). 
74 See article by Jean Francois Prud’home and Rodrigo Morales in Voz y voto. April 1993; (4): 21. 
75 Art 41 of the Constitution. “ the law shall establish the rules to which funding of political parties and its electoral 
campaigns will be subjected” 
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6.2.10  Auditing criteria and other regulations 
The creation of an organ to control party finances inside the parties, was put forward by 
the Ministry of the Interior, in the Plural Commission of Congress, during negotiations 
for electoral reform.
77 It is worth noting that the PRI’s first initiate for the reform of the 
COFIPE had been the proposal of the creation of a commission for the supervision of 
party finances. This was not accepted by the PRD and PAN who made their alternative 
proposal.
78  The  obligation  of  the  parties  to  have  an  internal  office,  responsible  for 
managing property and financial resources, was the first sign of the level of complexity 
that party finances were gaining of increasing party competition. Chayffet notes that in 
1991 the parties had to return a big part of public funding for specific activities (such as 
education  and  editorial)  due  to  insufficient  use  or  faulty  records  of  the  expenses.
79 
Eventually the law established that the party’s internal office had to report on their total 
earnings  and  expenditures.  At  the  same  time,  the  law  established  the  creation  of  a 
Commission of Councillors of the IFE in order to collect, audit and pass judgment on 
the parties’ reports every year.
80 The new commission had a fiscal control role as its 
members (IFE councillors) were empowered to propose to the General Council of IFE 
the  “approval  of  regulations  to  be  observed  by  the  parties  in  the  conduct  of  their 
accounting practices and the presentation of their reports.
81 In this area, PAN went a 
bit further by asking for an external body to audit party funding.
82 This formula of 
control of income and expenditure, which is quite normal in countries whose legislation 
regulates party funding, was novel in Mexico.
83 As many political analysts agree these 
dispositions  were  a  breakthrough  in  the  area  of  finance  and  politics.
84  First  of  all, 
because  they  created  a  legal  structure  for  the  control  of  party  finances  (income, 
expenditure and its use) as the parties were forced to present an annual report to IFE, 
and also more importantly they introduced the possibility of sanctions by the Electoral 
Tribunal. Secondly, because they created the basic structure for fiscal control in future 
                                                 
77 The creation of an organ to control party finances was put forward by the Minister of the Interior, in the Plural 
Commission of Congress during negotiations for the electoral reform. Voz y voto. El MES. April 1993; (2): 48-49. 
78 See Castro, I. at. el. ¿Dónde quedó la bolita? Voz y voto. November 1993; (9): 7-9. 
79 Chayffet Chemor, E. Algunas reflexiones sobre el financiamiento. Mexican Law Review. 2006; (5): 37. See 
http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/1/347/5.pdf 
80 Lujambio, A., Funding and fiscal control of political parties in Mexico. Elecciones México. November 2001 to 
April 2002; (5): 13. 
81 Ibid. “this commission should analyse and pass judgment on the complaints presented against the parties which 
allegedly contravened the provisions of the Code." 
82 Voz y voto. El mes. May 1993; (3): 48. 
83 Jean Francois Prud’homme and Rodrigo Morales note that in countries like Canada and EEUU the obligation to 
publish the political parties’ financial reports constitutes an important instrument that not only exercises fiscal control 
of the parties but also gives credibility to the system. See Voz y Voto. April 1993: (2): 16-23. 
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reforms. Nevertheless, the regulation on party finances lacked precision. First of all, 
Art. 49 of the COFIPE stated that parties only had to inform IFE of the origin and use of 
their public and private funding, in order to make their financial matters transparent, 
once a year. Additionally, many analysts considered the formula quite limited as it did 
not  require  the  publication  of  the  financial  reports  given  to  IFE.
85  As  a  result,  the 
accountability of the parties was only checked by IFE, an institution that was still not 
perceived as totally impartial, as it was chaired by the executive, through the Minister of 
the Interior. It was argued that in order for the reports to be taken seriously by the 
political parties, IFE needed to publish them before being publicly checked. Shortly 
after the 1994 presidential elections, the issue of the publishing of party funding reports 
would attract further attention.  
Finally, regarding the right to public finances by political parties, the law established 
that if a party lost its registration, it would not have the right to receive public funding.
86 
This regulation was linked to other regulations regarding the causes for a party to lose 
registration:  depending  on  the  number  of  votes  obtained  by  a  political  party  at  the 
national level.
87 With regard to the rights allocated to registered parties, many analysts 
argued for the need to establish different formulas for the parties to obtain legal and 
parliamentary representation. They considered it important to allow small parties to take 
part in the political system but also to give them consistency in the party system.
88 
Overall, the 1993 reform, the second for Salinas and the last bilateral reform negotiated 
by only the PRI and the PAN, was crucial for the beginning of fiscal control of parties 
public and private financing and the regulation of private funding. However, it was still 
considered  incomplete  and  to  have  too  many  outstandings  issues.  First  of  all,  the 
regulation on private finances needed important adjustment especially in the area of 
anonymous donations. Woldenberg, Becerra and Salazar mention the “black hole” that, 
for the fiscal control of the electoral authorities, meant that anonymous contributions 
could reach up to 10% of the total of the public funding to all parties, and also that the 
                                                 
85 Jean Francois Prud’homme and Rodrigo Morales note that the right to publish polical parties’ expenditure and 
income could clash with ethical issues, such as had ocurred in other countries like Sweden which was against the 
secrecy of the vote. Voz y voto. April 1993: (2): 23. 
86 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. 1997. IFE, p.119. 
87 “The law stated that a political party would lose its definitive register if it did not obtain a minimum of 1.5% of the 
national vote in two consecutive ordinary elections. This disposition was not applicable to parties with a conditional 
register or participating in a coalition during an election, because the political party could lose its register if it did 
not obtain 1.5% of the national vote in a federal ordinary election. When a political party with a definitive register 
did not obtain 1.5% of the votes in a federal ordinary election, as the code stated (but had a minimum 1%), it could 
keep its right and prerogatives under a special regime including public financing.” Ibid. 
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overly  high  limits  established  for  the  “individuals’  contributions”  were  reduced.
89 
Secondly, the campaign ceilings set up by the IFE were considered too high, especially 
the PRI’s proposal for granting 400 million dollars for the presidential campaign, an 
excess compared with richer countries.
90  
 
6.2.11  Role of the IFE in the 1993 reform 
There are two things to highlight with regard to the role of the IFE in the 1993 reform. 
Firstly, the proactive position that IFE, adopted for the first time, on mobilising debate 
and discussion between political actors, in order to initiate the reform. For example, the 
director  of  IFE  organised  a  public  round-table  on  electoral  reform  with  a  specific 
agenda including the conditions for competitiveness in electoral processes.
91 Secondly, 
another significant aspect was the increasing number of responsibilities that the IFE 
acquired as a result of the modifications to the electoral law and new regulations. It 
seemed that despite the IFE being perceived as a government branch, for the parties, it 
became the natural institution to be in charge of controlling party finances. In relation to 
IFE,  the  1993  reform  did  not  change  its  structure  or  the  basic  procedures  of  the 
organisation of the elections. However, by introducing mechanisms to control funding 
its role was expanded in the area of party financing.  First of all, the law assigned IFE 
the  tasks  of  setting  ceilings  for  the  spending  of  political  parties,  coalitions  and 
candidates  for  presidential,  senators  and  deputies  elections.  These  were  outstanding 
issues from the 1989-90 reform. Officially, the main purpose of these dispositions was 
to  ensure  equality  in  conditions  in  elections,  in  order  to  prevent  disparity  in  the 
accessibility  to  economic  resources  among  political  parties  and  it  could  affect  the 
acquisition of votes.
92 It is important to note, that the creation of the Commission of 
Councillors
93 inside IFE, for the collection and revision of financial reports presented by 
parties, not only set the basis for further regulations in the future in this area, but also 
presented the IFE members as electoral professionals.  From now on, the IFE would be 
in  charge  of  supervising  and  monitoring  the  public  and  private  funding  of  parties, 
therefore, forcing parties to be accountable for the first time. This fiscal responsibility 
                                                 
89 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., Mecánica del cambio político en México, p.289. 
90 See article by Aziz Nassif, A. Reformismo Agotado. Voz y voto.  June 1993; (4): 26-27. 
91 El Mes. Voz y voto. April 1993; (2): 48. 
92 The Mexican Electoral System. IFE. 1997.  
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would be added to the task of setting the limits for campaign expenditure,
94 which were 
also regulated in this reform. However, as noted earlier, the IFE’s credibility was still 
affected by its dependence on the executive, particularly as the Minister of the Interior, 
was  at  the  same  time  the  President  of  the  General  Council  of  IFE.  Even  the  fiscal 
functions of IFE were questioned by political parties as the institution responsible for 
carrying them out was suffering from a lack of credibility.
95 The image of IFE was also 
affected by the insistence of the PRD that the IFE was a government branch. In fact, 
PRD’s  main  demand  was  for  the  executive  to  abandon  the  structure  of  IFE.  
Additionally, the PAN had already highlighted the need to modify the powers of the 
General Council of IFE, as it considered them to be very limited.
96  
Finally, and as an opposing view to those who supported the fiscal control functions of 
IFE,  there  are  some  analysts  who  thought  that  this  new  function  of  IFE  could  be 
negative  for  the  institution.  Romero  argued  that  the  combination  of  these  two  jobs, 
organising elections and controlling party’s financing, made IFE vulnerable to attacks 
by parties.
97 First of all, because IFE’s budget was negotiated by the parties themselves 
in Congress every year, the parties were able to punish the institution for its function as 
fiscal controller. And secondly, in the case of IFE investigating irregularities in party 
funding, all of its decisions whether, in favour or against the parties were likely to be 
accused of being partial.    
 
6.2.12  The 1994 electoral reform: not many changes 
Despite being extremely important, with issues such as the impartiality of the electoral 
organs, the 1994 electoral reform did not add much to financing issues. As noted in 
chapter 3, the 1994 electoral reform was an unexpected emergency and reform initiated 
by  the  government  and  supported  by  the  parties  when  confronting  a  particular 
conjuncture. Consequently, the negotiations and consensus centred on aspects such as 
the new conformation of the electoral organs, foreign visitors, and the issues relating to 
media access by political parties. With reference to party finances the reform modified 
the “campaign expenditure ceilings”. Specifically the law changed the faculty for setting 
                                                 
94 The campaign spending ceilings included all of the elements involved in the propaganda including its logistic costs. 
95 Interview, Alejandro Zapata, Secretary of the National Executive Committee of PAN, Mexico City, 28 October 
2004. 
96 See interview to Felipe Calderon, president of the National Executive Committee of PAN. Voz y voto. June 1993; 
(4): 4-6. 
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the campaign spending ceilings for legislative campaigns; this passed from being the 
responsibility of executive boards (local and district) to the local district councils, which 
were collegiate bodies dominated by the citizen vote.
98  
 
6.2.13  The 1994 presidential election: controversial inequalities in the conditions 
of electoral competition. 
The electoral results of the 1994 presidential elections, which gave victory to the PRI’s 
candidate,  Ernesto  Zedillo,  with  50.13  %  of  the  national  vote  were  accepted  by  all 
parties except the PRD. Most political parties considered that the organisation of the 
electoral process was, on the whole, reliable and clean.
99 As noted in chapter 4 the 
electoral results consolidated the position of the two main opposition political parties, 
PAN and PRD in the electoral arena.
100 Hence the election political party system was 
re-defined into a system with three strong parties and four small parties. The return of 
the PAN as a second stronger party and the consolidation of the PRD in the electoral 
arena had two effects 1) it increased the level of competiteveness among the parties and 
2)  it  generated  specific  demands  for  more  equality  in  the  conditions  of  electoral 
competition. Becerra notes that one of the real problems for the PAN was its lack of 
funding to buy TV slots.
101 Indeed, increasing presence and strength of the opposition 
would be critical in future electoral reforms, as they had to be negotiated. As soon as the 
1994 election concluded, the debate among the electoral actors centred on the inequity 
in  the  political  parties’  resources  during  their  campaigns.
102  The  debate  among  the 
parties, on the need for a new electoral reform to introduce fairness in the conditions of 
electoral competion, was confirmed after IFE made public the conclusion of the revision 
of  campaign  expenses  and  annual  income  and  expenditure,  8  months  after  the 
elections.
103 The conclusion given by the Fiscal Commission of IFE, after analysing the 
                                                 
98 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J.  La mecánica del cambio político en México,  pp.330-331. 
99 Of a total of 96,415 polling booths, with participation greater than 35 million voters, only 1,232 complaints were 
made, and in the case of the presidential election, only 95 resulted in being partially proved. Despite the overall 
acceptance of the electoral instruments, there were still problems and gaps in aspects such as the electoral roll, 
nominal lists, etc that were noted in chapter 5. Ibid, pp.370-71. 
100 In the 1994 elections the PAN tripled its national vote, from 17% in 1988 to 26.6%. The PRD obtained 17% of the 
vote, a result that gave it enough credit to be within the three stronger parties. 
101 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004. 
102 Woldenberg, Becerra and Salazar note that after 1994 several aspects of the electoral framework showed 
“deformations such as inequalities in the resources of the parties, the impossibility of revising controversial cases in 
local elections and the consolidation of the autonomy of the electoral organs”. Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & 
Woldenberg, J., La Mecánica del cambio político en México, p.370. 
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reports on the parties’ income and expenses,  showed an enormous inequality among 
political  parties,  that  benefitted  the  PRI.
104  The  financial  report  also  showed  great 
differences in campaign expenditure among parties. While the PRI was responsible for 
71.4%  of  the  total  funding  expenditure  by  all  political  parties  in  the  presidential 
elections, the PAN only expended 17.8% and the third main party, PRD only 6.05. The 
minority parties expended around 1% of the total, including PT with  1.15%, PDM, 
1.02%, PPS 0.9%, PFCRN 0.87%, PVEM 0.56% and PARM 0.24%. As noted earlier, 
the Federal Elections of August 21
st 1994, were the first elections in history in which 
ceilings  for  campaign  spending  were  determined  and  applied.  However,  the  IFE’s 
conclusions also showed that the campaign electoral ceilings set up by it were too high, 
unrealistic  and  ineffective.    The  campaign  spending  ceiling  set  by  the  IFE  of  922 
million pesos, proved to be too high and unrealistic as in the elections the total expenses 
of all parties was only 414.7 million pesos.
105 In light of these conclusions, the IFE 
itself recognised, not only the impracticality of their campaign spending ceilings, but 
also the clear juridical and technical limitations of the monitoring exercise itself. The 
biggest obstacle was the fact that the revision of the parties’ income and expenses could 
only be carried out after the “word” of the political parties had been audited.
106  
In view of the bad reputation and dishonesty of Mexican politicians, the “word” of 
political parties seemed ironic.  The outcome of the IFE’s report on campaign party 
funding increased the pressure on the reformers to place the issue of fiscal control and 
party funding as a fundamental topic in future electoral reform. It was clear that the 
conditions of electoral competition between parties had to be improved, and the parties 
did not shrink from pushing for reform in this area. Soon after taking office the new 
president, Ernesto Zedillo, acknowledged the need for a new reform. 
 
6.2.14  The negotiations during the 1996 electoral reform: the financial issue comes 
to the fore  
The  negotiations  of  the  1996  electoral  reform,  between  political  parties  and  the 
government  were  arduous  and  long  in  both  the  constitutional  reform  and  the  legal 
reform (the reform to the COFIPE). Although the constitutional reform was negotiated 
                                                 
104 Report of the General Council of the IFE on the Report of Campaign expenditure, April 7 1995. “The most 
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by  consensus and approved by all political parties, the reform to the electoral code 
(secondary law) was a different matter as the PAN and PRD abandoned the negotiation 
tables  several  times,  leaving  the  PRI  alone  to  approve  it.  The  slow  pace  of  the 
negotiations throughout the 1996 electoral reform was due to a deep economic crisis, 
local post electoral conflicts and the general knowledge among political actors that any 
future reform had to be achieved through the consensus of the three main parties.
107 
This difficult situation did not help the PRI which acted alone to achieve consensus for 
its continuation.
108  
 
6.2.15  The Constitutional reform 1996  
From the first negotiations in March 1995
109 through the various levels
110 that followed, 
the discussions among parties and government centred on the conditions of electoral 
competition. Party financing issues were most predominant, particularly relating to the 
need to resolve the inequality in the funding of political parties. This was an opposition 
demand but was also a commitment of the newly elected president.
111 Indeed, it was one 
of  the  10  compromises  agreed  in  “The  National  Political  Agreement”
112  document 
signed, by president Zedillo and the main parties PAN, PRD, PRI and PT, in order to 
start  the  reform.  The  compromise  was  “to  guarantee  not  to  carry  out  post  electoral 
protests once the pre elections equitable conditions were fully satisfied”.
113 Also, at the 
first negotiation table following this agreement, one of the four chapters of the electoral 
agenda was dedicated to “Electoral Competition” (chapter D). It included criteria and 
rules for the equal distribution of public funding, auditing and financial control of party 
                                                 
107 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
108 Chapter 4 of this project explained the different setbacks that the negotiations encountered, mainly caused by 
disagreements over local election results. 
109 This first negotiation table was a result of the “National Political Agreement” signed by Zedillo and the four party 
representatives in Congress, in January 1995. 
110 During the reformist period of 1996 several negotiations were organised in order to debate the issues of the future 
electoral reform. One of the first negotiations to be organised was the so called “Seminary of the Chapultepec Castle 
organised by members of the General Council of IFE (citizens councillors), which was followed by official 
negotiations organised by the Ministry of the Interior. See chapter 4 for a summary of the different negotiations. 
111 The new president Zedillo had acknowledged on several occasions the “inequality of the electoral process”. First 
of all, during his “inaugural speech” on December 1, 1994 when he said “in order to carry out a definitive electoral 
reform, we should be willing to deal with all the issues, including party funding, campaign expenditure ceilings and 
access to media” Inaugural speech of president Ernesto Zedillo, December 1 1994. In this speech he highlighted the 
need for a deep reform which should be achieved by consensus. Also during a state visit to the UK on January 29, 
1996, he said that the elections were legal but not equitable. Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J.,  La mecánica 
del cambio político en México,  pp.373-375. 
112 The reform was agreed between the new president Zedillo, the Ministry of Government and the presidents of the 
biggest political parties (PRI, PAN, PRD, PT) through the signing of the “agreement for political reform” and 
approved unanimously by all political parties on 17 January 1995. 
113 Woldenberg, J. Propuesta de agenda para una nueva reforma electoral. Violencia y política. Noticieros Televisa. 
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funding and conditions for a mix system of campaign expenses.
114 Additionally, the 
opposition parties, for their part, placed emphasis on the concept of “fairness in party 
finances”  being  considered.  For  instance,  during  the  Third  Congress  of  the  PRD  in 
August  1995,  the  PRD  showed  its  interest  in  dialogue  with  political  forces, 
acknowledging  that  a  democratic  system  depended  on  two  minimum  conditions: 
“autonomy of the electoral organs and fair party financing in the electoral process.”
115 
The principle of “fairness” was also highlighted in the common agenda that the main 
opposition parties PAN and PRD presented.  As noted earlier, the leaders of PAN and 
PRD  presented  a  common  document  called  “Ten  fundamental  points  for  electoral 
reform”
116 as a starting point for negotiations between parties and government. This 
document signed and supported by the national presidents of PAN and PRD (Castillo 
Peraza and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo), was the result of a series of discussions organised by 
members of the General Council of IFE. Participating in the negotiations were members 
of  the  Seminario  del  Castillo  de  Chapultepec,  citizens  councils,  specialists  and  the 
representatives of PAN and PRD. The series of meetings lasted for months and reached 
139 agreements. Among the requirements, they highlighted the need for the introduction 
of the “fair play principle” in the distribution of public funding, the fiscal control of 
parties’ income and expenses, “strict limits to campaign expenses” and “limits to private 
donations in cash or in kind”.
117 Other aspects included in the PAN and PRD’s proposal 
was  that  “private  funding  cannot  exceed  public  funding.”
118  In  other  words,  the 
emphasis on public funding over private funding. Finally, the document also demanded 
“punishments” such as the loss of candidature, the annulment of the election or the loss 
of registration, for those parties that did not respect the campaign spending ceilings. 
(101).
119 Within the context of approving the reform through consensus, many of the 
demands presented by the parties, were considered in the electoral agendas of both the 
constitutional reform and the legal reform that took place later. For example, prior to the 
approval of the constitutional reform, on April 2, 1996 the parties (PRI, PRD, PT and 
the Minister of the Interior) handed to the congress the conclusions of their negotiations 
on electoral reform which stated among other things “to favour public funding over 
                                                 
114 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.383. 
115 PRD, Resolución del III Congreso, Oaxtepec, Morelos, September 1995. Ibid., p.391. 
116 “10 points of the PAN and PRD for the electoral reform”, 21 August 1995, tomado de La Nación, órgano official 
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private sources and increase its amount, and to establish that a proportional part would 
be distributed  70% proportionally to the number of votes and 30% equally”.
120 As the 
constitutional  reform  had  to  be  complemented  with  a  legal  reform,  among  the 
compromises  made  by  the  parties  there  was  also  a  chapter  on  “financing”  which 
included more detailed information on the issue highlighting the “need to generate fair 
conditions for electoral competence in order to carry out the reform.
121 For the first 
time in history, on 30 July 1996, the Constitutional Bill for constitutional reform was 
approved  unanimously  by  all  parties  in  Congress  and  in  the  Senate.  Finally,  the 
initiative of constitutional modification, achieved by consensus, dedicated one of its 
chapters (chapter D) to the conditions of electoral competition. Among its main points 
was a guarantee by the electoral law, 1) that the  parties receive public funding in a fair 
manner for their support and benefit during elections, with financial support to carry out 
their electoral activities; 2) to promote conditions of fair play for media access by the 
political  parties  3)  to  introduce  measures  to  set  limits  to  campaign  spending,    and 
donations from sympathisers and to introduce procedures for the control of the origin 
and use of resources of political parties; 4)  to define the various electoral crimes and 
the sanctions to be applied to those political parties that exceeded expenditure limits.
122  
 
6.2.16  The  reform  to  the  electoral  law  (COFIPE):  the  debate  over  finance  
increases (COFIPE November 1996) 
 
Following the constitutional reform, some issues remained outstanding and required 
further discussion by political parties. The political parties and the Ministry of 
Government carried out negotiations, in order to complete the second phase of electoral 
reform: the reform to the electoral law (COFIPE), which included the outstanding issues 
and “crucial aspects that remained undefined awaiting specification by the regular 
law”.
123 As noted earlier, the second round took place in difficult circumstances. First of 
all, as the negotiations between the political parties and the Ministry of Government 
continued after the constitutional reform, the political consensus that had been achieved 
during the constitutional reform disintegrated as the “reform moved from the general to 
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the specific”.
124 The reasons for this are explained in chapter four, but it is worth 
remembering that they varied from the disagreements over the appointment of the new 
director of IFE and the nine new members of the General Council of IFE, as the 
executive finally left the IFE, to the various post electoral conflicts at local level that 
forced the opposition to stop negotiations.
125 In addition, there was a time pressure, as 
the new law had to be approved before the beginning of the 1997 electoral process (the 
mid-term elections in 1997).  Despite disruption, the negotiations between parties and 
the government towards the reform of the electoral law followed its course, and 
eventually consensus was achieved on all points, except public funding and campaign 
spending ceilings. Disagreements over the financing model proposed by the PRI not 
only broke the consensus among parties but also led the PRI to present and approve its 
own bill on the reform of the electoral law on 13 November 1996.
126 First of all, the 
opposition parties, PAN, PRD and PT alleged that the amount of money assigned to 
political parties as public funding by the PRI was too high.
127 Their reactions were quite 
extreme, for instance the PAN returned part of its public funding allocation to the IFE 
considering it to be too high.
128 In fact, the PAN’s complaint over excessive party 
funding was a long standing concern and this was not the first time that there had been 
protests over it.
129 The PRI defended its position, arguing that these high amounts of 
funding were necessary in order to avoid other sources of private funding coming from 
illegal sources. However, Romero notes that the introduction of this controversial 
financing model was a response to the PRI’s interest in maintaining its financial level at 
the same level as it had benefitted from with illegal public funding.
130 Therefore, for the 
reform to be accepted by the PRI it had to include a huge amount of transparent 
funding.
131 When, the negotiations broke down, both sides blamed one another. The 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 The disruptions to the negotiations on the reform to the electoral law in 1996 can be found in chapter 4 of this 
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opposition perceived the PRI as high-handed and the PRI perceived the opposition as 
uncompromising.
132 
 
6.2.17  Regulations on financial issues: electoral reform (existing regulation until 
2007) 
On the issue of party funding, both public and private funding occupied a big part of the 
initiative that highlighted the main points of the reform. First of all, it is worth noting 
that despite the legal reform on electoral matters (modification to the COFIPE) only 
being approved by the PRI in Congress, the content of the reform included many of the 
opposition demands that had been discussed during the two year negotiation process. It 
included  adjustments  and  innovations  intended  to  ensure  equal  conditions  in  the 
electoral process, one of the main demands during the negotiations.  In fact, the reform 
proved to be the most advanced in the history of electoral reform, not only for giving 
the IFE total independence from the executive
133 but also for the fact that its content 
was negotiated between the political actors, therefore responding to specific opposition 
demands. The existing law on the financial matters of political parties was extended to 
cover a wide range of aspects: from 1) the redefinition of public systems in order to 
ensure  a  greater  equality  among  political  parties,  2)  introduction  of  regulations  for 
transparent handling of the origin and destination of financial resources used by political 
parties, 3) introduction of new campaign expenditure ceilings and mechanisms for the 
reporting and monitoring of these funds. Overall, the most important aspect was the 
introduction of the “principle of fair play” in the electoral law, which had been a long 
term demand of political parties in the opposition. Basically, they wanted to count in an 
equal manner and have elements to carry out their activities. 
 
 
6.2.18  Public funding  
The regulation of public funding of political parties had been a priority on the electoral 
agenda since the 1977 electoral law recognised the national political parties as a body of 
public interest, and established that the parties were entitled to receive a series of rights 
and prerogatives. Since 1986 when political parties obtained the constitutional right to 
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receive public funding, the electoral legislation established and regulated dispositions 
that led to a very precise financial regime for political parties.  
Then, during the electoral agenda for the 1996 reform three major issues emerged: the 
imperative of creating equal conditions for electoral competence, the need to make the 
funding scheme more transparent and most importantly the fiscal regulation of funding, 
including its origin, administration and use. As a result of the gradualist character of the 
reform, these demands were only outstanding issues from previous reforms that needed 
further  regulation.  Basically,  the  most  important  outcomes  of  the  reform  were 
regulations on a more equal distribution of public funding, the lowering of the spending 
ceiling and the improving of the instruments for strict monitoring of party income.
134 
Regarding the regulations on public funding, the reform finally established that public 
funding should prevail over other types of funding, such as private funding. The new 
public financing formula increased public funding destined to parties by 5 times.
 Among 
the principal innovations in this area it is worth noting, the constitutional mandate that 
established, that public funding should prevail over other sources allowed and regulated 
by law. Secondly, the reform re-defined a system for the distribution of public funding 
amongst the parties which was not only more equitable but also increased it greatly 
(disagreement of opposition) in Article 49.7 of COFIPE.  The secondary law established 
a new distribution system that contemplated three different systems for allocating public 
financing  and  the  conditions  for  their  distribution  which  were  established  at 
constitutional level.
135  The three new concepts of public funding to be distributed by 
the General Council of IFE were: 1) for permanent ordinary activities, 2) for campaign 
spending and 3) for specific activities. The formula to calculate the amount of public 
funding to be distributed was based on the concept of “minimum campaign costs”, then, 
the resulting amount “is multiplied by the number of candidates to be elected in the next 
election, and by the duration of their campaign”.
136 The amount of public funding to be 
distributed  among  political  parties  was  going  to  be  more  equitable.  1)  For  the 
maintenance of permanent ordinary activities, the total amount for this concept was to 
be  determined  annually,  30%  would  be  equally  distributed  amongst  all  parties  with 
representation in both chambers of Congress, and the other 70% would be assigned 
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according to the national voting percentage obtained by each political party in the last 
deputies’ election.
137 2) For campaign expenses it was established that during election 
year a similar amount to the permanent ordinary activities would be given. Therefore, in 
electoral years the parties would receive double funding. 3) For the specific activities 
conducted by political parties acting as entities of public interest, the law established 
support  for  their  educational  and  political  training  activities,  social  and  economic 
research, and publishing tasks. (Article 49.7) In this respect, the law empowered the 
General  Council  of  IFE  to  grant  and  provide  up  to  75%  of  the  reported  expenses 
corresponding to the previous year.
138 Finally, the law also established regulations for 
those  political  parties  that  obtained  their  registration  after  the  last  election  (Article, 
49.8): these parties would receive up to two per cent of the total amount granted to 
political  parties  to  support  their  permanent  ordinary  activities,  the  same  amount  to 
support electoral activities in election year; and the corresponding public financing to 
cover  their  specific  activities  as  entities  of  public  interest.
139  Regarding  the  right  to 
receive public funding, the law eliminated conditions relating to the granting of public 
financing to political parties with a limited and conditional registration, and instead it 
created a single procedure for a political organisation, to be granted registration as a 
national political party.
140 Finally, the reform also resolved a long standing problem 
related  to  the  use  of  public  and  government  resources  in  favour  of  the  PRI,  which 
included  equipment,  personnel  and  with  Salinas  the  use  of  social  governmental 
programmes.
141  There  was  clear  reference  to  government  programmes  such  as 
PRONASOL  and  PROCAMPO  that,  despite  being  successful  in  their  results,  were 
“clientalist”  programmes  that  intended  to  promote  the  PRI.
142  According  to  some 
sources, among the reform proposals that the Executive sent to Congress in 1996, was 
an Article that would require the suspension of social assistance propaganda 20 days 
before election day. However, this proposal was set aside when consensus was broken 
and it was finally excluded from the final reforms.
143  
                                                 
137 The Mexican Electoral system and the federal elections. IFE. 1997. 
138 Ibid.“The figures given above are computed and delivered to each political party according to the annually-
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140 Ibid. 
141 The social programmes were PRONASOL and PROCAMPO. Social programmes designed by Salinas to alleviate 
economic crisis. 
142 Interview, member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) A, Mexico City, September 20 & November 22 2004.  
143 de Swaan, M., Martorelli, P. & Molinar Horcasitas, M. Public financing of political parties and Electoral 
expenditures in Mexico, p.168. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
 
248 
 
6.2.19  Private funding 
The regulation on private funding of political parties became a significant aspect in the 
1996 reform. In relation to this issue, it is worth noting that the positions of the parties 
were very different. The PRI and the PRD expressed their preference for favouring 
public finances over private funding, while the PAN expressed the opposite.
144 PAN’s 
preference for private funding was due to the fact that traditionally it obtained support 
from  the  business  class,  especially  from  the  northern  states  that  were  traditionally 
conservative.  However,  despite  their  differences,  the  parties  achieved  consensus  in 
prioritising public funding over private in the reform, and also introduced regulation in 
the source of funding for political parties. One change from the 1993 reform was the 
prohibition of funding from non identified persons and the establishment of new limits 
to funding from participants. Parties were not allowed to receive contributions from 
anonymous donors, with the sole exception of collections taken in meetings or on the 
street. It is worth remembering that in 1993 the electoral code (COFIPE) had started 
regulating, for the first time, the four legal sources for political parties (by the militancy, 
by followers or sympathisers, by self-financing and by financial profits/earnings). The 
1996 reform introduced further limits to private sources of political parties. However, 
regulations on the contributions from militants and members stayed the same as did the 
regulations  on  the  other  two  types  of  private  funding  by  self-financing  (incomes 
collected by promotional activities such as selling publications, games, raffles, lotteries 
etc)  and  by  financial  profits  (revenues  generated  through  their  funds  and  trusts). 
Adjustments were however, introduced to the sympathisers contributions. For instance, 
the  limits  on  contributions  from  individuals  and  followers  were  reduced.  The  law 
established that political parties could not receive annual donations of an amount more 
than  10%  of  the  total  public  financing  given  to  support  the  ordinary  activities  of 
political  parties.  In  the  same  way,  donations  in  cash  provided  by  any  individual  or 
organisation  were  limited  to  0.05%  of  total  public  financing  to  support  permanent 
ordinary activities.
145 It is important to note that, despite these advances, the new model 
of party funding was criticised for benefitting only the three main parties, as they were 
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the only ones with the economic capability to maintain their presence in the media.
146 
The  fact  that  there  was  no  limitation  on  radio  and  television  advertising,  led  to  a 
situation where the small and new parties could not compete with the media attention 
obtained by the three big parties. 
 
6.2.20  Legal requirements to establish ceilings for campaign spending 
The new reform resulted from the demand for better and more equal conditions for the 
electoral context. It introduced to the Electoral Law important changes and adjustments 
on the matter. The decision to decrease the campaign expenditure ceilings of political 
parties was welcomed by the parties. Especially the PRD and PAN. It is important to 
remember that the 1993 reform had established a series of mandates that gave IFE the 
power to set limits on campaign expenses of political parties. The reform established 
that campaign spending ceilings should also be applied to the coalitions and candidates 
during the campaigns. Firstly, the General Council of IFE, was given the authority to set 
and approve campaign spending ceilings which were applied in federal elections. In the 
past the General Council had only been responsible for presidential elections, but more 
recently decentralised directive bodies had beeen empowered to approve ceilings for 
senators (local councils) and deputies (district councils) elections.
147 Secondly, criteria 
and rules to be followed by the General Council were modified in a significant way, to 
determine  ceilings  for  campaign  spending  in  presidential,  senators  and  deputies 
elections.
148 
 
6.2.21  Modifications to auditing and fiscal control: existing guidelines 
In order to control and strengthen the reports and accounts presented by the political 
parties  to  IFE,  the  reform  adjusted  the  procedures  and  mechanisms  that  had  to  be 
followed  by  the  parties  when  making  reports  on  the  origin,  destination  and 
administration of their finances. The intention was to make the rendition of budgeting 
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148 It is important to mention that the new rules on ceilings for campaign spending for deputies of relative majority 
included a rule which was to be applied in all the 300 single member districts: the same ceilings were to be applied in 
all electoral districts. Former rules considered a set of variables (population density and geographical conditions, 
amongst others) that created important differences amongst districts. Likewise, new and specific rules regarding the 
setting of ceilings for senator’s elections by the relative majority principle were included. In the past, the ceiling for 
campaign spending of each formula of senators per federal entity was equal to the sum of the ceilings set for each 
single member district, for relative majority deputies’ election purposes. Ibid. p.146. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
 
250 
more transparent and trustworthy. As noted  earlier, by  a legal mandate in the 1993 
electoral reform, political parties had an internal office responsible for collecting and 
managing their general financing and campaign resources, as well as presenting annual 
and campaign reports about the origin, amount, and use of income collected from any 
financial  source.
149  From  1993  the  parties  were  obligated  to  present  two  financial 
reports: one on annual expenses and another on campaigns. The reform reduced the time 
period  required  for  the  presentation  of  annual  reports,  from  90  to  60  days  for  both 
political parties and political groups.
150 Regarding the presentation of Campaign reports, 
where  the  parties  had  to  present  campaign  reports  for  each  electoral  campaign, 
including information on the spending made by the political party and its candidates in 
the corresponding territory, the law also reduced the period for the delivery of the report 
from 90 days to 60 days (Article 49a). The law established that each report had to detail 
the origin of resources, the fulfilment of the corresponding ceiling, established by the 
General Council for each election, and the amount of money and its destination.
151 
One particular aspect of the reform was the regulation of fiscal control over parties’ 
resources. The law established the creation of a permanent commission to supervise the 
income  and  expenditure  of  political  parties  and  provide  clearer  monitoring  of 
responsibilies.
152 This is significant, since in the 1994 elections the Commission that 
revised the annual and campaign expenditure reports was dissolved after completing the 
examination. The new law envisaged the creation of a permanent commission for the 
revision of reports which were presented by political parties and political groups on the 
origin  and  destination  of  their  annual  income  and  campaigns  resources.  The  new 
commission  was  called  “The  Fiscal  Regulation  Commission  of  the  Resources  of 
Political parties and Groups of the General Council of the IFE”. It is important to note 
that the significance of this new commission was not only that it was permanent and 
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formed  by  the  “electoral  councillors”  of  IFE,  but  also  because  it  was  the  only 
commission whose powers were established by the COFIPE.
153 First of all, Article 49.b 
endowed the commission with the power to develop guidelines with technical bases for 
the presentation of reports on the origin, amount and use of income received by political 
parties and groups.
154 The commission had also to examine all the resources used for the 
activities established by law, and to review the reports on the origin and destination of 
the  parties’  annual  campaign  resources.  Moreover,  the  commission  was  able,  in  the 
terms established by the General Council, to conduct or coordinate audits directly or 
through  third  parties  on  the  financial  status  of  political  parties  or  political  groups. 
(Article 49b). Furthermore, it was also in charge of ordering visits of verification to 
political parties and political groups in order to ratify their fulfilment of their obligations 
and the veracity of their reports. Finally, the commission also had the responsibility to 
present,  to  the  General  Council,  an  evaluation  on  audits  and  verifications  which 
informed the General council about any irregularities on the part of political parties and 
political groups regarding the use of their resources and the rendering of their report, 
and of the consequent sanctions which would be placed upon them. One further aspect 
in relation to the fiscal regime is, that according to the law, political parties and groups 
could challenge decisions made by the General Council before the Electoral Tribunal of 
the Judicial Branch of the Federation, in the form and terms established by the electoral 
law.
155 “At the same time, to be able to carry out its responsibilities the commission had 
the support of a technical office in which some of the most prestigious accounting firms 
took part”.
156  
                                                 
153 The commission has the power to “make decisions and implement them without consulting the General Council. 
Therefore the commission will continue receiving an annual report during the first 60 days of the year, and one 
campaign report for each electoral race during the following 60 days after elections.” (article 49a) de Swaan, M, 
Martorelli, P. & Molinar Horcasitas, J. Public financing of political parties and Electoral expenditures in Mexico, p. 
167. 
154 The first guidelines of this type were passed in December 1993 and reformed in October 1996 and January 1997. 
The current guidelines do not present important changes concerning the timing and quantity of party reports. 
Nevertheless, they are stricter in terms of financial book-keeeping and the documents parties should use in order to 
prove their incomes and expenses. In other words, emphasis was set not on the quantity of party reports, but on their 
quality and accuracy. Ibid. p.167. 
155 The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Election of the year 2000. IFE, pp. 13-14 & The Mexican 
Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.133. The commission has 60 days to check annual reports 
and 120 days to check campaign reports, while also being empowered to request necessary documents to ratify what 
has been reported by the parties’s accounting offices. In addition, it also has 120 days to write and present a final 
report to the General Council, in order to impose the corresponding sanctions when deemed necessary by this 
Council. The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.133.  
156 de Swaan, M., Martorelli, P. & Molinar Horcasitas, J., Public financing of political parties and Electoral 
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With  regard  to  political  parties,  the  reform  made  the  obligations  of  the  parties  in 
financial matters more precise: They had to allow the IFE’s Commission to undertake 
the  audit  and  its  verifications  and  make  important  information  available.  Another 
obligation related to party prerogatives as the parties had to apply for public funding in 
order to support their ordinary activities, to support their campaign expenses and to 
meet the terms of the objectives that the law requested.
157 Despite the positive results of 
the fiscal control by IFE, political parties, especially the PAN, believed that the fiscal 
control on party finances was still too limited. Among the problems highlighted by the 
PAN  were  the  fact  that  many  parties  exceeded  the  campaign  ceilings  and  the 
interference of local government with their parties.
158 Such problems did not help IFE to 
consolidate itself.
159  
 
6.2.22  Administrative offences and sanctions of the 1996 reform 
For many years the effectiveness of the regulations on electoral matters was doubted 
because of the lack of  precise definitive sanctions. An important aspect of the new 
electoral law in 1996 was that it provided a precise definition of the main types of 
administrative offences that a political party or group were not allowed to commit. The 
reform  empowered  the  commission  of  the  General  Council  to  establish  the 
corresponding  sanctions.  The  most  common  administrative  offences  were:  1)  not 
complying with the obligation to allow an audit and verification of the resources of 
political  parties  and  groups,  when  indicated  to  do  so  by  the  Commission  of  Fiscal 
Regulation as well as the refusal to deliver documents about income and expenditure, 
when requested by the Commission. 2) Accepting donations or economic contributions 
from people or organisations that were impeded from doing so, or applying for credit 
from development banks to finance their activities. 3) Accepting donations or economic 
contributions that exceeded the determined limits from sympathisers. 4) Not presenting 
the  annual  reports  and  campaign  reports  by  the  agreed  deadlines.  And  finally  5) 
Exceeding the electoral campaign spending ceilings set up by the General Council.
160 
The  IFE  was  empowered  to  determine  irregularities  committed  by  a  political  party, 
gather evidence, and formulate the decision that would be submitted to the General 
                                                 
157 Becerra, et. al. Mecánica del cambio político en México, p.443.  
158 Interview, Alejandro Zapata, Secretary of the National Executive Committee of PAN, Mexico City, 28 October 
2004. 
159 Ibid 
160 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.135 & The Mexican Electoral Regime and 
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Council for its determination/consensus. The General Council was empowered to apply 
the corresponding sanctions, taking account of the circumstances and severity of the 
offence. The General Council’s decision could be appealed at the Electoral Tribunal of 
the Judicial Branch of the Federation.
161  
 
6.2.23   The IFE in the reform: pushing on financial issues 
As highlighted in this and previous chapters, the 1996 reform proved to be the most 
advanced in the history of electoral reform. It not only responded to specific opposition 
demands relating to the introduction of fair conditions for electoral competition, but it 
also gave IFE total independence from the executive, another long standing demand of 
the opposition parties and condition for the credibility and transparency of electoral 
processes.
162 In 1966 the IFE differed greatly from the electoral authority that had been 
created back in 1990 to organise elections.
163 The perception of the electoral authority 
by the parties and the general public changed through the accumulation of powers and 
the input of its members. It is true that betweem 1990 and 1993 it had been perceived as 
another branch of the executive and had been largely disregarded. However, from the 
1993 and 1994 reforms, after changes to its responsibilities and membership, the IFE 
began  to  adopt  a  more  active  role  in  the  negotiation  process,  especially  in  creating 
debate over the issues to be reformed. As a result, the IFE entered another phase as it 
went from focusing on problems such as the organisation of elections and its autonomy 
from  the  government  to  concentrating  on  “injecting  fairness”  to  the  electoral 
processes.
164 The active and more independent input of the electoral authority started 
with the election of citizen’s councillors as a result of the 1994 reform. Indeed, despite 
some reservations, the “ciudanización” of the General Council helped IFE to become 
more  accepted  by  the  parties.  During  the  reformist  period  of  1996  when  president 
                                                 
161 Sanctions the General Council can impose are the following: 
A fine ranging from 50 to 5,000 minimal daily wage in Mexico City. 
Up to a 50% decrease in the rendering of public financing to the party during the period in which the decision is 
made. 
Total suspension of public financing to the party during the period in which the decision is made 
Suspension of the register as a political party or group. 
Cancellation of the register as a political party or group. 
The law states that the last three sanctions can be imposed only when the non-compliance or offence is severe or 
systematic, and in case of recurrence the General Council must apply a more severe sanction. IFE 1997, p. 136 
162 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
163 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
164 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
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Zedillo  acknowledged  the  need  for  a  deep  reform,  the  IFE  quickly  organised 
negotiations,  round-the  table  events  and  a  forum  at  which  political  parties’ 
representatives, academics, and citizens were invited to participate and express their 
views on the issues to be discussed on  future electoral reform. For instance, the so 
called “Seminario del Castillo de Chapultepec”, was organised by a few members of the 
IFE, whose agenda served as a starting point for the official negotiation between the 
parties and the Ministry of the Interior. Another example of IFE’s input into the parties’ 
negotiations was the assistance given to the main opposition parties, the PAN and PRD 
who  agreed  a  common  ground  for  them  to  present  a  common  agenda.  The  agenda 
presented by PAN and PRD, “Ten fundamental points for electoral reform”, was also 
used as the starting point for the renewal of negotiations. The discussion contributed to 
the precise definition of many of the regulations on party financing. In all round the 
table events organised by the IFE the issue of financial and media access occupied an 
important  place  on  the  agenda.  Especially  with  regard  to  the  need  to  introduce  the 
“principle of fair play” in the funding of political parties and media access. As the list of 
demands  on  electoral  matters  increased  during  1996,  the  IFE  acquired  greater 
responsibilities, especially in the area of party funding. The reform itself confirmed the 
role of IFE in many areas relating to party finances. First of all, it confirmed the control 
of the General Council of IFE in distributing public funding among the political parties. 
Secondly, the new electoral law gave IFE the authority to set and approve the ceilings 
for  campaign  spending,  which  were  applied  in  federal  elections  (for  senators  and 
deputies elections). Finally, the creation of a new permanent commission within IFE 
called  the  “Fiscal  Regulation  Commission  of  the  Resources  of  Political  parties  and 
groups  of  the  General  Council  of  IFE”  empowered  IFE  as  it  became  the  “fiscal 
controller  of  the  parties”.  Consequently,  the  General  Council  became  the  highest 
authority in charge of the control of party financing.
165 At the same time, IFE became 
the force behind discussions and negotiations while also receiving more responsibilities, 
especially those relating to the fiscal control and public and private funding of political 
parties. Despite the  IFE acquiring increased responsibilities and powers in the 1996 
electoral  reform,  it  was  still  being  tested  and  challenged.  Soon  after  the  reform,  it 
received  criticism  for  not  being  strong  enough.  Mony  de  Swaam,  Martorelli  and 
                                                 
165 The results of the modification to the electoral legislation that were approved by the General Council of IFE, 
December 1993, and reformed in 1996 and 1997. See “Normatividad en materia de fiscalización de los recursos de 
los partidos políticos. IFE. 1997. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
 
255 
Molinar  Horcasitas  note  that  the  General  Council  of  IFE  “felt  trapped  between  an 
incomplete  law  and  demands,  coming  from  opposition  parties’  representatives  and 
public opinion for further action”.
166 The complaints about the limited powers of the 
IFE  resulted  from  a  series  of  agreements  of  IFE,  relating  to  party  financing  and 
regulation of campaign expenditure not being upheld by the Electoral Tribunal.
167 Both 
documents were rejected by the Electoral Tribunal after the PRI presented an appeal. 
This provoked protest amongst the opposition who wanted more regulations in this area. 
However, other decisions made by IFE had been welcomed by all, and thus contributed 
to its consolidation. First of all, a revision of the 1996 financial reports, in which IFE 
after  finding  irregularity  issues  fined  the  PRI,  PT  and  PPS,  whose  appeals  in  the 
Electoral Tribunal were unsuccessful.
168 In 2000 after the presidential elections were 
won by the PAN’s candidate, the PAN was punished by IFE. This time the offence was 
irregular  funding  through  the  so  called  “Amigos  de  Fox”,  and  this  cost  PAN  an 
enormous sum of money. Later, the PRI was also fined by the IFE for benefitting from 
illegal  funding  through  PEMEX  (the  national  petroleum  industry),  known  as 
“Pemexgate”. In both cases, the decision by IFE to punish the parties, despite provoking 
tension  between  them  and  the  electoral  authority,  was  accepted  by  the  parties.  In 
contrast  to  the  first  two  resolutions  against  IFE’s  decision,  these  later  resolutions 
consolidated IFE’s autonomy in this area.  
 
6.2.24  The evolution of party funding through the elections 
This section will analyse the public funding received by the political parties during the 
electoral processes of 1994, 1997 and 2000, comparing them to see the advances in the 
distribution  of  public  funding.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  distribution  of  public 
funding for each election related to different reforms in the electoral law. For instance 
the concepts for distribution of public funding used in the 1994 election differed from 
those  used  in  the  1997  and  2000  elections.  As  noted  earlier,  after  1994,  with  the 
introduction  of  campaign  reporting,  the  inequality  in  the  resources  of  the  political 
parties  contesting  in  elections,  became  clear  and  was  deemed  an  issue  for  urgent 
correction. In order to be able to compare the discrepancies of the 1994 elections with 
                                                 
166 de Swaan, M.,  Martorelli, P. & Molinar Horcasitas, J., Public financing of political parties and Electoral 
expenditures in Mexico, p.168. 
167 Ibid.  
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those of 1997 and 2000 it is necessary to see in detail the distribution of public funding 
for each election. 
 
6.2.25  Direct public funding for 1994 elections 
As noted earlier the 1994 elections took place within a legal framework that resulted 
from the 1992 and 1993 electoral reforms. Back in 1990 the COFIPE established four 
types of public funding: for electoral activity, for general activity, for subrogation and 
for specific activities. With the 1993 reform a fifth type of public financing was added, 
“for the developing of parties.” The law stated that public funding had to be distributed 
for a three year period in which the agenda for it had to be determined by the General 
Council of IFE. In this formula the main variable in the calculation was the minimum 
costs of a campaign. The electoral code established cost and arithmetic operations in 
order to calculate the different types of finances to be distributed among the parties. 
The total public funding for the three year period between 1992 and 1994, granted to the 
political parties, increased to 422,657,852.27 pesos. It was distributed, following the 
then electoral formula, among the nine registered parties that participated in the federal 
elections of 1994. The following table shows the allocation for the three year period 
1992-1994 (20% the first, 30% the second and 50% the electoral year) for each political 
party. 
Table. 6.1. Public financing for the three year period 1992-1994 
1992  1993  1994  Political 
Parties  20%  30%  50% 
TOTAL 100% 
PRI  44,412,551.16  66,506,923.65  99,424,469.49  210,343,944.30 
PAN  14,218,434.32  20,624,578.81  28,966,248.34  63,809,261.47 
PRD  9,312,583.54  12,903,092.32  20,713,984.43  42,929,660.29 
PFCRN  7,833,769.66  10,225,337.44  15,170,319.27  33,229,426.37 
PARM  5,254,687.46  6,190,277.29  9,939,138.87  21,384,103.62 
PPS  5,142,179.14  6,120,029.88  9,131,215.25  20,393,424.27 
PDM  -------------  4,201,801.64  6,349,692.58  10,551,494.22 
PT  ------------  4,201,801.64  5,977,382.52  10,179,184.16 
PVEM  -----------  4,201,801.64  5,635,551.46  9,837,353.10 
TOTAL  $86,174,205.27  N$135,175,644.31  N$201,308,002.21  422,657,851.79 
Source: Report on the 1994 Federal Electoral Process. IFE 
As table (6.1) shows the public financing for parties was distributed in instalments at 
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year period 1992-1994 were paid in the first 5 days. As noted earlier, for the amounts 
for  each  category  the  COFIPE  (electoral  code)  established  costs  and  arithmetic 
operations. As the table shows, the new formula and the criteria for distribution over a 
three year period to the nine parties registered, required considerable amounts of money. 
However, the table also shows the great disparity in the public funding that the PRI 
received during the three year period, especially for the 1994 elections.
169  
In 1994, the total public financing distributed among the six parties on the register after 
the midterm elections of 1991 was 201,308,002.21 pesos which was spread between 5 
categories:  electoral  activities,  general  activities,  subrogation  of  the  State,  specific 
activities and developing of the parties.  
 
Table. 6.2. Public financing for the 1994 elections allocated for each party 
 
 
PUBLIC FUNDING IN 1994 
 
POLITICAL 
PARTY 
ELECTORAL 
ACTIVITIES 
GENERAL 
ACTIVITIES  
SUBROGATION 
OF THE STATE 
SPECIFIC 
ACTIVITIES 
DEVELOPING 
OF PARTY 
TOTAL   % 
PRI  65,553,759.81  2,834,271.06  19,080,240.00  11,956,198.62  0.00  99,424,469  49.39% 
PAN  18,845,757.61  2,834,271.06  4,076700.00  3,209,519.67  0.00  28,966,248  14.39% 
PRD  8,423,748.25  2,834,271.06  1,996,620.00  7,459,345.12  0.00  20,713,984  10.29% 
PFCRN  4,806,519.58  2,834,271.06  1,033,620.00  4,795,345.99  1,700,562.64  15,170,319  7.54% 
PARM  2,291,432.32  2,834,271.06  674,100.00  2,438,772.85  1,700,562.64  9,939,139  4.94% 
PPS  2,112,540.65  2,834,271.06  539,280.00  1,944,560.90  1,700,562.64  9,131,215  4.54% 
PDM  0.00  2,834,271.06  0.00  2,098,285.99  1,417,135.53  6,349,693  3.15% 
PT  0.00  2,834,271.06  0.00  1,725,975.93  1,417,135.53  5,977,383  2.97% 
PVEM  0.00  2,834,271.06  0.00  1,384,144.87  1,417,135.53  5,635,551  2.80% 
Total  102'033,758.22   25,508,439.54  27'400.560.00  37,012,149.94  9,353,094.51  201,308,002  100.00% 
 
Source: made by the author, according to the agreements of the General Council of IFE published in January 1994 
“Agreement of public funding to political parties in the terms of Article 49 of the COFIPE and Official report of the 1994 
elections”. IFE 
 
 
Table 6.2. shows how the PRI received 99,424,469 pesos of the total funding granted to 
the political parties contesting in the 1994 elections, which was up to 49.3% of the total 
201,308,002  pesos  allocated  for  public  funding  for  all  the  parties.  The  category  of 
funding  for  electoral  activities  shows  the  largest  difference,  as  the  PRI  received 
65,553,579.81 pesos, from a total of 102,033,758.22 pesos granted for the funding of 
electoral  activities  for  all  parties.  Therefore,  the  PRI  received  49.39%  of  the  total 
                                                 
169 For the 1991 federal elections, the General Council of the IFE calculated a minimum cost of $77,947,466 for a 
deputy campaign and $165,078,286 for a senator. On this basis, the financing for electoral activities over the three 
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funding, which was more than three times the level of the next party, the PAN, which 
had 14.39% of the total amount granted for electoral activities. The reason for this was 
that this category of funding was distributed proportionally and the minimum costs of a 
campaign for senator and deputy were used to determine the amount of financing for 
each electoral activity. The amount of financing received by the political parties using 
this proportional method of distribution can be seen in table 6.3. 
Table. 6.3. Public Funding allocated to political parties. 
Electoral 
Activity 
(proportional) 
General 
Activity 
(equal) 
Subrogation of 
the state 
(proportional) 
Specific activities 
(proportional) 
For developing of 
parties 
(equal) 
Total 
50.69%  12.67%  13.61%  18.39%  4.65%  100% 
 
Source: elaboration by the author using the data from the agreement of the General Council of IFE published in January 
1994. 
Electoral activity (50.69%) + subrogation of the state (13.61%) and specific activities 
(18.39%) = 82.69% 
General activity (12.67%), for developing activities (4.67%) = 17.3% 
Table (6.3) also shows the level of funding for political parties for general activities 
such as entities of public interest that the parties received. This category was determined 
taking into consideration the equivalent of 10% of the amount  granted for electoral 
activity, which was distributed annually. Here all parties received the same amount, 
2,834,271.06 pesos. With respect to the funding for subrogation of the state, where the 
parties received up to the 50% of the amounts  that their deputies received the previous 
year, in 1994 the electoral council of IFE approved the amount of 27,400,560 pesos to 
be distributed among the parties, from which the PRI received 19,080,240.00 pesos, 
69.63% of the total. The parties received further funding for their specific activities, 
funding for education and political education activities, etc, where IFE allocated up to 
50% of the approved expenses for each of the parties. In this category the PRI again 
received the greater amount, a total of 11,956,198.65 pesos, or 32.30% of the total. 
However the PAN only received 8.67% of the total, and the PRD, 20.15%, as this was 
related to the expenditure in specific activities of the previous year (1993).   
Finally the category for party development was introduced in the 1993 reform, in which 
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parties  but  did  not  have  a  major  impact  on  the  overall  funding.  The  parties  that 
benefitted  from  this  category  of  funding  were  the  PPS,  PARM  and  PFCRN  after 
obtaining between 1 and 5% in previous elections for deputies of relative majority, and 
also the PDM, PT and PVEM after obtaining their registration in January 1993. 
Table 4 shows the campaign expenditure by each political party in the 1994 electoral 
process. 
 
6.2.26   Campaign expenditure in the 1994 elections 
As a result of the 1993 electoral reform, the expenditure by each of the political parties 
in the 1994 electoral campaigns was reported for the first time to the IFE, through the 
creation of a special commission made up of the members of the General Council of 
IFE. It is worth noting that the new members of the General Council of IFE called 
“citizen councillors”, contributed to greater trust by the political parties. 
The commission was to be in charge of receiving, checking and reporting the results to 
the  General  Council  of  IFE.  Therefore,  once  the  1994  electoral  process  ended  the 
commission  passed  the  reports  which  contained  details  of  the  expenditure  of  the 
political parties’ detailed financial reports that contained detailed financial reports on 
the origin and amount of income, and expenditure of the political parties. The 1994 
election  campaign  expenditure  reports  included  information  on  three  concepts:  a) 
propaganda expenses,
170 b) campaign operative spending
171 and c) propaganda spending 
on newspaper, radio, and television: these expenses included messages, advertising etc. 
in order to obtain votes. The expenses incurred during the 1994 electoral campaign 
showed enormous differences, as the PRI was the party that not only received most but 
also had the highest expenditure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
170 This category included painting walls, large shawls, leaflets, banners, audio systems, political systems, political 
events in hired places, memorabilia etc. 
171 This included wages and salaries of temporary staff, temporary leasing of chattel or personal assets, transportation 
of material and staff, and travel expenses etc.  Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
 
260 
Table. 6.4 Campaign expenditure 1994 
 
Party  Expenditure  % 
PRI  324,681,340  78.28 
PAN  43,003,758  10.37 
PRD  19,916,700  4.73 
PPS  6,286,604  1.52 
PARM  5,319,506  1.28 
PT  4,637,703  1.12 
PFCRN  4,223,591  1.02 
PDM  3,662,530  0.88 
PVEM  3,349,219  0.81 
Total  414,700,000  100 
 
Source:  Report on the electoral process 1994 – consolidated report on the Political Parties’s campaign expenses in 
1994.  IFE, General Council, Mexico, 1994 
 
According to the expenses reports presented by the parties, the PRI expended (78.28%) 
more than three quarters of the total expenditure.  
As  noted  earlier,  the  conclusion,  of  the  revision  of  the  campaign  reports  by  the 
commission  of  the  General  Council,  showed  even  greater  disparities  in  campaign 
expenditure.  According  to  the  reports  the  PRI  spent  up  to  71%  of  the  total  money 
expended in the presidential elections, while the PAN expended 17.8%, the PRD 6.05%, 
the PT 1.15% the PDM 1.02%, the PPS 0.9%, the PFCRN 0.87%, the PVEM 0.56% and 
the PARM 0.24%”. For the senators elections something similar (77.7% of the total, in 
the deputies (81.2%) and in the representatives of the Assembly DF (77.7%).
172  
The report for the first time also allowed a split between the cost of the vote for each of 
the parties, in other words, the relationship between the campaign expenditure and the 
amount of votes received: for the PAN 3.4, PRI 7.4, PRD 1.8, PPS 9.6, PFCRN 5.2, 
PARM 2.1, PDM 18.4, PT 2.1 and PVEM 3.0. 
During the revision of the campaign expenses relating to the 1994 elections, the Cuerpo 
Técnico de Apoyo y la dirección Ejecutiva de Prerrogativas y Partidos politicos del IFE 
carried  out  a  comparative  exercise  between  the  expenses  of  the  campaign  and  the 
amount  of  votes  received  by  each  party.  This  is  included  in  the  Dictamen  of  the 
commission of the Councillors, and shows the following data:  
                                                 
172 Official report by the IFE’s councillors on the political parties’ reports of campaign expenses in 1994. IFE, April 7 
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  Table. 6.5. Relationship between campaign expenditure and votes in 1994.  
Party  President  Senators  Deputies 
Relation cost-
vote       
   Votes  Votes  Votes  % President  Senators  Deputies 
PAN  9,174,298.00  8,683,486.00  8,662,669.00  3.48  0.56  0.60 
PRI  17,215,256.00  16,774,821.00  16,853,958.00  7.44  4.79  6.19 
PRD  5,855,800.00  5,439,130.00  5,582,437.00  1.85  0.48  0.92 
PT  970,390.00  960,889.00  895,617.00  2.13  1.05  1.65 
PFCRN  300,193.00  394,591.00  382,228.00  5.19  1.12  5.27 
PVEM  300,875.00  431,408.00  471,701.00  3.01  0.67  3.87 
PPS   168,058.00  214,360.00  234,525.00  9.63  3.82  14.88 
PARM  194,303.00  262,468.00  285,711.00  2.18  3.22  12.46 
TOTAL  34,179,173.00  33,161,153.00  33,368,846.00          
 
Source: Report on the political parties’ campaign expenses in 1994. IFE, General Council.  
 
By analysing table (6.5) above we can see how the level of political competition of the 
parties  differs.The  previous  two  tables  show  inequalities  in  the  different  forms  of 
distribution of public funding among the parties and the consequent spending of the 
parties. Also the deficiencies of the funding system are shown in the level of political 
competence. The Level of political competence is the relationship between what a party 
spends and the votes received. This describes a different reality and variable for each 
party, reflected in the level of political competence. Table (6.5) shows the amount of 
public resources that each party received from IFE and how the different parties spent it. 
Despite  the  PRI  spending  more  money  the  table  shows  a  low  profitability  costing 
between the votes obtained and the expenses incurred in the 1994 campaigns. The PRD 
declared  expenses  of  16.5%  less  than  those  of  the  PRI,  under  the  average  general 
expenses and cost of vote, therefore, the PRD was the more economic party. The PT 
expended up to 70 times less that the PRI. 
The experience of the 1994 elections served as a starting point for the reformers who 
would negotiate the future 1996 electoral reform. The idea was to propose regulations 
and changes that ensured fairer conditions for the development of the electoral politics 
in elections. 
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6.2.27  Limits to campaign expenses in 1994 
The report presented by the IFE also revealed another factor: the campaign expending 
ceilings established by the same electoral authority were too high: In fact 922 million 
pesos was the total amount that any party could spend in all of its campaigns. Yet, the 
total sum for all the campaign expenses, for all types of elections and between all parties 
was only 414.7 millions pesos.The reduction of the campaign ceilings resulted from an 
appeal presented by the PRD to the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE) in which it 
cuestioned the times and processes of the ceiling. The resolution established that the 
entire  General  Council  had  to  decide  the  time  and  level  of  the  ceiling  which  was 
eventually were reduced in a extraordinary session on January 27 1994.
173 
Table. 6.6. Limits to campaign expenses 1994 
 
Type of campaign  Ceilings for 1994 elections 
Deputies  850,226 
Senators  7 970 874 
President  134 460 560 
 Source: Report on the electoral process 1994. IFE 
 
6.2.28  Direct public funding for 1997 elections: 
1) The midterm elections in 1997 took place under new electoral legislation, approved 
in 1996. As noted earlier, the 1996 reform introduced changes to the financing regime 
of  the  political  parties,  including  the  predominance  of  public  funding  over  private 
funding and the introduction of three different concepts through which to grant public 
funding:  1)  for  permanent  ordinary  activities  2)  for  campaign  expenses  and  c)  for 
specific  activities  as  entities  of  public  interest.  The  new  formula  applied  to  the 
distribution of public funding greatly increased the public resources given to the parties. 
The 1996 reform replaced the distribution of the three year period of public funding by 
an annual distribution and introduced a more equal formula for the distribution of public 
funding for “Permanent Ordinary Activities” where the total amount was determined 
annually.  
1) 30% was allocated in equal parts to all political parties represented in both chambers 
of Congress (deputies and senators) 
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2) The remaining 70% was distributed according to the percentage of votes gained by 
each political party  represented in both the Chambers of Congress in the preceding 
election for deputies at the national level. 
This  formula  did  indeed,  improve  the  conditions  of  the  competition  from  the  1994 
elections  where  only  17.3%  of  the  public  funding  was  distributed  in  equal  parts  in 
comparison to 30% in the 1997 elections.  
Table 6.7.  Distribution of Public funding 1994  
1994  Electoral Activity + Subrogation of the state + Specific 
activities  (proportional distribution )  
82.6 
1994  General Activity + developing of parties (equal 
distribution) 
17.3 
 
In  the  1997  election,  each  party  received  an  identical  amount  of  public  finance  for 
campaign spending to that granted for permanent ordinary activities. The 1996 electoral 
reform kept the funding category for specific activities as entities of public interest,
174 
but it increased from 50% to 75% the proven expenses incurred by the political parties 
corresponding  to  the  preceding  year.  The  following  table  show  the  public  funding 
allocated to the political parties for the federal election of 1997. 
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Table. 6.8. Public Funding for the 1997 elections allocated for each party. 
NATIONAL 
POLITICAL 
PARTY 
PERMANENT 
ORDINARY 
ACTIVITIES 
CAMPAIGN 
EXPENSES  
SPECIFIC 
ACTIVITIES  
TOTAL  %  With extra 
prerogatives 
PRI  437,011,758.76  437,011,758.76  18,089,139.75  892,112,657.27  42  44.3 
PAN  259,956,828.81  259,956,828.81  7,334,453.45  527,248,111.07  25  26.4 
PRD  194,531,523.78  194,531,523.78  2,272,992.90  391,336,040.46  18  19.7 
PT  92,994,946.66   92,994,946.66  3,947,624.70  189,937,518.02  9  9.4 
PC  15,751,920.92   19,689,901.16  2,382,957.21  37,824,779.29  2   
PVEM  15,751,920.92   19,689,901.16  2,151,111.94  37,592,934.02  2   
PPS  7,875,960.46    9,844,950.58  0.00  17,720,911.04  1   
PDM  7,875,960.46   9,844,950.58  0.00  17,720,911.04  1   
TOTAL  1,031,750,820.77   1,043,564,761.49  36,178,279.95  2,111,493,862.21  10
0 
100 
 
Source: Compiled by the author, according to the agreements of the General Council of IFE published in the Official 
Diary of the Federation on January 31 1997. (Agreement of the General Council of the IFE on the public funding of 
political parties for 1997).  
 
The  new  formula  of  30%  equal  distribution  and  70%  distribution  presented  a  more 
balanced formula for public financing in the 1997 elections. For these elections the PRI 
received 42% of the total amount, just under double that received by the PAN. 
Graph 6.1 Public Funding for 1997 elections 
 
Public Funding in 1997
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Source: Compiled by the author, according to the agreements of the General Council of IFE published in January 
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The new distribution formula that the IFE created for the midterm elections in 1997 
showed a considerable increase in public funding for political parties, from 201,308,002 
pesos in 1994 to a total of 2,111,493,862.21 pesos in 1997 (1,910,185,860 more than in 
1994). First of all, it is worth noting that the 1996 electoral reform had established a 
more equitable distribution formula: 70% proportional to the votes of each party and 
30% to the stricter criterion in equal parts. Secondly, as the number of types of public 
funding  changed  from  five  to  three  (support  of  permanent  ordinary  activities,  for 
campaign expenditure and specific activities), the new formula allowed the parties to 
invest greater amounts in campaign expenditure and electoral infrastructure than was 
reserved for the PRI in the past. As a result, the parties received an increase in public 
funding of up to five times the public funding they had received in the previous election. 
Although the PRI still received the biggest share, the significant aspect was that the 
other  opposition  parties,  especially  the  PAN  and  PRD,  received  enough  funding  to 
compete with the PRI under fair conditions.
175 The resources enabled the parties to enter 
into the electoral competition. However, some authors argue that, this new design for 
financial distribution only benefitted the three main parties, who negotiated the law. 
Consequently, small and medium sized parties, despite receiving more public funding 
than in the past, could  not compete with the big three, especially when buying TV 
advertising.
176 
Woldenberg notes that the PAN returned the first instalments as a protest, and the PRD 
announced  that  it  would  use  part  of  its  resources  for  giving  text  books  to  public 
schools.
177  Overall,  for  the  midterm  elections  in  1997  the  parties  obtained  more 
resources, which were better distributed, as a result of the new formula 70/30.  
Woldenberg notes that according to transitorial Article 6, two thousand million pesos 
would be able to be added in additional prerogatives after November and December 
1996. The total fund for the 1997 electoral process was 2,406,000,000 pesos. 
                                                 
175 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
176 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
177 See Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., Mecánica del cambio político en México, p.459. Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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PAN received more than 12 percent of the public funding, the PRI 5 percent less and PT 
nearly 7 per cent more.
178  
 
6.2.29  Campaign expenditure 1997 
 
Table. 6.9. Campaign expenditure in 1997 
 
PARTY  EXPENDITURE  % 
PRI  422,340,133.29  35.06 
PAN  291,354,176.09  24.18 
PRD  278,624,212.50  23.12 
PT  128,653,816.25  10.68 
PVEM  45,217,257.78  3.75 
PC  23,080,054.88  1.91 
PPS  11,257,417.81  0.93 
PDM  4,076,191.70  0.33 
TOTAL  1,204,603,260.29  100 
 
Source: Consolidated report presented by the Commission of Fiscalisation of the political parties presented by the 
General Council of IFE in relation to the expenses reports presented by the political parties in the 1997 elections. IFE 
With regard to the parties’ expenditure in 1997 compared to 1994 important changes 
were  registered.  The  PRI  was  the  organisation  that  spent  the  most  and  reported  a 
decrease in percentage from 78.28% in 1994 to 35.06% in 1997; in contrast the PAN 
increased from 10.37% to 24.18%, and the PRD increased from 4.73% to 23.12%. The 
PRD and the PAN increased their expenses significantly from one election to the next.  
 
6.2.30  Limits to Campaign expenses in 1997 
Campaign expenses ceilings were another aspect of the equity. The ceilings were lower 
than in the 1994 elections.  
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Table. 6.10. Limits to campaign expenses 1997 
Type of election  Limit in thousands of pesos 
Deputy for relative majority  676,091.52 
Senators for proportional 
representation 
176,265,567.95 
Deputy for the legislative 
assembly of the DF 
507,069.25 
Head of Government of Federal 
District 
28,556,005.13 
 
Source: Report on the electoral process 1997. IFE. 
 
The General Council established the ceilings for the deputies’ campaigns at a decrease 
of 54% in relation to 1994, and for senators at a decrease of 61%.  These measures were 
intended to restrain parties in their campaign expending.
179 After the Commission of 
Fiscalisation of the Resources of parties in 1997 all of the reports were revised and, the 
IFE proposed several recommendations to the parties.
180 Also, the commission found 
some irregularities in the parties campaign reports of 1997, and applied sanctions. 
The revision of the results of this exercise, implemented by IFE for the second time 
since  it  had  become  law,  allows  us  to  conclude  that  the  advance  in  the  practice  of 
presenting report on parties’ expenditure had been quite important. Also the institution 
was strengthened as it was organised in a better way to include more control, more 
transparency of the origin and more use of the resources that were destined to these 
parties. For those reasons the trust of the citizens and credibility of the parties increased. 
But it was still necessary to find new instruments to ensure the transparency of the 
financing of the political parties.  
 
 
                                                 
179 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.459. 
180 Results of the General Council of IFE in respect of the irregularities found in the revision of the reports on the 
campaign expenditure presented by the political parties in the 1997 electoral process.  See website for agreements 
January 1998. Section 15. http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/TRANSP/docs/consejo-general/acuer-
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6.2.31  Public funding in the 2000 election 
The 2000 elections were the second elections to be organised under the new electoral 
law of 1997. Despite using the same regulations for financing, some modifications were 
the prominence and constitutional mandate of public funding over private funding and 
2) The redefinition of the categories of public funding in an attempt to achieve more 
equity.  
Table 6.11. Public funding for permanent ordinary activities for political parties 
with representation in Congress. 
  PARTY  VOTES  %  30%  70%  TOTAL 
PRI  11,438,719  39.960001  80,381,578.13  374,738,929.31  455,120,507.44 
PAN  7,795,538  27.232919  80,381,578.13  255,386,251.17  335,767,829.30 
PRD  7,518,903  26.266522  80,381,578.13  246,323,531.53  326,705,109.66 
PVEM  1,116,137  3.899110  80,381,578.13  36,565,281.85  116,946,859.98 
PT  756,125  2.641445  80,381,578.13  24,771,084.34  105,152,662.47 
TOTAL  28,625,422  100.000000  401,907,890.65  937,785,078.20  1,339,692,968.85 
Source: Table compiled by the author according to agreements of the General Council of IFE January 
2000. 
The  elimination  of  the  category  of  public  funding  was  based  on  the  minimum 
percentage of votes required by a party to keep its definitive registration, by virtue of 
the elimination of the double form of registration and the requirement of 2% of votes for 
a  political  party  to  be  registered.  3)  The  creation  of  the  new  body  in  IFE,  the 
commission of Fiscalisation of resources of the parties and political groups, to ensure 
better fiscal control of the origin, destination and use of public funding that was granted 
to the parties. The General Council of IFE approved the agreement for the calculation of 
public funding in the ordinary session of 27 January 2000 which had been applied for 
the  first  time  in  the  1997  election.  After  the  IFE  calculated  the  minimum  cost  of 
campaigns  for  deputies  and  senators  as  it  did  in  1997,  it  calculated  the  amount  of 
permanent  public  funding  for  ordinary  activities  first,  and  then  for  campaign 
expenditures,  as  it  was  the  year  of  the  election.  The  third  modality,  for  specific 
activities, was supported up to 75% of the proven expenses for the previous year. As 
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previous election with a total of 3,064,092,232.97 pesos and a better distribution of 
funds. 
Table 6.12. Distribution of Public funding for political parties in 2000 
POLITICAL 
PARTY 
FOR 
ORDINARY 
ACTIVITIES 
FOR 
CAMPAIGN 
EXPENSES 
FOR SPECIFIC 
ACTIVITIES  
Total  % 
PRI  455,120,507.44  455,120,507.44  10,873,263.37  921,114,278.25  30.06 
PAN  335,767,829.30  335,767,829.30  21,177,590.59  692,713,249.19  22.61 
PRD  326,705,109.66  326,705,109.66  3,442,281.55  656,852,500.87  21.44 
PVEM  116,946,859.98  116,946,859.98  13,349,515.35  247,243,235.31  8.07 
PT  105,152,662.47  105,152,662.47  7,039,781.38  217,345,106.32  7.09 
PARTIDO DE LA 
SOCIEDAD 
NACIONALISTA 
26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  4,710,907.52  58,298,626.26  1.90 
PARTIDO DE 
CENTRO 
DEMOCRATICO
* 
26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  1,183,723.45  54,771,442.19  1.79 
CONVERGENCI
A POR LA 
DEMOCRACIA* 
26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  414,890.39  54,002,609.13  1.76 
PARTIDO 
AUTENTICO DE 
LA 
REVOLUCION 
MEXICANA* 
26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  0.00  53,587,718.74  1.75 
PARTIDO 
ALIANZA 
SOCIAL* 
26,793,859.37  26793,859.37  0.00  53,587,718.74  1.75 
DEMOCRACIA 
SOCIAL *  26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  988,029.23  54,575,747.97  1.78 
  1,500,456,125.07  1,500,456,125.07  63,179,982.83  3,064,092,232.97  100 
*Financing for parties that obtained their registration after the last election 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the agreement by General Council of IFE January 2000 and official report 
of the 2000 federal electoral process. IFE.    
The political parties that obtained their registration at a date which was later than the 
date of the election, had the right to have public funding. 1) 2% of public funding for 
their permanent ordinary activities 2) the same amount for their campaign expenses as it 
was an electoral year and 3) the corresponding public funding. In total six organisations 
received funding. In addition to this public funding, the IFE has other resources that are 
part of the general prerogatives:  
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Table 6.13. Public funding allocated to political parties for developing political 
campaigns  
 
Amounts for buying of  
slots 
300.09 million pesos 
 
Financing for National 
Political Groups  
30.01 million pesos 
 
These figures show that the law granted a minimum funding to develop the campaigns 
and that the parties on the register automatically obtained resources to do their work. 
For the first time in an electoral process, a coalition (Alliance for Mexico) obtained 
more public resources than the PRI.
181  
The  following  graph  shows  the  amount  of  public  funding  approved  by  the  General 
Council of the IFE for the year 2000, including for political parties that had formed 
coalitions.  The  political  context  for  the  2000  elections  changed  as  the  two  main 
opposition parties decided to compete in coalitions. On 17 December 1999, only days 
before  the  approval  of  public  funding,  the  General  council  of  IFE  approved  the 
application  for  registration  of  several  parties  wishing  to  form  coalitions  for  the 
elections:  PAN  and  the  green  party  under  the  “Alianza  por  México”  (Alliance  for 
Change) and PRD, Convergencia, PT, PNS and PAS joined forces under “Alianza por 
Mexico” (Alliance for Mexico). As a result of this decision, the amount of campaign 
expenses  was  aportioned  in  accordance  with  size  of  the  coalitions  and  the  same 
principles  were  applied  to  the  campaigns  for  the  presidential,  deputies  and  senators 
elections.
182 
The public funding for the 2000 elections increased greatly, and was distributed more 
equitably. 
                                                 
181 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio politico en México, p.509. 
182 Interview, Mario A. Rivera, Coordinator of electoral transparency and access to information, Civic 
Alliance, Mexico City, 5 October 2004. 
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Table  6.14  Public  Funding  for  the  2000  elections  allocated  for  each  party  or 
coalition. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using data by the General Council of IFE agreement January 2000)  
(Graph 2)  
 
 
POLITICAL 
PARTY OR 
COALITION 
PERMANENT 
ORDINARY 
ACTIVITIES 
CAMPAIGN 
EXPENSES 
SPECIFIC 
ACTIVITES 
TOTAL IN 
MILLIONS OF 
PESOS 
% 
ALLIANCE 
FOR CHANGE 
(PAN, PVEM) 
452,714,688.98  452,714,688.98  34,527,105.94  939,956,483.9 
 
30.67 
PRI  455,120,507.44  455,120,507.44  10,873,263.37  921,114,278.3  30.05 
ALLIANCE 
FOR MEXICO 
(PRD, PT, CD, 
PSN, PAS) 
512,239,350.3  512,239,350.3  16,376’693.9  1,040,855,395  33.96 
PCD  26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  1,183,723.45  54,77,1442.19  1.79 
PARM  26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  -  53,587,718.74  1.75 
DS 
 
26,793,859.37  26,793,859.37  988,029.23  54,575,747.97 
 
1.78 
TOTAL  1,500,456,124.83  1,500,456,124.83  63’948,815.89  3,064,861,066.10  100 
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Table 6.15 Campaign Expenditure 2000 
 
PARTY  EXPENDITURE  % 
PRI  901,392,199.91  40.48% 
ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE (PAN, PVEM)  673,695,813.30  30.26% 
ALLIANCE FOR MEXICO (PRD, PT, CD, PSN, PAS)  566,756,040.46  25.46% 
PARM  28,612,639.84  1.29% 
PCD  28,027,366.37  1.26% 
DS  28,010,494.66  1.26% 
TOTAL  2,226,494,554.54  100.00% 
 
Source: The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE  
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Another  interesting  aspect  of  the  election  was  the  correlation  between  the  vote  and 
money. In this case, the PRI was the party with the highest expenditure with 40% of the 
total amount spent by all parties, however it did not obtain the majority of votes.   
The votes from the 2000 elections were also counted with more instruments to achieve 
equality.  (See  the  campaign  ceilings.)  Only  the  campaign  ceiling  for  the  president 
increased  by  13%.  The  thousands  of  deputies  and  senators  had  to  spend  less  than 
previous elections (1997).  
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 Table 6.16 Limits to campaign expenses 2000 
 
Type of election  Limit in thousands of 
pesos 
Estimate in thousands of 
US dollars 
Lower Chamber  738,737.72  78 
Senators  1,493,285.42  157 
Presidential  491,816,870.75  51,770 
 
Source: The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE  
 
Table. 6.17. Comparison between the campaign ceilings in 1994 and 2000 
 
  Ceilings 1994  Ceilings of 1994 
with costs of 2000  Ceilings 2000  Perceptual 
change 
Deputies  850,226  2,750,977  738,737  -73.15 
Senators  7,970,874  25,790,427  12,646,261  -50.97 
President  134,460,560  435,058,343  491,816,870  13.05 
 
Source: The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE 
 
The General Council of IFE approved the ceilings. The election confirmed that the most 
recent  reform  had  achieved  at  least  two  objectives:  1)  the  ceilings  to  expenses  that 
resulted in a positive impact on the conditions with greater fairness in competence and 
2) facilitating the fiscal control of campaign expenditures, which was a complex task for 
IFE. The ceilings for deputies decreased 73% in real terms and for senators 51%. That 
meant  that  the  law  established  a  limit  to  the  inequality  of  the  invested  campaign 
resources. In order to verify that the campaign ceiling had been respected the parties’ 
financing  was  reviewed.  For  the  first  time  the  law  allowed  for  direct  audits  of  the 
parties. A technical body specialing in the fiscal control of party funding was created 
and that revised the 100% expenditure on income and media. The regime of sanctions 
was also improved, and that year the IFE returned to have access to the patrimony of the 
parties.
183  
                                                 
183 Reports on the Electoral process 1997 & 2000. See also Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenber, J., La mecánica del 
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6.3 Conclusion 
The first three sections of this chapter have shown how the issue of party finances and 
media access went from being an irrelevant part of the different electoral agendas to 
becoming the most discussed concern during the final stage of the reformist period. It 
became  apparent  that  from  1988  an  increasingly  stronger  opposition  sought  the 
opportunity to challenge the power of the PRI, and did not hesitate in demanding better 
rules  for  a  more  competitive  and  fair  electoral  process.  They  looked  for  better 
mechanisms for ensuring equity and transparency in public funding that was granted to 
parties. It has been noted that the role of the new electoral authority, did not only adopt 
a more active role in opening the discussion on financing issues and media access but 
also became the supervisor and guarantor of the new regulations. The role of IFE can 
therefore be considered crucial in the building of electoral democracy in Mexico. The 
IFE,  along  with  the  Electoral  Tribunal  and  through  the  various  electoral  processes, 
gained credit in relation to the transparency and credibility, not only among the parties 
but  within  civil  society  as  well.    After  1993,  IFE  appeared  to  start  acting  more 
independently,  especially  in  the  fight  for  equal  treatment  in  party  funding.  The 
responsibilities  of  IFE  after  2000,  in  party  finances,  are  a  result  of  cumulative 
responsibilies that the predecessor of the electoral authority gained through the various 
electoral reforms. First of all, the legislation gave IFE the function of distributing public 
resources, with the annual approval of the Chamber of Deputies. The IFE acquired more 
and more responsibilities until it become not only the administrator of public funding, 
but also the enforcer of regulations on private funding and the supervisor and controller 
of the income and expenditure of the parties. The reformist practices, together with the 
electoral processes, showed that the parties’ battle to achieve more equitable conditions 
in political competence, centred on two essential aspects: a) the financing of the parties 
and b) access to the media which will be discussed in the next chapter. Both these 
aspects were incorporated in the electoral processes of 1994, 1997 and 2000, as primary 
instruments in the development of the political campaigns, obtaining positive results and 
giving the added benefit of internal strength to its institutions. This contributed to the 
conformation of the electoral system and the parties. It is important to remember that in 
the 1988 elections, despite significant competition, the PRI still commanded most of the 
resources. Then in 1991, with the new electoral law COFIPE was approved and the new 
electoral authority IFE, whose focus was to organise transparent elections, as the issue Lidia Acosta    Chapter 6: The Role of IFE in the Financing of Political Parties 
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of party financing and media access was not yet a prime issue among political parties. It 
was  not  until  1993  that  the  financing  issue  and  media  access  became  the  centre  of 
discussion among reformists, when the first system of income and expenditure of the 
parties, with its legal limitations and policies, was regulated and applied for the first 
time.  
Overall, the most important achievements of the reforms were: the provision of more 
equally distributed public funding, a significant reduction in the spending ceiling and 
the  creation  of  mechanisms  to  enable  closer  monitoring  of  party  income  and 
expenditure. 
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7  Chapter 7 The role of IFE in media access by political parties: The 
issue of media access for political parties  
 
This chapter will concentrate on the very important aspect of electoral competence that 
includes  access  to  the  media  by  political  parties,  another  area  of  activity  that  was 
allocated to the Federal Electoral Institute.
1  
Political parties in Mexico have had the right of access to the media for many years. 
When electoral competition increased in the early 1990s and the character of electoral 
campaigns changed, it became a fundamental issue on the electoral agenda in order to 
promote and ensure conditions of fair play in elections. In the new party system that 
emerged in the 1990s, characterised by stronger opposition parties competing at various 
levels for electoral posts, electronic media, and TV and radio, became indispensable 
instruments in electoral campaigns and promotions. However, the limited prerogatives 
on media access of political parties and the lack of regulation in both their use and 
coverage created imperfect electoral conditions that only benefitted the official party, 
the PRI.  After the creation of the IFE in 1990, many of the regulations introduced in the 
electoral  law  relating  to  media  access  and  coverage  were  governed  by  the  electoral 
institution. Therefore, from 1993, along with the issue of party finances, regulations on 
media access (a form of indirect funding) were included on the agenda of the successive 
reforms negotiated between the political parties and government.  
The purpose of this chapter is to firstly, examine the evolution of the regulation of 
media  access  by  political  parties,  in  order  to  see  how  it  contributed  to  more  plural 
electoral campaigns and improved the level of party competition. Secondly, to analyse 
the role of  IFE in applying, enforcing and introducing regulations on media access, 
including  its  monitoring  task,  which  eventually  contributed  to  the  achievement  of 
fairness in the conditions of electoral competition.  The first section will concentrate on 
the evolution of the regulation of media access, through several electoral reforms, until 
the  creation  of  IFE  in  1990.  It  will  show  how  the  significance  of  media  access  by 
                                                 
1 The law confers four prerogatives on national political parties: 1) permanent access to radio and television, 2) to 
hold a special tax regime, 3) to have the necessary postal and telegraphic franchises to carry out their functions and 4) 
to have public funding. The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the Year 2000. Section 5. IFE, 
p.3. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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political parties increased in parallel to the development of the parties and in line with 
party funding.  
The second section will cover the development of media regulation between the 1993 
electoral reform, that granted political parties the right to buy broadcasting time on radio 
and TV, and the last electoral reform in 1996. This section will focus on the position of 
the different political actors and the main points discussed during the negotiations, in 
media related issues that became the centre of the debate after the 1994 presidential 
elections.  It  will  seek  to  establish  the  extent  to  which  the  IFE,  after  gaining  more 
functions  and  powers  in  the  regulation  of  media  access  by  political  parties,  started 
acting more independently and openly showing its commitment to ensuring equitable 
access to the media. The third section of the chapter will seek to compare the evolution 
of media access that political parties received between the 1991 midterm election and 
the 2000 presidential election, in order to highlight the disparity in media access and 
coverage. It will seek to establish whether the IFE’s activities in areas such as acting as 
an  intermediary  in  buying  commercial  time  and  media  monitoring  contributed  to 
improvement in the quality of information broadcast by TV and Radio.  
 
7.1 Evolution of the prerogatives in radio and television access 
This section will include an account of the development of the regulations on media 
access, by political parties in Mexico, through the different electoral reforms until the 
1990 reform. Unsurprisingly the issue of access to the media by political parties was not 
considered  in  the  electoral  legislation  until  1973,  when  the  Federal  Electoral  Law 
granted political parties free access to radio and television broadcasting for the first 
time.
2  This  delay  was  caused  by  the  nature  of  the  “hegemonic  party  system”  that 
governed Mexico until the late 1960’s where both free and paid access to the media was 
reserved only for the official party, the PRI. In addition to this, the media had no interest 
in the opposition and was completely closed to political alternatives to the PRI.
3 After 
the political instability caused by the repression of the students’ protests in 1969 and the 
                                                 
2 Through a presidential act in 1969, it was established that the State would make use of 12.5% of the broadcasting 
time of radio and television channels. These transmission times were supplied to the parties through the Inter-
secretarial Commission of Radio diffusion of the Ministry of the Interior.” The Mexican Electoral System and the 
Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.159-160. 
3 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
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successive  protests  for  democracy,  the  government  started  giving  concessions  to 
political parties, free media access being one of them. Officially, the introduction of this 
prerogative in the federal Electoral law intended to allow political parties free access to 
radio and television primarily during electoral periods in order for them to broadcast 
their electoral platforms.
4 The prerogative granted to political parties stated that “each 
political party will have up to 10 minutes of national television and radio broadcasting 
every  two  weeks”.
5  As  a  result,  official  air-time  reserved  for  the  government  was 
available to political parties. However, regulations were limited and the Government 
became  aware,  for  the  first  time,  of  the  importance  of  the  mass  media  in  electoral 
contests. Legislation followed a presidential act in 1969 that established that the State 
would make use of 12.5% of the broadcasting time of radio and television channels; 
these  transmission  times  were  allocated  to  the  parties  through  the  Inter-secretarial 
Commission of Radio Diffusion of the Ministry  of the  Interior.” Subsequent to this 
initial step in 1973, the new electoral law created in the electoral reform of 1977, the 
LFOPPE  (the  Federal  Act  of  Political  Organisations  and  Electoral  Procedures) 
established that “free access to radio and TV should be permanent, and that during an 
electoral period broadcasting time might be increased”.
6 This regulation was linked to 
the introduction of a new political parties’ prerogative that established in Art 48, the 
right of political parties to have permanent access to the mass media (TV and radio).
7 In 
parallel  to  the  extension  of  this  prerogative,  the  government  created  a  new  special 
commission to control access to the media called the “Radio Diffusion Commission” 
which was governed by the Federal Electoral Commission. The permanent character of 
media access by political parties and its regulation was introduced in the new Federal 
Electoral Code of 1987. The new code established the right of each party to have 15 
minutes per month of broadcasting time and allowed for an increase in time during 
electoral periods.
8 Additionally, the law stated that all parties had the right to participate 
in televised debates and radio programmes twice a month.
9 These programmes would be 
                                                 
4 The disposal of these official air times was the responsibility of the State to the media; see The Mexican electoral 
Regime and the Federal Elections of the Year 2000. Section 5. IFE, p.7. & The Mexican Electoral System and the 
Federal Election. IFE. 1997,  p.159. 
5 See The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997,  p.160. 
6 1997, IFE, p. 159 In the constitutional reform of electoral matters it was established in article 41 paragraph four that 
political parties would have the right to use the mass media in an equitable manner and according to their electoral 
strength. 
7 Article 48. Chapter I LFOPPE. 
8 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.159. 
9 Ibid. Likewise, it also stated that political parties could request regional transmissions, as long as these 
programmes did not exceed half of the assigned time for national broadcasting programmes. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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coordinated by the electoral authority, through the Commission of Radio-Diffusion.
10 
However, this formula was limited as it did not change the marginal presence of the 
parties on radio and TV and it “did not consider provisions for increasing the level of 
infrastructure that they were working within.
11 In this context it is worth noting, that for 
parties  such  as  PAN  the  biggest  problem  was  the  lack  of  funding  to  buy  TV 
advertising.
12  Finally,  the  new  electoral  legislation  approved  in  the  1990  electoral 
reform, the COFIPE (Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures) introduced 
a  formula  that  increased  the  broadcasting  time  for  political  parties  during  electoral 
periods, establishing that such increases would be proportional to the electoral force of 
each political party.
13 An interesting aspect of the regulation on media access was the 
introduction of a regulation that guaranteed to keep the tariffs for non-official times, 
during electoral campaigns, the same as those for commercial advertising”.
14  
Overall, the regulations on media access were quite limited up until 1990. However, 
after the electoral law of 1990 negotiations between the government and the opposition, 
were  required  and  the  opposition  started  demanding  specific  changes  in  this  area. 
Consequently, the issue of media access became a crucial demand during negotiations 
in pursuit of strengthening and balancing political parties. 
 
7.2 Media access: 1993-1996 
In the period between 1993 and 1996, the issue of access to the media, became a central 
item in the electoral agenda. The parties participating in the negotiations demanded, not 
only  equal  conditions  of  access  to  the  media  during  commercial  slots,  special 
programmes and publicly financed air time, but also impartial and professional coverage 
by  the  media.  It  was  during  this  period  that  the  IFE  adopted  a  more  active  role  in 
regulating the use of the media by political parties, and more importantly, acting as an 
intermediary between media representatives and political parties.  
                                                 
10 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.197. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Interview, Marcos Baños, Executive Director, Professional Electoral Service Executive Board. (IFE), Mexico City, 
November 16 2004. 
13 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997, p.159. The COFIPE established that “during 
that period at least one half of the time assigned to each political party might be used for the dissemination of the 
party’s electoral platform” 
14 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.260. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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The 1991 midterm elections which were the first elections under Salinas’ government, 
and  the  first  organised  by  IFE,  were  recognised  as  legal  by  most  of  the  parties. 
However, inequalities in electoral competition, including limited access to the media by 
the opposition and the partial media coverage of the parties’ campaigns triggered a new 
round of reforms. Partiality of the news programmes was a long standing problem in 
Mexico.  During  the  PRI  hegemony,  not  only  public  TV  and  radio  were  under 
government control but also the private media.
15 In addition, the PRI who had access to 
public resources was the only party able to purchase electoral advertising, thus creating 
a  commercial  relationship  with  the  media  owners.  Because  of  these  constraints,  the 
media, especially the radio and TV news programmes, were heavily criticised for their 
lack of impartiality. Indeed, during the 1988 Presidential elections the Mexican mass 
media was highly condemned. Becerra notes, that the lack of media coverage in the 
“Televisa” and radio news programmes of the most attended public meeting since 1968, 
addressed  by  the  presidential  candidate,  Cuauhtémoc  Cárdenas,  demonstrated  how 
biased  the  media  was.
16  By  1993,  inequalities  in  media  access  by  political  parties, 
especially  in  resources  for  purchasing  of  advertising  and  partial  coverage  by  media 
representatives were central issues in the negotiation of the reform. As the changes had 
to  be  negotiated,  these  issues  were  specific  to  opposition  demands  with  the  clear 
objective of increasing their level of competitiveness. As stated earlier, the demands 
relating to issues of party finances and media access were related to the strengthening of 
the opposition in the party system. As a result, the media was forced to acknowledge the 
changing situation. Becerra notes, that as long as there was no strong opposition, having 
a media closed to alternatives to the PRI, was not a big concern. However, when the 
opposition began to emerge, and the media was criticised the situation changed.
17 In 
addition  to  this,  changes  in  the  media  also  resulted  from  changes  in  the  economic 
system. For instance, the privatisation of the national television (public channel) by 
Salinas, led to the emergence of other private TV companies, which were available to 
                                                 
15 Interview, Francisco Bedolla  Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. As the PRI-government used to own the 
biggest paper factories, the newspaper owners were manipulated and controlled by the PRI. In the case of TV, there 
was only one TV conglomerate called “Televisa”, which was openly owned by PRI members. 
16 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
17 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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other parties, but only for the competition.
18 During the negotiations of the reform, the 
opposition was already concerned with three aspects: the use of air time on radio and 
TV by parties, the purchase of advertising and the media coverage of political parties’ 
campaigns in the news.
19 Thus, in respect of the issue of media access, the debate for the 
1993 electoral reform centred on the regulations for purchasing electoral advertising and 
the conduct of the news programmes.  
 
7.2.1  Main regulation on media: content of the 1993 electoral reform 
The first aspect to highlight in the law was the disposition that “granted political parties 
the exclusive right to buy broadcasting time to disseminate information directed towards 
the acquisition of votes”.
20 This was intended to promote fairer conditions for buying 
broadcasting time on radio and TV. Additionally, the reform established that this right 
to  hire  broadcasting  time  on  radio  and  TV,  for  electoral  campaigns,  was  limited 
exclusively to electoral campaign periods.
21 This was the first time that the Electoral 
Code had regulated on this subject. 
Another significant aspect of the reform was the empowerment of IFE by adding an 
additional  role  that  would  be  developed  in  future  reforms:  the  role  of  being  an 
intermediary between the political parties and the media access. The IFE’s “mediator 
functions” would focus on achieving a balance on media coverage and on guaranteeing 
that  all  parties  would  have  access  to  purchase  electoral  advertising  without 
discrimination  or  exclusions.  Firstly,  due  to  the  political  parties’  demand  for 
improvement in the quality of information broadcast, the reform allowed members of 
the General Council of IFE to have meetings with the National Chamber of Radio and 
Television Industry, in order to propose guidelines to be applied on the broadcasting of 
the political parties’ campaign activities in radio and TV news programmes.
22  In this 
context, in each federal electoral process, the Executive Director of Prerogatives and 
Political  parties,  was  required  to  hold  a  meeting  with  the  Commission  of  Radio 
Broadcasting  of  the  IFE  and  with  the  National  Chamber  of  Television  and  Radio 
Industries, in order to set general guidelines to be applied to news broadcasts involving 
                                                 
18 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
19 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, pp.298-299. 
20 The Mexican electoral system and the Federal election. IFE. 1997, p.160. 
21 Report on the electoral Process of 1997, IFE, p.160. 
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information  or  communication  on  campaign  activities  of  political  parties.
23  The 
guidelines given to the media representatives included a format for campaign coverage, 
criteria for objectivity, quality, possibility of correction or clarification of information, 
rectification, a fair allocation of broadcasting times and an evaluation of the importance 
of the news generated. This was provided as part of a scheme of communication and 
joint  responsibility  between  the  press  offices  of  the  parties  and  the  media,  with 
specifications in the case of information or paid message and with strict respect for the 
private lives of the candidates, civil servants and party representatives.
24 As a result of 
this regulation, the IFE started listing the guidelines to be followed by the media during 
the 1994 electoral campaign. Its intention was to reduce the enormous imbalances in 
media coverage of different political campaigns through the adoption of agreements on 
regulations.
25 Secondly, and with the purpose of avoiding inequality among the parties 
while buying commercial advertising, the law established a mechanism that empowered 
the IFE, through the Communication Secretary, to act as a mediator in the process of 
buying air time. Those in charge of granting concessions and licences had to present a 
catalogue of schedules and available tariffs for the acquisition of air time for use by 
political parties during two periods.
26 The IFE had to obtain this catalogue of time and 
tariffs and make it available to parties who, in turn, had to communicate in writing to 
the stations, channels and schedules in which they had an interest in buying air time. 
The law established that outside those times the parties were not allowed to contract 
advertising. This measure was an attempt to prevent any media-concessionary denying 
the  sale  of  advertising  to  a  specific  party  and  it  was  also  intended  to  balance  the 
presence of the parties on the radio and television to avoid unfair play.
  As a result the 
IFE, for the first time, began to adopt a more active and autonomous role in the political 
arena by giving recommendations to the media and parties. This not only prompted the 
political  parties  to  demand  more  functions  from  the  electoral  authority  but  it  also 
created a different perception of the government institution.   
                                                 
23 The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE, p.8. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Between December 1993 and January 1994 the nine parties obtained consensus on a list of general guidelines to be 
applied on radio and TV during the broadcasting campaigns of the political parties. The achievement of this 
consensus was significant because political parties agreed on another aspect to be introduced in the Electoral Code 
(COFIPE). Interview, Rosa M. González, member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), Mexico City, November 
2004. 
26 The first is from 1
st February to 31
st March of the election year (solely for the purpose of presidential campaigns) 
and the second from 1
st April up to three days before the day of the elections (for all federal campaigns). The tariffs 
may not be greater than those for commercial advertising. Report on the electoral Process of 2000. IFE, p.7. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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7.2.2  The 1994 electoral reform: the 1994 elections 
Following the 1993 electoral reform, the 1994 reform introduced additional changes 
related to the mass media. It is worth remembering that the decision to negotiate a new 
reform  in  1994,  just  before  the  presidential  election,  was  the  result  of  a  series  of 
dramatic  events,  such  as  the  Zapatista  rebellion  in  Chiapas  and  high  class  political 
assassinations, which prompted the parties to ensure the democratic option of choosing 
elections over other violent methods. Therefore, the reform, which was negotiated by 
the main political parties contending in the elections and the government, intended to 
ensure the credibility of the elections.  Important changes in the membership of the 
General Council of the Federal Electoral Institute increased its active role not only in 
promoting new regulations but also in implementing various measures. Among the most 
important regulations on media access promoted by the General Council of IFE were: 
first  of  all,  and  as  a  direct  demand  from  the  parties,  additional  radio-air  time  was 
allocated to the IFE’s budget, to be distributed among the political parties according to 
their political strength. It was agreed to grant up to 180% of additional time to each 
political party to promote their campaign.
27 In addition, and at the final stage of the 
electoral campaign, the IFE agreed with the National Chamber of Industry of the Radio 
and  Television  to  broadcast  116  daily  radio  messages,  to  be  allocated  amongst  the 
parties according to their electoral force.
28 Secondly, during the electoral campaign, the 
IFE urged the media to provide impartial and objective electoral coverage, for which, an 
agreement  exhorting  electronic  mass  media  to  respect  the  right  of  citizens  to  be 
informed was approved. Another significant measure was the decision to suspend the 
broadcasting of parties’ propaganda on radio and TV 10 days before the election, with 
the exception of information relating to the closing of electoral campaigns, as the large 
television and radio companies agreed to fully cover the live closing campaign of all 
parties.
29 Furthermore, and in response to another demand of the opposition, president 
Salinas decided to cancel all broadcasting information and advertising related to the 
social programmes of the government twenty days before the election.
30 
 
                                                 
27 180% of additional time was applied to the time allocated during the 1994 reform. See report on the 1994 electoral 
process. IFE. 
28 See report on the electoral process of 1994. IFE. 
29 Report on the Electoral Process of 1997. IFE, pp.160-61. 
30 Ibid. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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7.2.3  Monitoring in the media  
The introduction of monitoring tasks on media coverage was one of the most important 
aspects of the 1993 reform. It not only proved to be efficient in exposing the unequal 
treatment by the media in the coverage of parties’ activities, but showed the need for 
further  reforms  in  this  area.  At  the  negotiation  table,  the  parties  used  a  pioneering 
monitoring study that calculated the total time that news programmes dedicated to the 
1988 elections.
31 The results of the study showed that nearly 90% of the total time 
dedicated to electoral campaigns in the news was concentrated on Salinas‘campaign, 
leaving  just  3%  for  the  PRD.
32  As  a  result  of  the  PRD’s  proposal  that  had  been 
presented in the Commission of Radio diffusion of the IFE, it was agreed to carry out 
systematic monitoring of the main TV and radio news programmes during the 1994 
electoral campaign.
33 Once the monitoring process was completed, the General Council 
issued its recommendations based on the monitoring. The decision to carry out this 
monitoring,  although  promoted  by  the  PRD,  was  a  strategy  devised  by  IFE  to  put 
pressure on the media in order for it to be liberated.
34 Along with the monitoring carried 
out  by  the  IFE,  the  electoral  institution  employed  the  private  company  Delfos
35  to 
undertake  qualitative  monitoring.  In  parallel,  other  non  governmental  organisations, 
such as “Alianza Cívica” carried out media monitoring.
36 The intention was to verify the 
conduct of the main television and radio news programmes. The work carried out by 
several non  governmental organisations  was  grouped around Alianza  Cívica (“Civic 
Alliance”) and became very significant as it preceded and exemplified the work that IFE 
would  develop.
37  As  was  anticipated  by  the  opposition,  the  results  of  the  different 
monitoring processes showed partiality  and inequality in media coverage during the 
                                                 
31 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
32 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
33 See PRD proposal. Report on the Electoral Process of 1994. IFE. 
34 Interview, Rosa Maria González, member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), Mexico City, 4 October 2004. 
35 In the ordinary session of the General Council of IFE on 18 June 1994, a first exhortation to the media was 
conducted according to the approved guidelines and was agreed at the same time as that of the Commission of Radio. 
These were advertised and won by the company Delfos Communication. 
36 For the report on the monitoring carried out by Alianza Cívica, see Monitoring report on the electoral campaigns 
on radio and television during the 1994 and 1997 elections. Cuaderno de Trabajo, 2000. 
37 It worth noting that Civic Alliance, since its creation in 1994 was involved in tasks related to electoral observation 
and campaigns for the promotion of electoral reforms. It was also one of the first organisations to demand electoral 
transparency and free access to information. For a more detailed information about this organisation see 
http://www.alianzacivica.org.mx/quienes.html 
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1994 elections. The monitoring carried out by the IFE showed that in the first period of 
analysis the PRI occupied 49% of the total coverage.
38 It also showed that the media 
was unware of, or failed to follow, the guidelines given by the IFE. Also, similar to the 
IFE’s results,
39 the six weekly reports on media monitoring carried out by “Delfos” 
demonstrated that the PRI commanded more than 40% of the attention in the news.
40 
Following the two periods of monitoring, IFE prepared a report “on the fulfilment of the 
general guidelines applicable in the radio and television news programmes” and with 
its partial results, the General council tried to rectify or re channel the media that had 
not followed the public recommendations.
41 The monitoring results put pressure on the 
main media owners, who decided to grant time (three programmes of 15 minutes in 
primary timetables) free to all parties taking part in the 1994 election. Becerra notes that 
in the case of Mexico, the more impartial and independent media were a product of the 
same  process  of  transition,  as  the  electoral  strength  of  the  parties  and  the  electoral 
system had to develop before the media did.
42 This seems to invert the causal process of 
cause and effect in change. Finally, another aspect of the electoral campaign that proved 
to be a break through, in the significance of the media in elections, was the decision to 
hold the first televised debate between the three candidates of the main political parties. 
This was a political agreement without precedence; the three candidates of the 1994 
election (Zedillo, Fernández de Cevallos, and Cárdenas) agreed to have a debate on 
television to put forward their programmes and ideas.
43 The day before the debate, the 
three presidential candidates of smaller parties, also obtained air time on television, both 
private and public, to conduct their own debate.  
In  general,  the  reform  and  the  electoral  campaign  that  followed,  contributed  to  the 
acknowledgment  among  parties,  government,  media  and  the  IFE  itself,  that  more 
regulation in this area was needed. Among the parties, the agreement on pushing for 
more reforms in this area was in place. For the government, the issue was a concern, as 
it could become a problem in the coming reforms. And finally, for the IFE, it was a 
                                                 
38 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
39 After 22 June1994, that work was initiated (list of programmes and news analysed). A month later on 20 July the 
first fortnightly report was presented that revealed an unequal distribution in the news programmes. (Mec pp. 343-
344) 
40 See Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio politico en México., p.340. 
41 Ibid, p.341. 
42 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
43 For the opinions on the televised debate between the PRI, PRD and PAN candidates see El Mes (from April  17 to 
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major problem that needed to be resolved as a matter or urgency. First of all, the IFE 
could not afford confrontation among the parties based on inequality of media access 
and  coverage,  as  it  had  been  established  that  IFE’s  objective  was  to  ensure  fair 
elections. Secondly, among the increasing responsibilities of the electoral authority, the 
implementation of fair media access and treatment were the issues most demanded by 
political parties.
44  
 
7.2.4  The media regulations in the 1996 electoral reform 
As  occurred  with  party  finances,  by  the  1996  electoral  reform,  the  issues  of  equal 
conditions in media access and media coverage were at the centre of the negotiations.  
First of all, the existing formula for distribution of air time, that established an increase 
in broadcasting time during electoral times according to the parties’ electoral strength, 
was  substituted  by  a  more  precise  and  balanced  formula.  The  new  formula  for 
regulating  political  parties  access  to  radio  and  TV  during  electoral  periods  was  the 
following: 30% of free additional time to be distributed evenly between parties with 
parliamentary representation and the remaining 70% to be distributed according to their 
political strength.
45 Additionally, and with reference to this, it was agreed that the radio 
and television concessionaries must transmit the programmes of the parties and the IFE 
at peak audience times.
46 In addition to the new distribution formula for broadcasting 
time, the law introduced two important regulations intended to increase the publicity of 
the parties’ candidacy in the electronic media during electoral periods. In addition to the 
free 15 minutes monthly that each political party had on a permanent basis, the law 
established the following free air time for all parties: 1) For presidential elections, the 
assignment  of  up  to  250  hours  of  transmission  on  radio  and  200  on  TV,  2)  For 
intermediate legislative elections, these amounts would be cut in half to 125 hours on 
radio and 100 on TV, and 3) the law established that the IFE would also obtain up to 
10,000 promotional minutes on radio and 400 on television, with a period of 20 minutes 
to then be distributed among the parties.
47 The law established that these times could 
                                                 
44 Interview Francisco Bedolla. Member of IFE. Bedolla notes that these parties’ demands for fairer media treatment 
were first presented in an informal meeting inside IFE. These issues were then discussed in the General Council of 
IFE. This showed how IFE started to promote this process.  See IFE: Esperando a Godot. Voz y Voto. Abril 1994; 
(14): 50. Session of the IFE ( February 28) and ordinary session (March 1994).  
45 The Mexican Electoral System and the Federal Election. IFE. 1997,  p.161. 
46 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenber, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.440. 
47 The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE, p.7., Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & 
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only be used during electoral periods and for campaign activities. Another aspect of the 
reform was the introduction of a new procedure for the allocation of broadcasting time, 
in situations where more than one party was interested in contracting the same time 
schedules or channels.
48 The law set up an equal procedure controlled by the IFE, where 
the available time would be divided between the parties.
49 This formula was clearly 
intended to promote “equity” in the conditions of competence, as it did not benefit the 
stronger parties.  In reference to the behaviour of the mass media the reform and, as a 
direct consequence of the monitoring tasks in 1994, the law reinforced the success of 
the monitoring task of the IFE. First of all, the law allowed the Commission of Radio 
Broadcasting to carry out sample monitoring of transmission times of political party 
campaigns in the media news programmes. The idea was for the Commission to report 
on this to the General Council of IFE.
50 Secondly, the law prohibited a third party from 
acquiring air time for propaganda either in favour or or against any political party.
51 
Nonetheless, while acknowledging the positive outcome of the new law, the issue of 
media regulations was still a concern among parties. Firstly, as a result of the large 
amount  of  money  that  was  allocated  to  parties  in  the  1996  reform  to  spend  on 
campaigns,  electronic  media,  especially  TV,  became  the  most  used  instrument  to 
promote electoral campaigns. This caused a new context of “electoral marketing”, as up 
to 70% of the total funding that the parties received was spent entirely on TV. The so 
called  “fiesta  del  dinero”  generated  illicit  relationships  between  the  media  and  the 
parties.
52 Among other complaints was the criticism of the over-use of the media in 
politics,  as  it  not  only  presented  partial  information  but  also  increased  the  cost  of 
electoral campaigns enormously.
53 For instance, the PAN, in its criticism of the lack of 
regulation of the mass media, supported the idea of adopting a model similar to the 
European system that included stricter regulations on the use of the mass media and 
                                                 
48 “Once the procedure for distribution and assignment is concluded, the IFE should make known to each political 
party the corresponding times, stations, and channels so that it may proceed directly to its acquirement, informing 
simultaneously to the people in charge of issuing the concessions and permits for the times and schedules that each 
party is authorised to acquire.” The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE, p.8. 
49 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenber, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.441. 
50 The Mexican Electoral Regime and the Federal Elections of the year 2000. IFE, p.8. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. Romero notes that as the biggest parties were able to spend an 
enormous amount of money on TV (and the law allowed it), the media concessionaries supported the parties positive 
media coverage on the news programmes in exchange for an advertising contract. 
53 Interview, Alejandro Zapata, Secretary of the National Executive Committee of PAN, Mexico City, 28 October 
2004. Zapata comments on the need for stricter regulation of the mass media, citing Giovani Santory’s book 
“Homobidis”, that said that everything is what the media says it is. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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encouraged  the  media  to  be  more  balanced.
54  Other  critics  favoured  the  idea  of 
introducing a “bolsa de medios”, a limited amount of broadcasting time for each party, 
regulated and controlled by the IFE.
55  
In the section relating to the stipulation that regulated campaigns, the law gave political 
parties, candidates and coalitions the right to clarify any information presented by the 
mass media during electoral campaigns, whenever they considered that this information 
had  misrepresented  certain  facts  or  situations  related  to  their  activities  or  personal 
traits”.
56  
 
7.2.5  The IFE and the media  
On examining the content of the successive electoral reforms that took place between 
1990 and 1993, it becomes clear that attention on the issues of media access and party 
funding  changed  from  being  residual  to  being  the  centre  of  discussion.  Along  with 
increasing party competition and as a result of changes in the promotion of modern 
political parties, the nature of electoral campaigning also changed. The use of electronic 
media, Radio and TV became the most sought after and used instruments for political 
campaigns. As the electoral reforms from 1990 had to be negotiated with the opposition, 
many of the modifications to the electoral law and new regulations were responses to 
demands from the opposition. Two of the most common demands from the opposition 
were  for  greater  equality  in  access  to  the  media  and  greater  objectivity  in  media 
coverage. Over time and as a result of the various electoral reforms of the IFE, the 
electoral  authority  acquired  responsibilities  relating  to  the  administration  and 
distribution of broadcasting time. In 1993, in response to a request from those who took 
part in the negotiations, the IFE became a “mediator” between the parties and the media. 
This new role increased IFE’s credibility as an autonomous body. First of all, since the 
parties negotiated these regulations which empowered IFE, it was apparent that they 
already trusted it. Secondly, by receiving such important responsibilities the exigency of 
IFE became more effective.  In addition to this, another aspect that increased trust in 
IFE was the 1993 decision to empower IFE to acquire slots in the media that were to be 
                                                 
54 Ibid. Zapata on this point suggested that he would even support radical measures such as the total prohibition of 
electronic media in electoral campaigns 
55 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
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distributed amongst the parties.
57 It could also be said that the different activities carried 
out during the 1994 elections, such as the monitoring of media coverage, allowed the 
electoral authority to gain credibility among the parties, especially the opposition. It is 
worth noting that the IFE’s reports on news coverage monitoring in the 1994 elections 
showed a clear inequality in media access. Such reports were welcomed and analysed 
by the parties, who perceived the electoral authority as more professional than before. It 
is worth remembering that the opposition, especially the PRD, did not trust IFE’s ability 
to  perform  as  an  impartial  electoral  authority  because  of  its  connection  with  the 
government. Nevertheless, many of IFE’s activities before it became independent from 
the  executive  were  accepted.  It  seems  that  in  1994,  once  the  “citizens  councillors” 
substituted  the  “magistrate  councillors”  in  the  General  Council  of  IFE,  their  tasks 
become more welcome. By the time of the last electoral reform in 1996, the IFE was  
responsible  for  distributing  official  time  on  radio  and  television  through  the  Radio 
Diffusion Commission. It was also acting as a mediator in buying commercial air time 
from  media  concessionaries.  The  intention  of  allocating  these  tasks  to  the  electoral 
authority was to ensure equal conditions for all parties, regardless of popularity and 
resources, in order for them to broadcast their message to obtain votes. The reformist 
practices  of  the  legal  frame,  together  with  the  electoral  processes,  showed  that  the 
parties, the government and the IFE intended achieving fairer conditions in the political 
competence, through dealing with two important aspects: a) financing of the parties and 
b) access to the media. All the cumulative regulations that were negotiated and then 
approved  were  applied  to  the  electoral  processes  of  1994,  1997  and  2000.  This 
contributed to the conformation of an electoral system with more balanced access to the 
media by political parties and more impartial media coverage.  
 
 
7.2.6  Access to the media in the electoral processes  
The  following  section  will  show  comparative  analyses  in  respect  of  the  process  of 
achieving access to the media by the contesting parties during the 1991, 1994, 1997 and 
2000 elections. It is important to remember that in the 1988 elections, despite being 
highly contested, the PRI still commanded most of the resources that were used in the 
                                                 
57 “This function given to IFE was a direct demand of the parties and it showed how the parties started using IFE as 
a channel to process consensus on electoral matters”. Interview, Isabel Hernández, member of the Federal Electoral 
Institute, Civic Education (IFE), Mexico City, 3 November 2004. 
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media.
58 Then in 1991, with the new electoral law COFIPE approved the new electoral 
authority IFE and the aim was to organise transparent elections, as the issues of party 
financing and media access were still germinal among political parties. It was not until 
1993 that the financing issue and media access became the centre of discussion among 
reformists. In 1994 the first system for regulating income and expenditure of the parties, 
with its legal and political limitations was applied. In order to examine the extent to 
which the new regulations on party financing and media access improved the conditions 
of competition in the electoral process, it is necessary to analyse the federal electoral 
processes of 1994, 1997 and 2000. A comparative analysis will be presented firstly of 
the public funding received by political parties and campaign expenditure ceilings in the 
elections, and secondly of  media coverage of the parties during elections.   
 
7.2.7  The involvement of IFE in the media. 
IFE’s  first  involvement  in  relation  to  the  media  and  political  parties  began  in  the 
midterm elections of 1991. The IFE, through the Executive Board of Prerogatives and 
Political Parties and the Commission of Radio Diffusion, assumed responsibility for the 
administration and regulation of broadcasting time granted to the parties to advertise 
their campaigns.  However, at this time,  as a  result of the recent  controversial 1988 
elections, both political actors and the IFE were more focused on aspects relating to the 
organisation of the process such as transparency and the counting process.  The issues 
of media access and coverage were not major concerns.  There are few studies on access 
to  the  media.  The  study  carried  out  by  Sanchez  Gutierrez,  on  the  distribution  of 
broadcasting  time  in  the  electoral  campaign  in  1991,  found  that  that  there  was  a 
balanced distribution of official broadcasting time among parties.
59 Section three of this 
chapter explains the background and existing legislation relating to media access by 
political parties covering the period between 1973, when the first legislation granted 
political parties free access to radio and television broadcasting and the 1996 electoral 
reform that introduced a more balanced and accurate series of regulations in this area. 
Despite regulations in this area, the issue of media access was not a main concern until 
                                                 
58 During the 1988 elections, TV and radio were practically closed to the opposition parties. The press was also 
manipulated by the PRI, although there were still some independent journals and newspapers such as Progreso. 
Interview, Mauricio Merino, political academic and Electoral Councillor 1996-2000, General Council (IFE), 17 
December 2007. See Proceso. June 20 1988; (607): 28-30. Critics suggested that the TV and radio owners favoured 
Salinas giving him free airtime and opportunities for propaganda.  
59 See Sánchez Gutiérrez, A., Los partidos politicos: la competencia de 1991, in Arturo Sánchez (coord). Las 
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the  last  two  electoral  reforms’,  where  negotiations  between  parties  concentrated  on 
ensuring  equal  opportunities  in  the  electoral  contest,  based  on  the  rights  and 
prerogatives of the political parties. From 1993 efforts focused on defining guarantees 
and conditions of access to the mass media by political parties”, and the IFE became 
both the enforcer and the supervisor of the right application of these regulations. The 
following section analyses the monitoring tasks carried out by the IFE during the 1994, 
1997 and 2000 elections, in order to see how the electoral authority went from being 
supervisor of this task to being the main enforcer. 
Broadcasting time of the parties in the 
1991 elections
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Table 7.1. Broadcasting time of the parties in the 1991 elections. 
 
Party 
Radio 
%  Television % 
PAN  10.5  10.7 
PRI  11.4  12.0 
PPS  10.2  10.2 
PRD  10.0  10.0 
PFCRN  10.2  10.4 
PARM  10.2  10.2 
PDM  9.1  9.7 
PRT  8.9  9.0 
PEM  9.1  8.8 
 
Source: Monitoring report on the the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes 
carried out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de 
Trabajo Número 1. 
 
Sánchez Gutiérrez acknowledged that equal distribution of broadcasting time was not 
matched in media coverage of political parties in news programmes.
60 Following the 
elections and along with the increasing significance of the issues of media access and 
coverage,  during  the  1993  and  1994  electoral  reforms  the  need  for  introducing 
monitoring activities became essential. As noted earlier,  following the  elections and 
taking account of different proposals from various political parties, in the 1994 electoral 
reform a new mandate was added to the electoral code, “COFIPE”. The mandate stated 
that the IFE had to hold meetings with the National Chamber of Radio and Television 
Industry to set general guidelines on the broadcasting of the political parties’ campaign 
activities to be applied in radio and television news programmes. The General council 
of IFE signed an agreement, on 18 June 1994, which formulated recommendations to 
the media representatives relating to the diffusion and broadcasting of political parties’ 
campaign activities for the 1994 elections.
61 This agreement exhorting the electronic 
mass media to respect citizens’ rights to be informed was approved in order to render 
                                                 
60 See Sánchez Gutiérrez, A., Los partidos politicos: la competencia de 1991, p.19. 
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information  truthful  and  balanced  in  news  programmes.  This  was  a  response  to  the 
demands  of  political  parties  in  relation  to  the  lack  of  adherence  of  most  radio  and 
television  news  programmes  to  the  general  guidelines  relating  to  information  on 
campaign  activities.
62  As  a  result,  the  General  Council  of  IFE  instructed  the 
Commission  of  Radio  diffusion  to  verify  the  news  coverage  during  the  electoral 
campaigns  of  the  1994  elections,  which  had  started  on  March  19.  The  monitoring 
process to be carried out by IFE covered seven radio and nine TV news programmes 
and was to be completed by 30 June 1994.
63 The objective was to check whether the 
media followed the IFE’s guidelines given to the electronic media through the National 
Chamber  of  the  industry  of  TV  and  Radio,  in  respect  of  balanced,  impartial  and 
objective coverage of the candidates and political parties contesting in the elections.
64 
The resulting report from this first period of monitoring, carried out by IFE between 22 
June and 5 July and presented in its session on 20 July, showed that most of the media 
failed to comply with the guidelines.
65  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Report on the Electoral Process of 1994. IFE, p.223. 
63 The monitored television news programmes were the following: 24 Horas (Channel 2), Hechos (Channel 7), Para 
usted (multivisión), Muhas noticias (Channel 9), Enlace (Channel 11), Por por Punto (Channel 5), 24 Horas de la 
tarde (Channel 2), Al despertar (Channel 2), A primera Hora (Channel 13). The monitored news programmes of radio 
were the following: Monitor (Radio Red), Informativo Panorama (Estéreo Rey), Enfoque (Estéreo Amistad), Buenos 
días (Estéreo Cien), Enlace (Radio Mil), Línea Directa (Radio Uno). Monitoring report on the electoral campaigns on 
radio and TV, 1994-1997, IFE, p.27. 
64 Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried 
out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de Trabajo 
Número 1, pp.25-28; Report on the Federal Electoral Process, 1994, p.224. 
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Table. 7.2. Radio and Television coverage of political parties June 22 – July 5 1994 
Party  Global  Television  %  Radio            % 
PRI  41%  35.4  44.2 
PRD  18.70%  14.6  21.1 
PAN  17.80%  15.6  19.1 
PT  8.70%  6.9  9.8 
PVEM  3.30%  7  1.1 
PPS  2.90%  6  1 
PDM  2.80%  5.7  1.2 
PFCRN  2.50%  4.8  1.2 
PARM  2.20%  4  1.2 
               Source: Becerra, Salazar, and Woldenberg, La mecánica del cambio politico en México, p.344. 
 
It is worth noting, that despite the results, the political parties accepted the IFE’s report 
as impartial and of good quality and empowered the General Council of the IFE to 
undertake  another  three  monitoring  programmes  before  August  16,  including  an 
analysis  of  the  information  generated  about  the  electoral  campaigns.
66  The  three 
quantitative “monitoring programmes” were undertaken by the Commission of Radio 
diffusion  while  the  qualitative  assessment  was  the  responsibility  of  a  specialised 
company  called  Delfos  Comunicación.  Subsequently,  the  General  Council  again 
exhorted the media to conduct their coverage with objectivity and responsibility while 
respecting the rights of the participants in the electoral process and to allow parties the 
opportunity  to  clarify  factual  information.
67  The  General  Council  on  its  session  on 
August 6, decided to extend the monitoring process from 22 June until 20 August (the 
election day). Again, through the Executive Direction the  IFE organised a series of 
monitoring processes and the results had to be presented to the General Council every 
fortnight.
68 It is important to note that this was the first study of this type carried out by 
                                                 
66 Report on the Federal Electoral Process of 1994, p.223. 
67 Ibid. 
68Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried out 
by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de Trabajo 
Número 1, pp.25-28. The monitoring tasks would have to take into consideration aspects such as the presence or 
absence of a block of electoral news, the duration of the news related to every party, the time and place of appearance 
of each party in relation to the others, the number of times a party appeared in the news programmes during the week, Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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IFE with the purpose of improving the quality of competition amongst the parties in 
relation  to  the  broadcasting  of  their  campaigns.
69  On  completion  of  the  different 
monitoring
70 the results were delivered to the General Council for their analysis. The 
distribution  of  time  dedicated  to  each  political  party  through  news  programmes 
including  the  sampling  during  the  period  of  the  monitoring  (between  June  22  and 
August 16) is shown in percentage terms, in the following table.    
Table. 7.3. Radio and Television coverage of political parties June 22 – August 16 
Political Party  Global %  Radio %  Tv % 
PRI  33.4  35.0  30.8 
PRD  23.7  26.1  19.5 
PAN  19.7  21.7  16.3 
PT  7.7  6.9.  9 
PVM  5.3  3.4.  8.3 
PPS  2.2  1.2.  3.9 
PDM  3.4  2.4.  5.1 
PFCRN  2.7  2.0.  3.9 
PARM  1.9.  1.1.  3.2. 
 
Source: Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes 
carried out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de 
Trabajo Número 1. 
The total times given in the “global report on monitoring of radio and television” by the 
Commission of Radio-diffusion of IFE, in the period from 22 June to 16 August 1994. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
the distinction between the coverage, informative notes, interviews, analysis of specialists, special programmes and 
time dedicated to the debates, the number of different notes for parties, and the treatment of information for each 
party: Radio (quotation and audio, quote and voice, and only quote) Television: voice and image, quote and image, 
only voice, only image, only quote.  
69 Report on the Federal Electoral Process of 1994, p.224. 
70 The results of the monitoring process carried out by the Commission were handed in to the General Council. These 
documents were eight weekly reports with intervals from Wednesdays to Tuesdays ( 22
nd to 28
th June; from 29
th June 
to 5
th July; from 6
th to 12
th July; from 13
th to 19
th July; from 20
th to 26
th July; from 27
th July to 2
nd August; from 3
rd to 
9
th August; from 10
th to 16
th August;), four fortnightly reports (from 22
nd to 5
th July, from 6
th to 19
th July; from 20
th to 
2
nd August; and from 3
rd to 16
th July), an aggregate with the monitoring of 17
th, 18
th, 19
th of August and a 
comparative report on the four fortnights that covered the research. Report on the Federal Electoral Process 1994, p. 
224. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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Report of media coverage by IFE 
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Source: created by the author based on the data by R. Becerra, P. Salazar and J.Woldenberg. La mecánica del cambio 
político en México, p.344. 
 
The graph above shows that the three main parties, PRI, PAN and PRD received similar 
media coverage both in radio and television. However, the tendencies of media attention 
altered during the different periods of the monitoring process.  
The following graph illustrates the evolution of TV news coverage of the three main 
parties PRI, PAN and PRD in 1994 .  Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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Source: R. Becerra, P. Salazar and J. Woldenberg. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.345. 
The graph shows that although the PRI received almost double the amount of media 
time  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  in  June,  the  gap  closed  progressively,  until 
reaching a difference of only 8 percent between the campaigns of PRI and the PAN, and 
a significant increase in time taken up by the PRD.
71  
The coverage time dedicated to the PRI showed a general decreasing tendency, but with 
reversions, during the sixth and seventh weeks (27 June and 9 August). In contrast to 
the first week, during the eighth and last week of monitoring, TV gave the PRD and 
PAN more time in its news programmes than it gave to the PRI.
72 The PRD and PAN 
showed a progressive but irregular command of space over the four fortnights. In the 
case of radio, monitoring showed that the media coverage was more stable and there 
was  a  tendency  towards  a  more  equal  coverage  among  the  three  main  parties’ 
campaigns.
73 The PRD and the PAN achieved a percentage of time relatively much 
                                                 
71 Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, pp.344-445. 
Woldenberg notes the command of space by the PRD occupied 26% of the total time, greater than the coverage of the 
second force, PAN. (The irregularities and temporary breaks in the trends in the graph can give a distorted image of 
the PAN, as there was a period when the panista candidate temporarily retired from public duties, thus leaving the 
media short of coverage. 
The fortnightly reports revealed a systematic decrease in the space given to the PRI (41%, 37%, 31% and 30% in the 
respective fortnight), that result was repeated in both TV (35%, 32%, 31% and 27%) and in radio, except in the fourth 
fortnight in which the tendency ceased but was not reversed (44.2%, 34%, 31% and 33%). 
72 Report on the Electoral Process of 1994. IFE, p.226. 
73 Ibid. 
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greater on television.
74 In relation to the monitoring of the news programmes on TV and 
Radio in respect of the six smaller parties (PT, PVEM, PPS, PDM, PFCRN and PARM) 
the tendency to give them a reduced amount of attention in the media was constant, 
especially on radio. TV therefore, maintained a more favourable position in relation to 
the  time  allocated  to  party  campaigns.
75  The  overall  evidence  from  the  news 
programmes coverage shows that between 10
th and 16
th August, the campaign closings 
were the most equal/balanced. Among the positive aspects in this critical period was the 
broadcasting of campaigns from the same parties on regional TV channels, an advance 
on  the  previous  electoral  processes.  However,  at  national  level  the  PRI’s  campaign 
closing was covered much more than the others.
76  
In  respect  of  the  qualitative  monitoring,  the  study  was  carried  out  by  the  company 
DELFOS, that was employed by the IFE and presented six weekly reports on parties’ 
media coverage in news programmes between 11 July and 19 August. The objective of 
this  qualitative  monitoring  was  to  detect  the  existence  or  lack  of  favourable  or 
unfavourable editorial comment added to the information by radio or TV presenters in 
news programmes.
77 In general the conclusions of Delfos were similar to those of IFE. 
Its evaluation was interesting: only one party, the PRI, commanded more than 40% of 
the  attention  on  the  news.  It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  information  gained 
through the monitoring carried out by IFE and Delfos, was published in a report by IFE 
that resulted in  general  guidelines being introduced for Radio and TV  programmes. 
Subsequently, the IFE attempted to bring into line those sections of the media that did 
not adhere to the guidelines.
78 
                                                 
74 The general data shows important differences not only between the types of media (radio and television) but also 
between the different news programmes of the same media. For example, during the critical week from the 8
th August 
to 12
th August, the news programmes “Hechos” of TV gave comparable coverage to the principal parties: to the PRI 
it gave 30.7% of its space, to the PRD 30.3% and to the PAN 36%. In contrast, a different news programme “24 
Horas de la Noche”, gave 29.9% to the PRI, almost double the 15.4% that it gave to the PRD. It gave only 8.5% to 
the PAN and inexplicably gave 12.3% to the PFCRN and 11.6% to the PVEM. 
75 Woldenberg notes that in general (aggregating TV and radio) the evolution of the small parties followed these 
percentages: 3.7%, 3.1%, 5.3% and 3.7% in the four respective fortnights, having an average global coverage of 3.9% 
through the period. In addition television maintained a more favourable posture than radio in relation to the times that 
it gave to the campaigns of these parties; their monitored percentages were the following: (TV) 5.7%, 6.5%, 6.2% and 
4.5% in the four respective fortnights, giving an average global through the two months of 5.6%; and in radio the 
times are: 2.4%, 1.4%, 4.5% and 2.9%, with a global average of 2.8%. Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La 
mecánica del cambio político en México, p.347. 
76 Report on the Federal Electoral Process of 1994. IFE, p.226. 
77 Report on the Federal Electoral Process of 1994, p.226. In the five week period (from 11
th July to 12
th August)  
qualitative monitoring analysis of radio and television news programmes revealed that 3,446 were not edited and 435 
were edited.  
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Initially, editorial notes were not much in evidence. However, during the 5 weeks of 
monitoring process it was observed that radio was more inclined to edit information. 
Secondly, in relation to the bias of the comments, during the first three weeks of the 
study, a tendency to favour PRI was noted, while the majority of comments on other 
parties  were  unfavourable.  In  the  last  fortnight  all  parties  received  unfavourable 
comments in equal amounts.
79 Finally, there was no evidence of intrusion on the private 
lives of the candidates and during the five weeks the parties did not present complaints 
to the Commission of Radio diffusion relating to the refusal to broadcast clarification on 
transmitted information.
80  
In  parallel  to  the  IFE  monitoring  through  the  company  DELFOS,  the  Academia 
Mexicana de Derechos Humanos and Alianza Cívica (non government organisations) 
carried out monitoring of six news programmes on television.
81 The aim of the study 
was to analyse aspects such as, the definition of the informative notes selected within 
the media, the authors of the notes, the type of material by which they were supported, 
and the place where the information was generated. The results were as follows.  
 
Table. 7.4. Radio and Television coverage by non Government Organisations. 1994 
Parties  Television coverage 
PRI  29.0% 
PRD   19.7% 
PAN  14.4% 
Rest of the parties  10.4% 
 
Source: Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes 
carried out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de 
Trabajo Número 1. 
 
The conclusions of the study were quite similar to those provided by IFE, as the PRI 
had been shown to have received more media coverage than the other main parties. 
                                                 
79 Report on the Federal Electoral Process of 1994, p.226. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried 
out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de Trabajo 
Número 1.The news programmes analysed were: 24 horas, Hechos, Enlace, Para usted, Al despertar y Muchas 
Noticias in Mexico City. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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From the above figures it can be seen that there was partiality in the time dedicated to 
the parties in news programmes.
82  
In  addition  to  the  actions  taken  by  IFE  to  address  the  conduct  of  the  media,  the 
publication of the conclusion of the monitoring by the offices of the Ministry of the 
Interior, resulted in the owners of the two biggest TV channels deciding to grant time 
(three programmes of 15 minutes in prime slots) free to all parties competing.
83 Finally, 
there was political agreement to grant up to 189% of additional time for electoral radio 
and TV programmes for the parties. This was in addition to the agreement between IFE 
and the National Chamber of Industry of Radio and Television to broadcast 116 daily 
messages distributed amongst the parties according to their electoral strength.
84  
The response of the media can be explained by the context of exigency that put pressure 
on them to conform. The 1994 elections had shown that there were already institutional 
means to carry out precise and rigorous monitoring of the conduct of the media and the 
air time that it gave to politics and that instruments existed to address and correct the 
irregularities  detected  in  the  mass  media.  It  was  therefore  possible  to achieve  more 
democratic standards and to correct the behaviour of powerful institutions.  
 
7.2.8  The federal electoral process of 1997 and the media. 
As noted in section 7.2.2 of this chapter, the 1994 elections witnessed two important 
changes in the conditions of the political system including more competition in electoral 
processes and the use of electronic media as part of the marketing strategies of the 
political parties. By 1997 and in preparation for the mid-term elections, the media was 
central in all electoral campaigns. As a result of the different cumulative regulations in 
media access, the parties had greater opportunities for accessing the media. First of all, 
the new formula for distribution of broadcasting time by the IFE approved in 1996, that 
established 30% distribution of broadcasting time on an equal basis, and 70% in relation 
to a party’s electoral strength, contributed to a more balanced distribution.
85 Moreover, 
from 1996, parties could access radio and TV through various means including through 
                                                 
82 Acosta Valverde, M. Martinez Torres, M., Parra Rosales, M. & Paula, L. (comps). Las elecciones de 1994 en 
Mexico vistas por los medios de comunicación: 18 de Julio al 31 de agosto de 1994, Academia Mexicana de 
Derechos Humanos Alianza Cívica 1995. 
83 See Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.341. 
84 Ibid. 
85 As a result of the formula of distribution (70% proportional to votes and 30% equalitarian), the party with less time 
granted by the IFE had 10.58%, and the one that obtained the most had 18.5%. Ibid. p.460. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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“special  programmes”,  through  “permanent  programmes”,  through  complementary 
times  additional  to  those  programmes,  through  promotional  slots  and  by  buying 
themselves broadcasting time with their own resources. 
The following table shows the improvements in the 1997 election in relation to the 
previous election in 1994.  
Table. 7.5. Comparison of access to media by parties 1994 and 1997 elections  
  1994  1997 
Permanent times  114 hours  906 hours 
Special times  25 hours  208 hours 
Promotional slots  5 684  16 792 
TV channels  2  20 
Radio Frequencies  16  100 
Source: Compiled by the author based on reports of the electoral processes 1994-1997. IFE. 
 
The table shows that both permanent and special times increased considerably. As did 
the  number  of  promotional  slots,  that  increased  three  fold  in  1997.  In  addition,  the 
increase in the number  of TV channels and Radio Frequencies also shows how the 
media position focused on electoral campaigns.  
Another  important  aspect  of  the  1996  electoral  reform  was  the  legal  mandate  that 
established  the  carrying  out  of  monitoring  by  the  IFE.  As  noted  earlier,  the  1997 
elections  took  place  under  the  new  legislation  approved  within  the  1996  electoral 
reform. The new reform regulated the carrying out of sample monitoring on the conduct 
of the news programmes in all of the 31 states and in the Federal District. Taking as a 
precedent the agreement of the General Council of IFE, approved in June 18 1994 and 
other  related  agreements  on  media  monitoring,  the  1996  reform  (22  November) 
established in Art 48, paragraph 48 of the COFIPE, a mandate for the Commission of 
Radio Diffusion of IFE to carry out sample monitoring of political parties’ campaigns in Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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the news programmes of the mass media.
86 The purpose was to monitor the quality of 
the news coverage of the campaigns in the 300 districts of the country.  
In addition to this, the Commission of Radio Diffusion of IFE, issued to the National 
Chamber of  Industry of Radio and Television, a list of 10  general  guidelines to be 
applied to information on political parties’ activities broadcast on TV and radio news 
programmes.
87 For the 1997 elections, the Commission of Radio-Diffusion of the IFE 
agreed  to  carry  out  two  types  of  monitoring,  one  at  national  level  and  the  other  at 
Federal District level.
88 The first one considered a sample of 266 news programmes, 
163 on radio and 103 on television. The objective was to measure the times allocated to 
each party competing in the midterm elections in the 32 states.
89 For the first monitoring 
task of the deputies and senators campaigns the IFE chose a company based on an open 
public competition between companies who specialised in media analysis able to cover 
the five electoral districts and the largest number of news programmes of high rating.
90  
The second monitoring of media coverage of electoral campaigns for the election of 
Head of Government in FD and the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District was 
done by the Commission of Radio Diffusion of the IFE and elaborated by a special team 
set up for that purpose.
91 It took place in FD (between 16 March and 2 July 1997), and 
like the first, its aim was to measure the amount of time that 19 radio and 15 TV news 
programmes dedicated to each party competing in the election of Head of Government 
in the FD.  It is important to remember that in 1994 the IFE worked in the FD with a 
sample  of  8  TV  and  6 radio  news  programmes.
92    These  two  monitoring  processes 
showed the extension of IFE’s work as it covered both the electoral campaigns for the 
                                                 
86 Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried 
out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de Trabajo 
Número 1, p.29. 
87 This list of guidelines included 9 of the guidelines considered in June, 18 1994 for the 1994 elections and an 
additional point. The guidelines are the following 1) objectivity, 2) uniform quality in the management of 
information, 3) right to clarify, 4) special section of the political campaigns, 5) equal management of broadcasting 
time, 6) importance of the news, 7) responsibility of the parties and the media, 8) specifications of paid information, 
9) respect for private life, 10) distribution of the guidelines and monitoring of their performance. Ibid. 
88 The variables considered in both monitoring were related to the guidelines of the Commission: 1) handling of the 
times 2) uniform quality in the management of the information 3) objectivity 4) importance of the news, and 5) 
special section for the campaigns activities in the news programmes. To see the criteria to be monitored in each of the 
variables see Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes 
carried out by IFE in 1994-1997. Ibid. pp.30-33. 
89 Ibid. p.30. 
90 Ibid & Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.460. 
The IFE created a competition in which where several marketing companies specialised in media analysis took part, 
giving the task to a company called Marketing Solutions and Group Industrial MUSA, S.A. de CV. 
91 Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried 
out by IFE in 1994-1997. Ibid.30. 
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Head of Government of the DF and the electoral campaigns for senators and deputies in 
300 electoral districts.
93  
It is important to note that the new regulations, and monitoring, created a level of 
exigency that contributed to more equitable treatment by the media. However, equality 
was greater in the FD than at National Level.  
On  completion  of  the  monitoring  process,  the  Executive  Board  of  Prerogatives  and 
Political  Parties  of  IFE  presented  the  conclusions  of  the  monitoring  of  the  time 
dedicated on radio and TV programmes, to each party during their electoral campaigns 
in 1997.  
The following table shows the results obtained by the monitoring in the Federal District 
and at National level in the 1997 midterm elections.  
 
Table. 7.6. Media coverage in Mexico City and in the country during the mid-term 
election in 1997  
Party  Federal District  National 
  Radio%  % television  Radio%  % television 
PAN  26.73  23.94  22.65  20.86 
PRI  29.5  24.08  42.77  41.32 
PRD  27.64  24.83  22.07  17.71 
PC  3.71  5.18  1.75  3.53 
PT  4.37  5.64  5.47  10.37 
PVEM  4.71  7.65  2.45  2.28 
PPS  1.24  3.61  1.45  1.91 
PDM  2.11  5.08  1.39  2.02 
Total 
time   321 h 11’31’’   62h 42’14’’   616h 50’55’’  258h    13’43’’ 
 
Source: Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE. April 14 1999, p.5.  
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The  table  shows  that  the  tendency  to  dedicate  broadcasting  time  to  the  three  main 
parties continued in the 1997 midterm elections. Although at national level the PRI 
received nearly double the attention that the PAN and PRD did. Another interesting 
finding of the monitoring in the FD was the general increase of media attention in all 
parties due to the fact that it was the first election of this type.
94  
Examination of the two graphs below, shows that aggregated data gathered in more than 
four  months  revealed  that  there  was  a  contrast  between  the  coverage  of  parties  at 
national level and in the Federal District. First of all, the monitoring demonstrated that 
the  three  main  parties  received  similar  media  attention  in  the  news  in  the  FD. 
Woldenberg notes that from 16 March to 21 June the amount of time dedicated to the 
political campaigns in the electronic news programmes of the FD was impressive: 273 
hours and 40 minutes on radio and 54 hours and 26 minutes on TV.
95 In the FD, the 
total distribution of time dedicated to each party on radio and television, was : PAN, 
25.45%, PRI, 26.22%, PRD, 26.11%, PC, 4.47%, PT 5.2%, PVEM, 6.49%, PPS, 2.47 
and PDM, 3.58%.
96  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried 
out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de Trabajo 
Número 1, p.36. 
95 See Becerra, R., Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.462. 
96 Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried 
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Media Coverage in news in Federal 
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However, at national level in the rest of the country the monitoring took place between 
16 April and 31 May. This showed that the time dedicated to the principal parties, by 
most of the media was not as balanced as in the capital, as coverage was concentrated 
on the PRI. Despite this, it is important to recognise that there were improvements in 
relation to the preceding elections: PAN, 20.96%, PRI, 41.76% and PRD, 21, 48%.
97 
Media Coverage in news at National 
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The midterm elections in 1997 experienced a new electoral context that presented a 
more stable party system that was ready to benefit from the new regulations of the 1996 
electoral reform. As soon as the parties started benefitting from greater public funding 
and a more balanced distribution of media access it was clear that most of the funding 
would go to electronic media companies. Indeed better distribution of public funding 
and clearer spending ceilings allowed even small parties to access radio and TV.  The 
intention was to open the media to all parties in order for them to compete under fair 
conditions. However, the issue of the conduct of TV and radio news programmes was 
still  a  concern  among  the  parties  and  the  government.    The  inequalities  that  were 
observed in 1994 encouraged the reformers to empower the IFE to introduce equality 
and fairness in the conditions of competence. It is important to note the significance of 
the electoral mandate that empowered IFE to carry out systematic monitoring. First of 
all,  the  IFE  became  a  central  institution  in  the  relationship  between  the  media  and 
politics. As the monitoring was intended to evaluate the conduct of radio and television 
news programmes, the media became responsible to the IFE, and more importantly to 
the parties themselves. The guidelines prepared by the IFE in collaboration with the 
National Industry of Radio and Television were applied to Radio and Television news 
programmes and that contributed to the consolidation of the IFE as a more credible 
institution  that  had  the  clear  intention  of  preventing  partiality  and  unfair  treatment.  
Clearly, this also resulted from increasing demands from a better informed and more 
politicised  society  that  acknowledged  the  role  of  the  media  in  electoral  campaigns. 
Despite the inequalities registered in the national monitoring which highlighted that the  
PRI received more coverage than any other party, the political parties showed that they 
had the ability and that conditions existed for them to compete more equally and this 
was reflected in the media. The increased equality, especially evident in the FD, was a 
positive change related to the time dedicated to each political party.  
At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  there  were  those  who  claimed  that  the  existing 
legislation was deficient in respect of access to the media by parties, especially in pre-
campaigns. During the campaigns in 2000 they asked that new variables and methods of 
measurements be introduced to establish how parties were treated by the TV and radio.  
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7.2.9  The federal electoral process of 2000: Monitoring 
The use of electronic media to promote and publicise parties’ electoral campaigns had 
been increasing since 1990 and was at its peak by the presidential elections of 2000. 
According to data given by the Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties, in 
1994 the parties expended 25% in propaganda in press, radio and television, increasing 
to 55% in 1997, and for the year 2000, reaching 65 -70%. Woldenberg, notes that for 
this electoral process, the parties obtained more than 3 thousand million pesos of public 
funding, from which a great part was used to buy advertising media slots.
98 As happened 
in 1997, in the 2000 elections, the role of the media in electoral campaigns increased 
even more than in the past. The political parties had media access through acquiring 
slots  on  radio  and  TV  themselves,  but  as  had  already  been  established  in  the  1996 
reform  and  applied  in  the  1997  midterm  elections,  the  parties  had  other  sources  of 
broadcasting  time.  First  of  all,  the  parties  could  access  the  media  by  using  their 
prerogative of free monthly transmissions. As the electoral law had established, these 
permanent  times  were  increased  during  electoral  campaigns.  Therefore,  the  parties 
officially had free time of 1620 hours on radio and more than 420 hours on television.
99  
The table below shows the percentage of time allocated to parties and coalitions by the 
IFE: 
Table. 7.7. Percentage of assigned times provided to the parties and coalitions by 
the IFE in the 2000 elections. 
 
  
Alliance for 
Change  PRI 
Alliance 
for Mexico  PARM  PCD  DSPPN 
Radio  20%  19%  18%  14%  14%  14% 
Television  22%  25%  20%  11%  11%  11% 
 
Source: R. Becerra, P. Salazar & J. Woldenberg. La mecánica del cambio político en México, p.524. 
 
The promotional slots bought by the IFE to be used by parties, allowing them to  
use radio and television stations.  
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Broadcasting time in percentage of the political parties and coalition in 2000 
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Source: Compiled  by the author using data from R. Becerra, P. Salazar & J. Woldenberg, J. La mecánica del cambio 
político en México.  
 
 
A very important aspect of the 2000 elections was that never before had the IFE given 
such an amount of broadcasting time and space to parties and it had never been so well 
distributed.  Also,  the  parties  could  buy  slots  and  time  using  their  own  resources, 
according to their preferences and their campaign strategies.  
 
7.2.10  Monitoring and the IFE 
After the monitoring exercises, carried out by the IFE in 1994 and 1997, it was accepted 
that monitoring was a very important instrument to ensure the fairness of the electoral 
process in 2000. It is worth noting, that since 1994 the news programmes on radio and 
television had become the main vehicles for providing information on the development 
of campaigns.  
From  January  19,  the  first  day  of  the  electoral  campaign,  until  June  29,  the  news 
programmes on television and radio (222 that the IFE verified), transmitted a total of 
2650 hours. Never before in elections had so much attention been given to broadcasting 
electoral acts, proposals and positions. As established in the electoral legislation, one of 
the most important tasks for the IFE was to achieve fair treatment on radio and TV news Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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programmes for the parties and the candidates in the campaign, in order to achieve 
conditions of impartiality.
100  
For IFE it was intended that the monitoring be an instrument to positively influence 
radio and television programmes in respect of the dissemination of information about 
the campaigns of political parties and coalitions.  
In order to accomplish this, on the Executive Board of Prerogatives Political Parties 
requested  from  the  Centre  of  Education  a  methodological  proposal  to  carry  out  the 
monitoring tasks for the 2000 elections.
101 Once the IFE initiated the process of another 
monitoring  exercise,  the  president  of  the  Commission  of  Radio  Diffusion  of  IFE 
requested from parties a list of the news programmes at local and national level that, 
from their importance and coverage, should be included in the sample.
102 The IFE’s 
monitoring covered 222 news programmes, 134 radio and 88 television in 32 entities.  
The monitoring started with the campaign on January 19 and ended on June 29, three 
days before the election. Its basic functions were to inform the parties and the media 
about the quality and fairness of the coverage of the campaign.
103  
The total time allocated to each party or coalition on radio and in television is shown in 
the following table.  
Table. 7.8. Total time allocated to each party or coalition on radio and on TV. 2000 
Elections.  
 
Alliance for Change (PAN, PVEM)   27.4 
PRI  39.8 
Alliance for Mexico (PRD, PT, CD, PSN, 
PAS) 
20.1 
PCD  4.0 
                                                 
100 Monitoring report on the political parties’ electoral campaigns on radio and television news programmes carried 
out by IFE in 1994-1997. Executive Board of Prerogatives and Political Parties. IFE April 2000. Cuaderno de Trabajo 
Número 1, p.41. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. p.42. 
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PARM  4.9 
DS  3.5 
 
These results show two important aspects: first the relevant advantage of the PRI over 
the  coalitions  of  AC  (Alliance  for  Change)  and  AM  (Alliance  for  Mexico),  and 
secondly, the discriminatory treatment of the small parties such as PCD and DS (Social 
Democracy), that had recently registered.
104  The discriminatory treatment by radio and 
TV of the parties of recent registration was constant throughout the campaign. This has 
been  criticised  by  the  parties  and  even  by  IFE  members  as  it  did  not  uphold  their 
intention to produce fair elections.  
Despite the PRI campaign attracting major coverage in the media, coverage was not 
steady and fluctuated through out the six periods.  
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Source: Compiled by the author using data from R. Becerra, P. Salazar and J. Woldenberg, La mecánica del cambio 
político en México, p.526. 
                                                 
104 It is important to note that the percentages above were obtained using the sum of the time broadcaste by the news 
programmes in each entity, without undertaking a comparison in the ratings of the programmes, their reach and 
coverage, therefore the data is not weighed up or adjusted. It is fair to highlight that the news programmes of national 
impact that were broadcast from Mexico City, showed a balanced coverage between the three main parties and 
coalitions through the campaign. See Becerra, R.,  Salazar, P. & Woldenberg, J., La mecánica del cambio político en 
México. Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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Source: Compiled by the author using data from R. Becerra, P. Salazar and J. Woldenberg, La mecánica 
del cambio, 2000, p.526. 
The various monitoring tasks carried out by the  IFE showed that 90% of the news 
programmes were not subjective in approach.  This was an indication that the media had 
been  more  impartial  than  ever  before.  It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  IFE  was 
responsible  for  this  positive  achievement.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  the  electoral 
legislation included all of the checks and balances, the success of IFEs work in the area 
of  free  time  distribution  and  monitoring  contributed  to  the  creation  of  a  context  of 
exigency.  When the media became under pressure from the IFE, the parties and the 
general public, the tendency to provide biased information diminished.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
The  development  of  parties  was  related  to  the  cumulative  reforms,  that  not  only 
strengthened  parties,  by  giving  them  more  prerogatives,  but  also  gave  them  the 
opportunity to compete in fair conditions. Along with the most important outcomes of 
the reforms, including the provision of more equally distributed public funding and the 
mechanisms for monitoring of party income and expenditure, parties also highlighted 
another area that required attention. As had been the case with public funding, where 
only one party, the PRI had benefitted, the same was said of the media favouring that Lidia Acosta                                                      Chapter 7 The Issue of Media Access by Political Parties 
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party. As the first regulations on media access took place in the 1993 and1994 electoral 
reforms and were applied during the midterm elections of 1994, the increasing role of 
the media in modern electoral campaigns intensified the need for further regulations. 
The  1994  elections  were  highly  competitive  and  already  began  to  create  new 
institutional and legal conditions for equal access to the media. Then with the 1996 
electoral reform, parties with increasing popularity and roles asked for further reforms 
on the issue of media access, especially in relation to the way that news programmes 
covered parties’ electoral campaigns. In this respect, IFE through its official tasks of 
distributing free broadcasting time and being an intermediary in the purchase of time 
and slots on radio and TV, contributed to the democratisation of these matters. But more 
importantly its task of ensuring fair elections, through the carrying out of monitoring 
tasks, contributed to more balanced treatment from the electronic news programmes. 
The new legislation on media access, in addition to ensuring the role of IFE as mediator, 
supervisor  and  authority  between  parties  and  politics  contributed  to  the  creation  of 
common ground for an equitable election. The most important result was to open the 
media to all parties without exceptions or exclusions, neither for lack of resources nor 
for political partiality. As a result, it can be said that most of the factors that emerged 
from the electoral reform of 1996 proved to be valid.  
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8  Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
The discussion now turns to an examination of one more area of activity of the Federal 
Electoral Institute (IFE): civic education. 
After analysing the role of the Federal Electoral Institute in the areas of organisation and 
management of the electoral process in party finances and media access by political 
parties, it is necessary to examine a third area of activity undertaken by the electoral 
authority: the implementation of programmes of civic education and the promotion of 
the vote.  
The transition to democracy in Mexico came about gradually through the long and slow 
process of electoral reforms which were used as active elements of democratisation. 
Therefore, changes were made essentially in the electoral and party system. By the late 
1990s these electoral reforms successfully created a balanced party system with open 
competition  between  the  main  political  parties.  In  addition  to  this,  advances  in  the 
electoral legislation and electoral institutions allowed more transparent, credible and fair 
elections.  In contrast to other cases, the process of political change in Mexico was 
based on openings, recuperation of institutions and elections, where the votes gained 
more and more relevance.
1 However, despite the authoritarian regime being dismantled 
through electoral reforms, the electoral character of the transition had proved to be an 
obstacle for the consolidation of democracy. Therefore, the 2000 presidential elections 
not only witnessed an alternation in power for the first time in history but also opened 
the debate on whether the alternation culminated the transition to democracy or simply 
started it.
2 Given the context, the political plurality achieved as the system passed from 
a  hegemonic  party  system  to  a  multiparty  system  was  not  followed  by  a  totally 
democratic  attitudinal  change  among  political  actors  and  society  itself.  Therefore, 
despite the 2000 elections closing an important cycle in which plurality and a party 
                                                 
1 Interview Mauricio Merino. Merino notes that in Mexico it is essential to understand “the electoral dimension” of its 
transition, paradoxically in a country where “elections” were mere instruments of legitimacy of the official party. 
Interview, Mauricio Merino, political academic and Electoral Councillor 1996-2000, General Council (IFE), 17 
December 2007. 
2 This makes reference to the “double defeat criterion” discussed by Linz, J and Stepan, A.Problems of Democratic 
Transition and consolidation. Those who supported the idea of an alternation in power as the proof of the end of the 
transition had a limited view of democracy in the electoral process. Those who thought that the transition had just 
started put an emphasis on the political institutions, as perceived by the democratic regimes, not only from the 
electoral point of view, but also from the values and structures of a democracy.  Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
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system  were  finally  installed,  democracy  as  a  process  had  just  started  then.
3  The 
consolidation  of  democracy  in  Mexico  was  facing  challenges  directly  related  to  the 
electoral  character  of  the  political  change.  Firstly,  none  of  the  Mexican  political 
institutions,  except  the  newly  created  electoral  institutions,  were  designed  by  a 
democratic  regime.
4  Therefore,  when  plurality  was  introduced  in  Congress  and  the 
president lost hegemony in the decision making process, governing party and opposition 
parties faced a new situation. The activation of Congress and the competitive party 
system created a new context where political parties were forced to achieve consensus 
in order to ensure governability.
5 In addition, the emergence of “a divided government”
6 
at both Federal and state level, and the initial inability to achieve consensus amongst 
political parties challenged democracy.
7 A final  challenge  facing democracy was an 
ambiguous  political  culture,  which  shared  democratic  and  authoritarian  features. 
Democratic features, that had been adopted in the last twenty years and authoritarian 
features that were attached to its old political system. 
This  chapter  is  dedicated  to  the  role  of  the  electoral  authority  in  consolidating 
democracy in Mexico and promoting the “vote” through the implementation of civic 
education programmes. The promotion of civic education is one of the permanent tasks 
to which the IFE is committed.  
This section will analyse the role and the potential of Civic education in promoting a 
new democratic political culture and forming “citizens”. In order to analyse this, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the “political culture”, inherited from the old regime, 
and the new type of “citizens” that the IFE intended to promote.  It is also necessary to 
highlight some of the extensive literature on political culture in Mexico that has been 
developed since the 1960s.  
                                                 
3 See  Merino, M. La transición Votada, Crítica a la interpretación del cambio político en México. México: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 2003, p.28. 
4 Becerra notes that the consensus achieved at times between political parties in Congress while negotiating the 
electoral reforms during the 1990s disappeared with the alternation in power. It seemed that with the new president, 
all parties radicalised their positions and turned Congress into a “boxing ring”. Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political 
academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico City, 22 November 2004.   
5 Javier Romo notes that the “divided government” not only challenged the exercise of power of the president but also 
created a new dilemma in the institutional framework. Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor 
(IFE), former member of Democracia Social and political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
6 “Divided governments” refers to a local or national government in which the political party of the president does not 
have majority in Congress. It is important to note that since the early 1990s many state and municipalities have been 
experiencing “divided governments.” 
7 This dilemma is normally used as the excuse to consider that the transition just started with the 2000 elections.  Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
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The  first  part  of  this  chapter  seeks  to  address  why  civic  education  is  essential  in 
strengthening democracy in Mexico. The second part shows the various responsibilities 
of IFE within the area of civic education in its pursuit of constructing a democratic 
culture  and  creating  “citizens”  ready  to  live  in  a  democracy.  Among  its  main 
responsibilities  are  the  efforts  to  promote  voting  amongst  Mexicans.  This  part  will 
analyse the various research studies on values, perceptions and attitudes amongst the 
citizens, that the IFE carried out, in order to identify the best strategies and approaches 
for its civic education programmes. The real contribution of the IFE’s civic education 
programmes to the democratic culture and citizen participation in Mexico is difficult to 
measure. However, the increasing involvement of the electoral authority in this area and 
the increasing number of citizens involved in its programmes shows that the institution 
is trusted. Changes were not only required in the views and perceptions of the general 
public but also in the political elite, which still used non democratic practices.
8  This is a 
very high standard, even for consolidated democracies such as those seen in the USA 
and the United Kingdom. 
 
8.1 Civic education and political culture: changing the political culture 
In Mexico today, Civic education has become a priority on the public agenda as it is 
perceived as an essential tool to ensuring the consolidation of the new democratic order. 
The interest in the issue of Civic Education was initially brought about by a series of 
Human  Rights  Organisations  that  emerged  in  the  1980s  and  civil  organisations  and 
groups that were involved in such tasks as electoral observation.
9 After the IFE was 
created  in  1990,  following  a  constitutional  and  legal  mandate,  the  area  of  civic 
education was allocated to the electoral institution, with the intention of  increasing  the 
role  of  civic  education  in  the  consolidation  process  of  the  Mexican  democracy. 
Therefore,  in  addition  to  the  function  of  organising  elections  and  other  electoral 
activities,  the  electoral  authority  was  also  responsible  for  the  promotion  and 
consolidation of new democratic values and attitudes among the citizens through civic 
                                                 
8 The use of non democratic practices such as intimidation, corruption and bribery is still common amongst political 
parties’ members. Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, 
Electoral negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
9Interview, Isabel Hernández, member of the Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico City, 13 September 2004. Isabel 
Hernández notes that among the civil organisations, Civic Alliance was one of the pioneers in pursuing electoral 
observation. 
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education programmes.
10 These different functions of IFE distinguished the institution 
from other electoral commissions, whose tasks were mainly electoral. The objectives 
intended for this function are to contribute to the development of democratic life, to 
cooperate in the promotion and diffusion of the political culture and in the promotion of 
votes.  It is in this context of democratic consolidation that Civic education has its main 
role in re-building the political culture and the process of constructing the citizenry.  
 
8.1.1   Changing the political culture 
The mixed political culture in Mexico was shaped during the transition and continued to 
change afterwards in accordance with the nature of the former authoritarian regime and 
the transition itself. First of all, the inclusiveness of the Mexican authoritarian regime 
produced a type of citizen participation limited only to the corporatist networks and 
party  membership,  which  resulted  in  an  authoritarian  political  culture.
11  Secondly, 
during  the  processes  of  liberalisation  and  democratisation,  electoral  issues  such  as 
“elections”  and  the  use  of  the  “vote”  by  the  citizen,  received  greater  attention  than 
creating real democratic institutions. As a result, the country experienced a political 
change in the party system and electoral arena that was not extended to other political 
institutions.
12  However,  and  accepting  that  the  transition  to  democracy  culminated 
between 1996 and 2000, it became evident among political actors and analysts that the 
consolidation  of  the  Mexican  democracy  required  to  build  a  more  democratic  civil 
society  in  order  to  ensure  its  future.
13  Yet,  the  electoral  nature  of  its  democracy 
presented problems for the creation of a democratic civil society. As shown in earlier 
chapters, the political changes in Mexico took place through a long period of electoral 
reforms, creating an electoral democracy. Aspects of the resulting Mexican democracy, 
have divided political analysts who still today do not agree on the democratic nature of 
the  Mexican  regime.  Benítez  Manuat  notes  that  in  the  1980s  the  Latin-American 
political sciences developed the idea that “democracy was synonymous with free and 
                                                 
10 COFIPE, art 96 (current Mexican electoral law). 
11 Studies on the relationship between the authoritarian political system and the political culture in Mexico will be 
discussed later.  
12 According to a survey carried out by the IFE and the UNAM (Autonomous University of Mexico) in 1999: “the 
vote has connotations that go beyond party competition and express an intense relationship with political change”. 
Ciudadanos y Cultura de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la democracia. Meyenberg, Y. & Flores 
Dávila, J. Mexico: IFE – UNAM, 2000, p.111. 
13 The acceptance or not of the end of the transition to democracy in Mexico is more a personal perception than an 
objective one. The author opted for considering the year 2000 as the end of the transition to democracy. Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
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competitive elections where political parties were the main actors”.
14  This perception 
of  democracy  created  a  debate  on  whether  or  not  the  achievement  of  electoral 
democracy  was  enough  for  the  success  of  the  transition,  leading  to  two  different 
perceptions:  “political  electoral  democracy”  and  “fundamental  democracy”.
15  Those 
who  support  the  latter  idea  of  democracy,  think  that  solely  achieving  “electoral 
democracy” is not enough for the transition to succeed, as the social and economic 
aspects need to be addressed at the same time.
16  In the case of Mexico, the so-called 
“technocrat  presidents,”  De  la  Madrid  (1982-88)    and  Salinas  (1988-94)  initiated  a 
large  economic  transformation  during  the  1980s  and  early  1990s,  whose  negative 
consequences  eventually  triggered  political  changes  and  accelerated  the  political 
transition. However, this political transformation focused mainly on electoral issues, 
confirming the gradual nature of the transition through electoral reforms.
17 It seems that 
the  eventual  plurality  introduced  in  the  party  system  was  not  followed  by  a  new 
“democratic” political culture. However, several studies show that between the 1950s 
and 1980s there was a change in the general public towards democratic values, although 
this did not bring a democratic regime.
18 Dominguez and McCann argue that by the 
early 1990s, the citizens already showed clear sign of democratic attitudes and exerted 
pressure to reform the political process.
19 As occurred in other situations of political 
change towards a more democratic regime, the stability not only depends on the good 
functioning of the institutions but also on other factors related to the perceptions, beliefs 
and views that come with the political context such as, the democratic or authoritarian 
character of the political culture.
20 In addition, the building of a democratic “political 
culture”  appears  to  increase  in  cases  of  transition  to  democracy  and  consolidation 
processes as it is widely accepted that democracy as a form of government is more 
                                                 
14 Benítez Manaut, R. América Latina: reforma del Estado e instituciones para la consolidación de la democracia in 
La construcción de las instituciones para la democracia en América Latina. Mexico: Executive Board of Electoral 
Training and Civic Education, 1998, p.29. 
15 Ibid. pp.29-30. Manaus explains the differences between the two concepts: the “political electoral democracy” 
which perceives the “electoral systems” as the key to the transition and the impossibility of achieving a democracy at 
all levels due to economic crisis and change of the economic model. On the other hand, the “integralist democracy” 
or full democracy which perceives the electoral democracy as a condition for the transition, but not enough for a total 
change in society.  
16 Ibid. p.30. 
17 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004.  
18 Domínguez, J. & McCann, A. Norms of Mexican citizenshipL: Are Mexicans “democrats”. In: Democratising 
Mexico: Public opinion and electoral choices. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 
49. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ciudadanos y Cultura de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la democracia, p.7. Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
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efficient and stable with a democratic political culture.
21 Although in many processes of 
transition to democracy the “political culture” is not necessarily a decisive factor for its 
success,  this  situation  changes  in  the  period  of  consolidation.  With  reference  to  a 
democratic  political  culture,  Diamond,  Linz  and  Lipset  note  that  strong  and  stable 
countries tend to have the most democratic political values.
22  
 
8.1.2  Political culture and citizenry in consolidation to democracy 
Before analysing the political culture in Mexico it is necessary to define the concepts of 
political culture and citizenry. There are several definitions and categorisations of the 
term “political culture.”  In  general, political culture can be defined as  the group of 
“beliefs and values concerning politics that prevail within both the elite and the mass.”
 
23 These beliefs and values are acquired through their own individual experience and 
also through channels including tradition, family, education and social communication. 
24 Therefore, in order to study the political culture of a country it would be wise to 
analyse first the social agencies responsible for transmitting values and ideas that shape 
that political culture. Almond and Verba introduced a more specific definition in their 
study  “the  Civic  Culture”.
25  These  authors  claimed  that  the  term  “political  culture” 
“refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system 
and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.”
26  Within 
the  sphere  of  politics,  Almond  and  Verba  differentiate  three  types  of  orientation  in 
political  culture  that  allow  a  better  analysis  of  specific  problems  in  this  area:  one 
orientation refers to the knowledge that individuals have of politics; a second orientation 
is  related  to  the  attitude  that  individuals  have  towards  political  actions  or  political 
institutions and a third orientation is related to the opinions on the aims of politics.
27 
Overall, the importance of the political culture lies in the fact that those views and 
perceptions configure the frames of reference of the political attitudes and behaviour of 
                                                 
21 The interest in the issue of political culture has increased in parallel to processes of political change especially in 
Latin America and East Europe. Estrategias, programas y actividades de Educación Cívica. IFE. 2000, p.10. 
22 Diamond, L., Linz, J. & Seymor Martin Lipset. Politics in developing countries: comparing experiences with 
democracy. London: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995, p.18. 
23 Ibid. p.19. 
24 Estrategias, programas y actividades de Educación Cívica. IFE. 2000, p.26. 
25 In the book “The Civic Culture” a comparative study of the attitude and political behaviour in five countries, 
carried out in order to propose a method of observation of the political culture applicable to all political realities. 
Ciudadanos y cultura de la democracia: reglas, instituciones y valores de la democracia, p.7. 
Almond, Gabriel A. & Verba, S., The Civic Education. Princeton, N.J.: Princenton University Press, 1963.  
26 Almond, A. and Verba, S. Civic Culture. Princeton, N.J.: Princenton University Press, 1963, p.12. 
27 Ibid. See also Ciudadanos y Cultura de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la democracia, p.7. Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
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the  different  political  groups  and  citizens.  As  stated  by  Diamond,  Linz  and  Lipset, 
theorists have identified the different values and beliefs that are crucial for stable and 
effective  democracy.  Along  with  these  values  are  the  beliefs,  among  the  elite  and 
general  public,  about  the  legitimacy  of  democracy;  acceptance  of  the  existence  of 
opposition  parties,  cooperation  among  political  competitors,  civility  of  political 
discourse,  and  participation  and  political  efficacy  etc.
28  In  the  context  of  a  new 
democracy, and in relation to democratic political culture, the concept of “citizen” also 
becomes quite significant. Under a democratic regime, ideally the “citizen,” in addition 
to being a member of a political community, is an essential actor. In general, a citizen is 
an individual, over 18 years old, who is subject to rights and obligations, which form 
part of a country. In a democratic society the “citizenry” is understood as the group of 
persons that live and share a public space.
29 As they have to live together, they are 
forced to share norms, rights and obligations of an ethical, moral and juridical nature 
and need to comply in order to carry on a common life. There are a number of different 
models  of  definitions  and  views  on  the  responsibilites  and  rights  that  the  citizenry 
should have in a democracy.
30 T. H. Marshall notes that the status of citizenry has three 
elements:  a  civil  element  that  guarantees  the  citizen  the  rights  to  exercise  his/her 
individual freedom, a political element that allows the individual the right to participate 
in government such as voting, and a social element through which a citizen has certain 
rights that allow him/her to be treated equally, including their right to enjoy a certain 
degree of welfare.
31  Overall, the various interpretations on the model of citizenry in a 
democracy can be gathered into two basic concepts: minimalist and maximalist. The 
first notion states that “citizenry” is a juridical status and perceives the citizen as an 
entity with a certain civil status; however, the second conception states that “citizenry” 
is not only a juridical status but also a cultural and political identity.
32 Therefore, within 
the second perspective the citizen, in addition to his/her legal rights also “has a moral 
sense of self as a member of a community, with a democratic culture and a sense of 
responsibility  over  the  general  interest”.
33  Under  this  second  approach  the  “citizen” 
                                                 
28 Diamond, L., Linz, J. & Seymor Martin Lipset: Politics in developing countries: comparing experiences with 
democracy, p.19. 
29 Estrategias, programas y actividades de Educación Cívica. IFE, 2000, p.7. 
30 See Beiner Ronald (ed). Theorizing Citizenship. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.  
31 T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Others Essays, Pluto Press. London, 1991.  
32 Strategies, programmes and activities of Civic Education, IFE, 2000, p.4. Concepción Naval notes that this first 
conception perceives the citizenry as a juridical status. Naval, C., Educar ciudadanos: la polémica liberal 
comunitarista. Navarra: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra. EUNSA, 1995. 
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acquires a new role, and is expected not only to access his/her social, economic and 
civics rights but also to claim changes from those who govern.  
 
8.1.3  Political culture in Mexico: early studies 
In  Mexico,  the  slow  and  gradual  process  of  democratisation  of  the  last  forty  years 
entailed a change in public attitudes and a big cultural change.
34 There is extensive 
literature on political culture in Mexico.
35 However, the findings varied depending on 
the period when the survey was done. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between 
research completed during the PRI’s hegemony between the 1940s and the late 1970s 
and studies carried out during the political and economic changes in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and more recent surveys from the late 1990s to the present time. Most of the 
empirical  work  in  this  area  has  been  focused  on  assessment  of  authoritarian  and 
democratic values and their relationship to the political system. Before analysing the 
existing political culture in Mexico it is necessary to revise some of the early studies in 
this area. For the first period until the late 1970s, it worth mentioning the pioneering 
study by Almond and Verba, on the political values and beliefs of Mexicans. For many 
political analysts, their cross-national survey study “Civic Culture” is considered to be a 
crucial source to understanding the Mexican political culture and a clear breakthrough 
from early studies, which were mostly based on subjective interpretation.
36 Almond and 
Verba surveyed the opinions of Mexicans who lived in communities larger than ten 
thousand in order to explore their attitudes and behaviour which could exert influence 
on their political participation. They found contradictions and imbalances in the political 
culture. For instance, Mexicans scored the lowest of all five countries, (USA, UK, West 
Germany, Italy and Mexico) when asked to what extent they see their lives as related to 
the  activities  of  government,  up  to  66%  attributed  no  effect  to  their  national 
                                                 
34 Woldenberg notes that despite its complexities and contradictions, in recent times Mexico has experienced a real 
renovation process in political culture. Woldenberg, J.:Elecciones México. 2002; (6):1-2. 
35 Almond, G, and Verba, S. 1965. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965; Fagen, R., and 
Tuohy, W. Politics and Privilege in a Mexican city. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972; Segovia, Rafael.  La 
Politización del niño mexicano, 2 ed. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1982.; Booth, John, A., and Mitchel A. 
Seligson, 1984. The political culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: A re-examination, Latin American Research 
Review 19:106-124; Álvarez Gutiérrez, ¿Cómo se sienten los mexicanos? 1987; Hernández Medina, A. and Narros 
Rodriguez, L. (eds). ¿Cómo somos los Mexicanos? Mexico: CREA, 1987; Los Angeles Times poll, August, 1989 
;World Values Survey, 1990 Confidence in Government, Mexico, United States, and Canada, 1981 and 1990:William 
Flanigan and Nancy Zingale, Political Behaviour of the American Electorate, 17
th ed. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional quarterly Press, 1991; Este País, August 1991. 
36 Despite Civic Culture by Almond and Vera being a breaking point for the study of political culture in Mexico, their 
study would be criticised for having methodological and substantive weaknesses. See the critique by Craig, Ann L.  
and Cornelius, Wayne. A.  Political Culture in Mexico: Continuities and Revisionist interpretation. In: Almond, G. & 
Verba.S.  (eds.) The Civic Culture revised. USA: Little Brown and Company, 1980, pp.325-393. Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
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government.
37 Therefore their awareness of the significance of government was low. 
However,  such  findings  conflict  with  the  finding  that  they  expressed  a  significant 
willingness to express political opinions, despite their low level of political information. 
Another interesting aspect was the high degree of political pride that was shown by the 
Mexicans, which they mainly related to the Mexican Revolution and the presidential 
political system.
38 Almond and Verba related the impact of the Mexican Revolution to 
individual’s attachment to the political system, and it depends to some extent on the 
continuing symbolic identification with the Mexican revolution.
39 Finally, in respect to 
political participation and competence, they also found a lack of connection between 
individual’s political participation and their evaluation of the ouput of the government.
40   
Then when analysing intra-sources of variation they found that education played an 
important role in political attitudes, where highly educated people were more likely to 
discuss politics with a range of people.  With regard to gender, they found it made a 
difference in political attitudes, where women were less likely to discuss and participate 
in politics, while social class did not matter. (See Dominguez & McCann).
41 Another 
work that it worth mentioning is the study by Richard Fagen and William Tuohy in 
1966,  of  the  city  of  Jalapa,  in  which,  in  contrast  to  previous  studies,  they  revealed 
democratic  values  among  the  respondents.
42  However,  these  authors  found  that 
respondents appeared to be less democratic when asked about the rights of minority 
groups  such  as  women,  opposition  groups  and  the  illiterate.  (See  Dominguez  & 
McCann).
43 In respect to demographic variables, in contrast to Almond and Verba, these 
authors found that social class had an effect in political culture, where lower classes 
tended to support less democratic practices than the higher classes.
44 The comparative 
study of the political culture among the migrant poor in Mexico City between 1970 and 
1972 by Wayne Cornelius also added valuable knowledge to the area of political culture 
in  Mexico.  In  this  study  Cornelius  argued  that  there  was  a  relationship  between 
                                                 
37 Almond, A & Verba, S. Civic Culture, p.47. 
38 Ibid. p.66. 
39 Ibid. p.67. 
40 Ibid. p.196. 
41 Quoted by Dominguez, J & McCann, J. Democratising Mexico: Public opinion and electoral choices. Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. p.26. See Almond, A & Verba, S. Civic Culture.  
42 Fagen, R. and Tuohy, W. Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City.Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972, pp. 
122-27. 
43 Quoted by Dominguez, J & McCann, J. Democratizing Mexico: Public opinion and electoral choices. Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1996. p. 27. See Fagen, R. and Tuohy, W. Politics and Privilege in 
a Mexican City.  
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authoritarianism and participation. He claimed that the particular features of the context 
in which a migrant labourer lived had an impact on determining his political attitudes.
45 
He  also  found  out  that  the  urban  poors’  political  activity  was  focused  on  direct 
petitioning for assistance to the government or urban bosses, with their main demands 
being land possession and public services.
46 In 1978-79 Booth and Seligson studied the 
political attitudes of middle and working-class Mexicans in seven cities. Their central 
question was whether Mexican people were politically authoritarian. Therefore, they 
challenged  the  relationship  between  political  culture  and  political  structure.  They 
claimed that “they found a largely democratic political culture within an essentially 
authoritarian regime”, adding that their data couldn’t explain the authoritarian nature of 
the political system as the consequence of an authoritarian mass political culture, and 
concluded that middle and working class people strongly support basic civil rights.
47 
Finally, in 1982 Hernández Medina and Narro Rodriguez conducted a national survey 
on particular political values. In their conclusions, consistent with Almond and Verba, 
they found that education and gender had an effect on political values, where women 
and less educated people were less likely to be interested and to participate in politics 
than males and university graduates. However, in contrast to Almond and Verba, those 
authors found the variable of social class important in determining where individuals 
with a higher socio-economic status were more likely to have democratic values like 
political participation than those of lower classes.
48  
 
 8.1.4. Political culture and “citizenry” in Mexico  
According to recent studies, the new political culture and citizenry that exists today has 
emerged out of political changes that were not necessarily democratic. The existence of 
an old authoritarian political culture rooted in the society is one of the main problems 
for the new democratic system, especially when planning to build a new citizenry and 
political culture. There are several obstacles to the creation of a democratic political 
culture  that  are  necessary  when  consolidating  the  democracy.  First  of  all,  the 
                                                 
45 Cited by Cornelius in Politics and the migrant poor in Mexico City. 
http://www.popline.org/docs/0595/017907.html. Stanford, California, Standord. University Press, 1975, p.319. 
POPLINE Document Number: 017907 (20/04/08) 
46 See Cornelius, W. Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975. 
47 Cited by htpp:links.jstor.or/sici=0023-8791 (18/05/08) The Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: a re-
examination. Booth, J & Seligson, M. Latin American Research Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1984). Pp.106-124  
48 Hernández Medina, A. & Narro Rodriguez, L.  eds, Cómo son los mexicanos. Mexico: Centro de Estudios 
Educativos, 198 In: Dominguez, J & McCann, J. Democratising Mexico: Public opinion and electoral choices. 
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“hegemonic party system” which lasted over seventy years, exercised a profound effect 
within the society.
49 The authoritarian regime and the official PRI, not only used the 
principles  of  the  Mexican  Revolution  (1910-1917)
50  but  also  the  “democratic 
appearance of the regime” to support their legitimacy. The Mexican regime used the 
regular holding of elections, the presence of political parties and the economic bonanza 
to pretend that the authoritarian regime was a democratic regime. In particular, during 
the PRI hegemonic, the Mexicans’ only political participation was under the control of 
the regime’s corporative structures, which not only exercised a political influence but 
also  alienated  their  citizens’  rights  of  political  participation.  During  the  PRI’s 
hegemony, political participation and social movements outside the PRI’s control and 
corporatist sectors were almost non-existent and diminished by the regime.
51 Yet, when 
the process of political change was accelerated at the beginning of the 1990s and started 
shaping  new  political  attitudes  and  perceptions  especially  in  the  area  of  voting 
participation,  the  influence  of  the  authoritarian  values  were  quite  rooted  in  society. 
Therefore,  the  resulting  new  political  context  characterised  by  party  competition, 
political plurality and consensus at a political level was accompanied by ambiguous 
attitudes and opinions about politics. Secondly, the process of political change through 
electoral reforms put the emphasis on procedures that ensured elections and voting, but 
without a definition of a frame of reference for the building of a new political identity.
52 
Indeed the association of democracy with free and fair elections, despite being positive 
for democratic political culture, proved to be insufficient for its creation. In addition to 
this, as occurred in other cases, in Mexico the process of political change created high 
expectations  among  the  popular  classes,  who  expected  to  improve  their  social  and 
economic welfare.
53 However, especially in unstable economies, such improvements are 
difficult to achieve. Soon after the 2000 elections, the inability of the government to 
solve endemic problems such as corruption, lack of jobs and social insecurity, caused 
wide discontent among the population. In this context, the democratic elections and free 
elected government that emerged after the transition were perceived as changes that 
                                                 
49 See chapter 1 for a wider explanation of the Hegemonic party system. 
50 The principles of the Mexican Revolution were mainly “social justice” and “economic growth and stability”.  
51 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. 
52 Ciudadanos y Cultura de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la democracia, p.11. 
53 Interview, Alejandro Zapata, Secretary of the National Executive Committee of PAN, Mexico City, 28 October 
2004. 
 Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
 
324 
only  benefitted  their  protagonists.
54  Because  economic  and  social  changes  did  not 
happen overnight, the positive expectations of the citizens turned into disappointment.
55 
It appears that frustration on unresolved promises and a lack of economic and social 
incentives influenced a passive citizenry that were not only non- cooperative but even 
non-democratic. In this case, the clash between great expectations and the lack of action 
by the new government further contributed to the lack of trust not only in politicians but 
also in the new institutional change.
56 This disappointment is normal in most transitions. 
Finally, another obstacle to the creation of a solid democratic political culture was the 
existence of an authoritarian political culture not only in the governmental institutions 
but  also  amongst  the  people.  The  different  perceptions  and  ambiguous  approaches 
towards the new democratic context impeded the normal functioning of the democratic 
institutions  but  more  importantly  it  delayed  the  overall  consolidation  process.  In 
Mexico, it seems that the electoral democracy had to be extended to a more integral one, 
in  order  to  ensure  “governability”  and  more  importantly  consolidate  the  democratic 
regime that had just started operating. It is in this context of political change which 
seeks  consolidation  of  the  democracy,  that  the  IFE,  following  the  constitutional 
mandate, committed to contribute to the development of democratic life through the 
promotion of values of a democratic political culture. This process began to operate 
soon after it was created.  
 
8.1.4  Contradictions of the Mexican political culture 
Contradictions  in  the  political  culture  in  Mexico,  which  combines  the  features  of 
authoritarian logic with democratic logic, make consolidation more difficult. The results 
of a survey carried out by IFE in December 1999 confirmed this mixed political culture. 
The survey was carried out in order to investigate the perception of the population on 
the  role  of  citizens  in  democracy,  in  politics,  and  in  power  and  authority.  The 
conformation of the political culture.
57 The survey revealed a contradiction in Mexican 
                                                 
54 Interview, Francisco Bedolla, Advisor to the Executive Director of Professional Electoral Service, Electoral 
negotiator and political academic (IFE), Mexico City, 17 November 2004. 
55 Interview, Alejandro Zapata, Secretary of the National Executive Committee of PAN, Mexico City, 28 October 
2004. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The survey was based on thematic fields that intended gathering basic information to find out how rooted the 
democratic values were in the population including their perception on legitimacy, values in the changes of politics. 
The study also analysed the division of power, delegation of authority, citizen supervision, party systems and its links 
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political culture. First of all, the study showed a conflict between the high values that 
people gave to “voting” and their desire for a strong leader. 80% of people interviewed 
believed in the power of “the vote”, while 76% of people interviewed favoured a strong 
leader. The results can be explained by the authoritarian past that created the idea that 
only strong leaders could resolve problems.  However, the preference for an elected 
leader and the high rating of the vote came in response to the considerable electoral 
reform that had been experienced that had made democratic change a high priority. The 
positive perception of the value of the vote was also in contrast to a poor view of 
politics and institutions. The survey showed that perceptions about politics indicated 
that there was not only a lack of interest but also a lack of knowledge, and trust in their 
methods, instruments and institutions. For instance, up to 48% of the interviewees said 
they had little interest in politics and 24% said that they were not interested at all.
58 The 
low interest in politics was also evident in the family sphere and in their perception of 
public  institutions.
59  Regarding  perceptions  on  politics,  the  researchers  Yolanda 
Meyenberg and Julia Flores, found that the views of citizens on political institutions 
were weak and confused. According to the survey, most interviewees showed a lack of 
trust in politics as a useful activity for society, along with a lack of trust in government 
institutions and authorities.
60 In relation to this finding, the authors of the survey noted 
that for a democracy to function it is necessary that the citizens are not only interested in 
politics but also have a desire to participate and be informed about politics. Another 
striking discovery in the study was the significance of the “idea of fraud” among the 
population, which was not only related to electoral fraud but also to a general lack of 
trust  in  politicians.
61  According  to  the  study,  the  “idea  of  fraud”  was  perceived  as 
common  practice  by  significant  sectors  of  the  population,  but  “fraud”  was  also 
associated with elections and irregularities among the more educated population, and 
therefore perceived as false promises by the politicians.
 62 As a result, the relationship 
between  fraud  and  politics  had  an  impact  on  the  image  of  politicians,  who  were 
                                                                                                                                               
and political efficacy. They also observed the disposition to participate (essential element of democracy) and how 
assimilated the rules were and the level of comprehension that citizens had of them. 
58 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, p.29. 
59 In relation to the political institutions, the requirement of rating between 0 and 10, where 0 is no trust and 10 is a 
lot of trust, the major frequencies – assigned to deputies, governors, municipal presidents, president of the republic 
and political parties – was a rate of 5. Ibid. p.25. 
60 Ibid. p.26. 
61 Flores, J. & Meyenberg, Y. Ciudadanos y Cultura de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la 
democracia. December 2000. 1 Edition. IFE – UNAM. 
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perceived  as  distant  figures  who  were  detached  from  reality.  Furthermore,  this  also 
contributed to a lack of interest by the general public in participating in politics or even 
being informed.
63 As expected, this lack of trust had a negative effect on the relationship 
between citizens and political actors. For example, the survey showed that only 30% of 
those interviewed considered that the main function of the government was to impart 
justice. However, 25% said that the government should solve social problems, 20% said 
that the government should promote the developing of the economy and 17% said that 
the government’s main functions should be to ensure security.
64 The poor perception of 
politics was also highlighed by the low participation of people in social and political 
organisations.
65  A  second  important  finding  of  the  survey  was  the  relatively  high 
percentage of citizens that accepted different principles of legitimacy from that of the 
political power. For example, there was a contradiction between the ideas of having a 
government with laws and the preference for a strong leader.
66 With reference to the 
state of law, most citizens accepted the obligatory character of the law; although for a 
considerable percentage the law should not be followed nor change if it was considered 
unfair. For instance, 44% responded that people should always obey the law, but at the 
same time 29% revealed that the laws should change, and 24% considered that they 
were within their right not to obey them and to modify them when “they think that it 
was  unfair”.
67  On  the  other  hand,  86%  of  the  interviewees  believed  that  they  must 
denounce the civil servants who charge for a service that should be free, while 12% 
thought that “it isn’t worth it”.
68 Regarding, the process of change, the survey revealed 
that  there  was  a  strong  tendency  towards  change,  but  a  gradual  change.  The  study 
showed that up to 86% of these interviewed were in favour of a gradual change. In 
relation to this, 78% preferred the parties to take time making important decisions. In 
some ways, this demonstrates that even after the transition, most Mexicans still did not 
support  radical  solutions  and  preferred  the  political  parties  to  undertake  dialogue. 
However,  the  survey  confirmed  that  essential  democratic  aspects  such  as  respect, 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, p.25. 
65 Ibid. p.30. 
66 Ibid. p.25. The perceptions on power and authority were as follows: 60% of the interviewees declared that they 
were more willing to choose, as a leader, a person who they knew and always applied the law, while 31%, would 
prefer that someone respect the traditions of the community. However, 76% subscribed to the idea that it is necessary 
to have a strong leader. 
67 Ibid. 
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tolerance and political plurality all obtained a low rating. 
69 With reference to the lack of 
tolerance  it  is  worth  highlighting  that  41%  believed  that  in  order  to  “create  a  big 
nation” it is necessary for citizens to have the same ideas and values. However, 54% 
agreed that having different ideas and values was acceptable.
70 Relating to the tolerance 
between individuals, the survey showed negative results. For instance, 66% said that 
they would not live with homosexuals; 57% would not accept living with a person with 
aids; 56% would not live with a person of different race, and, 51% would not live with a 
person with different political ideas.
 Finally, another conclusion was the contradiction 
between the increasing belief of the citizens in their capacity to influence public matters 
and  their  lack  of  trust  and  “distance”  from  politics.  For  example,  51%  of  the 
interviewees believed that they could influence the decisions of politicians a great deal, 
33% of them considered that they could influence a little, and only 14% thought that 
they had no influence at all. In relation to the role of citizens in politics, it was asked 
who should ensure that politicians obey the law: the highest percentage (46%) thought 
that citizens should be in charge of such a role. This demonstrated that despite the lack 
of trust in politics, the self-perception of the citizens and their political efficacy they had 
relatively positive values that could be developed. In addition, it is important to note 
that the views on “citizenship” have an impact not only on the political system but also 
on the conditions of the exercise of power. For example, according to the survey, 81% 
relate  their  quality  as  “citizen”  to  their  political  rights.  Consequently,  70%  of  the 
interviewees  said  that  having  rights  and  obligations  made  them  a  citizen  and  11% 
considered that the ability to vote, was what made them citizens. Having rights and 
obligations not only refers to a legal status, but also implies a sense of belonging to a 
society. In this sense, civic education has the task of implicating the citizens in the 
performance  of  the  law,  and  also  in  the  exigency  towards  the  governors  and 
representatives  for  them  to  respect  them.
71  In  general,  the  study  showed  mixed 
perceptions  on  politics,  institutions  and  even  on  the  participation  of  citizens  in  a 
democracy. 
                                                 
69 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, p.25. With regards to the fundamental values for 
democracy, such as tolerance and respect, in general, the results showed that they are not yet consolidated. For 
example, in relation to tolerance it was observed that a high number of answers given by interviewees were negative 
in respect of living with a homosexual person (66%) or an aids victim (57%). It was only slightly better in respect of 
attitudes to living with people of different races (56%), of other religions (49%) or with people of other political ideas 
(51%).  
70 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, p.25. 
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8.2 Civic education 
There are different ways to define Civic Education. Among the various definitions Civic 
education is mostly related to the formation of political culture. For instance, it can be 
defined as a group of theoretical and methodological rules and didactic techniques that 
seek to influence positively the process of formation of political culture in a democratic 
way. In this sense, Civil Education is defined as an integral and continuous process of 
human development, which intends to make an impact on the preparation of conscious 
citizens and train them better to participate politically. Consequently, Civic Education 
has the objective of “training citizens” as members of a community.  Alanís gives a 
more specific definition of civic education as “a formative process for citizens using 
resources  from  the  fields  of  formal  and  informal  education  to  promote  democratic 
values and related attitudes and behaviour.”
 72 This concept portrays Civic Education as 
a process that takes place informally, first within the family and later more formally, at 
school. Civic education becomes very important, especially  during  childhood as the 
social dynamics between children are first shaped at school, where parents along with 
teachers  become  the  authority  figures.
73  The  strategies  of  civic  education  can  be 
efficient if they appeal to the resources of formal and informal education in  promoting  
values,  practices  and  institutions  of  democracy.  It  can  be  said  that  civic  education 
should have two levels that expand during the life of the individual: one instructive level 
and another “formative”.
74 Finally, when Civic Education is perceived as an area of 
activity,  that  area  should  include  three  essential  aspects.  The  first  aspect  is  civic 
knowledge which refers to ideas, information and experiences that individuals should 
have in key concepts in order to be responsible and effective citizens.
75 A second point 
of Civic Education is the values and requirements that refer to specific ways of seeing 
the  world  including  habits  and  attitudes  related  to  respect  of  human  dignity,  the 
                                                 
72 Alanís, Maria del Carmen. Elecciones Mexico; May 2002 (6):10. 
73 Ibid. 
74 The instructive level should be part of the first years of life and its objectives should centre on the acquisition and 
learning of the structures of the local, regional and state community, and the basic characteristics of the constitutional 
and legal framework. Then, during the formative period, the objectives should focus on the development of attitudes 
of cooperation, the fulfillment of laws and the exercise of their rights. Educar para la democracia: algunas campañas 
y experiencias de educación cívica en América Latina. Executive Board of Electoral Trainning and Civic Education. 
IFE. Cuaderno de Investigación Número 1. June 2000, pp.39-40. 
75 The civic knowledge of an individual includes knowledge about institutions of democracy and the role of the 
citizens in them. The citizens must note the implications of the vote and elections, government, etc… and also the 
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understanding  of  tolerance,  plurality,  general  equality  and  politics.  Finally,  the  last 
aspect is civic skills including intellectual abilities, operatives, dialogue, construction of 
consensus, citizen organisation, formulas for participating etc.
76  
 
8.3  The importance of Civic education in the transition to democracy. 
If Civic Education is understood as a means to influence the process of configuration of 
political culture in a democratic sense, civic education programmes operate better in 
democracies,  processes  of  democratisation  and  transitions.
77  In  this  context,  the 
relationship  between  political  culture  and  civic  education  should  be  taken  into 
consideration.  Political  culture  is  perceived  as  a  group  of  perceptions,  values,  and 
attitudes of the population in relation to politics that has become a starting point in 
applying programmes of civic education. Political culture, as the group of beliefs and 
values  concerning  politics  that  exists  within  the  mass  and  the  citizens,  can  also  be 
considered  a precondition that favours democracy. Diamond,  Linz and  Lipset found 
evidences  of  the  correlation  between  features  of  democratic  culture  and  democratic 
stability  while  researching  for  their  comparative  study  in  politics  in  developing 
countries.
78 Thus, it seems that the more stable and stronger a democracy becomes the 
more chance there is to adopt democratic values and beliefs. Several experiences of 
civic education campaigns in Latin America showed that in democratic or transition 
contexts citizens are more receptive and motivated to participate and to be educated 
civically.
79 During processes of political change and institutional transformation, the 
practice of democracy can contribute to creating a positive attitude among the people, 
even when their initial view of democratic values is low.
80 Therefore, it can be argued 
that during political openings, new practices and activities to promote civic education 
can be welcomed and seen as part of the overall political change that they are already 
experiencing. Expectations generated during circumstances of political change such as 
elections,  government  reshuffles  and  transitions,  can  make  the  programmes  of  civic 
                                                 
76 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001. 
77 Strategies, programmes and activities of Civic Education, IFE, 2000, p.26. 
78 Diamond, L., Linz, J. and Lipset. Politics in Developing Countries: Comparting experiences with democracy, p.19. 
    “Those countries that have been the most strongly and stably democratic also appear to have the most democratic 
political values and beliefs”. 
79 Educar para la democracia: algunas campañas experiencias de educación cívica en América Latina. IFE. June 2000, 
p. 33. Therefore, the character of “change”, the change from authoritarian to democratic rule and the route towards a 
democratic and participative society are the best contexts for civic experiences, e.g. Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chile and 
Colombia. 
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education  more  effective.
81  However,  the  motivation  to  participate  and  adopt  new 
attitudes  may  vary  depending  on  how  deep  the  previous  values  are  rooted  in  the 
population.  
In the context of political change toward democracy, Civic Education can be useful in 
creating a political culture with democratic values among the population. As part of this 
process of cultural change the individual can be educated as a responsible citizen in a 
context of freedom and respect for human dignity; promote solidarity and social co-
responsibility for the building of democratic order.
82  
 
8.3.1  Target groups of Civic education and programmes in Mexico 
In  the  Latin  American  context,  most  of  the  civic  education  campaigns  have  been 
directed at citizens, who became the primary actors.
83 However, the target group of a 
civic  education  campaign  may  vary  depending  on  the  specific  purpose  of  each 
programme. First of all, the ideal goal of a Civic Education programme should be to 
seek to influence spaces of basic socialisation such as school and family.
84 Programmes 
of civic education in these spheres should have a permanent character, as the school is a 
privileged place of socialisation, acquisition of universal values, personality and a social 
conscience. 
85 At this stage it is necessary to carry out various activities starting from 
the designing of study programmes, the production of didactic materials and training 
programmes for teachers.  Secondly, depending on the purpose, a programme of civic 
education should extend to work in other areas outside primary and secondary education 
such  as  community  spaces.  And  finally,  a  third  element  to  be  considered  when 
designing a programme is the mass media. The inclusion of the media in programmes is 
                                                 
81 Interview, Javier Romo, Advisor to President Councillor 2003-2010 (IFE) and political academic, Mexico City, 12 
November 2004. The competitiveness that emerged during the 1988 elections triggered an interest in elections that 
lasted for a decade. However, despite political mobilisations, few people believed in the real value and worth of their 
votes. In this context, the IFE initiated campaigns of promotion of votes that eventually became a permanent activity. 
Such campaigns proved to have an impact in voting participation especially during the 1991 and 1994 elections.    
82 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001. 
83 Educar para la democracia: algunas campañas experiencias de educación cívica en América Latina. IFE. June 2000, 
p.42. “Civic education is related to the relationships that people have amongst themselves and with authority within 
different spheres: the local community, the school, the family, social groups and the national community.” 
84 Alanís notes that “The school offers better conditions because its favours a systematic process in the long term, 
supported by contents of the subjects included in the programmes and the way in which these contents are taught. 
Alanís, Maria del Carmen. Elecciones Mexico; May 2002 (6):10. 
85 Educar para la democracia: algunas campañas experiencias de educación cívica en América Latina. IFE. June 2000, 
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quite significant, as it has become the primary source of information for most people
86. 
In  the  case  of  Mexico,  the  programmes  of  civic  education  are  mainly  focused  on 
children, young people and women. 
 
8.3.2  Civic education in Mexico: reasons for its application 
After Mexico experienced a political change which resulted in more competitive, clean 
and fair elections and greater political plurality, only a few people believed that the 
country had achieved a full democracy, as the political culture remained ambiguous. For 
those  who  thought  that  the  process  was  incomplete,  Civic  Education  programmes, 
seemed to be the best instrument to promote and strengthen new democratic values and 
attitudes;  in  other  words,  a  new  democratic  culture  in  Mexico.
87  As  noted  earlier, 
various studies on the political culture between 1999 and 2001 showed the need for the 
implementation  of  Civic  Education.
88  As  the  electoral  character  of  the  transition 
restricted most of the changes on electoral issues, the electoral mobilisation had very 
little impact on the existing political culture inherited from the authoritarian regime. 
There are various reasons that justify the need for civic education programmes in the 
consolidation of democracy in Mexico. First of all, as a precondition to democracy, the 
creation  of  a  democratic  political  culture  becomes  essential  not  only  to  reduce 
dangerous political polarisation but also to restrain common non democratic practices.
89 
Therefore, programmes of Civic Education can be used by the government to ensure 
stability. It is important to remember; that the authoritarian past of the regime shaped 
the political culture not only of the people but also of the political actors, who despite 
participating  in  democratic  institutions,  needed  to  learn  democratic  practices.
90  For 
instance, despite most members of political parties accepting in theory the importance 
of  political  negotiation  and  consensus,  most  of  them  showed  intolerance  when 
                                                 
86  The media has to remain open to new possibilities of political reflection and public debate and, if possible, it 
should also draw up ethical and discursive codes of action. Alanís, Maria del Carmen. Elecciones Mexico; May 2002 
(6):10. 
87 Woldenberg, J., Elecciones Mexico; May 2002; (6):2. “Civic education can be perceived as a vehicle to teach how 
to live in a different political world” 
88 Ciudadanos y Cultura de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la democracia, pp.1-7. The analysis of 
political culture includes the establishment of the links between the values, the rules and the institutions that allow the 
distinctive features that define the political character of the inhabitants of a country. 
89 Interview, member of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) B, Mexico City, 19 October 2004.  
90 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
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disagreeing in Congress.
91 It can be argued that Civic Education can also be applied to 
political elites, especially when learning how to engage in dialogue and negotiate while 
accepting different positions.
92 In addition to this, another reason for the application of 
civic education programmes is the lack of democratic values such as social and political 
tolerance  among  the  people.  Finally,  the  traditional  low  level  of  social  organisation 
outside  politics  in  Mexico,  contributed  to  a  passive  attitude  by  citizens  towards 
politics.
93 It is important to note that in the past, despite such passiveness, Mexicans 
always  showed  high  frequency  in  their  willingness  to  discuss  politics,  although  not 
necessarily to act.
94 Mexico also experienced a weak process towards direct political 
socialisation. Consequently, the adequate socialisation of politics was affected not only 
by cultural factors but also by the lack of education and media access. For instance, big 
social  groups such as women, ethnic minorities and the non educated  citizens were 
commonly marginalised from these processes.
95 Therefore, areas of Mexican political 
socialisation have been limited and differentiated.   For example, until recently, the 
public only discussed politics in private circles, as politics was perceived as the job of 
politicians in which the public could have no impact or influence.
96  
 
8.3.3  Civic Education and the IFE  
Initially,  the  interest  in  Civic  Education  in  Mexico,  among  social  institutions  and 
political actors, was a response to various factors, including the emergence of Human 
                                                 
91 Interview, Ricardo Becerra, political academic and advisor to the President Councillor 1996-2000 (IFE), Mexico 
City, 22 November 2004.   
92 Ibid.  
93 This should not be mistaken for participation in voting. In critical circumstances, people’s desire for change moves 
them to participate in elections.  
94 Almond, G. and Verba, S., Civic Culture, p.62. 
95 This was shown by using a question designed to observe the grade of primary socialisation. When you were a child 
did your family talk about politics? Only 22% said yes, while the majority, 70.3% said they didn’t. When the younger 
generations, between the ages of 18 and 30, were asked the same question, 26% replied yes, while those aged over 41 
years showed a minor grade of primary socialisation towards politics (18.3%) and more in the case of men (22.4%), 
than in women (21.6%). Additionally, professionals appeared to have an early primary socialisation towards politics 
with 49.5% showing political socialisation, while in other areas the following figures were evident: 40.7% of the 
private company managers, 40.5% of students, 17% of the unemployed, 18.1% of dependent workers and 12.5% of 
civil servants. The increase in socialisation was seen at the same time as increases in the level of education, therefore 
the early socialisation increased from 14.2%, among people without education, to 37.9% among those that had an 
unfinished university education. Ciudadanos y Cultura de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la 
democracia, by Julia Flores Dávila and Yolanda Meyenberg, p.19. 
96 For example, according to the Survey carried out by Julia Flores Dávila and Yolanda Meyenberg,75% showed their 
disagreement with the idea of priests talking about politics. Only 16.2% said that they agreed with priests talking 
about politics, 4.1% only agreed in part, and 75.7% said they totally disagreed. The answers to this question 
demonstrated not only the rejection of interference of politics in private ambits, but also a long socialisation of the 
secular culture of the Mexican state, that saw the separation between the state and the church. Ciudadanos y Cultura 
de la democracia. Reglas, instituciones y valores de la democracia, by Julia Flores Dávila and Yolanda Meyenberg, 
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Rights Commissions, the involvement of civil organisations in electoral observation and 
the introduction of the subject of “civic education” in the programmes of the educative 
system.
97 Most of the civil and non governmental organisations that emerged from the 
mid 1980s onwards started working in the defence and promotion of political and civil 
rights.
98  However,  as  many  analysts  agree,  the  creation  of  IFE  in  1991  and  the 
introduction of Civic Education as one of its main areas of activity was the factor that 
defined Civic Education as an essential part of the democratic construction.
99 However, 
the current role of this area of activity in the electoral authority was not considered until 
the 1996 electoral reform. Previously, civic education was like an accessory activity 
which was limited to electoral periods.
100 The decision to include civic education as an 
IFE function resulted from the idea that elections had to be accompanied by informed, 
free  and  conscious  participation  by  the  citizens,  not  only  during  elections  but  also 
during other public spaces.
101 The 1990 electoral reform established by constitutional 
and legal mandate that IFE, through its Executive Board of Electoral Training and Civic 
Education, had the responsibility of “elaborating and proposing programmes of civic 
education  and  electoral  training…and  orienting  the  citizens  in  the  exercise  of  their 
rights and fulfilment of their political electoral obligations.
102 In addition to the function 
of  organising  elections,  the  IFE  officially  became  responsible  for  helping  with  the 
development  of  democratic  life.  Conforming  to  the  constitutional  principles  and 
requirements that the electoral law (COFIPE) provided, the IFE had the responsibility to 
guide citizens on their political and electoral obligations and to promote democratic 
culture. In order to do this, the electoral authority had to design, promote and implement 
programmes  of  civic  education.  However,  due  to  the  enormous  work  involved  in 
carrying out programmes of civic education, it was also established that the electoral 
activity  had  to  actively  promote  agreements  and  common  projects  relating  to  civic 
education with other institutions and organs. Overall, the main tasks of IFE in this area 
included designing, promoting and applying programmes of civic education to inform 
                                                 
97 Strategies, programmes and activities of Civic Education, IFE, 2000, p.24. 
98 Written interview with Jose Luis Barajas, ex member of Alianza Cívica. 
99 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. “In some ways, taking into consideration the authoritarian past 
of the government, both government and political parties agreed that civic education needed to be allocated to an 
institution outside the government. Although at this early stage this matter was not a priority in their proposals.   
100 Strategies, programmes and activities of Civic Education, IFE, 2000, p.25. 
101 Ibid. 
102 COFIPE, Article 96, Point 1, section a & d. 
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citizens  of  their  political  and  electoral  rights  and  obligations  and  to  promote  and 
disseminate democratic values. Such programmes were to be applied in both the formal 
and informal spaces of education. This “formative” feature of the IFE differentiated the 
institution from other electoral commissions. In the long run, the purpose of IFE was to 
open a communication  channel to disseminate the culture of democracy  in order to 
consolidate civic culture in the population. IFE started operating in the area of civic 
education in the second semester of 1991, after the midterm elections were completed in 
order to elect members of the Congress. The allocation of this area of responsibility to 
the IFE provoked initial complaints among political actors.
103 Most of the complaints 
were related to the control that the PRI government still exercised inside IFE through 
the Minister of the Interior in the General Council.
104 At this early stage, the IFE was 
perceived as a government body; therefore, for most people its civic education activities 
were seen as governmental programmes. Additionally, the political education received 
in  schools  during  the  PRI’s  hegemony  had  been  totally  dominated  by  the  partial 
interpretation  of  the  regime.  In  time,  the  relative  success  of  initial  civic  education 
campaigns  in  the  mid  1990s,  including  the  updating  of  the  electoral  roll  and  the 
promotion  of  the  vote,  increased  trust  in  the  institution  although  it  was  limited.
105 
However, it was not until the electoral authority became independent in 1996, that the 
institution started being fully trusted. The trust and consistency of the IFE became very 
important for its programmes of civic education to be successful. Previous experiences 
in Latin America had proved that among the most successful civic education campaigns 
were those promoted by trusted and experienced social, political or public figures.
106 
Despite  the  IFE  initiating  programmes  of  civic  education,  it  was  understood  that 
because of the size of the group in a highly populated nation, the IFE had to collaborate 
with other civic institutions in respect of providing civic education. The collaboration 
                                                 
103 Initial complaints emerged, despite the electoral code establishing that in order to ensure the IFE’s legitimacy and 
commitment, civic education promoted by the electoral authority should be independent from party influences and 
unbiased and it should be of general interest and appeal to the whole population to participate. Strategies, 
programmes and activities of Civic Education, IFE, 2000, p.25. 
104 Interview, Jorge J. Romero, Advisor to President Councillor (IFE), former member of Democracia Social and 
political academic, Mexico City, 15 November 2004. As the reform was negotiated between the PAN and the PRI, 
other political parties such as the PRD were suspicious about the IFE function. 
105 A survey conducted by Covarrubias y Asociados between January 18 and January 22 1993, showed that only 7% 
of those questioned knew that IFE was responsible for organising elections and it also showed that up to 48% of 
respondents had not confidence in the electoral results and only 11% accepted it. See survey “IFE, el gran 
desconocido” in Voz y Voto, May 1993 (3):28-29 and “La credibilidad en las elecciones” in Voz y Voto, March 1993 
(1):22-24. 
106 Educar para la democracia: algunas campañas experiencias de educación cívica en América Latina. IFE. June 
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conducted  by  IFE,  through  its  Executive  Board  of  Training  and  Civic  Education, 
resulted  in  a  strategy  that  entailed  the  participation  of  other  institutions  with  the 
objective of extending and increasing the  impact of national civic education. 
 
8.3.4  Objectives of IFE in the area of Civic Education. 
One of IFE’s main goals was to generate, in society, a social demand for democracy, 
making this a more desirable option than other forms of government. In order to create 
this  social  demand  for  democracy,  the  IFE  acknowledged  that  society  needed  to 
understand  democratic  values,  principles,  institutional  mechanics  and  historical 
evolution.
107  The  IFE  said  that  it  was  committed  to  explaining  to  the  citizens  the 
practicality of politics and informing them about their political obligations that are part 
of a democracy. IFE claimed that its intention was not only to promote participation in 
politics and public matters among the citizens, but also to reduce the existing negative 
perception of politics. Alanis Figueroa notes, that gaining civil skills is part of civic 
education. Among the civic skills is the ability to organise, to identify problems, to be 
able to debate, to offer possible solutions, to be able to make a dialogue, to discuss, to 
listen and to negotiate, to reach agreements and to elect civil representatives and make 
politicians accountable.
108 IFE claims that another of its goals was the promotion of 
“governability” that aimed to educate in democratic values and practices in order to 
generate  responsibilities  that  balanced  the  different  demands  and  eased  conflicts.
109 
There were three main objectives that the IFE declared to follow: a) to contribute to 
promote the values and attitudes that allow the slow settling of a democratic way of life 
through the extended promotion of democratic fundamental values, through the media, 
and through basic socialisation where the political culture is formed, like the family, 
school and the community; b) to favour high levels of interest among citizens in politics 
and  c)  to  promote  the  participation  of  more  informed  and  responsible  citizens  in 
electoral political matters.  
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8.3.5  Programmes of civic education by IFE 
In order to design and develop the institutional civic education programmes, the IFE 
carried out various studies on the political culture in Mexico. The conclusions of those 
studies gave IFE important information for establishing priorities and objectives for its 
campaigns of civic education. Initial research on the existing political culture showed 
areas  that  IFE  needed  to  work  on.  For  instance,  the  obvious  contradictions  in  the 
political culture of Mexico which showed both authoritarian and democratic elements, 
was evidence of the need for political socialisation. As a result of this contradiction, the 
IFE  was  advised  to  develop  programmes  and  projects  of  civic  education  aimed  at 
having an influence on the political socialisation of citizens. Those programmes were 
intended  to  inform  people  about  the  different  democratic  institutions,  norms  and 
practices as well as the respect of legality.
110 In addition to providing information, the 
electoral  authority  was  also  advised  to  communicate  matters  that  were  related  to 
everyday life situations, in order to revive the collective identity.
111  
 
8.3.6  IFE as a promoter of civic culture 
The  promotion  of  social  responsibility  was  one  of  the  main  activities  of  IFE.  With 
regard to this, the IFE became responsible for designing, printing and delivering civic 
education  programmes  oriented  to  two  types  of  target  groups:  those  with  academic 
training and the general population.
112 As the IFE organised conferences and talks on 
the subject of civic education, the electoral authority emerged not only as a promoter 
and  diffuser  of  civic  culture,  but  also  as  a  promoter  of  ideas  and  knowledge  that 
nurtured  the  contemporary  debate  on  democracy.
113  Additionally,  the  early  printed 
material given to the general population became promotional material that even today, 
is in demand.
114   
 
                                                 
110 That resulted in being of great relevance to the population, for example on the matter of politics, it recommended 
emphasis on politics as an activity that involves everyone, and implies a commitment to social welfare. Educar para 
la democracia: algunas campañas experiencias de educación cívica en América Latina. IFE. June 2000, p.28. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Programmes for the first group included research projects and conferences. Eg. “Cuadernos de Divulgación de la 
Cultura democrática”. Programmes for the second group included leaflets and posters. eg. “Knowing the civic history 
of Mexico, etc). Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, p.11. 
113 For example, events such as the “Foro of Educación Cívica y Cultura Política Democrática” in 1998 were 
organised by the IFE, with the three federal governments: DF, Estado de Mexico and Jalisco, and civil institutions 
such as: Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior, Fundación SNTE para la 
Cultura del Maestro Mexicano, A.C., Causa Ciudadana, Centro de Estudios Educativos, Asociación Mexicana para 
las Naciones. 
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8.3.7  First activities of IFE: 1990 -1993 
The first civic education programes carried out by IFE in the early 1990s were quite 
limited and were focused mainly on the promotion of the vote.
115 Between the creation 
of the electoral authority and 1993, the main area of work was the design of activities 
linked to the civic-political history of Mexico. Printing materials such as leaflets and 
posters were used to provide information about significant events and people in the 
nation’s history. Then from 1993 onwards, the IFE started a new phase in the area of 
civic  education  and  expanded  its  programmes.  In  this  new  stage,  the  issues  of 
democratic  values  and  democratic  practices  were  introduced  and  prioritised  in  the 
programme, without abandoning the part on civic political history. The IFE organised 
four areas of work: 1) divulgation of democratic culture to citizens, b) civic education 
for  children  and  young  people,  c)  information  and  bibliographic  services,  d)  and 
promotion of the vote. 
116 It was established in different phases, and the IFE carried out 
research, planning and evaluation. There was also consultation in the area of Electoral 
Training  and  Civic  Education.  IFE’s  initial  activities  were  focused  on  the  task  of 
developing a strategy of civic education directed at different groups, such as children, 
young people and other previously determined target groups.  
This  strategy  incorporated  the  publication  of  various  materials  and  promotional 
activities. In parallel, the Electoral Training and Civic Education Board of IFE put into 
practice programmes, not only directed at the IFE’s electoral service, but also at the 
academic community, such as magisterial conferences, journals and books directed at 
university students, social scientists and politicians.  
 
8.3.8  The IFE and education 
When IFE was created, it was established that it had to collaborate with educational 
institutions.  The  programmes  were  to  be  delivered  not  only  by  the  vocals  of  the 
Electoral training and civil education of the electoral institution, but also by promoters 
and instructors of other institutions and civil organisations and by teachers who were 
part of the national education system. After the IFE delivered the first civic education 
programmes they were quickly adopted by the education authorities. In order for these 
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programmes to be implemented in schools, the IFE assumed responsibility for training 
teachers in civic education and designing text books on the subject. In relation to this, 
various agreements were signed with the education authorities, including universities. 
The IFE would functioned as a moderator during the implementation of programmes in  
formal and informal education applied by teachers and social promoters. Examples of 
the programmes introduced include: “Rights and Values of the Mexican Infancy” or 
“Us,  the  Young  People”,  “Citizen’s  Project”  and  “National  Week  in  support  of  the 
Rights  of  Children.”
117    Another  project  was  the  “Seminary  of  Civic-Electoral 
participation of children and young people”, in which various children’s elections that 
took place in 5 continents were analysed, with the participation of the Electoral Tribunal 
of the Judicial Branch of the Federation and the United Nations Fund for Children. One 
of the better known programmes in the area of education was “Civic Survey” (Jornadas 
Civicas), a programme of civic education delivered by the local structure of IFE that 
achieved an audience of up to 3 million children, young people and adults.
118  It was the 
first  attempt  to  use  a  programme  of  civic  education  in  the  scholar  space.  The 
programmes applied in primary and secondary schools were extracurricular and their 
purpose was to enforce and complement the programmes and official content of the 
subject of Civic Education. 
The  application  of  these  programmes  included  surveys  given  to  the  IFE  trainers, 
teachers  and  children,  which  were  followed  by  both  qualitative  and  quantitative 
evaluations,  as  well  as  evaluations  directed  at  the  analysis  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
editorial collections that fed the different programmes. One of the main intentions was 
to promote, within the children and young people populations, the formation of values 
and practices that are acquired through the realisation of a group of activities that result 
from  four  pedagogic  principles.
119  This  plan  was  initially  devised  in  1993.  In  this 
specific  project,  the  IFE  looked  for  the  approval  of  the  sample  programmes  and 
evaluated the materials provided by the education establishments.  In 1995 after the 
initial plan had been approved by the Education Secretary it was later re-designed and 
finally applied. Despite initial reservations by the education authorities, they accepted 
                                                 
117 Strategies, programmes and activities of Civic Education, IFE, 2000, pp.32-33; Righst and values of children and 
youth. National week in favour of Children’s rights.  
118 Strategies, programmes and activities of Civic Education, IFE, 2000, pp.32-33. 
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the programme. Indeed, in 1996 schools began to request the application of “Jornadas 
Cívicas”. In order to ensure the theoretical support, methodology and didactic materials 
of the programme, IFE carried out an internal evaluation using questionnaires directed 
at teachers and students. The programme also had an external evaluation in 1995, by the 
Centre  for  research  and  educative  and  social  development,  which  carried  out  a 
diagnostic evaluation of the programme.  The implementation of the “Jornadas Cívicas” 
contributed not only to the process of learning democratic values but it also established 
a more precise didactic strategy. Another significant project carried out by IFE, in the 
area of political culture and children, was a study on the effect of the 1997 elections on 
the  political  culture  of  children.  The  study  was  called  “Evaluation  of  the  impact  of 
campaigns of civic education of the IFE in the 1997 elections” and it was carried out in 
September 1998. The objective of this study was to examine the extent to which the 
campaigns  of  civic  education  applied  to  schools  had  reinforced  or  transformed  the 
impressions  that  children  and  young  people  had  of  the  democratic  culture.  With 
reference  to  the  civil  education  of  children  the  IFE  organised  the  “1997  children’s 
elections”. This project consisted of a simulated election where children voted on their 
main concerns. The results of this exercise were significant because they put the issue of 
childrens’ rights on the national public agenda and mobilised institutions to carry out 
initiatives  in  favour  of  children.  The  application  of  various  programmes  of  Civic 
Education  for  children  and  young  people  eventually  increased  and  gained  the 
recognition of the education authorities. Additionally, due to new forms of application, 
the  programmes  also  generated  a  national  demand.  After  the  project  concluded,  it 
proved to have been more effective in primary and secondary children than in older 
groups.  The  evaluation  also  showed  that  the  programme  was  more  efficient  in 
transmitting  information  than  in  generating  new  attitudes  and  behaviour.
120  It  also 
revealed  that  in  its  application  the  psycho-pedagogic  principles  of  the  programme 
tended to diminish, showing the need for operating changes in its methodology as in 
“Workshop of Training of Tutors and in the respective manual”.
121 
In 1996, the IFE began to work on the rights of children, which increased the issue of 
civil education for children. On this subject, the IFE developed a significant programme 
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121 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, pp.14-15. Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
 
340 
for children in civil education called “Programme for the rights and values of Mexican 
Youth.”
122 The purpose of this programme was to increase the institutional relationship 
between the IFE and other institutions and social organisations and agree a plan to teach 
democratic values and practices to children. The IFE asked other institutions and civil 
organisations  to  plan,  design  and  develop  a  programme  of  civic  education.  The 
collaboration between the IFE and another five institutions resulted in a programme of 
Inter-institutional Action.
123 This civic education programme was extracurricular and 
included two manuals of didactic support for teachers and was designed for fifth and 
sixth  grade  primary  school  children.  After  its  first  application,  this  programme  was 
included  in  the  Catalogue  of  Projects  and  Support  Services  activities  of  the  Basic 
Education of Mexico City. The programme was applied by the local organs of the IFE 
in the second semester of 2000. Overall, the programme was accepted by teachers and 
the education authorities and proved to be a very useful instrument for the support of 
teachers working on issues of rights and obligations. The pilot test also showed that the 
Manual  of  Training  for  teachers  was  too  long  and  that  some  lectures  repeated  the 
information, which added to the dynamic of the course.
124 An additional project in the 
area of civic education to children was “We, the youth, citizen project”, which was 
developed by IFE and the Sub secretary for Education Services of the Federal District in 
1998.
125 The objective of this programme was to trigger the interest of young people in 
the problems of the community. It also intended to involve secondary school children in 
identifying possible solutions to common problems in the community in order for them 
to design a plan of action to persuade the authorities to turn them into public policies.
126 
After the programme was completed, according to the participant teachers, the students 
became  more  interested  in  the  problems  of  their  community  and  gained  a  better 
understanding  of  their  ability  to  influence  change.  Despite  positive  results,  the 
evaluation of the programme showed that the training course for instructors had to be 
improved  and  the  teachers’  manual  had  to  include  a  better  explanation  of  the  key 
                                                 
122 Rights and values of Mexican Children. 
123 The IFE collaborated with five other institutions including UNICEF, the Ministry of Public Education (SEP), the 
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concepts  of  public  policy.
127  Finally,  one  of  IFE’s  most  significant  programmes 
regarding the civic education of children was the “Children and Youth Survey in 2000.” 
This programme was carried out on presidential election day, July 2 2000, making the 
election  day  also  a  civic  day  for  children,  and  thus  contributing  to  the  democratic 
development of the country. The tasks involved in this programme were implemented 
by IFE, along with a group of experts and representatives from public, private and social 
institutions.
128 The main aim was to find out the views that children had on the rules, the 
exercise of authority in the family, the school, the community and the country.
129 The 
results and information gathered in the survey were to be used to design programmes, 
policies and activities, to foster and strengthen the democracy.
130 The objective of this 
survey was to encourage awareness in children and young people about their legal rights 
and  obligations.  It  was  also  intended  that  the  children  consider  the  surveys  as  a 
legitimate  means  to  express  their  opinions  and  preferences,  while  respecting  the 
opinions of others. Consequently, this survey was not only a learning process about 
civic rights and obligations among children and young people but also a process to 
reinforce the practice of democratic values.
131 The target audience of the survey was 
children between the ages of 6 and 17 who were invited to participate in a survey that 
included democratic values and practices and other public problems such as alcohol, 
drugs and AIDS.
132 The survey was promoted through the use of mass media such as 
radio, print, and TV. Promotional material, such as posters, brochures and videotapes 
produced by the IFE, and other participating institutions, were sent to the Local and 
District  Boards  and  the  participating  organisations.  The  electoral  material  was 
distributed throughout Mexico’s 32 states while the polling site volunteers were trained 
to implement the programme.
133 Both the qualitative and statistical information gathered 
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128 The institutions involved were the Ministry of Public Education, the National Commission for Human Rights, the 
National System for the Overall Development of the Family, the National Indigenous Institute, United Nations 
Children’s fund, and other state government and public local bodies. IFE Children and Youth Survey 2000  
129 IFE Children and Youth Survey 2000 
130 Ibid. p.6. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Target audience and Ballot Design: those who participated in the survey were young people between 6 and 17 
years of age. Because of the differences in perceptions and environments, the overall group was divided into three 
ranges: 6 to 9, 10 to 13 and 14 to 17. The survey’s topics were the same for the three groups, but each group had its 
own ballot, based on cognitive and emotional development. IFE Children and Youth Survey 2000 
 
133 Elecciones México. Children and Youth Survey 2000. IFE, p.3. 
“Approximately 60,000 volunteers were recruited and trained to ensure the smooth operation of the polling sites. 
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from this survey was very useful. According to the IFE, the project satisfied several 
goals including the creation of space in which young people could exercise their right to 
participate and express themselves, in addition to putting these population groups in 
touch with the values and procedures typical of a democratic system.
134 It also gathered 
information  from  children  on  issues  that  affected  them  directly,  particularly  those 
related  to  human  interaction,  the  creation  and  respects  of  regulation,  and  the 
enforcement of authority. The researchers
135 from the National University of Pedagogy 
concluded that “children wish to be known in the public space as interlocutors worthy 
to  being  considered  in  the  decisions  that  affect  their  daily  lives  as  members  of  a 
community,  family,  school  and  country”.
136  The  survey  showed  that  the  concept  of 
political culture among children was more critical when moving from the private to the 
public ambit and with increasing age. Younger children valued the family more than the 
country. The perception on “childhood” was also more positive among young children 
than teenagers. Regarding the issue of gender equality, most of the 6 to 13 year olds 
(between 78% and 86%) shared the same opinion in the sense that in both the family 
and  school  they  felt  that  were  treated  equally.  However,  this  perception  of  equal 
treatment decreased among 14 to 17 year olds. In the same way, children perceived that 
rules  were  respected  more  in  the  family  than  in  school  or  in  the  country.  These 
responses showed that “scepticism” increased in older groups and conforming passed 
from the private to the public ambit. In this last context, 7 out of 10 children observed 
that  in  the  context  of  the  country,  they  were  not  taken  into  consideration  when 
elaborating the rules. A similar proportion thought that rules and laws were not applied 
the same way. They also thought that most adults did not respect them. The survey also 
demonstrated that the older the children got, the less willing they were to take decisions. 
With reference to authority, younger groups perceived more violence and abuse than 
                                                                                                                                               
on July 2: there were 14,307 polling sites for children and young people through Mexico, in urban and rural areas, as 
well as in indigenous communities. About, 4,000,000 girls, boys and teenagers participated in this survey” 
134 IFE. Children and Youth Survey, p.6. 
135 Aurora Elizondo, Corina Fernández and Lucía Rodriguez, from the National University of Pedagogy. 
136 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, p.29. 
It was observed that the children thought that there was more collaboration in the private ambit (86% for example, in 
the family) than in the public (only 45% recognised that collaboration existed in the country). While 84% and 81% 
respectively, perceived opportunities for developing inside the family and school context, the percentage decreased 
from around 65% and 64% within the community and the country. For example, in the school, 80% of the children 
between 6 and 9 years considered that they did participate in the decision taken, while in the groups between the ages 
of 10 to 13 and 14 to 17 years, only 73% and 58% respectively thought the same. And the same, when passing from 
the private to the public ambit, from the family to the country, they thought that the possibilities for participation 
decreased: the young affirmed that it was greater in the family (77%), a bit lower in the school (58%) and in the 
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older groups. However, in the context of the country, 1 out of 3 youths thought that they 
were treated with more violence. In general, the 14 to 17 year old group recognised, in a 
positive way, the existence of democracy. This was shown in the high values that they 
gave to elections (9 out of 10 considered this important throughout the country and 3 
out  of  4  in  the  school).  However,  regarding  the  political  parties,  only  47%  of  this 
population  group  considered  that  political  parties  took  their  interests  into 
consideration.
137  
 
8.3.9  Civic education for adults 
In relation to adults, the IFE developed a series of programmes and workshops intended 
to promote “citizen values” in adults. In 1998, the IFE through the Executive Board of 
Electoral Training and Civic Education designed a “Workshop for Citizen Education”. 
A year later, it started training vocals of IFE’s local branches and professionals. The 
purpose of this workshop was to promote the participation of citizens in political and 
public  issues.  This  particular  project  was  part  of  the  programme  of  civic  education 
presented by the IFE that was carried out in collaboration with other institutions and 
was intended to help to generate “citizen values” in adults. It was delivered by the local 
and district IFE boards, into different states’ government personnel, to  national political 
groups, to universities, to councils and to civil and political bodies.
138 In reference to the 
IFE’s activities in promoting the vote and participation in the electoral process, the IFE 
developed several campaigns between 1991 and 1994. However, in 1994 the electoral 
authority, in collaboration with the Coordination of Social Communication, organised 
the most significant campaign on the issue of promotion of the vote. In this campaign, 
the IFE’s Executive Board performed a vital role by making and issuing posters on 
democratic values and the promotion of the vote, and elaborating scripts for radio and 
television to be used by the National Chamber of the Industry of Radio and Television.  
Later, for the midterm elections in 1997, the Executive Board of Electoral Training and 
Civic Education designed the  general strategy of the campaign, which included sub 
campaigns  of  composition  of  directive  boards,  promotion  of  the  vote,  and  were  in 
favour of a free and secret vote. However, this campaign encountered various problems 
during  the  broadcasting,  including  a  low  allocation  of  official  times,  a  lack  of 
                                                 
137 Civic Education. Three-year Plan (2001-2003). IFE. April 2001, p.29. 
138 Ibid, p.20. 
 Lidia Acosta                                                     Chapter 8 The Role of IFE in Civic Education in Mexico 
 
344 
commitment  to  the  General  Direction  of  Radio,  Television  and  Cinematography’s 
guidelines by the radio stations, and the broadcast of the campaigns in low viewing 
time. Despite these various difficulties, the audience reviews revealed that the campaign 
had  an  impact  on  the  target  groups  with  good  comprehension  and  retention  of  key 
messages.
139 Finally, in 1991 the Executive Board of IFE created a central library which 
became  an  important  source  of  resources  for  both  the  IFE  and  other  academic 
institutions.  In  1993  a  National  Network  of  Libraries  was  created.  In  this  way,  the 
central offices of IFE supported the local ones.  
 
8.3.10  The International activities of IFE 
The  international  activities  of  IFE  were  introduced  in  the  1993  electoral  reform. 
Initially, the activities were focused on institutional promotion and reception of foreign 
delegations.  However,  by  1994  IFE  started  to  cooperate  with  other  countries  on 
common projects. In particular, it is worth noting the technical assistance received from 
the United Nations in respect of electoral activities in 1994. This was the first step in the 
internationalisation of IFE as it was subsequently invited to participate in international 
projects  of  technical  assistance  to  others  countries.    Since  1994  IFE  has  signed 
agreements  with  various  organisations  including  the  International  Foundation  for 
Election Systems (IFES).
140  
Of note is the agreement in 1999 to create the Partnerships of Electoral and Democratic 
Development, together with the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division, IFES, 
international  IDEA,  and  Elections  Canada.  As  a  result  of  this,  IFE  was  invited  to 
participate in the directive councils of the international missions organised by the UN. 
Most of the assistance requested from IFE has been related to technical assistance on 
electoral procedures. For instance, for the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, 
carried out in 2005, the IFE contributed to the making up of technical reports on the 
updating of the electoral roll and certification of political parties and candidates.  
The promotion of democratic culture and values is also part of the IFE’s international 
activity.  Since  1993,  the  IFE  has  organised  and  co-sponsored  many  international 
forums. It has also been invited to participate in several forums held abroad, usually to 
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provide information on the Mexican political and electoral system.
141 IFE has also been 
involved in comparative international studies that have contributed to the strengthening 
of  inter-institutional  cooperation.  The  IFE  collaborates  as  a  regional  centre  for  the 
composition and updating of all information related to Central America and Caribbean 
countries. This collection may be viewed at: www.epicproject.org.
142  
8.4 Conclusion 
The role of IFE in the area of Civic Education in Mexico has changed through the years. 
From its creation in 1990 until 1993, the electoral authority focused mainly on electoral 
activities such as the promotion of the vote and updating the electoral roll. In this earlier 
period, when the IFE was chaired by the Minister of the Interior, the political parties 
perceived IFE’s campaigns as suspicious, claiming them to be partial and fraudulent. 
When the IFE became totally independent, with the reform of 1996, its activities for the 
promotion of votes were perceived in a more positive way by the parties and by the 
general public. On the other hand, the incursion of the IFE in the field of civic education 
at school was also perceived with reservations by education authorities. However, after 
the  first  projects  obtained  high  rates  of  participation  and  positive  feedback,  the 
institutional work of IFE and its delivery of courses to teachers and students became 
popular  and  gained  interest  and  pedagogic  recognition  from  authorities.    The  first 
programmes that were  directed to children started in 1993, when the recognition of 
IFE’s  role  increased,  especially  among  teachers.  In  particular,  the  production  and 
distribution of different editorial collections for children by IFE had been successful. 
The evaluations revealed that teachers saw these materials as useful for their job and 
adequate for the formation of civic values. However, specific aspects such as teacher 
and instructors’ training needed improvement in order to have a greater impact. The IFE 
also recommended that teachers use the didactic materials produced by the electoral 
authority with other techniques and also for these to be part of their daily activities and 
not only used once a year.
143   
With reference to the programmes of civic education for adults, both public and civil 
institutions received the work of IFE positively. The collaboration established between 
the IFE and different social and civil organisation was crucial in this acceptance. One of 
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the  most  valuable  activities  of  IFE  in  this  area  was  the  design,  production  and 
distribution of materials promoting democratic  principles, institutions and values,  as 
part of its objective to create a democratic political culture. Another important activity 
of  IFE that  gained recognition was the promotion of democratic values through the 
organisation  of  conferences,  forums  and  surveys.  The  IFE  showed  itself  to  be  a 
generator  of  ideas,  projects  and  materials,  and  to  be  a  promoter  of  programmes  of 
citizens formation and actions of promotion of democratic culture. Through this taks, 
the IFE triggered discussion and public debate on issues of civic education that had been 
ignored  in  the  past.  In  relation  to  the  international  activities  of  IFE,  its  efforts  on 
institutional  promotion  through  the  elaboration  and  distribution  of  information 
documents  and  the  reception  of  foreign  delegations  interested  in  learning  about  the 
Mexican  electoral  system  were  widely  accepted.  In  recent  times,  the  IFE’s  active 
participation in a wide range of technical and cooperation assistance to other countries, 
has  contributed  to  the  popularity  of  the  electoral  authority  not  only  as  an  electoral 
commission but also as an electoral consultant body. However, the real impact of IFE’s 
campaign of Civic Education is difficult to measure. Apart from the surveys on political 
culture carried out by the IFE in 1999 and 2001, there is no form for evaluating the 
immediate effect of the different aspects of civic education. This is because the political 
culture is influenced by many different factors including the media, the behaviour of the 
parties and the government. 
Overall,  according  to  the  IFE  and  external  academic  sources  the  civic  campaigns 
developed by IFE, did increase the knowledge and awareness of certain civic education 
issues in the target groups for both children and adults, but, they had a lower impact on 
creating  values  and  developing  civic  abilities.  However,  programmes  such  as  the 
Citizen Project, which focused on the developing of civic skills and the Workshop for 
Citizen Education, had greater impact. The impact was related to internal problems of 
the programmes, in particular to their methods and concepts, and operative and logistic 
problems. Another concern regarding the role of IFE, was the fact that for many sectors 
its responsibilities were still not really clear. In addition, the relationship between local 
education activities and the IFE was still weak and it was struggling to sign agreements 
on  collaboration.
144  Finally,  the  increasing  importance  that  had  been  given  to  the 
activities of IFE in the area of Civic Education did not result in an increase in financial 
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and human resources. As a result, the  IFE found great difficulty in carrying out its 
projects.  Given  the  infrastructure  of  the  IFE,  it  was  impossible  to  cover  all  the 
population in the application of the civic education programmes. For that reason, some 
of the programmes that required systematisation and permanency in their application 
did not produce the anticipated results.  
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Overall conclusion 
Between 1977 and 2000 Mexico experienced a transition from an authoritarian regime 
with a hegemonic party to a multi-party regime with competitive, fair and transparent 
elections.  This  process  of  political  change  has  been  interpreted  in  different  ways 
depending on the approach by which it is analysed. The first chapter of this study gave 
an  account  of  some  of  the  most  well  known  explanations  of  the  Mexican  political 
change given by scholars who still continue to discuss the subject. However, evidence 
gathered in this study suggests that, despite the different views, it is widely accepted 
today that there was indeed a transition to democracy and this transition was of electoral 
nature. The political change started in the political arena but expanded to other areas of 
political life. The regime went from being a one party to a multi-party regime. The 
government branches, legislative and judiciary, which were dominated by the executive, 
became totally independent from each other and started functioning. At a local level, 
state and municipal government, that had been subordinate to the presidency in the past, 
became active institutions contributing to a more active federalism.  
My interpretation of Mexican political change, shared by others, is that the Mexico 
transition  was  a  gradual  and  long  process  of  political  change  that  concentrated 
exclusively on electoral issues, leaving for later other political agreements that modified 
the  remaining  political  institutions.  This  political  change  was  based  on  interaction 
between the electoral and political party systems that allowed them both to increase in 
strength.  In  my  view  the  introduction  of  Proportional  Representation  in  Congress, 
during the 1977 electoral reform, was the key to the political change as it opened the 
door  to  political  representation  for  the  opposition  allowing  interaction  between  the 
electoral and party systems. The reform was an essential step to regulate the existence 
of political parties and elections that became more and more competitive. After this 
reform, every modification to the electoral institution and its procedures contributed to 
strengthening the opposition parties, which in turn encouraged them to push for further 
reforms  to  create  more  sophisticated  methods  and  institutions  to  regulate  their  own 
competence, until all participating actors accepted “the rules of the game.
1”  
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Evidence gathered in this study, confirms the double significance of electoral reforms in 
the process of political change in Mexico. On the one hand, the first significant reform 
in  1977  was  a  liberalising  measure  used  by  the  ruling  PRI-government  to  recover 
electoral legitimacy and ease the pressure for change, which proved to be an effect of a 
process of political and social change that had originated in the previous decade. While 
on  the  other  hand,  the  outcomes  of  the  1977  electoral  reform  led  to  a  slow  but 
irreversible  continuous  process  of  political  change  including  electoral  reforms, 
strengthening of parties, and phenomenon of alternation at local level, that intensified in 
the 1990s. If the 1977 electoral reform was an essential step in initiating the process of 
change, the political crisis that emerged from the highly contested 1988 presidential 
elections greatly accelerated it.  
As chapter three of this thesis outlines, it was the first time that the official party was 
challenged by an opposition party at presidential level. The contender was the Party of 
the Democratic Revolution (PRD), that emerged at the end of the 1980’s as a result of a 
PRI split. The controversy over the official electoral reform results showed, more than 
ever before, that the existing electoral rules and institutions could not respond to the 
new political plurality. The newly elected president, Salinas responded to the political 
crisis with a new electoral reform promising to clean the electoral processes. This first 
reform  initiated  by  Salinas,  seems  to  have  been  an  extreme  measure  not  only  to 
legitimise the regime but more importantly to avoid major civil unrest that could have 
led to civil war. As shown in chapter four, it appears that neither Salinas nor the PRI of 
that period knew the potential consequences of this first reform. This study suggests that 
despite the president announcing the dismantlement of the hegemonic party system and 
promising major electoral reform, it was not understood that this would accelerate the 
transition to democracy.  
The  first  reform  negotiated  between  the  PRI  and  the  PAN  in  1990,  established  the 
ground for future negotiations between the parties and government. Four major electoral 
reforms  took  place  in  less  than  seven  years.  In  each  of  the  four  reforms  between 
political parties and the government the nature of electoral institutions and rules became 
the  centre  of  negotiations.    This  development  makes  the  Mexican  case  historically 
unique, as the ruling government and official party and the opposition managed to agree 
and implement four major electoral reforms in less than ten years that set the electoral 
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elections  but  more  importantly  contributed  to  the  defeat  of  the  hegemonic  party  in 
democratic elections.  
Consequently, the successive electoral reforms mostly initiated by the government or 
dominated by the PRI views, had a snowball effect that none could have predicted. 
There  was  an  uncontrollable  and  unexpected  expansion  of  the  consequences  of  the 
electoral reforms. For instance, comparison between the agenda of the 1977 electoral 
reform and the 1996 reform provides evidence of how the electoral reform expanded. 
Just five points were discussed in the agenda of the 1977 reform, while forty-five points 
were discussed in 1996.  
Finally, another significant aspect highlighted in this study is the fact that the electoral 
character of the transition is what created the problem for its consolidation. The current 
debate in Mexico is the quality of the democracy. This suggests that political change 
through electoral pacts is not enough to ensure its consolidation. In the case of Mexico, 
electoral reform allowed a change of government, but neither the political class nor the 
political  forms  of  relationship  changed.    As  a  result,  authoritarian  and  democratic 
political practices co-exist. The contradictions resulting in the electoral character of the 
democracy are highlighted in Chapter eight of the study. 
The  second  question  posed  in  the  study  relates  to  the  role  of  the  Federal  Electoral 
Institute in the transition to democracy in Mexico. This question is analysed in Chapter 
four of the study. The creation of the Federal Electoral Institute in 1990, as the body in 
charge  of  organising  and  supervising  elections,  was  the  result  of  a  political  crisis 
generated by the 1988 presidential elections. In fact, it was the lack of credibility of the 
institutions in charge of organising the electoral processes, experienced during the 1988 
presidential elections, that led to the creation of a brand new electoral code (COFIPE) 
and electoral institutions.  
This research has shown that the role of the Federal Electoral Institute in the transition 
has to be considered on two dimensions.  
First of all, IFE was created as a result of relatively severe political conflict at the time 
of its creation, but later became the generator of change itself. IFE became the “vehicle” 
through which conflicts, disputes and political energies between political parties and the 
government were channelled. Even though the IFE was created with the constitutional 
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electoral  reform  that  such  characteristics  were  applied.  As  a  result,  the  IFE  played 
different parts in the process of democratisation depending on how independent it was 
from the government.  
In the period between 1990-1994, the overwhelming presence of the government in the 
institution provoked mistrust of the institution, particularly by the PRD. During this 
time most of the criticism was related to the presence of the Minister of Government in 
the major decision making body of the institution, the Electoral Council, and the control 
of the majority of votes by the PRI.  
The second stage of IFE began in 1994, with the introduction of the figure of “citizen 
electoral councillors”, and lasted until 1996. This injection of independence to the IFE 
was the result of a political crisis generated by events such as the Zapatista rebellion in 
Chiapas  and  high  class  political  assassinations.  As  chapter  three  indicates,  the 
negotiations of the final electoral reform between 1994 and 1996 were long and arduous 
and  the  political  parties  abandoned  the  negotiation  table  several  times.  During  this 
period the  IFE became an active element in the negotiation of electoral reforms, in 
particular  the  efforts  of  the  “citizens  councillors”  in  calling  for  and  ensuring 
negotiations between the political parties.  
It was at this time that the IFE became the “vehicle” through which political energies 
were  channelled.  With  the  approval  of  a  new  reform  in  1996,  which  gave  total 
independence and impartiality to the electoral institution, the IFE began a new era that 
lasted between 1996 and 2003. It has been established that the IFE played an essential 
role  in  the  1997  midterm  elections  and  the  2000  presidential  elections  which 
experienced an alternation in power for the first time. The alternation was not due to the 
IFE, but because the electoral results were accepted without resistance from the PRI and 
without conflict. It seems that the alternation in power, first in the capital FD in 1997 
and then in the 2000 presidential elections, was an essential factor for the IFE to gain 
the recognition of both parties and the general public.  
However, the analysis in this study shows the achievement of a transparent and peaceful 
alternation was not only a result of IFE but also a result of an Electoral Tribunal (TEPJ). 
Chapter four analyses the evolution and role of the electoral tribunal as the arbitrator in 
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In order to assess the credibility of the electoral authority it is necessary to distinguish 
the two levels of IFE: its political dimension (represented by the General Council) and 
its technical operative dimension (formed by the professional electoral service).  
On the one hand, the political dimension of IFE as a mediator in the electoral game 
remained open to challenge. The consensus achieved between the political parties in 
selecting  the  members  of  the  General  Council  of  IFE  in  1996  was  perceived  as  a 
political pact that turned IFE into a guarantor of democratic elections.
2   
However, in more recent times, the lack of agreement in 2003 between political parties 
in achieving consensus to select the members of the General Council of IFE, led to the 
break up of this pact, affecting the credibility and impartiality of the institution. The 
findings of my research suggest that the operative and administrative functions of IFE 
have been successful and the institution has credibility and trust. Regarding the question 
of whether its roles expanded beyond original expectations, this study found that the 
impartiality of the IFE in 1996 was a loss to the PRI. As the PRI was accustomed to 
having control over the electoral organs, when it was forced to accept the impartiality of 
the  electoral  body,  it  was  perceived  as  a  defeat.  However,  in  order  to  make  this 
statement it is important to consider the nature of the official party and the type of 
political regime in place. As indicated in chapter two of this study, the official party was 
never a homogenous organisation despite the internal discipline. In other words, it was a 
sea of different interests.  
In this way there is a clear difference between the PRI of Salinas (1988-1994) and the 
PRI of Zedillo (1994-2000). This study suggests that despite resistance within the party, 
Zedillo  pledged  for  the  impartiality  of  the  IFE,  therefore  the  independence  of  the 
electoral institution in 1996 was perceived as a personal success. The main areas of 
activity of the IFE have been analysed in chapters five, six, seven and eight of this 
study. The study shows that the IFE in its first stage between 1991-1994 concentrated 
mainly in resolving the specific problem of the organisation of electoral processes.  
In this first area, the elaboration of a new electoral roll and issue of photo-credentials 
and the developing of a new process of vote counting became the major issues to be 
addressed. Perhaps IFE’s most important task was the elaboration of a new electoral roll 
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using a new census technique that ensured its objectivity. Another important step taken 
in this area, was the creation of the SPE (Electoral Professional Service) which started 
operating in 1994, not only because it ensured the professional organisation of elections, 
but also because it was the first and unique body of civil servants who were regularly 
assessed and evaluated.  
Another element to be highlighted in this area is the elaboration of the Programme of 
Preliminary Electoral Results (PREP), which ensured the delivery of electoral tendency 
just a few hours after elections were completed.  
Once the IFE finished resolving problems related to the organisation of elections, it 
started  focusing  on  other  issues  such  as  the  regulation  of  party  finances  and  media 
access. Chapter six and seven of the thesis analyse IFE’s role in the legislation and 
measures taken in the area of party finances and access to the media. The study shows 
that the issue of party finances and media access only became relevant once earlier 
issues related to the organisation of elections were solved, in the period between 1994-
1996.  It  was  the  increasing  competition  of  the  opposition  that  made  the  opposition 
parties push for reforms in this area. It seems that the more competitive political parties 
became, the more important the issue of party funding and media access also became. In 
relation to the role of the electoral authority in this area, my research shows that it 
contributed to the discussion on party funding and media access and monitoring among 
political parties. Maybe the most important role was the monitoring of party finances 
and the media. 
In this area the IFE is in charge of reviewing the expenditure and income of the parties 
and political groups, including private donations to the parties. This fiscal aspect of the 
institution differs from others in the world, as it made it accountable for party finances 
which are under public scrutiny. For instance, the IFE published on the Internet the 
names of all private donors to the parties and also the final reports on the income and 
expenditure  of  the  parties,  including  the  sanctions  applied  for  mismanagement  of 
funding  or  errors  in  their  accounting.  These  publications  had  a  positive  effect  on 
reducing corruption as the consequences of not complying were severe. There were 
outstanding issues to be resolved in this area, including a reinforcement of the fiscal role 
of the IFE, the fiscal control of the resources used by the pre-candidates during internal 
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Finally, Chapter 8 examines the role of the IFE in the area of civic education. This is 
related to the fact that political changes took place in the electoral arena. Here the IFE 
encountered a major challenge, as creating and promoting a democratic political culture 
is a very difficult task to carry out, especially in a country where the political culture has 
both authoritarian and democratic characteristics. However, the programmes promoting 
civic education for children and adults including campaigns for voting are regarded as a 
major role of the IFE today.  
Finally another aspect to be highlighted is its participation in a wide range of technical 
and cooperation assistance to other countries.  
Today,  IFE  is  an  electoral  institution  characterised  by  its  complexity.    The  lack  of 
credibility of the electoral process made political parties push for the introduction of 
complete transparency of its activities at all levels of the organisation. For instance, 
parties were allowed to supervise all the steps taken in the organisation of elections, 
including  the  elaboration  of  electoral  roll,  nominal  lists,  the  selection  of  poll  booth 
officials and their training, the design and production of the electoral materials etc. As a 
result, the increased transparency required by the organisations of the electoral process 
contributed to IFE’s credibility. The reforms were demanded by the parties and were 
created on an ad hoc basis in response to specific problems as they emerged at the time.  
Overall,  the  IFE  today  is  an  organisation  that  is  more  than  simply  an  electoral 
commission  that  organises  and  supervises  elections.  The  IFE  acts  as  a  promoter  of 
democratic values and practices while also being an audit agency for parties and it also 
investigates areas of possible electoral crime.  
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Appendix A 
With the objective of examining the different views of the political elites on the role of 
electoral reforms and the electoral commission (IFE) in the transition to democracy in 
Mexico,  qualitative  data  was  collected  in  the  form  of  semi-structured  interviews 
between September and mid November 2004. The purpose of interviewing participants 
from  political  parties  and  the  Mexican  government,  who  had  been  involved  in  the 
negotiation of the various electoral reforms between 1988 and 1996 was to obtain an 
indepth analysis of the different attitudes and expectations of electoral reform and the 
methods  of  negotiation  that  were  utilised  in  the  process.  In  addition,  these  semi-
structured  interviews  were  also  intended  to  examine  participants’  evaluation  of  the 
subsequent  development  of  electoral  reforms  and  IFE,  in  the  context  of  their 
expectations. Furthermore, in order to carry out an indepth analysis of the functions of 
IFE  and  its  evolution,  qualitative  data  was  collected  in  the  form  of  semi-structured 
interviews with present and former members of the IFE. This data was complemented 
by less structured interviews with members of NGO’s and pressure groups who had an 
active role during the negotiation through their pro-democratic protests for electoral 
cleansing and competitive elections. 
A total of 19 respondents were interviewed in depth, with a maximum of two hours per 
interview  and  an  approximately  total  interviewing  time  of  forty  three  hours.  Some 
respondents were interviewed more than once.The sample was constructed as follows: 
eleven members of IFE, two members of PRI, two members of PAN, two members of 
PRD and two members of Civic Alliance.  Two models of semi-structured interviews of 
members  of  political  parties  and  former  members  of  the  government  are  appended.  
Other  methodological  approaches  were  used  as  a  supplement  to  the  interviews, 
including analysis of law and official documents, party proposals over electoral reform, 
data  collected  in  open  debates,  party  literature,  news  papers,  political  journals, 
periodicals  and  secondary  sources.  Those  interviewed  were  useful  in  being  able  to 
recommend relevant documents.  
 
A.1. Selection of research methodology: semi-structured interview  
As one of the purposes of this study was to collect information about the attitudes and 
expectations of those who participated in the negotiation towards electoral reform and Lidia Acosta                                                                                                                              Appendix A 
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the negotiation process, in other words, the decision-makers and the decision-making 
process,  the  most  appropriate  research  technique  to  use  was  that  known  as  elite 
interviewing. According to Burnham this type of research technique is characterised by 
the target group examined, being an elite, and the use of semi-structured interviewing.
1 
This type of semi-structured interview was useful as it was flexible and allowed for 
follow up questions to be asked, that could provide valuable information and further 
discussion of the topic. Fully structured interviews were not used due to the fact that 
open ended questions have greater potential for eliciting wider information.  As the 
respondents interviewed were mainly members of the Mexican political elite who had 
taken part in the decision-making process, it was important to maximise the benefit of 
their experiences and knowledge. Open questions allowed them to expand their answers 
and add information that had not previously been considered and thus open new lines in 
the research. Ideally, this study would have benefitted from a questionnaire given to a 
wider sample of the public in order to examine their views on the impact of the electoral 
reform  and  the  role  of  IFE  in  the  transition  to  democracy.  However,  this  was  not 
feasible due to the author’s limited financial  resources and time.  
 
A.2. Selection of the samples 
I will now explain how I decided on who I would see, how I got access and arranged 
interviews, how I conducted the interviews and how I analysed the results. The first 
sample was based on current members of political parties who had participated in the 
negotiations  of  electoral  reform.  First  of  all,  prior  to  contacting  the  potential 
respondents, I read secondary sources and visited websites in order to identify relevant 
members  of  the  political  parties  and  the  government.  Information  gathered  through 
these sources was complemented by assistance from my supervisor of studies who, as 
an  expert  in  Mexican  politics,  already  knew  some  relevant  people  who  could  be 
accessed  in  order  to  begin  the  field  work.  Thereafter,  I  decided  to  use  a  technique 
known as “snowball” or “referral” sampling. Burnham notes that this technique consists 
“of starting out with a few key informants and then asking them to name other key 
individuals relevant to the study”.
2 This technique is useful for various  reasons. First of 
                                                 
1 Burnham, P, Gilland, K, Grant, W & Layton-Henry, Z. Research methods in politics. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004, p. 205 
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all, it is important to note that despite the Mexican political community being expanded 
beyond  the  former  official  party,  PRI,  access  to  political  party  members  of  high 
hierarchy is still difficult for members outside the political elite. Secondly, as political 
instability still prevailed and the new correlation of forces were still defining positions 
some members of the political community seemed to be suspicious or at least cautious 
about the intentions of foreign researchers and journalists. Therefore, the author realised 
that a more personalised and direct approach was needed in order to obtain an interview. 
After  scheduling  a  few  appointments  with  initial  contacts  a  process  of  networking 
began.  The  referral  method  proved  to  be  quite  successful  to  begin  with  as  most 
responded positively to the contact.  Planning initial meetings became crucial for the 
author, as it allowed for the preparation of the interview in terms of the design of the 
semi-structured interview, preparation of a tape-recorder and planning of the journey in 
Mexico. In addition to this technique to contact key actors, other potential interviewees 
were  contacted  by  email  and  then  by  telephone.  The  latter  technique  was  more 
successful  with  members  of  the  electoral  commission,  IFE  and  with  academic  and 
political analysts as they seemed to be either less busy or more interested in the topic, 
than members of political parties. On a few occasions meetings with party members 
were  postponed  and  even  cancelled.  However,  one  of  the  interviews  cancelled  was 
carried  out  by  phone  after  the  author  left  Mexico.    Despite  the  problems  with 
cancellation, most of the respondents interviewed were generous with their time once 
they agreed to the interview. The average time of each interview was between one and a 
half  and  two  hours.  Prior  to  each  meeting,  the  author  designed  a  semi-structured 
interview targeted to the specific person to be interviewed. Due to the limitations in 
time it was important to ensure that the questions asked were well informed and could 
not  be  found  in  other  published  sources.  All  the  semi-structured  interviews  were 
conducted in the workplace of the interviewees, ranging from government offices to 
universities. Only one interview took place in a café and one was done on the telephone. 
All the interviews were based on a one to one meeting and were recorded using a tape 
recorder. Back up notes were also taken. All interviewees were asked at the beginning 
of the meeting for their permission to use the tape recorder. All respondents agreed to be 
recorded and seemed to feel comfortable with the recording. Although it may be said, 
that more cautious and less direct answers from certain members of political parties Lidia Acosta                                                                                                                              Appendix A 
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were due to them being recorded. After completing the semi-structured interview and 
the ensuing discussion, the author transcribed the content in order to analyse it.  
 
A.3 The composition of the sample 
The socio-economic characteristics of the interviewees are the following. The members 
of the political parties were male. This was expected in view of the traditionally male 
dominated Mexican society, where the decision-making process is generally left to men. 
However, the sample of IFE’s former and current employees was more balanced, as 
many women have already attained important positions in the commission.  
 
A.4 The semi-structured interviews 
The semi-structured interviews elaborated for the different types of respondent followed 
a flexible format depending on the person to be interviewed, the role in the negotiation 
and their knowledge of the topic. As a result, the semi-structured interviews did not 
follow a common plan and were adapted according to the circumstances. Respondents 
(members of political parties and the former government) were asked 32 questions on 
their  attitudes  and  expectations  of  electoral  reform  and  the  creation  of  IFE.  Semi-
structured interviews were also designed for the members of IFE. The design of the 
interviews was discussed with the supervisor of studies. Full copies of the various semi-
structured interviews are attached at the end.  
Despite there being a basic design, it is important to note that some of the questions 
were  re-designed  as  the  research  progressed,  taking  account  of  new  themes  that 
emerged. Also, adjustments were made between interviews, following an initial review 
of the information gathered in interviews. This was in keeping with Burnhman’s view 
that it is important that the research design is flexible while still being informed by an 
over-arching theoretical framework and a central research question.
3 
 
The format of the semi-structured interviews for members of political parties and the 
government was based on a list of topics. 
The semi-structured interview of members of political parties and political analysts was 
divided  into  three  sections:  1)  their  general  attitudes  towards,  and  expectations  of 
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electoral reform, 2) their methods of negotiation with each other, 3) their views and 
expectations of the 1989-90 reform and the creation and evolution of IFE, 4) the role of 
IFE  during  the  various  electoral  reforms  and  electoral  processes  between  1988  and 
1996. 5) the main areas of activity of IFE. 
The semi-structured interviews with present and former members of the IFE to discuss 
its  functioning  and  evolution  shared  some  of  the  questions  posed  to  members  of 
political parties, and some more specific questions related to their area of speciality 
within the IFE. 
The questions included in the semi-structured interviews were broad and general as it 
was quite important to allow respondents to open new topics and provide information 
that previously had not been considered and could be relevant to the study. Despite most 
of the respondents answering the specific questions and expanding on them, some tried 
to avoid answering specific questions and to change the topic. In these circumstances, 
the author attempted to frame the questions in a different way.  
 
Before embarking on the interview, the author provided an explanation of the context of 
the research and what was hoped to be gained from the interview, in an attempt to create 
a good rapport with the respondent. The first topic to be discussed related to the attitude 
of their party towards electoral reform after the controversial elections in 1988. The first 
question (hereafter “Q.1” etc.) addressed the general attitudes towards and expectations 
of electoral reform after the 1988 presidential elections and the new presidency with 
Carlos Salinas in power, in order to assess the extent to which electoral reform was part 
of the agenda of the party or whether it was more an improvised response to a political 
crisis.  In the case of the former governing party, PRI, it was important to understand its 
role  and  to  gain  an  understanding  of  its  motives  for  initiating  the  reform.  For  the 
opposition  parties,  this  question  was  also  crucial  as  they  came  to  the  debate  over 
electoral reform with different hopes and expectations. It was interesting to compare the 
expectations of the opposition parties to the reform. The right wing PAN, had launched 
a  campaign  against  electoral  fraud  and  the  need  for  electoral  reform  in  the  1980s, 
therefore it was important to assess its attitudes to the PRI’s proposal for reform. The 
leftist opposition, the FDN/PRD had come to the debate with similar complaints about 
the prevalence of corruption but evolved a different set of demands on the process of 
electoral reform. This topic sought to achieve an awareness of how the electoral reform Lidia Acosta                                                                                                                              Appendix A 
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related to the political context. Q.2. and Q.3. related to the motivation of the parties to 
negotiate  on  electoral  reform.  These  question  sought  to  establish  why  at  that  time 
electoral reform became a major feature of political debate and legislation. Q.4. asked 
who  decided  to  negotiate  inside  the  party  and  whether  Salinas’  decision  to  pursue 
electoral  reform  was  a  common  and  joint  decision  of  the  PRI  elite  or  was  a  more 
personal resolution.  
 
The second topic related to the methods of negotiation adopted by the various parties in 
respect  of  legislation.  Q.5.  asked  about  the  methods  of  negotiation  between  the 
government and the parties. This question intended to establish whether the parties had 
different approaches towards the other parties when establishing lines of negotiation. 
Q.6. and Q.7. related to whether there were different tendencies within the party on the 
issue of electoral reform. In the interview of PRI’s members, this question attempted to 
establish  the  extent  to  which  several  tendencies,  which  had  emerged  in  the  1980’s 
ranging from the metropolitan reform-minded modernisers to the mainly rural based 
were still divided over the issue of electoral reform and if they had concerns about the 
implications of the reform. Q.8., Q.8.1. and Q.8.2 related to the different approaches 
that the PRI-government adopted during the negotiations. These questions tried to find 
out whether the PRI-government was intentionally more willing to negotiate with the 
PAN while isolating the PRD. The same questions were posed to the other opposition 
parties, PAN and PRD. To PAN and PRD, the question Q.8, Q.8.1. and Q.8.2 related to 
the  reasons  for  negotiating  or  not  with  the  PRI-government.  These  questions  were 
intended  to  see  the  differences  in  the  main  opposition  parties’  attitudes  toward  the 
outcome of electoral reform. 
The third topic related to the 1989 electoral reform and the creation and evolution of the 
electoral commission, the IFE.  Q.9. related to the expectations of the parties after the 
1989-90 new electoral reform was finally approved by the PRI and PAN. Q.10 asked 
whether the outcome of the reform responded to their initial hopes in the reform. Q.11 
asked their expectations of the role of the newly created electoral commission in the 
long term. For the PRI, this question was crucial, as it was interesting to see the extent 
to  which  the  future  evolution  of  IFE  was  expected  or  not  by  its  creators.  For  the 
opposition,  this  question  sought  to  establish  whether  they  perceived  the  electoral Lidia Acosta                                                                                                                              Appendix A 
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commission as a potential opportunity for their electoral competence in the future or 
whether it just represented another governmental agency. Q.12. asked for their opinion 
on the initial role adopted by the IFE and its first works after being created. Q.13 asked 
for their views on the input of the government in the IFE. Q.14 asked what specific 
interests and requirements of the government and the parties were represented in the 
IFE. Q.15 related to the independency of the IFE and was asked in order to establish 
what caused the independency of the electoral commission and whether this outcome 
was expected or not. Q.16. asked about their views on the evolution of the electoral 
commission through the reforms. Q.17 related to what the main changes in the IFE were 
and how controlled they were. Q.18 asked whether the IFE adopted more powers than 
those established by legislation in order to see how the parties perceived the evolution of 
IFE. Q. 19 related to the relationship between parties and the IFE. In the case of the PRI 
it was interesting to see whether there were any divisions or disagreements between the 
PRI’s elite and the IFE general council. Q.20 asked their opinion of their parties in the 
transformation of the IFE. Q.21 asked a general question about the contribution of the 
IFE in the transition to democracy. This was in order to see how they viewed the role of 
the IFE in the wider context of political change and to establish the real contribution of 
the institution. 
The fourth topic related to the role of IFE during the successive electoral reforms and 
the electoral processes between 1991 and 1996. Q. 22 asked about their opinion on the 
functioning of IFE immediately after it was created, especially during the 1991 mid-
term elections where the institution was first tested. Q.23 related to how they perceived 
the  role  of  IFE  in  the  subsequent  electoral  reforms  in  1993,  1994  and  1996.  This 
question was to find out whether IFE had an active role in creating consensus among the 
participants  or  whether  its  role  was  less  prominent.  This  question  allowed  for 
subsequent questions related to the socio-economic aspects that surrounded the reforms 
at this time, such as the local post-electoral conflicts, the Chiapas’ uprising and the 
economic crisis. In this context, the parties expressed their opinion on the impact of the 
various socio-economic and political crises on the electoral reforms and in the IFE itself. 
Q.24 asked about the role of the IFE in the 1994 and 2000 elections and Q.25 asked for 
their description of the contribution of IFE in the alternation of power in 2000, where 
the opposition party, PAN won the presidential elections for the first time in 70 years. Lidia Acosta                                                                                                                              Appendix A 
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Q.26 asked about their confidence in the work of IFE in the case of close elections. Q.27 
related to electoral changes in more recent elections. Q.28, Q.29 and Q.30. related to 
possibilities for improvements of the IFE and its current role. 
The fifth topic was related to the main areas of activity of IFE: the management of the 
electoral  process,  the  financing  of  political  parties,  including  the  development  of 
formulas for the allocation of funds, the regulation of broadcasting time on radio and 
TV, and the efforts made to improve participation rates, including political and civic 
education for adults and children. The questions posed in relation to the functions of IFE 
depended on the knowledge and experience of the person interviewed. Consequently, 
the author did not follow a structure or semi-structured format for this topic, but asked 
specific questions related to each of the areas. However three last general questions 
were  asked.  Q.31  was  related  to  the  extent  to  which  the  emergence  of  a  more 
independent media in the 1990s made electoral fraud a constant issue of discussion 
amongst political parties. Q. 32 related to the impact of early reforms on party financing 
in future demands made in respect of the limits on campaign spending and more equal 
distribution of resources to political parties. Finally, Q.32 asked about their opinion of 
the IFE’s efforts in increasing the participation rate in elections.  
The  format  of  the  semi-structured  interview  for  members  of  the  IFE  was  a  list  of 
questions related to the creation of IFE, the negotiations between political parties and 
their views about the institution. Some of the question coincided with the ones asked of 
members  of  political  parties  but  others  were  more  specific.  The  full  interview  is 
appended at the end.  
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An English version of the original Spanish basic structure of the interviews is given 
below:   
THE ROLE OF THE IFE IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: 
Government members and PRI members 
After the Federal elections in 1988, the revision of electoral law became a pending issue 
and a new electoral reform started. 
First topic: Attitudes towards electoral reform 
1)  As the party in government, what were the attitudes towards the electoral reform? 
2)  Why did your party decide to initiate an electoral reform? 
3)  What was the main motivation for the PRI, as the governing party to propose a 
major electoral reform?  
4)  Who decided to negotiate inside the party? How important was the input of Salinas 
in such a decision? 
Second topic: Methods of negotiation  
5)  How would you describe the methods of negotiation of the government with each 
other over legislation?  
6)  What were the different tendencies within the party on the issue of electoral reform? 
7)  Were there elements within the party who had any reservations over the possible 
implications of the reforms? 
8)  Do you think that the PRI was more prone to negotiate with the PAN than with the 
PRD?  
8.1)     For the PRI only: Did you receive any invitations from the PRD to negotiate over 
electoral reforms? 
8.2.)     Did you receive any pressure from the opposition in specific matters? 
8.3.)     Why did the parties, especially the PRD and PAN abandon the negotiation table 
several times? 
Third topic: The IFE 
Once in 1990, the new electoral law COFIPE was approved and the new electoral 
commission (IFE) established. 
9)  What were the expectations over the new reform? 
10)  Did the results of the electoral reform match your expectations? 
11)  What were the views of the party on the potential role of the new electoral 
commission in the long term? Lidia Acosta                                                                                                                              Appendix A 
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12)  What is your opinion of the role adopted by the IFE when it was first created? 
What functions were expected? 
13)  What is your opinion of the role of the PRI-government in the IFE? 
14)  As the IFE was established through legislation Which PRI’s interests were 
represented in the IFE? 
15)  Was there a key event for the total independence of IFE in 1996? 
16)  What is your opinion on the evolution of the IFE between the first reform in 1989-
90 and the last reform in 1996?  
17)  What has been the most important change in IFE? 
18)  Do you think that IFE adopted more powers than those set by legislation in a more 
creative way? Do you think that IFE accumulated more functions that initially 
expected? Why or why not?  
19)  How would you describe the relationship between your party and the IFE? 
20)  What do you think was the contribution of the PRI-government and political 
parties in the transformation of the electoral authorities in Mexico? 
21)  What was the contribution of IFE to the process of transition from your point of 
view? 
21.1)  How would you describe electoral competition before the creation of IFE and the 
major electoral reforms that cleaned electoral processes? 
 
Fourth topic: the role of the IFE in reforms and electoral processes 
22)  What is your opinion about the functioning of IFE before, during and after the 
mid-term elections in 1991?  
23)  How would you describe the role of IFE during the 1993, 1994 and 1996 reforms? 
24)  And the role of IFE in the 1994 and 2000 elections? 
25)  How would you describe the contribution of IFE in the peaceful alternation in 
power in 2000?  
26)  How confident is your party in the work of IFE in the case of a close difference in 
the polling booths? 
27)  In the 2003 middle-term elections the PAN obtained fewer votes than in 2000 and 
the PRI showed recuperation. Why do you think these changes happened? 
28)  What area of IFE do you think the electoral commission should improve? 
29)  How would describe the role of IFE at present? 
30)  Do you have any suggestions about how to improve the IFE? 
Fifth topic: The areas of activities of the IFE (management of the electoral process, 
the regulation of financing of political parties and media access and the 
programmes to improve participation rates and civic education to adults and 
children.  
31)  Do you think that the emergence of more independent and critical media made the 
issue of electoral fraud a constant source of debate? 
32)  How important were the initial reforms on party financing for future 
demands in respect of limits on campaign spending and more equal 
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33)  How much has the IFE increased the level of participation in voting? 
THE ROLE OF THE IFE IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: 
Members of PAN and PRD. Former opposition. 
After the Federal elections in 1988, the revision of electoral law became a pending issue 
and a new electoral reform started. 
First topic: Attitudes towards electoral reform 
Either The PAN has always emphasised the importance of democratic elections. 
However, after the controversial federal elections in 1988, which were highly contested, 
this demand became more obvious. 
Or The PRD, after the 1988 elections, came to the table with complaints about the 
prevalence of corruption and electoral fraud. 
1)  As a party, then in opposition, what were your attitudes on a new stage of electoral 
reforms? 
2)  Why did the PAN concentrate its demands on electoral reform?  
3)  What was the main motivation for your party to negotiate a major electoral reform 
with the PRI?  
4)  Who inside the party decided to negotiate?  
Second topic: Methods of negotiation  
5)  How would you describe the methods of negotiation with the government and other 
parties relating to the electoral reforms?  
6)  What were the different tendencies within the party on the issue of electoral reform? 
7)  Were there elements within the party who had reservations over the possible 
implications of the reforms? 
8)  Do you think that the PRI was more prone to negotiate with the PAN than with the 
PRD?  
8.1) For the opposition: Did you receive any invitations from the other opposition 
parties to negotiate over electoral reforms? 
8.2.) Why did the parties, especially the PRD and PAN abandon the negotiation table at 
several times? 
8.3) Why did your party (PAN) adopt an active role in negotiating electoral reforms 
with the PRI-government? Or Why did your party (PRD) refuse to negotiate at most of 
the negotiation tables? 
Third topic: The IFE 
Once in 1990, the new electoral law COFIPE was approved and the new electoral 
commission (IFE) established. Lidia Acosta                                                                                                                              Appendix A 
 
366 
9)  What were the expectations of the new reform? 
10)  Did the results of the electoral reform match your expectations? 
11)  What were the views of your party on the potential role of the new electoral 
commission in the long term? 
12)  What is your opinion on the role adopted by the IFE when it was first created? 
What functions were expected? 
13)  What was your opinion in respect of the role of the PRI-government in the IFE? 
14)  What were your demands respecting the institution? 
15)  Was there a key event for the total independence of IFE in 1996? 
16)  What is your opinion on the evolution of the IFE between the first reform in 1989-
90 and the last reform in 1996? 
16.1) With the creation of IFE and its consequent evolution, do you think that the 
PAN/PRD obtained more than it hoped, or less than it expected? 
17)  What has been the most important change in IFE? 
18)  Do you think that IFE adopted more powers that those set by legislation in a more 
creative way? Do you think that IFE accumulated more functions that initially 
expected? Why or why not?  
19)  How would you describe the relationship between your party and the IFE? 
20)  The contribution of the PAN/PRD in the transformation of the electoral authorities 
in Mexico? 
21)  What was the contribution of IFE to the process of transition from your point of 
view?  
21.1) How would you describe electoral competition before the creation of IFE and the 
major electoral reforms that cleaned electoral processes? 
Fourth topic: the role of the IFE in reforms and electoral processes 
22)  What is your opinion about the functioning of IFE before, during and after the 
mid-term elections in 1991?  
23)  How would you describe the role of IFE during the 1993, 1994 and 1996 reforms? 
24)  And the role of IFE in the 1994 and 2000 elections? 
25)  How would you describe the contribution of IFE in the peaceful alternation in 
power in 2000?  
26)  How confident is your party in the work of IFE in the case of a close difference in 
the polling booths? 
27)  In the 2003 middle-term elections the PAN obtained fewer votes than in 2000 and 
the PRI showed recuperation. Why do you think these changes happened? 
28)  What area of IFE do you think that the electoral commission should improve? 
29)  How would describe the role of IFE at present? 
30)  Do you have any suggestions about how to improve the IFE? 
Fifth topic: The areas of activity of the IFE (management of the electoral process, 
the regulation of financing of political parties and media access and the 
programmes to improve participation rates and civic education to adults and 
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26) Do you think that the emergence of more independent and critical media made the 
issue of electoral fraud a constant source of debate? 
27) How important were the initial reforms on party financing for future demands in 
respect of the limits on campaign spending and more equal distribution of resources 
to political parties? 
28) How much has the IFE contributed to increasing the level of participation in voting? 
 
THE ROLE OF THE IFE IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
As a member/former member of the IFE 
1)  Prior to the creation of IFE, how did the three main parties PRI, PAN and PRD 
approach the reforms? 
2)  Can you describe the main conflicts and differences in the parties over electoral 
reform during the negotiations and the creation of the new institution? 
3)  What is your opinion about the different demands of the parties? 
4)  Which of the main parties resisted more? 
5)  Do you think that there was a pact between the PRI and the PAN to negotiate while 
isolating the PRD? 
6)  What led to the creation of the IFE? 
7)  When the IFE was created, what were the expectations in the political and social 
context?  
8)  What is your opinion of the relationship between the IFE and the political parties? 
9)  What kind of reception did the electoral commission receive when it was first 
created?  
10) Has the body acquired extra-legislative powers or has it interpreted its legislative 
powers in new or creative ways? 
11) Do you think that the accumulation of functions was expected by those who 
participated in the negotiations? 
12) Do you know if there was a division between the elite of the PRI and the IFE’s main 
decision-making body during the evolution of the IFE? 
13) Was it  more difficult to advance in the early reforms or the late reforms?  
14) Since the IFE was created what has been was the key factor for the strengthening of 
it? 
15) What was the major change in IFE from the point of the view of the institution? 
16) What was the greatest challenge to IFE? or what were the threats to its credibility?  
17) Did the IFE receive any pressure from a more critical media? 
18) As a member of the electoral commission, what were the attitudes of the staff at the 
beginning and their expectation for the future?  
19) Did you perceive that the new law was more independent, than what you expected?  
20) What is your opinion on the role of IFE in the transition to democracy? 
21) Do you think that the creation of the IFE was part of a process, or was it a key player 
in the transition to democracy?  
22) How did the modification to party financing and media access contribute to more 
competitive elections? 
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Functions of IFE 
23) How important were the creation of a new electoral roll and the issue of photo-
credentials for the electoral processes after the IFE was created? 
24) What are the main aspects of the Electoral Professional Service? 
25) How were they recruited and are there any patterns of experience/education of its 
personnel?  
26) How did the regulation of media access in election campaigns contribute to more 
transparent elections? 
27) Once the financing of party funding and the fiscal control, and access to media 
started, how did they impact on the competition in the electoral processes?  
28) What is the pending reform of IFE? 
29) Do you think that the alternation in power in the presidential election in 2000 would 
have been possible without an independent IFE? 
30) Has the alternation marked the end of the transition? 
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Table 1: Political reforms 1953-1996 
Year of the reform  Presidential Administration  Object of the reform 
1918  Venustiano Carranza  New Electoral Code 
1920  Adolfo de la Huerta  Electoral Code Amendment 
1921  Álvaro Obregón  Constitutional Amendment and Electoral 
Code Amendment 
1927 
1928 
Plutarco Elías Calles  Constitutional Amendments 
Constitutional Amendments 
1931  Pascual Ortiz Rubio  Electoral Code Amendment 
1933  Abelardo Rodríguez  Constitutional Amendment 
1942 
 
1943 
Manuel Ávila Camacho  Constitutional Amendment and Electoral 
Code Amendment 
 Electoral Code Amendment 
1946 
1949 
1951 
Miguel Alemán  New Electoral Code 
 Electoral Code Amendment 
New Electoral Code 
1953 
1954 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines  Constitutional Amendment  
Electoral Code Amendment *Women’s 
vote 
1963  Adolfo López Mateos  Constitutional Amendment and  Electoral 
Code Amendment *Party deputies 
1969  Gustavo Díaz Ordaz  Constitutional Amendment and Electoral 
Code Amendment 
* Right to vote for 18 years old 
1972 
1973 
 
1974 
Luis Echevarría Álvarez  Constitutional Amendments 
Constitutional Amendment and New 
Electoral Code 
Constitutional Amendment 
*right to be elected deputy changed from 
25 to 21 years old, and for senator from 
35 to 30 years old 
1977  José López Portillo  Constitutional Amendment and New 
Electoral Code  
*Integral Electoral System 
1986  Miguel de La Madrid  New Electoral Code 
*Integral Electoral System 
1990  Carlos Salinas  Constitutional Amendment and New 
Electoral Code 
*Integral Electoral System 
1993  Carlos Salinas   Constitutional Amendment and Electoral 
Code Amendment *Integral Electoral 
System 
1994  Carlos Salinas   Constitutional Amendment and Electoral 
Code Amendment “ciudanización of the 
electoral commission” 
1996  Ernesto Zedillo  Constitutional Amendment and New 
Electoral Code 
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PAN     National Action Party 
PRD     Party of the Democratic Revolution 
PRI    Institutional Revolutionary Party 
PNM    Mexican National Party 
PPS    Social Popular Party (former Mexican National Party) 
PARM   Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution 
PVEM   Green Ecologist Party of Mexico 
PT    Workers Party 
PCM    Mexican Communist Party  
PC    Convergencia Party 
PDM    Democratic Party of Mexico 
PFCRN  The Cárdenas Front of the National Reconstruction Party 
DS     Social Democracy 
DF    Federal District (Mexico FD) 
LFOPPE  Federal Electoral of Political Organisation and Electoral Processes 
COFIPE  Federal Electoral Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures 
IFE    Federal Electoral Institute 
SPE    Professional Electoral Service 
RFE    Federal Electoral Registry 
TFE    Federal Electoral Tribunal 
TEPJF   Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Power of the Federation 
NAFTA  North America Fair Trade Agreement 
CNC    National Peasant Confederation 
CTM    Mexican Workers Confederation 
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